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2026:CGHC:1993

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

ORDER RESERVED ON 08. 01.2026

ORDER DELIVERED ON 13. 01.2026

ORDER UPLOADED ON 13. 01.2026

MCRCA No. 11 of 2026

1 - Saumya Chaurasia D/o Lt. Shri O.N. Chaurasia Aged About 46

Years R/o A/21 Surya Residency, Junwani Road, Kohka, Bhilai, Supela

Durg, Chhattisgarh-490023 (Currently Under Judicial Custody At

Central Jail, Raipur (C.G.)

... Applicant(s)

versus

1 - The State Of Chhattisgarh Through Economic Offences Wing (Eow)/

Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Headquarter, Opposite Jai Jawan Petrol

Pump, Telibandha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh - 492001

... Respondent(s)

For Applicant (s) :Shri Siddarth Dave, Sr. Advocate through VC

assisted by Shri Harshwardhan Parganiha,

Shri Anshul Rai, Shri Mayank Jain, Shri

Madhur Jain, Shri Arpit Goel, Shri Harshit

Sharma, Shri Ojaswa Pathak, Ms. Alekhya

Shastry and Ms. Manubha Shankar,

Advocates

For Respondent/State :Shri Shri Praveen Das, Addl. Advocate

General and Dr. Saurabh Kumar Pande, Dy.

Advocate General

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(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR VERMA)

C A V Order

The Applicant seeks the indulgence of this Court by invoking its

extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, apprehending her imminent arrest in

connection with FIR No. 04 of 2024 dated 17.01.2024, registered by the

Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau, Chhattisgarh, Raipur,

for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 420,

467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections

7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2.The Applicant asserts with utmost humility that she has been

falsely implicated owing to extraneous and ulterior considerations, and

that the substratum of the allegations, even if taken at their face value,

fails to disclose any prima facie involvement or culpability on her part.

The material placed on record, including the charge-sheets, does not

reveal any legally sustainable nexus between the Applicant and the

alleged offences.

3.The present application has, therefore, been necessitated in the

paramount interest of justice and fair play, seeking protection of the

Applicant’s personal liberty, which stands sanctified and zealously

guarded under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE.

4.The present application has been preferred by the Applicant

under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,

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seeking protection against arrest in connection with FIR No. 04 of 2024

dated 17.01.2024 registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-

Corruption Bureau, Chhattisgarh, Raipur, for the alleged commission of

offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988.

5.As per the prosecution version, it is alleged that during the period

from 2019 to 2022, a large-scale syndicate was operating in the State

of Chhattisgarh which was purportedly involved in the manufacture and

sale of illegal liquor through licensed government outlets, thereby

generating unlawful pecuniary gains. It is further alleged that the

proceeds emanating from the aforesaid illicit activities were

systematically distributed amongst the members of the syndicate and

further utilized to unlawfully influence and suborn certain political and

administrative functionaries, thereby occasioning a colossal loss to the

State exchequer.

6.As per prosecution case, it is alleged that she is neither named in

the present FIR nor is any specific, direct or overt role attributed to her

therein. The FIR, as it stands, contains general and omnibus

allegations against multiple individuals, without disclosing the

Applicant’s involvement either by name, by role, or by necessary

implication.

6.It is the further allegation that the registration of the present FIR

is of nearly two years ago, the investigating agency has filed one

charge-sheet and six supplementary charge-sheets, arraigning as

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many as 51 accused persons. However, not a single notice, summons

or call for interrogation has ever been issued to the Applicant in

connection with the present FIR, clearly indicating that custodial

interrogation of the Applicant was never considered necessary during

the course of investigation.

7.At present, the applicant is in judicial custody in connection with

proceedings initiated by the Directorate of Enforcement, arising out of a

separate and independent ECIR based on distinct statutory provisions.

The said custody does not pertain to the present FIR and has no

bearing on the Applicant’s alleged role in the offences under

investigation by the EOW/ACB.

8.Notwithstanding the absence of any incriminating material

against the Applicant in the present FIR, the Non-Applicant has sought

issuance of a production warrant to secure the Applicant’s presence

from judicial custody for the purpose of interrogation in the present

case. The said action, taken without attributing any specific role or

demonstrating custodial necessity, has given rise to a reasonable,

genuine and bona fide apprehension in the mind of the Applicant that

she may be arrested in the present case in a mechanical and punitive

manner.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT

9. Shri Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the Applicant fairly and

candidly submits that the Applicant is presently in judicial custody in

connection with proceedings initiated by the Directorate of Enforcement

arising out of a distinct ECIR. However, it is respectfully submitted that

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such custody pertains to an independent and separate offence and

cannot, in law or logic, be treated as a bar to the grant of anticipatory

bail in the present FIR registered by the EOW/ACB.Learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that the present case is

not merely one of an apprehended arrest but one that strikes at the

very constitutional discipline governing arrest, liberty and investigation.

The Applicant stands before this Court not as a named accused in the

FIR, nor as one against whom any specific role is attributed, but as a

citizen whose liberty is sought to be imperilled by a demonstrable

pattern of coercive and successive prosecutions, divorced from

evidentiary necessity and sanctioned legal procedure.

10.It is submitted that the gravamen of the Applicant’s apprehension

arises from the fact that, despite the present FIR consistently held that

further investigation must be court-controlled, exception-based, and not

a matter of executive whim. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the

law on this issue is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in

Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.

2501 of 2024, has categorically held that there is no restriction,

either in the text or in the scheme of Section 438 CrPC (now

Section 482 BNSS), which precludes an accused from seeking

anticipatory bail in one case merely because he or she is in

custody in another case. The Applicant’s present custody, therefore,

does not dilute her statutory or constitutional entitlement to seek

protection against arrest in the present FIR. is into the offence and not

the offender, and the filing of successive charge-sheets against persons

not named in the FIR, without fresh material, is legally impermissible.

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The 41st Law Commission Report also clarifies that further

investigation must be triggered only by fresh material, not by what was

already available at the time of filing the charge-sheet.

11.Learned Senior Counsel submits that the Applicant’s conduct is

unimpeachable. She has been granted interim/default bail in multiple

independent proceedings, including proceedings before the Supreme

Court, and in not a single case has there been even an allegation of

misuse of liberty, non-cooperation, tampering with evidence, or

influencing witnesses. This conduct decisively answers all

apprehensions raised by the prosecution.

12.He further submits that parity is writ large. Numerous co-

accused, including Excise Officers, have been granted protection either

by the Supreme Court or by this Court. The Applicant stands on an

even stronger footing, being neither named in the FIR nor arrested

during the long course of investigation ie. nearly for about two years. It

is submitted that the very fact that the Applicant is already in judicial

custody further demonstrates that there exists no possibility of flight,

abscondence, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses in the

present case. The apprehensions customarily raised by the prosecution

stand automatically neutralized by the Applicant’s present custodial

status.

13.It is further submitted that economic offences do not create a

separate jurisprudence of bail. In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of

Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791, the Apex Court has authoritatively

held that bail is not excluded merely because allegations pertain to

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economic offences, and that constitutional parameters governing liberty

remain unchanged.

14.Learned Senior Counsel placed his strong reliance on the

Constitution Bench judgment in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of

Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that anticipatory bail

is not to be limited by time and that the court must consider only three

factors—flight risk, tampering with evidence, and influencing witnesses.

The Applicant satisfies all three parameters unequivocally.

15.Learned Senior Counsel submits that Article 21 is not a matter of

convenience but of command. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,

(2021) 3 SCC 713, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that courts must

remain alive to the constitutional mandate of personal liberty,

particularly where the prosecution itself has failed to progress the case

in a manner warranting incarceration.

16.Learned Senior Counsel submits that despite the registration of

the present FIR nearly two years ago, and despite the filing of one

charge-sheet and six supplementary charge-sheets arraigning 51

accused persons, the Applicant has never been served with a notice,

summons, or call for interrogation in connection with the present FIR.

This conduct of the prosecution conclusively establishes that custodial

interrogation of the Applicant has never been considered necessary

during the entire course of investigation.

17.It is further submitted that the sudden attempt to secure the

Applicant’s custody in the present case, by issuance of a production

warrant while she is already in custody in the ED case, is nothing but a

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colourable exercise of power, intended to defeat the safeguards

governing arrest and to subject the Applicant to successive and punitive

incarceration, without any demonstrable investigative necessity.

18.Learned Senior Counsel submits that custodial interrogation

cannot be claimed as a matter of course, nor can it be invoked as a

talisman to oppose anticipatory bail. The Supreme Court in Ashok

Kumar v. State of Union Territory, Chandigarh, 2024 SCC OnLine

SC 274, has held that a mere assertion by the State that custodial

interrogation is required is wholly insufficient, and that the prosecution

must place material showing something more than a prima facie case.

No such material exists against the Applicant.

19.On merits, it is submitted that the Applicant is not named in the

FIR, and no specific role, overt act, demand, acceptance, or

participation is attributed to her. The allegations are vague, omnibus

and general. In Soundarajan v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police,

2023 SCC OnLine SC 424, the Supreme Court has held that for

offences under Section 7 of the PC Act, demand and acceptance of

illegal gratification are sine qua non, and in the absence thereof,

prosecution itself becomes unsustainable.

20.Similarly, the allegation of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-

B IPC is wholly misconceived. In Ram Sharan Chaturvedi v. State of

M.P., (2022) 16 SCC 166, the Supreme Court has held that conspiracy

cannot be inferred in the absence of cogent evidence demonstrating a

meeting of minds or a common design. No such evidence is

forthcoming in the present case.

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21.Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the investigating

agency is impermissibly seeking to continue investigation under the

guise of “further investigation” without obtaining prior permission of the

competent court, in clear violation of settled law laid down in Ram Lal

Narang v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 2 SCC 322; Vinay

Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC 762; and Vinubhai Haribhai

Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17 SCC 1. It is submitted that the

Applicant’s conduct throughout various proceedings is impeccable.

22.Lastly, learned Senior Counsel beseeches this Court to consider

the grave humanitarian dimension. The Applicant is a woman with two

minor children of tender age, wholly dependent on her care. Her arrest

would inflict irreversible emotional and psychological harm upon them

—harm which no subsequent acquittal can undo. The criminal process

cannot be permitted to become a tool of punishment by itself.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

23.At the outset, Learned State counsel, while strongly opposing the

prayer for anticipatory bail, has placed reliance upon the following

authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to contend

that pre-arrest bail in serious economic and corruption-related offences

is an exception and not the rule, and that investigating agencies must

be granted adequate freedom to conduct a fair and effective

investigation. The answering Respondent–State submits that the

present application seeking interim protection is wholly misconceived,

premature and devoid of merit, and has been filed with a view to pre-

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empt the lawful course of investigation in a serious and grave economic

offence having far-reaching ramifications.

25.At the very threshold, it is submitted that the earlier anticipatory

bail application preferred by the Applicant stood dismissed by the Trial

Court vide a detailed and reasoned order dated 22.12.2025. The mere

filing of a subsequent application before this Court does not ipso facto

efface the said order, nor does it render the judicial process adopted by

the investigating agency nugatory.

26.It is further submitted that the issuance of a production warrant

by the learned Sessions Court cannot be interdicted merely on the

ground that an anticipatory bail application has been filed, lest the

statutory powers of investigation be rendered illusory. The anticipatory

bail proceedings and the investigative process are distinct, independent

and operate in separate spheres.

27.It is submitted that the law with respect to grant of anticipatory

bail in cases involving serious offences under the Prevention of

Corruption Act and large-scale economic crimes has been recently

crystallized by the Supreme Court in Devendra Kumar Bansal v.

State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493. Placing reliance on this recent

authoritative pronouncement, learned State Counsel submits that:

•In cases involving corruption and abuse of official position,

anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional

circumstances, such as where the allegations are prima facie

false, frivolous, or politically motivated.

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•Presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole ground

for grant of anticipatory bail.

•Overemphasis on the liberty of the accused, at the cost of public

interest, may defeat the cause of public justice.

The Court has further clarified that Section 438 Cr.P.C. is not an

integral facet of Article 21, and denial of anticipatory bail in appropriate

cases does not amount to violation of constitutional rights.

28.The Apex Court has held that anticipatory bail in corruption cases

is not a matter of course and can be granted only in exceptional

circumstances, where the Court is prima facie satisfied that the

accused has been falsely implicated or the allegations are manifestly

frivolous or politically motivated.

29.In the present case, no such exceptional circumstances are

made out. The allegations against the Applicant are neither bald nor

speculative. On the contrary, the investigation has unearthed

contemporaneous digital evidence, including WhatsApp

communications,which prima facie indicate the Applicant’s active and

supervisory role in the execution of the liquor scam, in close

coordination with co-accused persons including Anwar Dhebar, Anil

Tuteja and others.

30.It is submitted that the complicity of the Applicant is not

incidental, derivative or merely associative, but is borne out from

material collected during investigation which demonstrates that the

Applicant was involved in monitoring, supervising and accounting

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(“Hisab”) of proceeds of crime, and in facilitating collection and routing

of illicit funds generated from the scam.

31.The State further submits that the present matter arises out of

Crime No. 04 of 2024 registered by EOW/ACB, pertaining to a large-

scale liquor scam in the State of Chhattisgarh, involving proceeds of

crime estimated to be in excess of ₹4,000 crores. Given the magnitude

of the offence, the complexity of financial layering, and the number of

accused involved, the investigation necessarily requires qualitative

custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court, in the matter of Sumitha

Pradeep Vs. Arun Kumar C.K. and Another, (2022) 17 SCC 391 ,

while summarizing the governing principles for grant of anticipatory bail,

has held that:

•The absence of a specific plea for custodial interrogation, by

itself, cannot be treated as a ground for grant of anticipatory bail.

•The Court must primarily consider the prima facie case, the

nature and gravity of the offence, and the severity of punishment.

Even where custodial interrogation may not appear immediately

necessary, anticipatory bail can still be refused if the overall facts so

warrant.

32.The judgment underscores that anticipatory bail is not to be

granted mechanically and must be declined where serious allegations

exist. In the matter of State v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187,

Learned State Counsel further relies upon this classic authority to

submit that:

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•Custodial interrogation is qualitatively more effective than

questioning an accused who is protected by anticipatory bail.

•Grant of anticipatory bail in cases involving high-ranking or

influential persons may seriously impair the investigation,

particularly where the accused has the capacity to influence

witnesses or tamper with evidence.

•The Court cautioned that anticipatory bail should not be granted

in a routine manner, especially in corruption cases.

33.It is not in dispute that the Applicant has been arrested by the

Directorate of Enforcement on 16.12.2025 in connection with ECIR No.

RPZO/04/2024 dated 11.04.2024, and is presently lodged in judicial

custody at Raipur Central Jail. The State submits that the mere fact of

such custody does not insulate the Applicant from being lawfully

interrogated or arrested in another cognate offence, particularly where

the investigating agency has demonstrated sufficient material

necessitating such interrogation.

34.The contention that there is any violation of Article 21 merely

because a production warrant has been sought is wholly untenable.

The Applicant is already in judicial custody under due process of law.

Seeking a production warrant for further investigation in a connected

offence does not, by itself, infringe the right to life and personal liberty.

35.It is further submitted that the legality of the investigation

conducted by EOW/ACB has already been upheld, including by the

Supreme Court, when challenges raised by co-accused persons were

repelled and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed vide order dated

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16.09.2025. Having failed in such challenges, the Applicant cannot now

indirectly assail the investigation under the garb of seeking interim

protection.

36.It is submitted that the economic offences constitute a class

apart. The Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of

Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791, has held that while bail is not

barred in economic offences, the gravity of the offence, the magnitude

of the economic loss, and the societal impact are relevant

considerations which weigh heavily against grant of anticipatory bail.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the scope of Section

438 Cr.P.C. in economic offences and money-laundering cases, has

categorically held that:

•Anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be exercised

sparingly, particularly in cases involving economic offences with

deep-rooted conspiracies.

•Such offences require systematic and structured investigation,

which would be seriously hampered if the accused is protected

by a pre-arrest bail order.

•Grant of anticipatory bail in such cases may scuttle the statutory

power of arrest and impede effective investigation.

37. The Court further emphasized that personal liberty under Article

21 must be balanced against societal interest, and that economic

offences constitute a class apart warranting stricter judicial scrutiny.

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38.Further, in State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal,

(1987) 2 SCC 364, the Supreme Court observed that economic

offences corrode the fabric of society and must be viewed with greater

seriousness than conventional crimes.

39.It has also been relied upon the matter of Y.S. Jagan Mohan

Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439, wherein the Supreme Court

cautioned that economic offences involving deep-rooted conspiracies

and huge loss of public funds stand on a different footing and warrant a

strict approach in matters of bail.

40.It is submitted that grant of ad-interim or interim protection at the

very first hearing, without affording the prosecution an effective

opportunity to place the case diary, statements and material on record,

would be contrary to settled principles governing anticipatory bail,

particularly in serious corruption and economic offence cases.

41.It is emphatically submitted that the prayer for interim protection

under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure / Section 482 of

the BNSS is neither automatic nor a matter of right, particularly in cases

involving grave economic offences, corruption, criminal conspiracy and

large-scale loss to public exchequer. Interim protection, if granted at

this stage, would virtually amount to granting the final relief at the

threshold, thereby rendering the statutory power of investigation otiose.

42.The present case pertains to a well-organized and deep-rooted

liquor scam of enormous magnitude, involving allegations of cheating,

forgery, use of forged documents, criminal conspiracy and offences

under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The nature of allegations,

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manner of commission, systemic abuse of official position and far-

reaching public impact constitute relevant and weighty considerations

militating against grant of any interim indulgence.

43.The contention of the Applicant that she is already in judicial

custody in connection with an Enforcement Directorate case and,

therefore, deserves interim protection in the present matter is wholly

misconceived and legally untenable. It is submitted that custody in one

case does not create any vested or automatic entitlement to protection

in another independent crime, nor does it curtail the statutory powers of

the investigating agency to seek a production warrant and conduct

custodial interrogation in accordance with law.

44.It is further submitted that the Applicant has been arrested by the

Directorate of Enforcement on 16.12.2025 in ECIR No. RPZO/04/2024

and is presently lodged in judicial custody at Raipur Central Jail. The

attempt of the Applicant to project the filing of a production warrant by

EOW/ACB as an infringement of Article 21 is misplaced and legally

unsustainable, as deprivation of liberty pursuant to a procedure

established by law cannot be characterized as unconstitutional.

45.Learned Counsel for the Respondent–State submits that

custodial interrogation of the Applicant is indispensable for a fair,

complete and effective investigation, inter alia, for:

(i) confronting the Applicant with voluminous documentary and digital

evidence;

(ii) verifying the sequence of events and the precise role of various

conspirators;

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(iii) ascertaining linkages, flow of proceeds of crime and layering of

funds; and

(iv) collecting further material information which lies especially within

the knowledge of the Applicant.

Grant of interim protection would seriously impair these legitimate

investigative steps.

46.It is denied that mere appearance or questioning under the

umbrella of interim protection would suffice for a qualitative

investigation. On the contrary, effective confrontation, coordinated

questioning and verification of digital trails cannot be meaningfully

carried out if the investigating agency is restrained by judicial protection

at this incipient stage.

47.He further submits that the Applicant held a highly influential

position in the State administration, having remained posted as Deputy

Secretary to the Chief Minister’s Office. In view of her administrative

access, institutional reach and influence, there exists a real and

reasonable apprehension of influencing witnesses and tampering with

documentary and digital evidence, particularly when the investigation

involves multiple accused and a complex evidentiary matrix.

48.The argument that no interim protection would cause irreparable

prejudice to the Applicant is illusory. On the contrary, grant of interim

protection at this stage would cause irreversible prejudice to the

investigation and undermine public confidence in the administration of

criminal justice in cases involving corruption at high places. It is further

submitted that the Applicant is also involved in other serious criminal

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matters, including cases relating to coal scam and DMF scam, wherein

she has already been arrested. These antecedents and the Applicant’s

repeated involvement in serious economic offences are relevant factors

which weigh heavily against the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in

her favour.

49.The answering Respondent submits that economic offences and

corruption-related crimes stand on a distinct footing, as repeatedly

recognized by the Supreme Court, having a deep-seated impact on the

economy and public faith in governance. Courts have consistently

cautioned that liberal grant of interim protection in such cases may

have deleterious consequences on the rule of law. It is reiterated that

interim protection is an exception, not the rule, and can be granted only

where the Court is prima facie satisfied that the Applicant has been

falsely implicated or that the prosecution is patently mala fide. In the

present case, the material collected during investigation, including

contemporaneous digital evidence, belies any such claim.

50.The answering Respondent submits that issuance of a

production warrant is a lawful investigative step, recognized by criminal

jurisprudence, and the mere pendency of an anticipatory bail

application cannot operate as a fetter on the powers of the investigating

agency. The remedy of anticipatory bail and the process of production

warrant operate in distinct legal spheres and one cannot eclipse the

other.

51.On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid judgments, learned State

Counsel submits that:

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Economic and corruption-related offences stand on a different

footing and require greater judicial restraint while considering

anticipatory bail. The stage of investigation, nature of allegations,

magnitude of the offence, and possibility of interference with evidence

or witnesses are decisive considerations. Grant of anticipatory bail at a

premature stage may frustrate the investigation and undermine public

confidence in the administration of justice. Therefore the anticipatory

bail application filed by the Applicant may be rejected.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

52.This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the

submissions made at the bar and has examined the pleadings,

objections, and the material placed on record, including the nature of

allegations, the stage of investigation and the surrounding

circumstances, the following findings emerge.

53. Although the prosecution alleges involvement of more than

seventy-one accused persons in the present crime, the applicant was

admittedly not named in the First Information Report. Secondly, it is

borne out from the record that despite filing of the main charge sheet

and as many as six supplementary charge sheets, arraigning in all fifty-

one accused persons, there is no categorical assertion or specific

material therein demonstrating the applicant’s culpability in the present

case. Thirdly, it is also true that the applicant was never served with any

notice, summons, nor was she ever called upon for interrogation in

connection with the said FIR during the relevant period.

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54.It is also not in dispute that the FIR was registered on

17.01.2024, and even after the lapse of a substantial period, the

investigation has not attained finality. This is despite the fact that the

Supreme Court, in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 11790/2024 arising out of Cr.M.P.

No. 721 of 2024, vide order dated 16.09.2025, has made observations

with regard to the manner and timeline of investigation. Notwithstanding

the said judicial pronouncement, the Investigating Agency has

continued with further investigation even after filing of the charge sheet,

and that too without obtaining prior permission of the competent court,

which raises serious concerns regarding procedural propriety. It has

been observed that:

“…………..We would only direct the Investigating

Agencies ie. the Enforcement Directorate and

the concerned State Agencies to file the

complaint and conclude the investigation by way

of an additional charge sheet, within a period of

three months from the date of receipt of a copy

of this order.

Thereafter, liberty is granted to the

petitioner(s) to file application(s) for regular bail

or anticipatory bail, as the case may be, which

will have to be considered on their own merits

without being influenced by any of the orders

passed earlier or by the impugned order(s). For

seeking the aforesaid relief of bail, the petitioners

can approach the High Court. The interim order

granted earlier stand vacated…...”

55.It further emerges from the record that approximately 29 Excise

Officials, who were also alleged to be involved in the commission of

the economic offence, have been granted anticipatory bail by the

Supreme Court. Additionally, several co-accused persons, namely

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Arunpati Tripathi, Arvind Singh, Trilok Singh Dhillon, Anurag

Dwivedi, Amit Singh, Deepak Duary and Dilip Pandey have already

been granted regular bail either by the Hon’ble Supreme Court or by

this Court. It is of considerable significance that the Economic Offences

Wing has been in possession of the alleged digital evidence since the

year 2019, yet, despite such prolonged availability of material, no

notice, summons or any form of investigative process was ever initiated

against the applicant in the said offence.

56.The present application arises out of FIR No. 04 of 2024

registered by the Economic Offences Wing/Anti-Corruption Bureau for

offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of

the IPC and Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988, pertaining to an alleged large-scale liquor scam involving

systemic corruption, criminal conspiracy and diversion of substantial

public revenue. The law is well settled that anticipatory bail is an

extraordinary discretionary relief, to be granted only in exceptional

circumstances, and not as a matter of course. The Constitution Bench

in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1 has held

that while the power under Section 438 CrPC (now Section 482 BNSS)

is wide, its exercise must be guided by judicial restraint, having regard

to the nature and gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the

accused, and the requirement of fair investigation.

57.In the present case, the allegations pertain to grave economic

offences and corruption at high places, which, by their very nature,

stand on a distinct footing. The Supreme Court has consistently held

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that economic offences corrode the fabric of society and pose a serious

threat to public interest, and therefore warrant a cautious approach

while considering bail. Reference may be made to P. Chidambaram v.

Directorate of Enforcement, (2020) 13 SCC 791 and Y.S. Jagan

Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439.

58.This Court is not persuaded to accept the submission that the

Applicant deserves interim or anticipatory protection merely on the

ground that she is already in judicial custody in connection with a

separate Enforcement Directorate case. Custody in one case does not

create any indefeasible right or automatic entitlement to anticipatory

bail in another independent offence. The remedy of anticipatory bail

and the statutory power of the investigating agency to seek a

production warrant operate in separate legal domains and cannot be

conflated.

59.The contention that issuance of a production warrant infringes

Article 21 of the Constitution is equally misconceived. Deprivation of

liberty pursuant to a procedure established by law cannot be

characterized as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has repeatedly

held that Article 21 does not eclipse lawful investigation, provided the

procedure adopted is fair and sanctioned by law.

60.The investigating agency has specifically asserted the necessity

of custodial interrogation of the Applicant for confronting her with

documentary and digital evidence, ascertaining linkages, tracing

proceeds of crime and unearthing the larger conspiracy. At this stage,

this Court finds no reason to doubt that such custodial interrogation is a

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legitimate investigative requirement and not a mere ruse for

harassment. The Supreme Court in State v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7

SCC 187, has held that custodial interrogation is qualitatively more

elicitation-oriented than questioning a suspect protected by anticipatory

bail.

61.The apprehension expressed by the State regarding possibility of

influencing witnesses and tampering with evidence cannot be brushed

aside lightly, particularly when the Applicant is alleged to have held a

highly influential position in the State administration. In corruption and

conspiracy cases involving multiple accused and voluminous digital

material, the potential for interference with investigation remains a

relevant consideration.

62.The submission that interim protection at this stage would

effectively amount to granting the main relief cannot be ignored. Courts

have consistently cautioned that interim protection should not be

granted mechanically, as it may frustrate lawful investigative steps and

render the final adjudication nugatory.

63.This Court is also mindful of the settled principle that at the stage

of considering anticipatory bail, a detailed evaluation of evidence is

neither warranted nor permissible. Suffice it to observe that the material

placed before this Court does disclose prima facie grounds justifying

further investigation, and the case does not fall within the narrow

category where the Court may conclude that the prosecution is patently

frivolous or actuated by malice.

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64.This Court has carefully examined the rival submissions, perused

the case diary and the material placed on record, and bestowed its

anxious and circumspect consideration to the facts and circumstances

of the present case. It is true that the name of the Applicant does not

find mention in the FIR and that, despite filing of multiple charge-sheets

by the Economic Offences Wing, the Applicant has not yet been

formally arrayed as an accused. It is also not in dispute that the FIR

was registered on 17.01.2024 and that custodial interrogation of the

Applicant has been sought after a lapse of two years. However, mere

absence of the Applicant’s name in the FIR or delay in summoning

cannot, by themselves, be determinative factors for grant of anticipatory

bail, particularly when the investigation is continuing and fresh

incriminating material has surfaced. The record reveals that the

investigation is still in progress and substantial material, including

contemporaneous digital evidence such as WhatsApp conversations,

has been recovered, and as alleged, prima facie indicates the

Applicant’s nexus with the alleged transactions and necessitates further

probing. The record indicates that the investigation is stated to be

continuing and that certain material, including contemporaneous digital

evidence such as alleged WhatsApp communications, has been

recovered. However, a mere assertion of recovery of digital material,

without demonstrable linkage, contextual analysis, or corroboration,

cannot ipso facto establish any incriminating nexus attributable to the

applicant. The nature of allegations, the modus operandi adopted, and

the magnitude of the alleged economic offence clearly demonstrate that

the investigation is at a sensitive and decisive stage, where custodial

25

interrogation may be required to unearth the larger conspiracy, trace

the flow of funds and confront the Applicant with documentary and

digital evidence.

65.It is a well-settled principle of law that the powers under Section

438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 482 of the

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita are extraordinary and

discretionary, to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional

circumstances. Anticipatory bail is not intended to operate as a shield

against a legitimate and lawful investigation, particularly in cases

involving grave economic offences and allegations of corruption, which

have far-reaching societal and public ramifications.

66.In the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court

finds that the allegations pertain to serious economic offences involving

cheating, forgery, criminal conspiracy and corruption, with large-scale

financial implications. The investigation is ongoing, several witnesses

are yet to be examined, and material evidence is yet to be collected. At

this stage, the Court is unable to discern any exceptional or compelling

circumstance warranting the exercise of discretion in favour of the

Applicant.

67.This Court is also mindful of the settled position that economic

offences constitute a distinct class, and custodial interrogation in such

cases assumes significance for a fair, effective and meaningful

investigation. Be that as it may, all the above facts may be considered

at the time of regular bail and not at this stage. Grant of anticipatory bail

26

at this juncture would not only impede the investigative process but

may also prejudice the collection of evidence.

68.Having regard to the gravity of the allegations, the stage of the

investigation, the nature of the material collected, and the absence of

any exceptional circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that

the Applicant has failed to make out a case for grant of anticipatory bail

under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

Consequently, the application seeking anticipatory bail is devoid of

merit and is, accordingly, rejected.

69.It is clarified that the observations made hereinabove are

confined strictly to the adjudication of the present anticipatory bail

application and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on

the merits of the case. The investigating agency and the Trial Court

shall proceed independently and in accordance with law, uninfluenced

by any observations contained in this order.

Sd/-

(Arvind Kumar Verma)

Judge