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Reserved on : 27.11.2025

Pronounced on :21.02.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 21

ST

DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.5163 OF 2023

BETWEEN:

PRABHUGOWDA PATIL,

S/O SIDDANAGOWDA PATIL

AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS

RESIDING AT NO.16

MARASANAHALLI TALUKA

INDI, MARASANAHALLI

VIBHUTHALLI INDI,

VIJAYAPURA – 586 217.

... PETITIONER

(BY SRI TEJAS N., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA

BY LOKAYUKTA POLICE

M.S.BUILDING

DR.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI

BENGALURU – 560 001

REPRESENTED BY

SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

BENGALURU – 560 001.

2

2 . SRI SHASHIDHAR G.,

S/O GANGADHAR G.,

AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS

NO.55, NO.1, 2

ND

FLOOR

THIMMAIAH CHAMBERS

1

ST

CROSS, GANDHINAGAR

BENGALURU – 560 009.

... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI VENKATESH S.ARBATTI, ADVOCATE FOR R1;

SRI SURESH S., ADVOCATE FOR R2 )

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF

CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.45/2019 FOR THE

ALLEGED OFFENCES P/U/S 7A OF P.C. ACT REGISTERED BY THE

THEN ACB AND NOW BEING TRANSFERRED TO LOKAYUKTA POL ICE

PURSUANT TO THE COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE RESPONDENT

NO.2 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XXIII ADDL.CITY CIV IL AND

SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU.

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND

RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 27.11.2025, COMING ON FOR

PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWIN G:-

CAV ORDER

The petitioner/accused No.2 in Crime No.45 of 2019 is at the

doors of this Court calling in question registration of a crime against

him for offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short).

CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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2. Heard Sri Tejas N., learned counsel appearing f or the

petitioner, Sri Venkatesh Arbatti, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.1 and Sri Suresh. S, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.2.

3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-

The petitioner is the Sub-Inspector of Police and the 2

nd

respondent is the complainant. Pursuant to a compl aint made by

one Rajendra against the 2

nd

respondent, the petitioner investigated

the said case and filed the final report in respect of offence

punishable under Sections 341, 324, 506 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.

After the said registration of crime, the complainant appears before

the 1

st

respondent/Lokayukta Police alleging that the petitioner had

demanded ₹1,00,000/- for the purpose of filing a ‘B ’ report in

respect of the case registered against him in Crime No.173 of 2019

and that accused No.1, one Ananda is said to have c alled the

complainant over phone and demanded ₹1,00,000/- for the

aforesaid purpose of filing of ‘B’ report, which would be shared by

himself and the petitioner. The complaint further a lleges that

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accused No.2, the present petitioner, was brought b efore the

complainant in his chambers, wherein the complainan t was

informed that after making payment of ₹1,00,000/-, the petitioner

would somehow get the case closed. It is based upon these

allegations, the crime is registered by the then An ti-Corruption

Bureau, the ACB in Crime No.45 of 2019. Registratio n of crime

leads to investigation. At the stage of investigation, the petitioner

approaches this Court in the subject petition.

4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitione r would

vehemently contend that no trap is laid against the petitioner. He

has neither demanded nor accepted any money. The co mplainant’s

allegation itself is against accused No.1. The complaint is registered

only to wreak vengeance against the petitioner for having

registered the crime against the complainant. The learned counsel

would seek to placed reliance upon plethora of judg ments of the

Apex Court and that of this Court to buttress his submission that

there is neither demand nor acceptance in the case at hand.

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5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for t he

complainant would vehemently refute the submission contending

that the petitioner has deliberately registered a crime against the

complainant when the complainant was not even in th e City. It is

alleged that he has indulged in voluntarily restrai ning another

person which led to serious dent on the image of the complainant.

The learned counsel submits that the petitioner had summoned the

complainant to file a ‘B’ report for which he had demanded bribe.

The learned counsel submits that it is a matter of investigation in

the least which should be permitted, as the crime registered is of

the year 2019 and the issue with regard to existence of ACB itself

was in doubt and, therefore, the investigation had not progressed

further despite four years having been passed, prior to filing of the

present petition.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the 1

st

respondent/

Lokayukta would again take this Court through the d ocuments

appended to the petition to demonstrate that the pe titioner had

demanded money and there is a recording with regard to demand

of money. No trap is laid, but there is clear demand. In the light of

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demand being there, the petition must not be entertained. It is for

the petitioner to prove that, he has neither demanded nor accepted

or demanded not accepted, accepted but never demand ed, all

before the concerned Court in a full-blown trial. He would seek

dismissal of the petition.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the su bmissions

made by the respective learned counsel and have per used the

material on record.

8. The afore-narrated facts and link in the chain of events are

all a matter of record. Before embarking upon consideration of the

subject complaint, it is necessary to notice that a crime was

registered in Crime No.173 of 2019 against the comp lainant in

which the Investigating Officer was the present pet itioner. The

investigation is conducted in the crime and charge sheet is filed by

the petitioner for offences punishable under Sections 341, 324, 506

r/w 34 of the IPC. The charge sheet is filed on 13-12-2019. A week

before filing of the charge sheet against the compl ainant, the

complainant registers a complaint before the Lokayukta. Since the

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entire issue in the subject petition has figured from registration of

the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It

reads as follows:

INTHE, GCOUR: 04/12/2019

FOKA BLDS NT2O1Y,OT06'

M.2OJPOI o0.5 ದಳ,

Wo/ ಭವನ, 9EDS,EVDS– ರ&ೆ',

(ೆಂಗಳ)ರು.

ಇಂದ,

ಶ-ಧ/, 0

12. 0UHO:- 0.

ವಯಸು5 : 38 ವಷ%

# S-5,

ನಂ. 1, 2 CEDac5u,

scdtA PEDUmS– 1CED ಅಡ?ರ&ೆ', HOUYK0I,

(ೆಂಗಳ)ರು – 560 009.

@: 9845933390

FOKA9E

,

Aಷಯ : i434v04U‘E’O6A BLDS EಾFೆಯ c4WA’EDwE ಆನಂI, J.zS.ಐ.

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***

8

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11

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wEVIeZ,EVl(ED,EU34 ಈ ಮೂಲಕ bKUsZ,EV6'gcE7DCE.”

Based upon the said complaint there is no trap laid against the

petitioner. He is not caught accepting the bribe. The allegation is,

12

that he had demanded, in the complaint. Nonetheless , crime had

been registered in Crime No.45 of 2019 for offence punishable

under Section 7(a) of the Act. The 1

st

respondent/Lokayukta has

filed its statement of objections. The contention with regard to no

trap being laid and no acceptance of any amount has not been

controverted. Therefore, it is undoubtedly a case where there is a

demand as alleged by the complainant. But, there is no document

or evidence to prove that the petitioner had accepted.

9. It is an admitted fact that in the case at hand no pre-trap

mahazar is drawn, no demand and acceptance is prove d even to its

prima facie sense, there is no recovery of money from the

petitioner and there is no conversation between the complainant

and the petitioner. The petitioner has also placed on record that on

20-11-2019 he was not even in the City of Bengaluru , he was at

Hyderabad. There are 9 cases registered against the complainant

before different police stations, one of which is registered by the

petitioner himself. The facts and contentions being thus, it becomes

necessary to notice the interpretation of Section 7(a) of the Act by

13

the Apex Court, both in the pre-amendment stage and post

amendment stage.

INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT:

10.1. The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v. STATE

OF ANDHRA PRADESH

1

interprets Section 7 of the Act and holds

as follows:

“…. …. ….

7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is

concerned, it is a settled position in law that dem and of

illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said

offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot

constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved

beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused volunt arily

accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above

position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of

this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the

decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 :

(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish

Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 ].”

(Emphasis supplied)

10.2. The Apex Court later, in the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR

v. STATE OF TAMILNADU

2

has held as follows:

1

(2014) 13 SCC 55

2

(2021) 3 SCC 687

14

“…. …. ….

26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery b y

itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution a gainst

the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of

this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish

Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]

and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. S tate of

A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the

aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the

case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to

prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt

that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be

bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and

mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient

to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held

that even the presumption under Section 20 of the A ct can be

drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illeg al

gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial

presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprude nce gets

doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.

27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment

in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC

55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp . 58-

59)

“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is

concerned, it is a settled position in law that dem and

of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the

said offence and mere recovery of currency notes

cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unles s

it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the

accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it t o

be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly

laid down in several judgments of this Court. By wa y

of illustration, reference may be made to the decis ion

in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. Sta te

of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89]

and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CB I,

(2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] .

8. In the present case, the complainant did not

support the prosecution case insofar as demand by th e

15

accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined

any other witness, present at the time when the money was

allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to

prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by

the accused. When the complainant himself had disowne d

what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P -11)

before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove t hat

the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1

and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come

to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of

the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are,

therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well

as the High Court was not correct in holding the dema nd

alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The onl y

other material available is the recovery of the taint ed

currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact

such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere

possession and recovery of the currency notes from

the accused without proof of demand will not bring

home the offence under Section 7. The above also will

be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any

proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt

or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to

obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be

held to be established.

9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be

drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such

presumption can only be in respect of the offence und er

Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)( i)

and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of

acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be

drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratific ation

was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act.

Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if

there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in t he

present case the primary facts on the basis of which the

legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are

wholly absent.”

The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case

of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us

above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of

the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and

acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the app ellant, is

16

not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard t o such

evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a

“possible view” as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N.

Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is

fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction un der the

provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have

to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is

recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption

Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart

from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the

same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by

the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any

definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own

merits, having regard to evidence on record.”

(Emphasis supplied)

10.3. The Apex Court in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v.

STATE OF TELANGANA

3

has held as follows:

“…. …. ….

10. We have given careful consideration to the

submissions. We have perused the depositions of the

prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC

Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of

illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of

demand of bribe by a public servant and its accepta nce by

him is sine qua non for establishing the offence un der

Section 7 of the PC Act.

11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P.

Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SC C 152 :

(2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the well-

settled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC p.

159)

“23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification,

thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and

3

(2022) 4 SCC 574

17

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence ther eof,

unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere

acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal

gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of

demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to br ing

home the charge under these two sections of the Act. A s a

corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for

illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the

amount from the person accused of the offence under

Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction

thereunder.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had kept

pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said Society

for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a no tice dated

14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the said Society to

produce the record. Accordingly, the necessary book s were

produced by the said Society. The case made out by PW 1 is

that when he repeatedly visited the office of the appellant in

February 2020, the demand of Rs.3000 by way of ille gal

gratification was made by the appellant for passing the

assessment order. However, PW 1, in his cross-exami nation,

accepted that the notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the

appellant was received by the said Society on 15-3- 2000 in

which it was mentioned that after verification of the books of

accounts of the said Society, exemption from paymen t of

commercial tax as claimed by the said Society was allowed. PW

1 accepted that it was stated in the said notice that there was

no necessity for the said Society to pay any commercial tax for

Assessment Year 1996-97.

13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he

visited the appellant's office to request her to is sue final

assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially,

the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But she scaled

it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society

was served with a notice informing the said Society that an

exemption has been granted from payment of commerci al tax to

the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to

pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The issue of the final

assessment order was only a procedural formality. T herefore,

the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe ma de on 23-

3-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.

18

14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre-trap

mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Sh ri R. Hari

Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 — complainant at the time of

offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8

Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had

instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 — complainant ins ide the

chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating

in the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to accompany

PW 1 and observe what transpires between the appell ant and

PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered

the chamber of the appellant and LW 8 waited outsid e the

chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in the cross-examinatio n that

when PW 1 entered the appellant's chamber, LW 8 rem ained

outside in the corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an

independent witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the

directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not accomp any PW 1

inside the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the

chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no explanation

why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the

appellant at the time of the trap.

15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged

demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand

was made of Rs.3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000.

Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiter ated the

demand when he visited the appellant's office. Last ly, the

appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-200 0. On

this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned

Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His version about

the demand and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:

“In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which we

went there was stopped and I was asked to go into the

office of AO and the trap party took vantage positions.

Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I wished AO. At

that time apart from AO some other person was found i n

the office room of AO and he was talking to the AO. A O

offered me a chair. After discussion with the AO the said

other person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I

brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and also

asked her to issue the final assessment orders. Then I took

the said tainted currency notes from my shirt pocket and I

was about to give the same to the AO and on which instead

of taking the same amount directly by her with her ha nds

19

she took out a diary from her table drawer, opened t he

diary and asked me to keep the said amount in the d iary.

Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She closed

the said diary and again kept the same in her table drawer

and locked the drawer and kept the keys in her hand bag

which was hanging to her seat. She pressed the calling bell

and a lady attender came into the room of AO, then sh e

instructed the lady attender to call ACTO concerned to her

along with the society records concerned.

Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. Aft er going

through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last

page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26 -2-2000

below her signature in the said register though she signed on

27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix

official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash

book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also signed

on the office note of final assessment orders at th at time.

Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash book from

the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and

came out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal

to the trap party.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant reiterated

her demand at the time of trap. His version is that on his own,

he told her that he had brought the amount. What is material is

the cross-examination on this aspect. In the cross-examination,

PW 1 accepted that his version regarding the demand made by

the appellant on various dates was an improvement. The

relevant part of the cross-examination of the appellant reads

thus:

“I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161 CrPC

statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met th e AO

and that she demanded the bribe. I did not mention in Ext.

P-3 complaint that continuously for 3 days after 24-2-2000

I met the AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I di d not

mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000 I

approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe of Rs 300 0

and that unless I pay the said bribe amount she wil l not

issue final assessment orders. I did not state in my Section

164 statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16-

3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3-2000, I

20

was engaged in recovering the dues of the society. It is not

true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuous ly 3

days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and that

27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that I did not

meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did

not demand any money from me. I did not state in my

Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that before

I left the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a phone

call enquiring about the availability of AO and the AO was in

the office and informed me that she should be available in

the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day so also in my

Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call from the office

of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as to from which phone

number I made phone call on that day. I cannot descr ibe

office telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest

that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that she

did not give any such reply to me. I did not state to ACB

Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or to the

Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that I went

inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that t ime

apart from AO some other person was found in the office

room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and that the

AO offered me a chair and that after discussion with the AO

the said person left the room of AO and then I informed the

AO that I brought the bribe amount. I did not state that said

aspects to DSP during the post trap proceedings also.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-chief

about the demand made by the appellant from time to time is

an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not ent er the

appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is n o other

evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1

about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all

reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made b y the

appellant has not been conclusively proved.

18. PW.2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal

knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted th at on

15-3-2000, the said Society received a communicatio n

informing that the said Society need not pay any ta x for the

year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as

Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on 15-3-

2000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO served the

original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that

21

the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his version that

when he met the appellant on the same day, she enqu ired

whether he had brought the demanded amount of Rs 30 00.

However, PW 3 did not state that the appellant dema nded the

said amount for granting any favour to the said society.

19. PW.4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant

time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant i nstructed

him to prepare the final assessment order, which wa s kept

ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m. to

the chamber of the appellant along with books of th e said

Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that the

appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the said

Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a

witness to the alleged demand. However, in the cros s-

examination, he admitted that the appellant had served a memo

dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careles s in

performing his duties.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The afore-quoted judgments were rendered interpreti ng Section 7

as it stood prior to amendment. The Apex Court holds that demand

and acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under Section 7 of

the Act.

INTERPRETATION POST AMENDMENT:

10.4. The Apex Court has further interpreted Sectio n 7(a)

post amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT.

OF NCT OF DELHI

4

and holds as follows:

4

2023 SCC OnLine SC 280

22

“…. …. ….

8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we

are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood

prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 w ith effect

from 26

th

July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as

they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7,

as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:

“7. Public servant taking gratification other

than legal remuneration in respect of an official a ct.—

Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant,

accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain

from any person, for himself or for any other person, an y

gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a

motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official

act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of

his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or

for rendering or attempting to render any service or

disservice to any person, with the Central Government or

any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of

any State or with any local authority, corporation or

Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2,

or with any public servant, whether named or otherwis e,

shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall b e not

less than three years but which may extend to seven years

and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanations.-

(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”- If a person not

expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by

deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be

in office, and that he will then serve them, he may

be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the

offence defined in this section.

(b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not

restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to

gratifications estimable in money.

(c) “Legal remuneration”- The words “legal

remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration

which a public servant can lawfully demand, but

include all remuneration which he is permitted by the

23

Government or the organisation, which he serves, to

accept.

(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who

receives a gratification as a motive or reward for

doing what he does not intend or is not in a position

to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.

(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneous ly

to believe that his influence with the Government

has obtained a title for that person and thus induces

that person to give the public servant, money or any

other gratification as a reward for this service, the

public servant has committed an offence under this

section.”

9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time,

reads thus:

“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—

(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of

criminal misconduct,-

(a) ………………………………

(b) ………………………………

(c) ………………………………

(d) if he,-

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for

any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage; or

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains

for himself or for any other person any valuable

thing or pecuniary advantage; or

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for

any person any valuable thing or pecuniary

advantage without any public interest; or

(e) ………………………………….”

24

10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance

thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under

Section 7 of the PC Act.

11. The Constitution Bench

4

was called upon to decide

the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the

conclusions of the Constitution have been summarise d, which

read thus:

“74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is

summarised as under:

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal

gratification by a public servant as a fact in

issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in

order to establish the guilt of the accused

public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)

and (ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,

the prosecution has to first prove the demand

of illegal gratification and the subsequent

acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in

issue can be proved either by direct evidence

which can be in the nature of oral evidence or

documentary evidence.

(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of

demand and acceptance of illegal gratification

can also be proved by circumstantial evidence

in the absence of direct oral and documentary

evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the

demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the

public servant, the following aspects have to be

borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe

giver without there being any demand from the

public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer

and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of

acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a

case, there need not be a prior demand by the public

servant.

25

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a

demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand

and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn

is received by the public servant, it is a case of

obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior

demand for illegal gratification emanates from the

public servant. This is an offence under Section

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by

the bribe giver and the demand by the public

servant respectively have to be proved by the

prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words,

mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal

gratification without anything more would not

make it an offence under Section 7 or Section

13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the

Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order

to bring home the offence, there must be an offer

which emanates from the bribe giver which is

accepted by the public servant which would make it

an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the

public servant when accepted by the bribe

giver and in turn there is a payment made

which is received by the public servant, would

be an offence of obtainment under Section

13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the

demand and acceptance or obtainment of an

illegal gratification may be made by a court of

law by way of an inference only when the

foundational facts have been proved by

relevant oral and documentary evidence and

not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the

material on record, the Court has the discretion to

raise a presumption of fact while considering

whether the fact of demand has been proved by the

prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact

is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the

absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has

died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during

trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by

letting in the evidence of any other witness who can

again let in evidence, either orally or by

26

documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove

the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does

not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of

the accused public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned,

on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20

mandates the court to raise a presumption that

the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a

motive or reward as mentioned in the said

Section. The said presumption has to be raised by

the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in

law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject

to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section

13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Se ction

20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact

referred to above in point

(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while t he

latter is discretionary in nature.”

(emphasis added)

12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76

of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus:

“76. Accordingly, the question referred for

consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as

under:

In the absence of evidence of the complainant

(direct/primary, oral/ document-tary evidence), it is

permissible to draw an inferential deduction of

culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7

and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the

Act based on other evidence adduced by the

prosecution.”

(emphasis added)

13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of

the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Be nch by

holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, S ection 20

mandates the Court to raise a presumption that ille gal

gratification was for the purpose of motive or rewa rd as

27

mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of

2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two

decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases

of B. Jayaraj

1

and P. Satyanarayana Murthy

2

. There is another

decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N.

Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu

5

, which follows the view

taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj

1

and P. Satyanarayana Murthy

2

.

In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj

1

, this

Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC

Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus:

“9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to

be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned,

such presumption can only be in respect of the

offence under Section 7 and not the offences under

Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any ev ent,

it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification

that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of

the Act that such gratification was received for do ing

or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance

of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of

demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the

primary facts on the basis of which the legal presum ption

under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”

(emphasis added)

14. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked

only when the two basic facts required to be proved under

Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are ‘demand’ and

‘acceptance’ of gratification. The presumption under Section 20

is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptan ce of

gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as

contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of

the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are

proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have to

presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a

motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. Howe ver, this

presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the

preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the

presumption.

15. In the case of N. Vijayakumar

5

, another bench of

three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under

28

Section 20 and the degree of proof required to esta blish the

offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii)

Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In

paragraph 26, the bench held thus:

“26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by

itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the

accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of t his

Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish

Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and

in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of

A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the

aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering

the case under Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiter ated

that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyon d

reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily

accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of

proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession

or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute

such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even

the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be dr awn

only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification

is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initia l

presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets

doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

(emphasis added)

16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance

must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26

th

July 2018, was

different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7

which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to

“any gratification”. The substituted Section 7 does not use the

word “gratification”, but it uses a wider term “und ue

advantage”. When the allegation is of demand of gra tification

and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive

or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact

that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive

or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking

the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations

of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are

also concerned with the offence punishable under cl auses (i)

29

and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section

13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13,

which existed on the statute book prior to the amen dment of

26

th

July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of

clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof

of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove

the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In

view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given

case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a

public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the

absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. Whi le

answering the referred question, the Constitution B ench has

observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction

of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences

punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section

13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct

evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always b e proved

by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence.

18. The allegation of demand of gratification and

acceptance made by a public servant has to be estab lished

beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Cons titution

Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement o f proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench w as dealing

with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be

proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that t he proof

need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it

can be by way of other evidence including circumsta ntial

evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to

prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must

establish each and every circumstance from which th e

prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The

facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis

that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused.

Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is

any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that

there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to

consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove

the demand.”

30

10.5. Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA’S case, the Apex Court

in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE

5

has held as follows:

“ FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND:

9. We have considered the submissions. It is well set tled

that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratifi cation and

acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover, the

Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutta

3

has reiterated that

the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked

only on proof of facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification

by the accused and the acceptance thereof.

10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not suppor ted

the prosecution. He has not said anything in his examination-in-

chief about the demand made by the appellant. The p ublic

prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The witness stated that there

was no demand of a bribe made by the appellant. According to him,

he filed a complaint as the return of the sale deed was delayed.

Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the complain t, in the

cross-examination, he was not confronted with the m aterial

portions of the complaint in which he had narrated how the alleged

demand was made. The public prosecutor ought to hav e confronted

the witness with his alleged prior statements in the complaint and

proved that part of the complaint through the conce rned police

officer who had reduced the complaint into writing. However, that

was not done.

11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness

(PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant

asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount. P W-3 did not

say that the appellant made a specific demand of gratification in his

presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand

for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a

reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before

26

th

July 2018, is ‘gratification’. There has to be a demand for

gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be

5

2023 SCC OnLine SC 424

31

a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification

and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumpt ion under

Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presum e that the

demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act.

This presumption can be rebutted by the accused.

12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand fo r

gratification in this case. In the circumstances, t he offences

punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read w ith

Section 13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both

demand and acceptance are established, offence of

obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means cove red by

clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved.”

(Emphasis supplied)

The Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA supra was clarifying

and interpreting the judgment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA ,

which was rendered by a Constitution Bench and further holds that

proof of demand and acceptance of gratification is sine qua non for

any allegation under Section 7 of the Act, be it pre-amendment or

post-amendment. This is reiterated in the case of SOUNDARAJAN

supra.

11. On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex

Court, as quoted supra, the soul of Section 7 of the Act is demand

and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on the interpretation,

in the considered view of the Court, would be if there is demand but

32

no acceptance, it would not make an offence under Section 7 of the

Act. If there is acceptance but no demand, it would then also make

no offence under Section 7 of the Act. An act alleged under Section

7 of the Act should have the ingredients of demand and acceptance

and it is for the performance of a public duty or forbearance from

performance. Therefore, demand and acceptance shou ld be for the

purpose of performance of some public duty. For such performance,

there should be work pending at the hands of the pu blic servant

against whom Section 7 of the Act is alleged.

12. The aforesaid judgments have been considered by this

Bench sitting at Dharwad Bench in the case of BEERALINGA v.

STATE OF KARNATAKA – W.P.No.105067 of 2023 decided on

7

th

June, 2024. The said judgment was challenged by the State

before the Apex Court in S.L.P.No.6770 of 2025 . The said S.L.P.

comes to be dismissed on 04-09-2025 by the following order:

“Upon hearing the counsel the court made the following:

ORDER

1. The delay of 152 days in filing and 173 days in refiling the

Special Leave Petition is condoned in the facts and

33

circumstances of the case. Accordingly, I.A.Nos. 211938

of 2025 and 211943 of 2025 are allowed.

2. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we a re not

convinced that any case for interference under Article 136

of the Constitution on India is made out.

3. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dism issed.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.”

The Apex Court refuses to interfere with the findings recorded by

this Court. In the light of the judgment rendered as afore-quoted

the issue in the case at hand need not detain this Court for long or

delve deep into the matter. It is admitted that there is no trap and

there is not even a prima facie finding that there has been demand

and acceptance. There is no tainted money recovered from the

hands of the petitioner and it is a fact that the p etitioner was

instrumental in registering several crimes against the complainant

and the complaint against the petitioner is filed undoubtedly to

wreak vengeance. The statement of objections filed by the

complainant is a vindication of the finding recorded hereinabove.

13. In that light, there is no warrant to permit investigation

to continue six years after registration of the crime, when there is

not even a titter of document to permit such invest igation. It

34

becomes apposite, in this regard, to refer to the judgment of the

Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. BHAJAN LAL

6

,

wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “…. …. ….

102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV a nd of the

principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions

relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article

226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which

we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following

categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power

could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may

not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly de fined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid

formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases

wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first inform ation

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at

their face value and accepted in their entirety do

not prima facie constitute any offence or make out

a case against the accused.

(2) where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do no t

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation

by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview o f

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in t he FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

same do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the accused.

6

1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335

35

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not const itute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated un der

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or compl aint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the

basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a

just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (un der

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is

a specific provision in the Code or the concerned A ct,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly atte nded with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciousl y

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.”

(Emphasis supplied)

14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

O R D E R

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

36

(ii) FIR registered against the petitioner in Crime No.45 of

2019 pending before the XXIII Additional City Civil and

Sessions Judge, Bengaluru stands quashed.

Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

JUDGE

Bkp

CT:MJ