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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 4810 of 2025

IA No. CRAN 1 of 2026

Puja Hari

Vs.

The State of West Bengal & Anr.

For the petitioners : Mr. Ayan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Soumyajit Das Mahapatra

Mr. Soumya Basu Roy Chowdhuri

Ms. Upasana Banerjee

Mr. Abir Dalui

For the opposite party No.2 : Mr. Sandipan Gangully, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Sabyasachi Banerjee, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Anirban Dutta

Mr. Dwip Raj Basu

For the State : Mr. Debasish Roy, Ld. PP

Mr. Rudradipta Nandy, Ld. APP

Mr. Suman De

Mr. Sachit Talukdar

Heard on : 28.04.2026

Judgment on : 23.06.2026

Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. The petitioner herein, Puja Hari wife of accused Bikash Hari has

challenged the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

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Howrah, dated 24

th September, 2025. By the impugned order, the court

below attached total three properties owned jointly by the accused Bikash

Hari and Puja Hari and also two properties belonging exclusively to Puja

Hari invoking jurisdiction under section 107 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short BNSS) and directed investigating officer of

the case to take necessary further step towards attachment of the property

in question with an intimation to superintendent of police and collector of

the concerned district, where the properties situate.

2. The inception of the dispute is when one written complaint was lodged

at Sakrail P.S. on 20.05.2025 by one Manoj Agarwal, representative of

Utkarsh India Limited alleging interalia that the company was approached

by one Shyam Kumar Gupta, representative of Shree Shyam Road Safety

and also its sole proprietor, Lalita Devi in the year 2020 and they thereby

started a business relationship. It is alleged that thereafter discrepancies

were discovered in the ledger of Shree Shyam Road Safety during the period

form 16.04.2022 to 22.02.2024.

3. Upon receipt of such complaint, Sakrail P.S. Case no. 433/2025 dated

20.05.2025 under section 420/426/120B/34 of the IPC was started against

aforesaid Bikash Hari and other employees of the company. During

pendency of the investigation on 10.07.2025, the investigating officer made

a prayer for order of forfeiture of the properties under section 107 of the

BNSS 2023. On that date, the court below declined to pass any order as the

accused persons were not within the clutch of investigating agency till that

date. Thereafter on 24.09.2025, when the accused persons were arrested,

the court below was pleased to allow the attachment of properties including

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the properties of the petitioner herein, who is not an accused. The petitioner

herein had taken various grounds to challenge said order dated 24.09.2025

and amongst the grounds which were argued are:-

(a) Though the petitioner Puja Hari has not been arraigned as accused

person but still she became the victim of the instant impugned

order. The impugned order came to the notice of the present

petitioner only on 11.10.2025, when she found that a notice has

been pasted upon her properties directing her to vacate.

(b) The petitioner is the owner of the properties but no notice was

served upon her as mandated under section 107(2) & (3) of the

BNSS and everything has been done behind her back, affecting her

rights and interests.

(c) Learned magistrate without any reason has held that the right of

audience of the present petitioner Puja Hari is not available as she

is absconding. Such observation is a flawed observation because

she was neither named as an accused in the FIR nor she has been

inducted in the present case as an accused and as such, the

question of abscondence by the petitioner does not arise. Moreover,

even if she would have been an absconding accused, law does not

prevent serving of notice of hearing by pasting it over the house of

the petitioner.

4. Admittedly the petitioner has not been arraigned as an accused

person in the instant case. Out of the attached properties, three are being

jointly held by the petitioner and accused Bikash Hari who is her husband

and two are exclusively owned by the petitioner. Though the petitioner is

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owner of all those properties under attachment, there is nothing to show

that before passing the impugned order of attachment, any notice was

served upon her under the mandatory provision laid down in section 107(2)

& (3) of BNSS and obviously she did not get any chance to place her case

before the court.

5. Section 107 of BNSS specifically prescribe the procedure of

attachment. Before proceeding further, let me reproduce the said provision.

107. Attachment, forfeiture or restoration of property.-- (1) Where a police

officer making an investigation has reason to believe that any property is derived or

obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of a criminal activity or from the

commission of any offence, he may, with the approval of the Superintendent of Police

or Commissioner of Police, make an application to the Court or the Magistrate

exercising jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence or commit for trial or try the

case, for the attachment of such property.

(2) If the Court or the Magistrate has reasons to believe, whether before or after

taking evidence, that all or any of such properties are proceeds of crime, the Court or

the Magistrate may issue a notice upon such person calling upon him to show cause

within a period of fourteen days as to why an order of attachment shall not be made.

(3) Where the notice issued to any person under sub-section (2) specifies any

property as being held by any other person on behalf of such person, a copy of the

notice shall also be served upon such other person.

(4) The Court or the Magistrate may, after considering the explanation, if any, to

the show-cause notice issued under sub-section (2) and the material fact available

before such Court or Magistrate and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being

heard to such person or persons, may pass an order of attachment, in respect of

those properties which are found to be the proceeds of crime:Provided that if such

person does not appear before the Court or the Magistrate or represent his case

before the Court or Magistrate within a period of fourteen days specified in the show-

cause notice, the Court or the Magistrate may proceed to pass the ex parte order.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), if the Court or the

Magistrate is of the opinion that issuance of notice under the said sub-section would

defeat the object of attachment or seizure, the Court or Magistrate may by an interim

order passed ex parte direct attachment or seizure of such property, and such order

shall remain in force till an order under sub-section (6) is passed.

(6) If the Court or the Magistrate finds the attached or seized properties to be

the proceeds of crime, the Court or the Magistrate shall by order direct the District

Magistrate to rateably distribute such proceeds of crime to the persons who are

affected by such crime:

(7) On receipt of an order passed under sub-section (6), the District Magistrate

shall, within a period of sixty days distribute the proceeds of crime either by himself

or authorise any officer subordinate to him to effect such distribution.

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(8) If there are no claimants to receive such proceeds or no claimant is

ascertainable or there is any surplus after satisfying the claimants, such proceeds of

crime shall stand forfeited to the Government.

6. Therefore, section 107(2) of BNSS provides for four steps and/or pre-

requisites to be followed before passing any order of attachment which

has to be adhered to i.e.

(a) notice to the person of whom the property in question belongs to

(b) a time period of 14 days

(c) reasonable opportunity of being heard and

(d) to come to a logical conclusion that the property in question is

actually proceeds of crime.

7. The statute also provides exceptions (a) if such person does not

represent his case before the court within a period of 14 days and (b) if the

court is of the opinion that issuance of notice under the said sub section

would defeat the object of attachment or seizure. Therefore, the legislature

in its wisdom made a specific provision for attachment mandating service of

notice upon the person whose property would be attached and as such it

made the room for the opportunity of being heard.

8. However, in the present case in hand as stated above the petitioner

who is the owner of the concerned properties in question was not intimated

through any notice and as such she failed to participate in the proceeding

and lost the opportunity to be heard. Not only that, in support of his order

for attachment of petitioner’s property, learned Magistrate erroneously held

that the petitioner is absconding and therefore, right of audience does not

arise in her case and furthermore even after passing attachment order,

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surprisingly he again directed the investigating officer to make the

attachment by taking physical possession of the said properties.

9. Since the trial Court while passing the impugned order has clearly

flouted the mandate of section 107 of BNSS, the matter could have ended

here by remanding the case before trial Court for initiating the process of

attachment, if any, afresh in accordance with law but the way the trial court

brushed off all the warnings laid down in sub section (1) (2) & (3) of section

107 by observing that approval of the Commissioner of Police, Howrah is a

technical issue and that service of notice upon Bikash Hari is sufficient

compliance of section 107(2),/107(3), since property under attachment was

purchased in the benam of present petitioner, being unjustly taking her as

“absconding accused”, it tempted me to remind the court below the

necessity of following the newly incorporated provisions in the BNSS, in its

true letter and spirit.

10. Needless to say section 107 BNSS has introduced a mechanism

whereby property can be attached, liquidated and distributed even before

the investigation or trial concludes. The understanding of attachment and

forfeiture originates from the Criminal Law Ordinance which was designed

to prevent dissipation of assets derived from specified offence and

attachment. Under the said ordinance, attachment was essentially a civil

recovery mechanism and not a punishment.

11. The procedure for attachment at the threshold of investigation has

been incorporated mainly to serve dual purposes. Firstly to ensure

participation of the accused in the legal process and secondly to deprive

offenders of illegal gains. However, since newly incorporated law involves

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valuable property rights of public or private, it demands procedural fairness

within a framework. This is also because earlier law treated attachment as

ancillary to adjudication. But presumably keeping the earlier similar

provisions in mind, legislature has framed section 107(1) to 107(8) as a

standalone mechanism for attachment. The other important aspect is that

while the provisions for attachment have been framed, legislature did not

make any distinction between serious economic crimes and minor offences

as said section is applicable to ‘any offence’ .

12. Therefore, both the investigating agency and the Courts must be

vigilant while exercising such jurisdiction as indiscriminate use of such

power without application of mind, may cause serious disaster to the

constitutional right of ‘right to property’.

13. An investigating officer can seek approval of his superior under

section 107 (1) of BNSS only when there is a ‘reason to believe’ that the

property is derived or obtained as a result of any offence. ‘Reason to believe’

of the investigating officer must be recorded in the application which will be

forwarded to his superior as envisaged under section 107 (1) of the BNSS.

The said application must demonstrate the close connection with the

criminal activity or an offence which is under investigation. Furthermore,

the report should additionally demonstrate as far as practicable the

necessity of such attachment mainly from the point of view of concealment

or transfer etc. The approval of higher official as envisaged under section

107 (1) of BNSS must reflect the due application of mind on the basis of

cogent materials which will be part of investigation. Mere endorsement by

the higher official should not be treated as an approval. The approval must

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satisfy the requirement of attachment as envisaged under section 107 (1) of

the BNSS.

14. The aforesaid provision can only be invoked by the investigating

agency where there is reason to believe. The term ‘reason to believe’ must

get strict interpretation. For commencement of investigation, the threshold

limit is ‘reason to suspect’ vide section 176 of BNSS. Therefore, the

provisions under section 107 of BNSS should not be invoked by an

investigating officer without proper investigation as the threshold for ‘reason

to believe’ is much higher than the ‘reason to suspect’. In a recent judgment

Supreme Court held that reason to believe’ must have strict interpretation in

Arvind Kejriwal Vs. ED reported in (2025) 2 SCC 248 which may be

reproduced below:-

“61. The legality of the “reasons to believe” has to be examined based on what is

mentioned and recorded therein and the material on record. However, the officer

acting under Section 19(1) of the PML Act cannot ignore or not consider the material

which exonerates the arrestee. Any such non-consideration would lead to difficult and

unacceptable results. First, it would negate the legislative intent which imposes

stringent conditions. As a general rule of interpretation, penal provisions must be

interpreted strictly. [ See Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC

1 at para 106 : (2023) 21 ITR-OL 1 (SC) : (SCC pp. 164-65)“106. The “proceeds of

crime” being the core of the ingredients constituting the offence of money laundering,

that expression needs to be construed strictly. In that, all properties recovered or

attached by the investigating agency in connection with the criminal activity relating to

a scheduled offence under the general law cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime.

There may be cases where the property involved in the commission of scheduled

offence attached by the investigating agency dealing with that offence, cannot be

wholly or partly regarded as proceeds of crime within themeaning of Section 2(1)(u) of

the 2002 Act—so long as the whole or some portion of the property has been derived

or obtained by any person “as a result of” criminal activity relating to the stated

scheduled offence.”Also see M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,

(2021) 2 SCC 485 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 876 at para 17.9 : (SCC p. 505)“17. … 17.9.

Additionally, it is well settled that in case of any ambiguity in the construction of a

penal statute, the courts must favour the interpretation which leans towards

protecting the rights of the accused, given the ubiquitous power disparity between the

individual accused and the State machinery. This is applicable not only in the case of

substantive penal statutes but also in the case of procedures providing for the

curtailment of the liberty of the accused.”] Secondly, any undue indulgence and

latitude to DoE will be deleterious to the constitutional values of rule of law and life

and liberty of persons. An officer cannot be allowed to selectively pick and choose

material implicating the person to be arrested. They have to equally apply their mind

to other material which absolves and exculpates the arrestee. The power to arrest

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under Section 19(1) of the PML Act cannot be exercised as per the whims and fancies

of the officer.”

15. Naturally the words “approval of superintendent of police” must not be

taken as a mere formality but would mean and pre suppose a detailed

representation to superior officer by the investigating officer with cogent

material and case docket indicating his reason to believe why such property

which is attempted to be attached, has link with the proceeds of crime.

Parallelly the approval so granted by the superior officer would also indicate

his satisfaction regarding the necessity for such attachment and also a

prima facie finding regarding the link between the proceeds of crime and the

property attempted to be attached.

16. Similarly, when the Court while examining such application along

with the approval must examine and assess, though to a limited extent, the

same on every aspect, For example if there is an involvement of public

property and/or government property that must be appropriately scrutinized

by the Court and to that effect appropriate findings must be recorded in the

order.

17. In a case of exparte order under section 107(5) of the BNSS, the court

should be more careful and should be invoked in rare cases which must

demonstrate the reasons for such haste in the application as well as in the

approval. Since the process of attachment has a deleterious effect on the

right of a citizen, therefore, the same must be interpreted rigorously. It is

settled law that attachment must receive strict interpretation as held in N.

Padmamma and Ors. Vs. S. Ramkrishan Reddy and Ors . reported in

(2008) 15 SCC 517 :-

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“21. If a right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the

same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the

Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such

right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of

India, must be strictly construed. (See Hindustan Petroleum Corpn.

Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai [(2005) 7 SCC 627] .) The principle laid down in

the said decision, having regard to the concept of Article 300-A of the

Constitution of India may be held to have some application in a case of this

nature.”

18. On a bare perusal of section 107 itself, it is clear that before passing

an order of attachment by the court, the legislature through sub-section (1)

to (4) of section 107 of the BNSS has provided for multiple layers of scrutiny.

At the first stage the scrutiny was conducted on the Executive side first by

the investigating officer and secondly by the superintendent of police or the

Commissioner of the police, i.e. highest superior officer of the investigating

officer. When such application is made by the investigating officer before the

Court, there are again two lawyers of judicial scrutiny conducted on the

facts provided to such court or magistrate by the investigating officer. One

prior to issuance of the show cause notice to the person whose property is

proposed to be attached under section 107 of BNSS and the second stage of

judicial consideration takes place after such persons appear in terms of

show cause notice and provide their explanation. Therefore, it is apparent

that the legislature in its wisdom had provided multiple layers of checks and

balances both at the executive and judicial level in order to ensure that the

process under section 107 of the BNSS leading to attachment of property

cannot be done at the whims and fancies of the investigating officer.

19. Therefore after considering the materials placed before him, if he

considers the requirement to pass such order, he must also record his

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satisfaction that unless such order is passed, the victim of the crime shall

be seriously prejudiced.

20. Keeping it in mind that forfeiture of property is not a punishment

under section 4(d) of BNS, recording of ‘reason to believe’; has to be made by

the investigating agency and mandatorily by the court along with

satisfaction if required, regarding the likelihood and/or transfer, in the line

of section 5 of The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (in short PMLA Act).

In this context, I feel it necessary to quote the observation made in the

judgment (though in connection with attachment and confiscation in PMLA

case), in Vijay Madan Lal Chowdhury Vs. Union Of India reported in

(2023) 12 SCC 1 which runs as follows:-

“179. The other grievance of the petitioners is in reference to the stipulation in

sub-section (4) of Section 8 providing for taking possession of the property. This

provision ought to be invoked only in exceptional situation keeping in mind the

peculiar facts of the case. In that, merely because the provisional attachment

order passed under Section 5(1) is confirmed, it does not follow that the

property stands confiscated; and until an order of confiscation is formally

passed, there is no reason to hasten the process of taking possession of such

property. The principle set out in Section 5(4) of the 2002 Act needs to be

extended even after confirmation of provisional attachment order until a formal

confiscation order is passed.

180. Section 5(4) clearly states that nothing in Section 5 including the order of

provisional attachment shall prevent the person interested in the enjoyment of

immovable property attached under sub-section (1) from such enjoyment. The

need to take possession of the attached property would arise only for giving

effect to the order of confiscation. This is also because sub-section (6) of Section

8 postulates that where on conclusion of a trial under the 2002 Act which is

obviously in respect of offence of money laundering, the Special Court finds that

the offence of money laundering has not taken place or the property is not

involved in money laundering, it shall order release of such property to the

person entitled to receive it. Once the possession of the property is taken in

terms of sub-section (4) and the finding in favour of the person is rendered by

the Special Court thereafter and during the interregnum if the property changes

hands and title vest in some third party, it would result in civil consequences

even to third party. That is certainly avoidable unless it is absolutely necessary

in the peculiar facts of a particular case so as to invoke the option available

under sub-section (4) of Section 8.

181. Indisputably, statutory rules have been framed by the Central

Government in exercise of powers under Section 73 of the 2002 Act regarding

the manner of taking possession of attached or frozen properties confirmed by

the adjudicating authority in 2013, and also regarding restoration of

confiscated property in 2019. Suffice it to observe that direction under Section

8(4) for taking possession of the property in question before a formal order of

confiscation is passed merely on the basis of confirmation of provisional

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attachment order, should be an exception and not a rule. That issue will have

to be considered on case-to-case basis. Upon such harmonious construction of

the relevant provisions, it is not possible to countenance challenge to the

validity of sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the 2002 Act.

182. The learned counsel appearing for the Union of India, had invited our

attention to the recommendations made by FATF in 2003 and 2012 to justify

the provision under consideration. The fact that non-conviction based

confiscation model is permissible, it does not warrant an extreme and drastic

action of physical dispossession of the person from the property in every case

— which can be industrial/commercial/business and also residential property,

until a formal order of confiscation is passed under Section 8(5) or 8(7) of the

2002 Act. As demonstrated earlier, it is possible that the Special Court in the

trial concerning money laundering offence may eventually decide the issue in

favour of the person in possession of the property as not being proceeds of

crime or for any other valid ground. Before such order is passed by the Special

Court, it would be a case of serious miscarriage of justice, if not abuse of

process to take physical possession of the property held by such person.

Further, it would serve no purpose by hastening the process of taking

possession of the property and then returning the same back to the same

person at a later date pursuant to the order passed by the court of competent

jurisdiction. Moreover, for the view taken by us while interpretating Section 3 of

the 2002 Act regarding the offence of money laundering, it can proceed only if it

is established that the person has directly or indirectly derived or obtained

proceeds of crime as a result of criminal activity relating to or relatable to a

scheduled offence or was involved in any process or activity connected with

proceeds of crime.

183. It is unfathomable as to how the action of confiscation can be resorted to

in respect of property in the event of his acquittal or discharge in connection

with the scheduled offence. Resultantly, we would sum up by observing that

the provision in the form of Section 8(4) can be resorted to only by way of an

exception and not as a rule. The analogy drawn by the Union of India on the

basis of decisions of this Court in Divl. Forest Officer v. G.V. Sudhakar

Rao [Divl. Forest Officer v. G.V. Sudhakar Rao, (1985) 4 SCC 573 : 1986 SCC

(Cri) 34] , Biswanath Bhattacharya [Biswanath Bhattacharya v. Union of India,

(2014) 4 SCC 392 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 342] , Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State

of Bihar [Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC 183 : (2016)

2 SCC (Cri) 1] , will be of no avail in the context of the scheme of attachment,

confiscation and vesting of proceeds of crime in the Central Government

provided for in the 2002 Act.

21. It may very well come to one’s mind as to how the spirit of Vijay

Madan Lal (supra) judgment becomes relevant for the present context as it

was passed in connection with special statutes namely PMLA. In my

opinion, it becomes relevant as the statute itself has created an anomalous

situation with the nucleus in the provision under section 107 of the BNSS in

connection with the term “criminal activity” and/or “proceeds of crime”. Both

these terminologies are not defined in the relevant chapter. The definition of

“proceeds of crime” as found under section 111( c) of the BNSS may not be

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of much assistance, because such definition has been restricted only for

chapter VIII of BNSS. It is trite law that in such case the court will adopt the

general definition, as a sequel there will be a room for uncertainty. The net

will remain wide enough thereby rendering the provisions susceptible to

misuse. It is true that possibility of misuse of a provision is not a ground for

declaration of the same as ultra vires but can be taken as a ground for

taking additional safeguards by the Executive and the Judiciary while

invoking their respective jurisdictions. In the absence of application of mind

and/or taking requisite safeguards, there is every likelihood that the

criminal prosecution would be used in some cases as a tool of recovery

mechanism, which is not permissible under the law.

22. It further needs to be mentioned about another particular feature of

section 107 which deals with exparte interim attachment order. As stated

above, the provisions allow such orders to be issued where notice would

defeat the purpose of attachment though it does not provide any guidance

on the circumstances justifying such action. Once such interim order is

passed there is likelihood that it may continue indefinitely, because the

statute does not prescribe any time limit for final adjudication and it may

create a situation where individual may be deprived of his property for

prolonged period without effective remedy. Furthermore, though bare

reading of heading under section 107 speaks about restoration of property

but said section is silent about the mode or manner as to how such

attached property can be restored, if situation demands. Moreover, in the

statute like PMLA, such provisional attachment limits for a period of 180

days, though section 107 imposes no such constraints. Therefore exparte

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order under section 107 (5) of the BNSS can only be passed in rare cases

which must demonstrate the reason for such haste in the application as well

as in the approval. Since, such ex parte order of attachment may cause a

deleterious effect on the right of a citizen therefore the same must be

interpreted rigorously.

23. Needless to say that the term ‘proceeds of crime’ if taken as ‘any

property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal

activity or from the commission of any offence’, this layer of judicial

supervision can be triggered prior to even issuance of any show cause notice

to the affected person. Therefore, while the court is going to exercise such

power on the basis of ex parte hearing, the court should record material

evidence to that effect. ‘Reason to believe’ of the investigating officer in all

such cases must be in writing and could be placed before superior police

officer or before the court or magistrate.

24. In short, I may conclude that non application of judicial mind or to

take casual approach while dealing with prayer for attachment under

section 107, (as has happened in the instant case) may render section 107

vulnerable under multiple constitutional provisions. If the investigating

authorities and the Court do not keep in mind what has been reiterated in

Arvind Kejriwal Case (supra) that the words ‘but not otherwise’ gives a

stringent condition that before invoking jurisdiction under the said provision

concerned authority must have sufficient cause to believe, otherwise

absolute discretion would lead to tyranny. The investigating officer must

base their belief on hard admissible material in their actual possession and

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that material must clearly indicate guilt. Mere non co-operation with

question or a general “reason to suspect” does not meet the “sufficient

cause………but not otherwise” threshold required to deprive an individual of

their liberty. Needless to say that the deprivation of property if not made on

sound judicial discretion may violate Article 300A also as recognized in K.T.

plantation Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 and may

also lead to violation of article 14 in the light of EP Royappa Vs. State of

Tamilnadu reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3 and Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of

India, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248.

25. Coming back to the instant case, as I have already stated above that

since no notice was served upon the petitioner in violation of section 107 (2)

& (3) of the BNSS the instant application being CRR 4810 of 2025 is

allowed. The impugned order dated 24.09.2025 passed by the learned CJM

Howrah, in GR no. 2801 of 2025 is hereby set aside. However, this order will

not prevent the concerned investigating authority to initiate process afresh

strictly in compliance with section 107 of BNSS, within a period of four

weeks from the date of this order and in the event of initiation of such

process afresh and also in the event of making any prayer under section 107

(2) or (3) of BNSS afresh, the court below will dispose of such prayer, if any,

strictly in accordance with law as discussed above.

26. Connected Application also stand disposed of accordingly.

Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given

to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.

(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)