Neutral Citation

2026:JHHC:5839-DB

CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) NO. 20 OF 2026 1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 20 of 2026

Prabhu Prasad Sao @ Prabhu Sao @ Prabhu Saw @ Prabhu

Sahu @ Prabhu Prasad Sahu , S/o Brij Mali Sao, R/o

Banari, P.O.- Banari, P.S.- Bhishunpur, Dist.- Gumla.

... Appellant

Versus

Union of India through National Investigating Agency

… Respondent

----

PRESENT

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

----

For the Appellant : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Adv.

For the Resp.-NIA : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Spl. P.P.-NIA

----

Dated : 27/02/2026

1. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the

appellant and Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned Spl. P.P.-NIA.

2. This appeal is directed against the order dated

26-11-2025 passed by the learned Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi,

in Special (NIA) Case No. 03 of 2021 corresponding to

RC-03/2021/NIA/RNC, arising out of Ga ru P.S. Case

No. 32/2017, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for bail of the

appellant has been rejected.

3. The prosecution case in brief is that an information

was received by the Officer -in-Charge of Garu P.S. on

31-08-2017 that during interrogation of Prabhu Sao (appellant),

it had come to light that he was a supporter of Sudhakaran, a

Central Committee Member of CPI(Maoist) and that he had been

purchasing arms, ammunition, explosive materials and other

logistic support to members of CPI(Maoist). The said Prabhu Sao

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had further revealed that Sudhakaran along with Balram Oraon,

Chhotu Kherwar, Ravindra Ganjhu, Mrityunjay ji, Pradeep Singh

and 100-110 other members of CPI (Maoist) were camping in Rud

Forest and were planning a major incident. Consequently,

Prabhu Sao was brought to Ga ru P.S. where his disclosure

statement was recorded. It has been alleged that on 01-09-2017,

a joint Police team proceeded for Rud Forest with Prabhu Sao

and on his pointing out, 13 live rounds of 7.62mm (SLR), Maoist

literature and other items were recovered and Prabhu Sao was

arrested.

Based on the aforesaid allegations, Garu P.S. Case

No. 32/2017 was instituted for the offences under Sections 120B

IPC, Sections 25(1-A), 26 and 35 of the Arms Act, Sections 16,

20 and 23 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and

Section 17 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the Government

of India, Ministry of Home Affairs (CTCR division), New Delhi vide

F. No. 11011/26/2021/NIA dated 12-04-2021 issued an order

under Sub-section 5 of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 directing the National

Investigation Agency to take over the investigation of Garu P.S.

Case no. 32/2017. Accordingly, the National Investigation

Agency re-registered the case as R.C. No. 03/2021/NIA/RNC

under Sections 120B, IPC, Section 25(1-A), 26(2) and 35 of the

Arms Act, Section 16, 20 and 23 of the Unlawful Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1967 and under Section 17 of the Criminal Law

(Amendment) Act, 1908 against 11 named accused persons and

100-110 unknown members of the CPI (Maoist ) and took up

investigation of the case. After investigation, NIA had submitted

a charge sheet on 11-11-2022 under Section 120B, IPC, Sections

25(1-A), 26 and 35 Arms Act, Sections 16, 20 and 23 of the

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and under Section 17

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of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1908 against 14 accused

persons keeping the investigation pending against the other

accused persons.

4. It has been submitted by Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned

counsel for the appellant that the appellant was granted bail on

27-02-2018 in B.A. No. 963/2018 but the appellant did not

furnish bail bond as he was in custody in another case and after

the grant of bail, when the bail bond of the appellant was not

accepted, he had preferred Cr. M.P. No. 2192/204 which,

however, was dismissed vide order dated 12-09-2025. Mr. Sinha

has submitted that the appellant is in custody since 01-09-2017

and till date no witness has been examined by the prosecution.

Though the NIA has given a list of 84 witnesses in the charge

sheet and even if the number of witnesses is curtailed to 51, as

submitted by Mr. Das, the same also, according to Mr. Sinha,

will take a considerable length of time prolonging the

incarceration of the appellant. While referring to Para 7.16 of the

counter affidavit of NIA, Mr. Sinha has submitted that it is

erroneous to state that the defence has adopted dilatory tactics

to delay the trial as the defence had merely exercised their right

to file an application when one of the witnesses was produced for

examination and the trial court can expeditiously dispose of such

application and proceed with the trial. Mr. Sinha , learned

counsel for the appellant has copiously referred to the order

dated 25-06-2024 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 380 of

2024 vide which the present appellant was granted bail taking

into consideration the period of custody undergone by him.

5. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned Special P.P.-NIA has

opposed the prayer for bail made by the appellant and has

submitted that in course of investigation, the various nefarious

activities of the appellant in connection with the proscribed

organization has come to light and granting bail to the appellant

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would amount to giving him a license to tamper with the evidence

and threaten the witnesses. Mr. Das has submitted that there

are a large number of protected witnesses who would become

vulnerable if the appellant is granted bail. Mr. Das, learned

Special P.P.-NIA has referred to the case of Gulfisha Fatima v.

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2026 SCC Online

SC 10. Submission has been advanced that it is on account of

the appellant that the trial has got delayed.

6. Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant in reply

has submitted that after the NIA had taken over investigation,

charge sheet had been filed on 11-11-2022 and the charge has

been framed on 24-09-2025. This would imply that the delay was

caused by the prosecuting agency and not the appellant.

Mr. Sinha has also relied in the case of Gulfisha Fatima v.

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (Supra) and has submitted that

the case of Union of India v. K. A. Naj eeb reported in

(2021) 3 SCC 713 is by a Three Judge Bench which is to ensure

constitutional safeguards, especially when a protracted trial has

led to a long incarceration of an accused. Mr. Sinha has also

relied upon the case of Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of

Investigation reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 3038 and

Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective

sides and have also perused the affidavits on record as well.

8. The appellant has been arrayed as (A-1) in the charge

sheet submitted by the NIA and his role and involvement has

been depicted in para 17.48 which reads as follows:

“17.48 ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT OF ACCUSED

PERSONS:

17.48.1 PRASAD SAO @ PRABHU SAO (A -1): Prabhu

Sao (A-1), is an overground worker and supporter of

CPI (Maoist), a proscribed terrorist organization, since

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1999. Since then, he worked for top Maoist operatives

including Sudhakaran, Nilima, Balram Oraon (A -2),

Chotu Kherwar (A-3), Ravindra Ganjhu (A-4), Niraj

Kherwar (A-5), Mrityunjay Bhuiya (A-6) and Pradeep

Singh Kherwar (A-7) etc. A-1 is a party of the conspiracy

hatched by CPI(Maoist) for terrorist activities and wage

war against the Government of India and knowingly

facilitated the Maoist cadres in preparation to the

commission of terrorist acts. A-1 knowingly concealed

the existence of a design to wage war against the state.

A-1 had supplied arms, ammunition and explosive

materials or their parts, other necessary items such as

items of daily use, ration, blankets, clothes, uniform

and provided logistic support to the cadres of CPI

(Maoist). A-1 acquired, was in possession of and

delivered prohibited ammunition to the operatives of

CPI(Maoist). A- 1 aided the proscribed terrorist

organisation CPI(Maoist) and involved in preparatory

acts to contravention of the laws of land by suppling

prohibited arms, ammuni tion and explosive

substances. At the instance of A-1, police recovered 13

live ammunition, Naxal literature and other items

concealed/dumped at temporary camp of Maoist

cadres in Rud hilly forested area. A-1 collected levies

and extorted money from contractors by putting the

contractors in fear of death at the behest of CPI (Maoist)

and provided the raised funds to the top Maoist

operatives knowing that such funds are likely to be

used by the Maoist cadres to commit terrorist acts. A-1

arranged transportation and also provided

shelter/accommodation/harbour to an active cadre

knowing that the person is a terrorist and a

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sympathizer of CPI (Maoist). He has given support to

CPI (Maoist), a banned terrorist organisation with

intention to further the activity by arranging or

managing meetings of top Maoist operatives with

villagers and contractors for the purpose of support to

the said terrorist organisation. On earlier occasion, in

2007, Ranchi police recovered country made parts of

various weapons viz. SLR, 51mm/2" Mortar and

grenade from godown of a transport company named

Maa Annpurna Transport Pvt Ltd, Rathu Road at the

instance of A-1 when he had come to receive the

consignment at the behest of CPI (Maoist), hence, he

was arrested and a case was registered against him at

PS Sukhdevnagar vide FIR No. 67/07 dated

24.01.2007 U/s 122 of the IPC, sections 25(1-A), 26

and 35 of the Arms Act, and section 17 of the CL(A) Act

and subsequently he was charge-sheeted in the said

case. He was also charge-sheeted in another NIA case

No. RC-14/2017/NIA/DLI dated 31.10.2017 (Arising

out of crime FIR No. 180/2017 dated 31.08.2017 of PS

Chutia, District Ranchi).

Thereby, accused Prabhu Sao @ Prabhu Prasad Sao

(A-1) has committed offence under sections under

sections 121A, 123, 386, 411 and 120B of the IPC,

sections 25 (1-A) and 26 (2) of the Arms Act, 1959 and

sections 17, 18, 19, 23, 39 and 40 of the UA (P) Act,

1967.

Apart from the evidence discussed above, the oral,

documentary and material evidences collected

against the accused and included in Annexure A,

B and C establishes the complicity of Prabhu Sao

@ Prabhu Prasad Sao (A-1) in the instant case.”

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9. The role of the appellant as would transpire that the

appellant had supplied arms, ammunitions and explosive

materials as well as logistical support to the proscribed

organization. It has also been mentioned therein that he had

harbored an active cadre and had also provided transportation

to him which demarcates that he is a sympathizer of the

CPI(Maoist). In 2007, some weapons were recovered from the

godown of a transport company purportedly at the instance of

the appellant.

10. The pre-dominant submission of Mr. Sinha, learned

counsel for the appellant is the period of incarceration of the

appellant and the delay in completion of the trial. The appellant

is in custody since 01-09-2017 and not a single witness has been

examined till date. According to Mr. Das, learned Spl. P.P.-NIA,

the period of incarceration would hardly be of any consequence

considering the gravity of the offence. Mr. Das has relied on the

case of Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

reported in 2026 SCC Online SC 10 wherein, it has been held

as follows:

“27. Accordingly, before turning to the case of each

appellant, it becomes necessary to first address certain

questions of general application. These include the

manner in which pleas founded on delay are to be

assessed in prosecutions under special statutes, the

contours of the statutory restraint embodied in

the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and the

principles governing the formation of prima facie

satisfaction under Section 43D(5) of the Act. This

exercise is intended to provide the legal setting within

which individual roles and allegations are thereafter

examined.

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28. At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify the legal

contours within which the plea of delay operates in

prosecutions under the UAPA. Delay engages Article 21

at two distinct constitutional planes. First, delay may

be of such magnitude and character that continued

detention becomes per se unconstitutional, irrespective

of the strength of the prosecution case. Second, delay

may be pressed as a circumstance to contend that the

statutory satisfaction under Section 43D(5) stands

diluted or displaced. The present case, on an

examination of the record, does not meet either

threshold. The inquiry that follows is therefore confined

to whether the delay alleged is of such a nature as to

constitutionally eclipse the statutory embargo, and not

whether delay exists in the abstract.

32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court

recognised a constitutional safeguard that cannot be

ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as

to render the guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It

was held that where the trial is not likely to commence

or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional

courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail

notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus

operates as a protection against unconscionable

detention and there can be no second opinion on the

said principle.

33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as

laying down a mechanical rule under which the mere

passage of time becomes determinative in every case

arising under a special statute. The jurisprudence of

this Court does not support a construction whereby

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delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by

Parliament to address offences of a special category.

34. The constitutional inquiry into delay is not an

inquiry into guilt. It is an inquiry into whether continued

detention remains constitutionally permissible in the

circumstances of the case. That inquiry is necessarily

contextual. Context includes the nature of the

allegation, the statutory field, the stage of the

proceedings, the realistic trajectory of the trial, the

causes contributing to delay, and the risks attendant

upon release. Delay cannot be detached from these

considerations and treated as a solitary determinant.

35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not

whether Article 21 is superior to Section 43D(5). The

proper question is how Article 21 is to be applied where

Parliament has expressly conditioned the grant of bail

in relation to offences alleged to implicate national

security. The law does not contemplate an either-or

approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured

blending of statutory and constitutional considerations.

What is required is disciplined judicial scrutiny that

gives due regard to both.

38. What assumes significance is that the procedural

history and order sheets do not support the assertion

that the delay is attributable to prosecutorial inaction or

judicial inaction. The common counter affidavit and the

Trial Court's orders record that, at various stages, the

prosecution expressed readiness to proceed, including

readiness to commence arguments on charge, while

objections, requests for deferment, and issues relating

to sequencing of arguments were raised on behalf of the

accused. At the s tage of compliance under

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Section 207 CrPC itself, the Trial Court noted that

despite repeated directions, certain accused declined to

receive copies of the charge-sheet in the manner

directed, insisted on alternate modes of supply, or filed

successive applications, necessitating further

procedural orders and contributing to delay at the pre-

charge stage. These aspects emerge from the record

and are not matters of conjecture.

440. Having regard to the nature of the prosecution and

the period of incarceration already undergone, it is

considered appropriate to direct that the Trial Court

shall proceed with the matter with due expedition and

shall endeavour to ensure that the examination of

witnesses, particularly the protected witnesses relied

upon by the prosecution, is taken up and carried

forward without delay.”

11. In the case of Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb reported

in (2021) 3 SCC 713, it has been held as follows:

“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory

restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does

not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant

bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the

Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a

statute as well as the powers exercisable under

constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised.

Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts

are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against

grant of bail but the rigors of such provisions will melt

down where there is no likelihood of trial being

completed within a reasonable time and the period of

incarceration already undergone has exceeded a

substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an

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approach would safeguard against the possibility of

provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used

as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale

breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.

18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of

the fact that the charges levelled against the

respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal

harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would

have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer.

However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent

by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being

completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to

have been left with no other option except to grant bail.

An attempt has been made to strike a balance between

the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and

establish the charges beyond any doubt and

simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed

under Part III of our Constitution have been well

protected.

19. Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge

the respondent on bail is that Section 43-D(5) of the

UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of

the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS Act where the competent

court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused

is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another

offence while on bail; there is no such precondition

under UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA

merely provides another possible ground for the

competent court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-

settled considerations like gravity of the offence,

possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the

witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by

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absconsion, etc.

Conclusion

20. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined

to interfere with the impugned order. However, we feel

that besides the conditions to be imposed by the trial

court while releasing the respondent, it would serve the

best interest of justice and the society at large to impose

some additional conditions that the respondent shall

mark his presence every week on Monday at 10 a.m. at

the local police station and inform in writing that he is

not involved in any other new crime. The respondent

shall also refrain from participating in any activity

which might enrage communal sentiments. In case the

respondent is found to have violated any of his bail

conditions or attempted to have tampered the evidence,

influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any other

way, then the Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel

his bail forthwith. The appeal is accordingly dismissed

subject to the above stated directions.”

12. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant

has also placed reliance in the case of Gulfisha Fatima v. State

(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in 2026 SCC Online

SC 10, more particularly to the following paragraphs:

“52. The consequence of the above is

that Najeeb (supra) must be understood as a principled

safeguard against unconscionable detention. Prolonged

incarceration is a matter of serious constitutional

concern and carries great weight. It is not, however, the

sole determinant. The Court must consider, in totality,

whether continued detention has become

constitutionally unjustifiable, having regard to the role

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attributed, the statutory context, the limited prima facie

material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes of delay,

and the availability of intermediate remedies.

53. This approach does not dilute Article 21. It gives

Article 21 structured content in a field where the

Constitution itself recognises competing interests. Nor

does it render Section 43D(5) absolute. It recognises

that statutory restraint must yield in an appropriate

case where detention becomes punitive by reason of

unreasonable and unjustified delay. What it excludes

is a mechanical override based on time alone, divorced

from legal context.

61. To read Najeeb (supra) as mandating bail solely on

account of prolonged incarceration, irrespective of the

statutory context or the nature of the allegations, would

be to attribute to the decision a consequence it neither

intended nor supports. Such a construction would also

lead to an interpretive absurdity, whereby a special

statute enacted by Parliament to address offences

implicating the sovereignty, integrity, and security of

the State would stand effectively neutralised by the

mere passage of time, even at a pre-trial stage. Such an

outcome cannot be countenanced in constitutional

adjudication. Accordingly, the finding in Najeeb (supra)

is properly situated as a constitutional safeguard to be

invoked in appropriate cases, and not as a

mathematical formula of universal application.

62. Before parting with the discussion on delay, it is

clarified that the observations herein are confined to the

present stage of the proceedings. The constitutional

concern arising from prolonged custody has been duly

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considered on the basis of the record as it presently

stands. In the event of continued and unexplained

stagnation of the trial, it shall remain open to the

appellants to avail such remedies as are permissible in

law. The Trial Court is expected to accord due priority

to the matter and ensure that the proceedings are

carried forward with reasonable expedition.”

13. In Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb (supra), it has been

held that statutory restrictions imposed by Section 43D(5) of the

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act will not act as a deterrent in

granting bail to an accused when there is no likelihood of the trial

being concluded in the near future and where the concerned

accused has undergone a substantial part of the prescribed

sentence. As has been held in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt.

of NCT of Delhi), the finding in K.A. Najeeb (supra) acts as a

constitutional safeguard to be invoked in appropriate cases and

not as a mathematical formula of universal application.

14. In the background of the judicial pronouncements

referred to above, what speaks out in the present case is of the

long incarceration of the appellant which is since 01-09-2017,

i.e. almost eight and half years, and not a single witness has been

examined by the prosecution though as per Mr. Das, learned Spl.

P.P.-NIA, the list of 84 witnesses as submitted by the NIA has

been pruned down to 51 witnesses, but such pruning down

cannot be concluded to presume that the trial would be

completed anytime soon. It has rightly been pointed out by Mr.

Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant that though charge

sheet has been filed on 11-11-2022, but the charge has been

framed on 24-09-2025 and such delay cannot be fastened upon

the appellant.

15. In view of the nature of allegations levelled against the

appellant, his period of incarceration which is since 01-09-2017

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and that not a single witness has been examined by the

prosecution which furthermore reflects, considering that 51

witnesses are to be examined, that the trial is not likely to be

concluded in the near future, we are inclined to allow this appeal.

Accordingly, the order dated 26-11-2025 passed by the learned

Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi, in Special (NIA) Case No. 03 of 2021

corresponding to RC-03/2021/NIA/RNC, arising out of Garu

P.S. Case No. 32/2017 is hereby set aside and the appellant is

directed to be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of

Rs.10,000/- (Ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount

each to the satisfaction of learned A.J.C. XVI-cum-Special Judge,

N.I.A. Cases, Ranchi, subject to the condition that the appellant

shall remain physically present before the learned trial court on

each and every date till the conclusion of trial.

16. This appeal is allowed.

17. Pending I.A.(s), if any, stands closed.

(RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY, J.)

(PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA , J.)

Dated: 27

th February, 2026.

Preet/-

Uploaded on: 27 /02/2026.