2026 INSC 124 1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4452 of 2025)

PRAMOD KUMAR NAVRATNA …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of order dated 03.03.2025 passed by

the High Court for the State of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR

No.117/2025 dismissing the Writ Petition filed under Article 226

of Constitution of India preferred by the accused-appellant herein

and thereby refusing to quash the proceedings arising out of the

FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered at Sarkanda Police

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Station, District Bilaspur under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) that was registered by the

complainant-respondent No.3.

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the complainant-

respondent No.3, an Advocate by profession, solemnized marriage

with one Mitendra Kumar Dhirde on 02.06.2011 and subsequently

gave birth to a boy named Ojash on 12.04.2012. Thereafter, owing

to matrimonial discord between the couple, the husband sought

divorce by filing the divorce petition Civil Case No.F/232A/2018

against the complainant-respondent No.3 on 10.12.2018 under

Section 13(1)(ia) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family

Court, Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. The contentions and grievances of

the parties in the said divorce petition are not germane to the facts

of the present case and hence are not dealt with herein. Suffice it

to say that the said divorce petition was dismissed by the Family

Court on 27.11.2024 and an appeal No.FA(MAT)/11/2025 against

the said order was preferred by the husband of the complainant-

respondent No.3 on 10.01.2025 which is currently pending

adjudication before the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur.

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Therefore, at the time of disposal of the present petition, the

complainant-respondent No.3 is married and has a son.

4. It is stated that on 18.09.2022, the complainant-respondent

No.3 had come into contact with the accused-appellant who is also

an Advocate by profession, at a social event wherein both developed

a mutual liking and fondness for each other and thereafter stayed

in contact with each other.

5. On 06.02.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 lodged an

FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 at Police Station Sarkanda at

District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC

against the accused-appellant alleging that he had raped her on a

false promise of marriage. The allegations against the accused-

appellant contained in the said FIR can be crystallised as

hereunder:

i. That the complainant-respondent No.3 got acquainted

with the accused-appellant during a social event wherein

both the parties developed a cordial relationship based on

their similar profession. The accused-appellant thereafter,

on a regular basis, used to pick up and drop the

complainant-respondent No.3 to and from her house.

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That, the accused-appellant was told by the complainant-

respondent No.3 that there were divorce proceedings

pending before the Family Court between her and her

husband.

ii. On 18.09.2022, while going to a Mahan Bada Jarhabhata

meeting, the accused-appellant took the complainant-

respondent No.3 to his friend’s house in Geetanjali Phase-

02, Sarkanda on the pretext of picking up some of his

essential documents from the said location.

iii. Thereafter, in the guise of seeking help from the

complainant-respondent No.3, the accused -appellant

raped her. Upon protest and threat of lodgement of police

complaint, the accused-appellant told the complainant-

respondent No.3 that he likes her and wants to marry her

and thereafter he proceeded to apply vermilion on her

head.

iv. Subsequently, on different occasions the accused -

appellant indulged in physical relations with the

complainant-respondent No.3 whilst he kept verbally

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assuring her that he will marry her and meet and talk to

her family about the same.

v. Thereafter, the complainant-respondent No.3 informed the

accused-appellant that she was pregnant with his child.

Upon hearing the said information, he became evasive

about the topic of marriage and said that he was neither

ready for a social marriage nor for a child and

consequently forced her to consume tablets for abortion.

vi. On 27.01.2025, the complainant-respondent No.3 visited

the residence of the accused-appellant to confront him and

his family about the said situation and was received with

hostility by the members of the family of the accused-

appellant who proceeded to assault and threaten the

complainant-respondent No.3 with dire consequences and

threw her out of the house.

6. Thereafter, alleging harassment and blackmail on behalf of

the complainant-respondent No.3, the accused-appellant lodged a

complaint before Superintendent of Police, District Bilaspur on

06.02.2025 wherein he alleged that the complainant-respondent

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No.3 had been harassing him and his family with demand of

marriage whilst threatening to commit suicide if the said demands

of marriage were not met. It has further been alleged by the

accused-appellant in the said complaint that he had never thought

about marrying her but instead always saw her as a good friend

and a colleague with whom he shared workspace.

7. Apprehending arrest in connection with the FIR No.213/2025,

the accused-appellant preferred Anticipatory Bail Application

under Section 482 of BNSS in MCRCA No.285/2025 before the

High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur. The said Anticipatory Bail

Application was allowed by the High Court by its order dated

03.03.2025. While allowing the said Anticipatory Bail Application,

the High Court observed that upon perusal of the statement made

by the complainant-respondent No.3 under Section 183 of BNSS,

it appeared that she was married and had a 10-11 years old son

and had indulged in a consensual relationship with the accused-

appellant. Pursuant thereto, the accused-appellant was formally

arrested on 28.03.2025 and thereafter released on bail.

8. On the same day i.e. 03.03.2025 when the accused-appellant

was allowed the relief of anticipatory bail by the High Court of

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Chhattisgarh in MCRCA No.285/2025, the WPCR No.117/2025

filed by him seeking relief of quashment of the FIR No.213/2025

and all consequential proceedings thereto was dismissed. While

dismissing the said Writ Petition, the High Court observed that the

complainant-respondent No.3 has made vivid allegations against

the accused-appellant that on the pretext of marriage, she was

induced into sexual intercourse after which, ultimately, he refused

to marry her. On the point of quality of consent, it was observed

that the misconception of fact or pretext of marriage are questions

of fact which require proper investigation and therefore, at the

nascent stage of investigation, it cannot be said with a certainty

that the allegations levelled by the complainant-respondent No.3

are false and no prima facie offence has been made out and

therefore the High Court, in its wisdom, found no ground to

interfere with the proceedings emanating from the said FIR.

9. In the interregnum, the Investigating Officer submitted Final

Report No.269/2025 under Section 192 of Bhar atiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter ‘BNSS’ for short) on

02.04.2025 against the accused-appellant alleging commission of

offence u/s 376(2)(n) of the IPC and in pursuance thereto, Sessions

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Case No.89/2025 has been instituted before the Court of District

and Sessions Judge, Bilaspur to try the accused-appellant for the

aforesaid offence.

10. We have heard the learned counsel for the accused-appellant

and learned counsel for respondent No.1-State as well as the

complainant-respondent No.3. We have perused the material on

record.

11. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant submitted that

the alleged victim is a thirty-three years old married lady and an

advocate by profession with a son aged 10 -11 years old and

therefore has knowledge of her well-being and hence by any stretch

of imagination, it cannot be said that she was duped on the pretext

of marriage considering her marital status and her occupation. It

was further submitted that she voluntarily developed physical

relationship with the accused-appellant which continued up to

January 2025 which in itself goes on to show that she was a

consenting party with the accused-appellant and hence no offence

of rape is made out even from the contents of the FIR itself. Further,

it has been alleged that the accused-appellant himself was the

victim of the act of the complainant-respondent No.3 as she had

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been blackmailing him for which the he had filed a complaint to

the Superintendent of Police on 06.02.2025 and therefore, in the

absence of any prima facie ingredients to constitute the offence of

rape, he cannot be prosecuted for the same. He further submitted

that the accused-appellant had also applied for grant of

anticipatory bail registered as MCRCA No.285/2025 before the

High Court of Chhattisgarh which was allowed vide the order dated

03.03.2025. Therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances of

the case, the petition may be allowed and the impugned FIR may

be quashed.

12. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1-State

contended that the facts of the present case are not only heinous

but also grave in nature for which the accused-appellant, if found

guilty, would be liable to be punished. Furthermore, it has also

been contended that through the investigation, there has been a

recovery of WhatsApp conversation exchanged between the

accused-appellant and the complainant-respondent No.3

wherefrom it is apparent that the accused-appellant was aware

that the complainant-respondent No.3 was having a matrimonial

dispute with her husband and therefore in a pre-planned manner

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induced her into a physical relationship for satisfying his lust

under the false pretext of marriage and thereafter impregnated her

without having any actual intention to honour his promise.

Therefore, it was argued that any argument on the consent of the

prosecutrix stands vitiated at the very threshold by fraud and

misconception induced by the accused-appellant.

13. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant-

respondent No.3 has contended that the police officials after due

investigation found that offence has been made out against the

accused-appellant and consequently Chargesheet No.269/2025

has been filed on 02.04.2025 under section 376(2)(n) of the IPC

and Sessions Case No.89/2025 has been instituted. It was further

contended that the accused-appellant, being an advocate himself,

knows the implications of law and has committed the sexual

offence with intention and full knowledge. That apart, it was

contended by the counsel that the accused -appellant is not

appearing before the Sessions Judge and therefore is delaying the

trial and he has an alternative remedy of arguing the case before

the Sessions Judge on the point of discharge instead of pursuing

the remedy of quashing the FIR before this Court. It has been

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pointed out by the learned counsel that only fourteen witnesses

have been listed in the chargesheet for examination and hence

there is no scope for delay of trial and the same may be concluded

within six months and therefore all the questions regarding the

consent of the complainant-respondent No.3 and its quality can be

decided at the stage of trial itself.

14. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments

advanced at the Bar and the material on record.

15. In the instant case the allegations in the FIR are under

Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. An offence of rape, if established in

terms of Section 375 of the IPC, is punishable under Section 376

of the IPC. In the present case, the second description of Section

376 is relevant which is set out below: :

“376. Punishment for rape. — (1). Whoever, except in the

cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall

be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either

description for a term which shall not be less than ten

years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and

shall also be liable to fine.

2. Whoever, -

xxx

(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term

which shall not be less than ten years, but which may

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extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean

imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural

life, and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—

(a) “armed forces” means the naval, military and air

forces and includes any member of the Armed Forces

constituted under any law for the time being in force,

including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces

that are under the control of the Central Government or

the State Government;

(b) “hospital” means the precincts of the hospital and

includes the precincts of any institution for the reception

and treatment of persons during convalescence or of

persons requiring medical attention or rehabilitation;

(c) “police officer” shall have the same meaning as

assigned to the expression “police” under the Police Act,

1861 (5 of 1861);

(d) “women's or children's institution” means an

institution, whether called an orphanage or a home for

neglected women or children or a widow's home or an

institution called by any other name, which is established

and maintained for the reception and care of women or

children.”

16. Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC provides for enhanced

punishment in cases where rape is committed repeatedly on the

same woman. It mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term of not

less than ten years which may extend to life imprisonment for the

remainder of the person's natural life. The object of this provision

is to address aggravated instances of sexual assault where the

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offence is not a single incident but has occurred repeatedly on the

same victim. The expression “repeatedly” employed in the provision

is of significance. It contemplates more than one act of sexual

assault, committed at different points in time on the same victim.

Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean a series

of acts that are separate in nature and not a continuation of a

single transaction. In genuine cases under Section 376(2)(n) of the

IPC, the pattern is usually unmistakable; it is an initial act of

sexual assault, followed by multiple acts under fear, pressure,

captivity, or continued deceit, often when the woman is rendered

vulnerable and unable to escape the situation.

17. At the outset, we refer to the ratio in the case of Naim

Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 385 whereby

this Court had decided a similar matter, wherein allegedly, the

prosecutrix had also given her consent for a sexual relationship

with the accused-appellant therein, upon an assurance to marry.

The prosecutrix, who was herself a married woman having three

children, had continued to have such a relationship with the

accused-appellant, at least for about five years till she gave the

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complaint. In the conspectus of such facts and circumstances, this

Court had observed as under:

“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the

respondents is that the prosecutrix had given her consent

for sexual relationship under the misconception of fact, as

the accused had given a false promise to marry her and

subsequently he did not marry, and therefore such

consent was no consent in the eye of the law and the case

fell under Clause Secondly of Section 375 IPC. In this

regard, it is pertinent to note that there is a difference

between giving a false promise and committing breach of

promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the

accused right from the beginning would not have any

intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated

or deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to

marry her only with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in

case of breach of promise, one cannot deny a possibility

that the accused might have given a promise with all

seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have

encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or

the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented

him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a folly to treat

each breach of promise to marry as a false promise and to

prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As

stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved

facts before the court.”

18. It has been time and again settled by this Court, that the

mere fact that the parties indulged in physical relations pursuant

to a promise to marry will not amount to a rape in every case. An

offence under Section 375 of the IPC could only be made out, if

promise of marriage was made by the accused solely with a view to

obtain consent for sexual relations without having any intent of

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fulfilling said promise from the very beginning and that such false

promise of marriage had a direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving

her consent for sexual relations. The issue for consideration is

whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after

examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash

the ongoing criminal proceedings against the accused-appellant

arising out of FIR No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 and the

Chargesheet No.269/2025.

19. Upon a careful consideration of the record in the present case,

we are unable to discern any material that would warrant the

invocation of Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. The facts of the present

case unmistakably indicate towards a classic case of a consensual

relationship turning acrimonious. Upon perusal of the records of

the case, it is evident that the complainant-respondent No.3 is a

married lady with a ten years old child. The said marriage was

solemnized on 02.06.2011 and although divorce proceedings are

currently pending adjudication between her and her husband, by

no stretch of imagination can it be held that the complainant-

respondent No.3 was eligible for being married with the accused-

appellant on 18.09.2022, the date on which the first of the multiple

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instances of acts of rape on the false pretext of marriage has been

committed by the accused-appellant are alleged. Therefore, even

for the sake of argument, if the contention of the respondent No.1

- State and the complainant-respondent No.3 is accepted that there

indeed was a false promise of marriage based on which the

accused-appellant indulged in sexual activities, such a promise

would not be legally enforceable or even capable of being acted

upon as the victim herself was not eligible for marriage, neither on

the date of the first alleged act of offence i.e. 18.09.2022 nor on any

subsequent dates wherein the parties indulged in the sexual

activities, till the point of the date of registration of FIR i.e.

06.02.2025. The said embargo arises from sub-clause (i) of Section

5 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 which categorically prohibits

marriage between two individuals if either of them have a living

spouse. The said position of law has been reiterated under sub-

clause (i) of Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

20. In other words, the law prohibits bigamous unions and

therefore disallows parties from entering into a second marriage

during the subsistence of their first marriage. It is, therefore,

difficult to accept the view that the complainant-respondent No.3,

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who herself is an advocate, was oblivious to the said settled

position of law and hence was duped and induced by the accused-

appellant into having sexual relations with him on different

occasions on the pretext of marriage especially when both the

parties were cognizant of the marital status of the complainant-

respondent No.3.

21. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to mention that the

complainant-respondent No.3 is a thirty-three years old woman

and an advocate by profession and not a naïve or gullible woman

incapable of taking decisions for herself. It would be remiss not to

mention, at the cost of repetition, that the complainant-

respondent No.3 is herself an advocate and therefore she should

have exercised her prudence and discretion before engaging the

already burdened State machinery into a roving criminal litigation.

22. The Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in

identifying the genuine cases filed under Section 376(2)(n) of the

IPC by identifying the essential ingredients to constitute the said

offence i.e. there should be a promise of marriage made by the

accused solely with a view to obtain consent for sexual relations

and without having any intent of fulfilling said promise from the

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very beginning, and that such false promise of marriage had a

direct bearing on the prosecutrix giving her consent for sexual

relations. Such genuine cases that deserve prosecution of the

accused must be clearly demarcated from the litigation that arises

from the cases of consensual relationships between consenting

adults going acrimonious on account of dispute and disagreement

or a future change of mind. In view of the aforesaid settled position

of law, the respondent No.1-State and the complainant-respondent

No.3 has failed to place any material on record to show how the

accused-appellant on the subsequent meetings managed to

repeatedly coax and dupe the complainant-respondent No.3 into

having physical relations with him on the false pretext of marriage

considering the fact that within initial meetings, both parties were

aware about the marital status of the victim and therefore it cannot

be, by any stretch imagination said that the consent of the

complainant-respondent No.3 has been vitiated or obtained on

fraud and misrepresentation made by the accused-appellant.

23. At this stage, it is material to refer to the decision of this Court

in Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11

SCC 398, wherein the following observations were made:

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“29. It must also be clear that for a promise to be a false

promise to amount to misconception of fact within the

meaning of Section 90 IPC, it must have been made from

the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman

to persuade her to have a physical relationship. Therefore,

if it is established that such consent was given under a

misconception of fact, the said consent is vitiated and not

a valid consent. …”

24. On a perusal of the allegations made in the present case, it is

an admitted fact that the complainant-respondent No.3, within the

first initial meetings told the accused-appellant that she was a

married woman with divorce proceedings pending before the

Family Court. Therefore, in the same breath, she cannot be

allowed to claim and allege that she was also coaxed by the

accused-appellant into having a physical relationship with him on

the false pretext of marriage as the two facts cannot stand together

on the same plane and simultaneously as both are antagonistic

and antithetical to each other. In our opinion, the facts of the

present case clearly indicate a consensual relationship gone sour

whereas both the parties should have exercised restraint and

should have refrained from involving the State into their personal

relationship turning rancour.

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25. At this juncture, it is important to place reliance upon the

observations in Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC

764, wherein this Court speaking through one of us (Nagarathna,

J.) observed that a mere break-up of a relationship between a

consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal

proceedings. What was a consensual relationship between the

parties at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality

when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage.

Furthermore, this Court in Samadhan vs. State of

Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528 through one of us

(Nagarathna, J.) observed that this Court has, on numerous

occasions, taken note of the disquieting tendency wherein failed or

broken relationships are given the colour of criminality. The offence

of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases

where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of

free consent. To convert every soured relationship into an offence

of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also

inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such

instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The

misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter

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of profound concern for the judiciary already facing a heavy load

and calls for condemnation.

26. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in

the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)

SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph

102 therein, where this Court observed thus:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of

the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series

of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we have given the following categories

of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could

be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the

Accused.

xxx

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the

FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of

the same do not disclose the commission of any offence

and make out a case against the Accused.

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xxx

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any

of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is

a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private

and personal grudge.”

27. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial

dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the accused-

appellant herein is not made out at all. In fact, we find that the

allegation of rape on false pretext of marriage even when taken on

its face value, does not amount to an offence of rape and hence not

liable for punishment under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC in the

instant case and therefore, the judgment of this Court in the case

of Bhajan Lal squarely apply to the facts of these cases. Therefore,

it is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the

present prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent

Sessions Case No.89/2025 to continue.

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28. In view of the aforesaid discussion and keeping the judicial

dicta laid down by this Court in mind we set aside the impugned

order dated 03.03.2025 of the High Court and consequently, FIR

No.213/2025 dated 06.02.2025 registered with Sarkanda Police

Station at district Bilaspur and the Chargesheet No.269/2025, and

the consequent proceedings arising out of the said proceedings in

Sessions Case No.89/2025 are quashed.

The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

…………………………………..J.

(B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 05, 2026.