LPA 99/2026 Page 1 of 15

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Reserved on: 27.02.2026

% Judgment Delivered on: 26.05.2026

+ LPA 99/2026, CM Nos. 13512/2026 & 13513/2026

SANJAY KUMAR SINGH .....Appellant

versus

THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO LG &

ORS .....Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case

For the Appellant: Ms. Aarushi Tiku, Advocate with

Appellant in person.

For the Respondents: Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, Mr. Nitesh

Kumar Singh, Mr. Aliza Alam & Mr.

Mohnish Sehrawat, Advocates for

GNCTD.

Mr. Prashant Mehta, Mr. Pranav

Singh & Ms. Prachi Mehta,

Advocates for R-4 to 6 & 8.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

JUDGMENT

TEJAS KARIA, J

1.The present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the

Order dated 06.02.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed in W.P.(C) 5826/2025

(“Writ Petition”) whereby the learned Single Judge had dismissed the Writ

Petition and upheld the Office Order dated 05.04.2024 (“Impugned Office

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Order”) by way of which the Appellant’s extension had been superseded

and the Appellant was relieved from service as an Executive Assistant with

Respondent No. 4.

FACTUAL MATRIX

2.On 09.07.2013, Respondent No. 4 by way of a Full Bench order

created a sanctioned post of Executive Assistant by converting two vacant

posts of Steno-cum-Computer Operators in the same pay scale on account of

paucity of proper support staff. On 31.03.2014, in pursuance of the creation

of the sanctioned post of Executive Assistant, an advertisement was taken

out by the Respondent No. 4 inviting applications from eligible candidates

for filling vacancies including the post of Executive Assistant on contract

basis for a period of 3 years, in accordance with the Delhi Electricity

Regulatory Commission (Management & Development of Human

Resources) Regulations, 2001 (“DERC MDHRRegulations”).

3.On 24.05.2014, the Appellant applied for the post of Executive

Assistant on a contractual basis. Thereafter, on 28.11.2014, Respondent No.

4 issued an offer of appointment to the Appellant for the said post, which

was duly accepted by him. Subsequently, Respondent No. 4 issued a formal

Office Order dated 16.12.2014 recording that the Appellant had joined

duties as Executive Assistant on a contractual basis for a period of three

years with effect from 03.12.2014.

4.On 07.11.2017, Respondent No. 4 extended the Appellant’s tenure for

a further period of three years, i.e., from 03.12.2017 to 02.12.2020.

Thereafter, on 01.12.2020, Respondent No. 4 again extended the Appellant’s

tenure with effect from 03.12.2020 until a new incumbent joined the post.

Subsequently, Respondent No. 4 issued an advertisement inviting

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applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the post of

Executive Assistant on a contractual basis for a period of three years.

Pursuant thereto, the Appellant once again applied for the said post on

30.12.2020 and was called for a personal interaction on 26.03.2021.

Following the said interaction, Respondent No. 4 issued an offer of

appointment dated 31.03.2021 to the Appellant, which was duly accepted by

him. Thereafter, by Office Order dated 09.04.2021, Respondent No. 4

appointed the Appellant to the post of Executive Assistant on a contractual

basis for a period of three years with effect from 06.04.2021, and the said

Office Order was signed by the Personnel Officer.

5.The Appellant had been in the employment of Respondent No. 4 since

2014 and had been granted repeated extensions of his contractual

engagement. In view of the earlier extensions granted by Respondent No. 4,

the Appellant submitted an application dated 22.05.2023 seeking a further

extension of his tenure for an additional period of three years, as his existing

tenure was due to expire on 05.04.2024.

6.On 03.07.2023, the said request was forwarded by the Joint Secretary

for consideration. Thereafter, on 31.07.2023, an Office Order (“Order of

Extension”) was issued by the Personnel Officer extending the Appellant’s

tenure for a further period of three years, i.e., from 06.04.2024 to

05.04.2027, on the existing terms and conditions.

7.The said Order of Extension was issued in continuation of the earlier

Office Order dated 09.04.2021 and was also marked to the Joint Secretary

and the Deputy Director (P&A) of Respondent No. 4.

8.Respondent No. 4 issued the Impugned Office Order, whereby the

Order of Extension stood superseded. On the same date, the Appellant

LPA 99/2026 Page 4 of 15

submitted a representation to Respondent No. 4 seeking an opportunity of

hearing. As no response was forthcoming, the Appellant approached this

Court by filing the Writ Petition seeking reinstatement to the post of

Executive Assistant with Respondent No. 4.

9.By the Impugned Order, the Writ Petition came to be dismissed on the

finding that the Appellant’s contractual employment had come to an end on

05.04.2024 and that any right to continue in service thereafter was

contingent upon a valid extension order. It was further held that the Order of

Extension had been issued prematurely, was not founded upon the requisite

performance appraisal, had been issued by an unauthorised decision-maker

in the absence of the Chairperson and without the claimed approval.

10.It is also observed in the Impugned Order that, in any event, the Order

of Extension had not matured into an executed contract for the subsequent

term. The Impugned Order also clarified that dismissal of the Writ Petition

would not preclude the Appellant from participating in any recruitment or

selection process for which he was otherwise eligible.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

11.The learned Counsel for the Appellant made the following

submissions:

11.1The Impugned Order proceeds on a mischaracterisation of the

core controversy, inasmuch as the learned Single Judge treated

the matter as one concerning mere non-renewal of a contract,

whereas the Appellant’s case was that of unilateral and

arbitrary withdrawal of an extension already granted by the

Respondents. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that

the Impugned Office Order issued by Respondent No. 4 was

LPA 99/2026 Page 5 of 15

not a mere intimation of expiry of the contractual term, but an

order rescinding an existing administrative decision whereby

the Appellant’s extension had been granted, and that too

without assigning any reasons. The Impugned Order is further

vitiated in accepting the assertions of Respondent Nos. 4 to 6

that the extension was premature and issued by an incompetent

authority, despite the absence of any documentary material in

support thereof. The learned Single Judge further erred in

holding that the Order of Extension had been issued by a person

lacking authority to do so, without any reliance by the

Respondents upon service regulations or other governing

provisions bearing upon the competence of the Single Member.

11.2Under the contract entered into between the Appellant and

Respondent No. 4, the Appellant’s appointment was governed

by Regulations 5, 10, 11 and 12 of the DERC MDHR

Regulations. In terms of Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR

Regulations, the contract of an employee was capable of being

extended at the discretion of Respondent No. 4. Regulation 5(a)

of the DERC MDHR Regulations reads as under:

“5 (a) All appointments made to the Commission on deputation

or on contractual basis to the Commission under these

regulations shall be for a period not 19 exceeding three years

in the first instance which will be extendable / renewable for

upto a period of three years at the discretion of the

Commission which shall be based on the performance

appraisal report submitted by the designated authority as

nominated by the Commission. The Chairperson shall have the

discretion to review such performance appraisal report on his

own appraisal of the performance of the officer / staff member

concerned.”

LPA 99/2026 Page 6 of 15

11.3On 03.07.2023, the Appellant’s request for extension was duly

forwarded by the Joint Secretary for consideration by the

competent authority. The said communication specifically

recorded that the Appellant’s Annual Performance Appraisal

Report had been adjudged “Outstanding” for the relevant period

required to be considered for extension for the period from

06.04.2024 to 05.04.2027.

11.4The learned Single Judge failed to consider that Respondent

Nos. 4 to 6 themselves admitted that the Impugned Office

Order had been issued in supersession of the earlier Order of

Extension. It was, therefore, in substance a withdrawal of an

extension already granted, and not a mere intimation of expiry,

as contended by the Respondents and erroneously accepted by

the learned Single Judge.

11.5The learned Single Judge further failed to appreciate that, had

the Impugned Office Order been merely an intimation of the

expiry of the contract, there would have been no occasion to

state that the earlier Order of Extension stood superseded. The

Respondents, however, formally rescinded a prior extension in

an arbitrary and unfair manner without assigning any reasons.

The learned Single Judge also erred in failing to appreciate that

the Respondents’ entire case was founded on reasons not

contained in the Impugned Office Order but introduced

subsequently by way of the Counter Affidavit filed in the Writ

Petition.

LPA 99/2026 Page 7 of 15

11.6The learned Single Judge did not consider that the Impugned

Office Order, by which a formal extension granted to the

Appellant was withdrawn, made no reference whatsoever to the

reasons later advanced by Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 in their

Counter Affidavit in the Writ Petition. The Respondents’ entire

defense of the Impugned Office Order is founded upon reasons

that do not appear in the Impugned Office Order itself, but were

introduced subsequently as an afterthought by way of the

Counter Affidavit, constituting a case of post facto justification.

This approach is contrary to the settled principle laid down by

the Supreme Court inMohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election

Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, namely, that the validity of

an order must be judged on the reasons stated therein and

cannot be supplemented by reasons furnished subsequently.

11.7The learned Single Judge, while passing the Impugned Order,

failed to consider that the arbitrary withdrawal of a formal

extension, having civil consequences and resulting in the

deprivation of benefits to the Appellant, necessarily required

the grant of a hearing. The learned Single Judge further failed

to appreciate that the Order of Extension expressly recorded

that it had been issued by the competent authority, was signed

by the Personnel Officer, and was marked to the Joint Secretary

and the Deputy Director (P&A). It was also the Respondents’

own admission in their internal noting that there existed no

standard procedure governing extensions. In view of that

admission, the Respondents’ contention that the extension

LPA 99/2026 Page 8 of 15

granted to the Appellant was premature is both factually and

legally untenable.

11.8The learned Single Judge failed to consider that the Supreme

Court in the case ofBhola Nath v. State of Jharkhand, 2026

SCC Online SC 129, has held that contractual nomenclature

will not denude employees of constitutional protection. Long,

uninterrupted service on sanctioned posts gives rise to

protection under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950

(“Constitution of India”), legitimate expectation and

entitlement to fair treatment. The State bears a heightened

obligation and cannot take advantage of its superior bargaining

power. The Supreme Court inBhola Nath(supra) further held

that legitimate expectation arises from consistent past conduct

like repeated extensions and the State must pass a speaking

order before discontinuing a formal extension. An abrupt

discontinuance after long service is violative of Article 14 of

the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of this Court in

the judgment ofPawan Sharma v. Govt. of NCT Delhi, 2025

SCC Online Del 8313, held that where the initial appointment

is through structured selection process, continuous service for

long period, multiple renewals, good performance etc., in such

cases labels such as contractual, temporary are irrelevant and

the aforesaid factors mandate constitutional protection.

11.9The Impugned Order is, therefore, contrary to settled principles

of law and judgments passed by the Supreme Court and this

Court and thus liable to be set aside.

LPA 99/2026 Page 9 of 15

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

12.The learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 and 8 made the

following submissions:

12.1The Appellant has no vested right to renewal or continuation of

a contractual engagement. The contract between the Appellant

and Respondent No. 4 was terminated by efflux of time, and

renewal was subject to discretion of Respondent No. 4. The

Appellant cannot insist upon continuation merely because an

earlier contract existed.

12.2The request for extension was submitted nearly ten months

prior to the expiry of the subsisting contract, and the Order of

Extension was issued approximately nine months before the

contractual term, which was due to expire on 05.04.2024.

Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR Regulations contemplates

renewal of the contract based on a performance appraisal

undertaken at the point of renewal. Accordingly, any advance

renewal is contrary to the procedure prescribed therein. The

extension was not founded upon the requisite performance

appraisal. The appraisal for the period immediately preceding

the expiry of the contract could not have been evaluated at the

time the extension was granted, and even the preceding

appraisal segment had not been completed in the manner

required. The Order of Extension is, therefore, contrary to

Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR Regulations.

12.3The Secretary recorded objections to the proposed extension on

the ground that it was due only in April 2024 and that the issue

LPA 99/2026 Page 10 of 15

of performance appraisal had not been duly addressed.

Notwithstanding those objections, a single member purported

to extend the tenure on the eve of the expiry of his own term.

The decision to grant the extension, having been taken in the

absence of the Chairperson and without the requisite approvals,

could not bind Respondent No. 4. No enforceable contract ever

came into existence for the period from 06.04.2024 to

05.04.2027, since no agreement for the said period was

executed. The only subsisting contractual engagement came to

an end on 05.04.2024, and the Impugned Office Order merely

communicated that consequence.

12.4No hearing was required when a contract expired by efflux of

time. Further, the post of Executive Assistant was not a duly

sanctioned post approved by the Government of NCT of Delhi.

An internal decision of Respondent No. 4 could not substitute

statutory approval, and the Appellant cannot assert an

enforceable claim on the basis of such an arrangement.

12.5In these circumstances, there is no infirmity in the Impugned

Order, and the present Appeal is liable to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

13.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

Impugned Order.

14.By way of the present Appeal, the Appellant has assailed the

Impugned Order passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the Writ

Petition preferred by the Appellant came to be dismissed on the finding that

the Appellant’s contractual employment stood concluded on 05.04.2024 and

LPA 99/2026 Page 11 of 15

that any right to continue in service thereafter was contingent upon a valid

extension order. It was further held that, in the Appellant’s case, the alleged

extension was premature as the same was not founded upon the requisite

performance appraisal and had been issued by an unauthorised decision-

maker in the absence of the Chairperson and without the claimed approval.

The Impugned Order has held that Order of Extension had never matured

into an executed contract for the subsequent term.

15.The Impugned Order further clarified that the dismissal of the Writ

Petition would not preclude the Appellant from participating in any

recruitment or selection process for which he was otherwise eligible, in

accordance with the applicable rules and the terms of the relevant

advertisement.

16.It is the Appellant’s case that the Impugned Office Order was not a

mere intimation of the expiry of the contract, but an order cancelling an

existing administrative decision whereby an extension had been granted in

his favour. We are unable to accept the said contention. It is an admitted

position that the Appellant was engaged by Respondent No. 4 on a

contractual basis, and that such engagement was liable to renewal every

three years only in accordance with the applicable performance appraisal

and the governing provisions of the DERC MDHR Regulations. Upon

expiry of the contractual term on 05.04.2024, the engagement stood

concluded by efflux of time, and any renewal thereafter remained subject to

the discretion of Respondent No. 4 in accordance with law. Accordingly, the

Impugned Office Order merely communicated the legal consequence of such

expiry.

LPA 99/2026 Page 12 of 15

17.The Order of Extension was issued without the requisite approval and,

therefore, it did not culminate in an enforceable contract. Consequently, the

Impugned Office Order was merely an intimation of the completion of the

contractual tenure, coupled with the supersession of an earlier and disputed

decision to extend the same.

18.It is well settled that a contractual employee has no vested right to

continue beyond the agreed tenure. Accordingly, the Appellant cannot assert

any vested right to renewal or continuation of a contractual engagement.

Mere existence of an earlier contract does not entitle the Appellant, as of

right, to insist upon continuation in service. No enforceable contract ever

came into existence for the period from 06.04.2024 to 05.04.2027, since no

agreement governing the said period was ever executed.

19.Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR Regulations clearly prescribes

the procedure governing renewal of a contractual engagement. The said

provision specifically contemplates review of the performance appraisal of

the employee concerned by the Chairperson for the purposes of extension of

the contract. In the present case, the Order of Extension was issued by a

Single Member in the absence of the Chairperson, and the Appellant has

been unable to establish that the said Order was not premature or that it was

issued in due compliance with Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR

Regulations. The Single Member, therefore, lacked the authority to grant the

extension in question, and the Order of Extension, having been issued

without the approval of the Chairperson, did not culminate in an enforceable

contract binding upon Respondent No. 4.

20.Further, neither the Impugned Office Order nor the Impugned Order

is punitive or adversarial in nature, and the Appellant remains eligible to

LPA 99/2026 Page 13 of 15

participate in any recruitment or selection process for which he is otherwise

eligible, in accordance with the applicable rules and the terms of the relevant

advertisement.

21.The Appellant has contended that the Impugned Office Order did not

disclose any reasons for the withdrawal of the purported formal extension

granted in his favour, and that Respondent Nos. 4 to 6 sought to furnish such

reasons subsequently in their Counter Affidavit filed in the Writ Petition,

notwithstanding the absence of any such reasons in the Impugned Office

Order itself. This contention of the Appellant also cannot be accepted, as the

Impugned Office Order merely informed the Appellant that his tenure with

Respondent No. 4 had come to an end. Accordingly, the Impugned Office

Order neither terminated a subsisting contract nor constituted an adverse

order against the Appellant. In these circumstances, neither the furnishing of

reasons nor the grant of an opportunity of hearing was required when the

contractual engagement had come to an end by efflux of time.

22.The Appellant has contended that the Order of Extension was not

premature and that the authority issuing the same was competent to grant

such extension. Notably, the request for extension was made by the

Appellant nearly ten months prior to the expiry of the subsisting contract,

and the Order of Extension granting such extension was issued

approximately nine months before the contractual term was due to expire on

05.04.2024. Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR Regulations does not

contemplate renewal of a contract without a performance appraisal

undertaken at the point of renewal. An advance renewal was, therefore,

contrary to the procedure prescribed under the DERC MDHR Regulations.

LPA 99/2026 Page 14 of 15

23.Further, the authority which issued the Order of Extension was not

competent to grant such extension. In any event, at the time the said Order

came to be issued, no performance appraisal had been undertaken, although

the same was required to be conducted immediately prior to the expiry of

tenure. On previous occasions, when the Appellant’s contractual

engagement was extended, such extension had been granted on the basis of

the latest performance appraisal and such extension was granted

immediately prior to the expiry of the existing tenure.

24.In the absence of compliance with the mandatory requirements of

Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR Regulations, there was no valid

extension of contract accrued in favour of the Appellant. The Appellant’s

right, if any, to continue in service with Respondent No. 4 was contingent

upon the grant of a valid extension by Respondent No. 4. Since the Order of

Extension was contrary to Regulation 5(a) of the DERC MDHR

Regulations, the same could not be regarded as a valid and enforceable

contract binding upon Respondent No. 4.

25.The Appellant has contended that merely describing his engagement

as contractual would not denude him of constitutional protection. According

to the Appellant, his long and uninterrupted service on a sanctioned post

gave rise to protection under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as well

as a legitimate expectation of fair treatment. However, the learned Single

Judge has rightly held that the Appellant’s engagement was contractual in

nature for a fixed term. It is also held in the Impugned Order the Appellant

was unable to demonstrate a lawful and concluded extension conferring an

enforceable right to continue after 05.04.2024. In absence of such a right,

there was not infirmity with the Impugned Office Order.

LPA 99/2026 Page 15 of 15

26.In any event, the post of Executive Assistant was not a duly

sanctioned post approved by the Government of NCT of Delhi.

Consequently, the decisions inBhola Nath(supra) andPawan Sharma

(supra) do not advance the case of the Appellant. An internal decision of

Respondent No. 4 cannot substitute mandatory statutory approval, and the

Appellant cannot assert any enforceable claim on the basis of such an

arrangement.

27.In view of the foregoing analysis, we are of the considered opinion

that the Appellant has failed to make out any ground warranting interference

with the Impugned Order. Accordingly, the present Appeal, along with the

pending applications, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

TEJAS KARIA, J

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ

MAY 26, 2026/'AK’