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Smt. Shipra Mandal W/o Shri Ranjan Kumar Mandal vs. State Of Chhattisgarh and others

  Chhattisgarh High Court WPS No. 2597 of 2023
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Case Background

As per case facts, the Petitioner, an Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), suffered a prolonged illness from 2014-2019, leading to unauthorized absence. Despite submitting medical certificates and replies to show cause notices, ...

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Document Text Version

1

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPS No. 2597 of 2023

Order Reserved on: 14.01.2026

Order Delivered on : 28.2.2026

•Smt. Shipra Mandal W/o Shri Ranjan Kumar Mandal Aged About

37 Years Resident Of P.V.-73, Pakhanjur, Post- Pakhanjur, Tehsil-

Pakhanjur, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh.

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1.State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Department Of Panchayat

And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New

Raipur (C.G.).

2.The Commissioner Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, District :

Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh.

3.The Collector District - Narayanpur (C.G.).

4.Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat (Wrongly Mentioned As

Zila Panchayat), Office Orchha, District : Narayanpur,

Chhattisgarh.

2

... Respondent(s)

For Petitioner :Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Sr. Advocate

assisted by Ms. Kanchan Karwani,

Advocate

For Respondent/

State

:Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer.

For Respondent

No. 4

:Mr. Himanshu Yadu, Advocate holding

brief on behalf of Ms. Astha Shukla,

Advocate.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

C.A.V. Order

1.The present petition is directed against the order dated

28.02.2023 (Annexure P/1), whereby the appeal preferred by the

petitioner has been dismissed, without appreciating the illegality

and arbitrariness committed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and in

gross violation of the principles of natural justice, hence, this writ

petition is preferred seeking following reliefs :

“10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be

pleased to call the entire records of

subject matter of the present case, from

the respondents.

10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be

3

pleased to quash/set- aside the

impugned order dated 28.02.2023

passed by respondent no. 2 (Annexure

P/1) and further be pleased to direct the

respondent authorities allow the

petitioner to resume her duties on the

post of Shikshakarmi.

10.3 Any other relief/order which may

deem fit and just in the facts and

circumstances of the case including

award of the costs of the petition may

be given.”

2.Facts of the case, as canvased, are that the petitioner was initially

appointed to the post of Shikshakarmi Grade-III by the Chief

Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Narayanpur, vide

appointment order dated 16.06.2010. A perusal of the

appointment order clearly reveals that the service conditions of

the petitioner are governed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh

Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions of Service)

Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 2007”).

Subsequently, in the year 2013, the services of the petitioner were

regularized, and she was appointed as Assistant Teacher

(Panchayat) and posted at Primary School, Gumiyabeda, District

Narayanpur. It is submitted that unfortunately, in the year 2014,

4

the petitioner suffered from a serious and prolonged illness, which

continued intermittently till the year 2019. Owing to her

deteriorating health condition, she was compelled to remain under

continuous medical treatment and was unable to attend her duties

during the said period. The petitioner was regularly examined and

treated by the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre,

Bhopalpattnam, District Bijapur. A perusal of the said certificates

clearly establishes their authenticity and the genuineness of the

petitioner’s illness. For the first time, a show cause notice dated

11.06.2018 was issued to the petitioner. Due to her serious health

condition, she could not submit a reply within the stipulated time.

However, upon improvement in her health, the petitioner

submitted a detailed reply on 29.07.2019, enclosing all relevant

medical certificates covering the period from 2014 to 2019. In her

reply, the petitioner specifically explained that she had remained

absent from duties w.e.f. 16.06.2014 solely on account of her

medical condition and further assured the authorities that her

health had improved and she was willing and able to rejoin her

duties. Thereafter, vide letter dated 17.12.2020, the Block

Education Officer called upon the petitioner to submit a further

explanation along with a medical certificate issued by a Medical

Board. From the said communication, it is evident that the Block

Education Officer was not satisfied with the reply already

submitted by the petitioner and sought additional medical

verification, despite the fact that authentic medical certificates had

5

already been placed on record. To the utter shock and surprise of

the petitioner, she was served with an order of termination dated

24.12.2021. In the said order, it was stated that since the

petitioner had allegedly failed to submit replies to various notices,

a proposal for termination of her services had been passed in the

General Body Meeting of Janpad Panchayat, Orchha dated

08.04.2021. Consequently, by placing reliance on the Circular

dated 21.12.2020 and Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Shikshak

(Panchayat) Samvarg (Recruitment & Service Conditions) Rules,

2012, the services of the petitioner were terminated. It is

submitted that the said termination order is ex facie illegal and

arbitrary, as the services of the petitioner are governed by the

Rules, 2007, whereas the impugned order has been passed

under the Rules of 2012, which are wholly inapplicable to the

petitioner’s case. Being aggrieved by the illegal and arbitrary

termination order dated 24.12.2021, the petitioner preferred an

appeal before the Collector, Narayanpur (Respondent No.3). After

granting an opportunity of hearing to the parties, the learned

Collector, vide order dated 25.03.2022, dismissed the appeal. The

learned Collector erroneously held that sufficient opportunities

had been granted to the petitioner and further observed that her

conduct amounted to indiscipline in violation of Civil Services

Conduct Rules. Against the order passed by the learned Collector,

the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the

Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur. After hearing the

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parties, the learned Commissioner, vide impugned order dated

28.02.2023, dismissed the second appeal and affirmed the

findings recorded by the learned Collector, holding the termination

to be just and proper. Being left with no other efficacious

alternative remedy, the petitioner has been constrained to invoke

the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present

petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned

order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the learned Commissioner,

Bastar Division, Jagdalpur (Annexure-P/1) is ex facie illegal,

arbitrary, erroneous, and discriminatory in nature. The said order

has been passed without proper appreciation of facts and settled

principles of law and, therefore, is liable to be set aside on this

ground alone. It is vehemently contended that while deciding the

second appeal, the learned Commissioner has completely

overlooked a fundamental and crucial aspect of the matter,

namely that the petitioner was appointed and governed under the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions

of Service) Rules, 2007. However, the termination order dated

24.12.2021 has been passed by invoking the provisions of the

Chhattisgarh Shikshak (Panchayat) Samvarg (Recruitment &

Service Conditions) Rules, 2012, which are wholly inapplicable to

the petitioner. The action of terminating the petitioner’s services

under an inapplicable statutory framework is patently illegal,

arbitrary, and unsustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel

7

further submits that the learned Commissioner has failed to

appreciate that no proper or effective opportunity of hearing was

ever granted to the petitioner before passing the proposal for

termination in the General Body Meeting of Janpad Panchayat,

Orchha, District Narayanpur. The decision affecting the civil rights

of the petitioner was taken behind her back, rendering the entire

proceedings vitiated. It is further submitted that no notice

whatsoever was issued to the petitioner regarding the General

Body Meeting dated 08.04.2021. In absence of any prior

intimation or opportunity to present her case, an ex parte proposal

for termination of the petitioner from the post of Shikshakarmi

Grade-III was passed. Such action is in blatant violation of the

principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram

partem. Learned counsel submits that the learned Commissioner

has also failed to properly consider the Circular dated 21.12.2020,

which clearly mandates that in cases of long unauthorised

absence, disciplinary proceedings must be initiated. In the present

case, admittedly, no disciplinary enquiry was ever initiated, no

charge-sheet was served, and no opportunity was afforded to the

petitioner to explain the allegations against her. Instead, the

extreme penalty of termination was imposed solely on the basis of

a proposal passed in a General Body Meeting, which is wholly

impermissible in law. It is further submitted that while passing the

order of termination, the respondent authorities have completely

ignored the fact that the petitioner had submitted her reply to the

8

show cause notice along with medical certificates covering the

period from 2014 to 2019. The said certificates were duly issued

by the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Bhopalpattnam,

District Bijapur, and their authenticity has never been disputed. In

such circumstances, the authorities were required to take a

compassionate and sympathetic view rather than resorting to a

harsh and disproportionate punishment.

4.Learned counsel further contended that that the punishment

imposed upon the petitioner is grossly disproportionate to the

alleged misconduct, especially in view of her prolonged and

genuine medical condition. The petitioner’s absence was neither

wilful nor deliberate but was compelled by circumstances beyond

her control. The doctrine of proportionality has been completely

ignored by both the authorities below. It is contended that the

learned Commissioner has overlooked the fact that the petitioner

was never afforded an opportunity of hearing prior to the General

Body Meeting, wherein the proposal for her termination was

passed. Such action strikes at the very root of fair play and justice

and is contrary to settled legal principles governing service

jurisprudence. Learned counsel further submits that the

petitioner’s services had already been regularised as Assistant

Teacher (Panchayat) in the year 2013. Once an employee attains

regular status, her services cannot be terminated without

conducting a full-fledged departmental enquiry as per the

9

applicable service rules. In the present case, no such enquiry was

conducted, making the impugned termination order legally

untenable. It is not a case where the petitioner had concealed her

illness or failed to inform the authorities. As early as September

2014, the petitioner had duly informed the Block Education

Officer, Janpad Panchayat Orchha, and the Chief Executive

Officer, Narayanpur, about her illness through speed post. This

fact has been completely ignored by both the appellate

authorities. Learned counsel submits that both the authorities

below have failed to appreciate the documentary evidence filed by

the petitioner in its correct perspective and have mechanically

upheld the termination without assigning cogent and legally

sustainable reasons. Even a contractual employee is entitled to a

proper departmental enquiry before passing any stigmatic or

punitive order, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the

present case, the petitioner being a regular employee was entitled

to a higher degree of procedural protection. The impugned

termination order has been passed in gross violation of Article

311(2) of the Constitution of India, as no reasonable opportunity of

hearing was provided and no enquiry was conducted to establish

the alleged misconduct. Learned counsel also submits that while

imposing the major penalty of termination, the respondent

authorities have completely ignored the provisions of the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,

1999, particularly Rule 7, which prescribes the mandatory

10

procedure for imposing major penalties. Non-compliance with the

statutory procedure renders the impugned order void ab initio. In

support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the

petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the matters of Sandeep Kumar vs. G.B. Pant Institute

of Engineering and Technology Ghurdauri and Others ,

reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 541, Krishna Kumar Kosaria

vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Writ Appeal No. 450 of 2021, Chhel

Singh vs. MGB Gramin Bank, Pali and Others , reported in

(2014) 13 SCC 166. On the basis of the aforesaid facts,

submissions, and settled position of law, it is prayed that this

Court may be pleased to quash the impugned orders and grant

appropriate relief to the petitioner in the interest of justice.

5.Learned State counsel as also the learned counsel for the

respondent No. 4 jointly submit that the petitioner has challenged

the impugned order dated 28.02.2023 mainly on the grounds that

no proper opportunity of hearing was granted to her and that the

learned Commissioner failed to consider the medical certificates

filed by the petitioner along with her reply to the show cause

notice. It is submitted that the said contentions are misconceived,

factually incorrect, and contrary to the record. At the very outset, it

is submitted that the present writ petition, as framed and filed, is

devoid of any merit or substance and is liable to be dismissed at

the threshold. The impugned order has been passed after due

11

consideration of all relevant facts, documents, and applicable

rules, and does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness, or

procedural infirmity. It is an admitted and undisputed fact that the

petitioner was appointed on the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III

and was posted at Primary School, Gudarapara (Garpa), vide

order dated 16.06.2010 issued by the respondent No.4. While

posted at the said school, the petitioner proceeded on leave

without submitting any leave application and without obtaining

prior permission from the competent authority. The petitioner

remained absent from her duties unauthorizedly with effect from

16.06.2014 onwards. Learned counsel submits that upon noticing

the prolonged unauthorized absence of the petitioner, the

competent authority promptly issued a show cause notice dated

10.01.2017, calling upon the petitioner to submit her explanation

within three days regarding her absence from duty. Despite

service of the said notice, the petitioner failed to submit any

explanation or disclose any reason for her continued absence.

Subsequently, another show cause notice dated 10.03.2017 was

issued to the petitioner, calling upon her to explain as to why

proceedings for termination of her services should not be initiated

by placing her case before the General Administration Committee.

Even to this notice, the petitioner did not submit any reply. It is

further submitted that since the petitioner continued to remain

absent from duty unauthorizedly for a prolonged period, yet

another show cause notice dated 11.06.2018 was issued to her,

12

requiring her to submit an explanation within three days as to why

disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated and her services

terminated. Learned counsel submits that after a lapse of more

than one year, the petitioner, for the first time, submitted a reply

dated 29.07.2019, wherein she herself admitted her unauthorized

absence from duty with effect from 16.06.2014. Along with the

said reply, the petitioner for the first time enclosed medical

certificates. The said medical certificates were forwarded to the

Block Education Officer, Orchha, for verification and submission of

a report in accordance with law. Upon examination of the records

and documents, several discrepancies were noticed. The

petitioner claimed absence from duty from 16.06.2014, whereas

the medical certificates submitted by her pertained to the period

from 15.08.2014 to 29.07.2019. Further, a fitness certificate dated

29.07.2019 was allegedly issued by the Medical Officer, CHC

Bhopalpattanam, whereas the distance between the said CHC

and the office of the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat

Orchha, is approximately 400 kilometers, making it improbable for

the petitioner to submit the same on the very same date. In view

of these discrepancies, the Block Education Officer, Orchha,

issued a letter dated 25.08.2019 directing the petitioner to submit

clarification on eight specific points along with a Medical Board

certificate, as the petitioner had remained absent for more than

five years. Despite this, the petitioner deliberately chose not to

respond. It is submitted that the said letter dated 25.08.2019 was

13

followed by another letter dated 17.12.2020, directing the

petitioner to appear before the office along with explanation on

eight points and a Medical Board certificate within one week,

failing which termination proceedings would be initiated. Once

again, the petitioner failed to submit any reply or comply with the

directions. From the aforesaid sequence of events, it is

abundantly clear that the petitioner was afforded more than

adequate opportunities to explain her prolonged unauthorized

absence, but she failed to submit any satisfactory explanation or

comply with the directions issued by the authorities.

6.Learned counsel further submits that during the pendency of the

matter, the Director, Panchayat, issued instructions dated

21.12.2020 regarding disciplinary action against Teacher

(Panchayat) who remain absent from duty for prolonged periods.

The said instructions provided that upon receipt of a proposal

from the General Administration Committee of the concerned Zila

or Janpad Panchayat, appropriate action shall be taken. In

compliance with the aforesaid instructions and considering the

prolonged unauthorized absence of the petitioner and her failure

to submit satisfactory explanation, the matter was placed before

the General Administration Committee of Janpad Panchayat,

Orchha, in its meeting dated 08.04.2021. The Committee

unanimously resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner,

and the said resolution was duly implemented by the respondent

14

No.4 by issuing the termination order dated 24.12.2021. Learned

counsel submits that the termination order was assailed by the

petitioner before the Collector, District Narayanpur, under the

provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision)

Rules, 1995. After providing due opportunity of hearing and

considering the material on record, the learned Collector found no

merit in the appeal and dismissed the same vide order dated

25.03.2022. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a second appeal

before the learned Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur,

under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam,

1993. The learned Commissioner, after hearing the petitioner and

after appreciating all documents and relevant circulars, including

the circular dated 22.03.2018 issued by the Department of

Finance, dismissed the appeal. The learned Commissioner has

rightly observed that where a government servant remains absent

from duty unauthorizedly for more than three years, it shall be

presumed that such employee has voluntarily abandoned service.

In the present case, the petitioner remained unauthorizedly

absent for more than five years and failed to submit any

satisfactory explanation despite repeated opportunities. Thus, the

termination of the petitioner is legal, justified, and in accordance

with law. In view of the aforesaid facts and settled position of law,

it is submitted that the impugned order dated 28.02.2023 is just,

proper, and legal and does not suffer from any infirmity. The

present writ petition, being devoid of merit and substance,

15

deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.

7.I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the

impugned orders, and examined the record with due care.

8.The question that falls for consideration is whether the termination

of the petitioner satisfies the requirements of Rule 7 of the

Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 ?

9.Rule 5(b)(vi) of the Rules of 1999 clearly prescribes removal from

service as a major penalty. Rule 7 mandates that no major penalty

can be imposed without a formal enquiry. Such an enquiry

necessarily requires framing of definite charges, communication

of allegations to the delinquent employee, opportunity to inspect

records, oral hearing with right to cross-examine witnesses,

submission of enquiry report, and supply of findings to the

delinquent for his representation before passing of final orders.

Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 is quoted below for ready

reference :

5. Penalties. - The following penalties

may, for good and sufficient reasons,

and as hereinafter provided by imposed

on a member of the Panchayat Service

namely :-

16

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Major Penalties-

xxx xxx xxx

(vi)Removal from service not

disqualifying for future employment;

7. Procedure for imposing major

penalties. - (1)No order, imposing on a

member of the Panchayat Service, any

of the penalties specified in clauses (iv)

to (via) of Rule 5 shall be passed

except after a formal inquiry is held as

far as may be, in the manner

hereinafter provided.

(2)When an order for formal inquiry has

been made, the disciplinary authority

shall frame Definite charges on the

basis of allegations and shall

communicate such charges, alongwith

the statement of the allegations, to the

member of the Panchayat Service and

also require him to submit, within such

time as may be specified a written

statement of defence and also to state

whether he desires to be heard in

17

person.

(3)The person against whom inquiry is

to be held shall, for the purpose of

preparing to defence, be permitted to

inspect and take extracts from such

records as he may specify :

Provided that such permission

may be refused if, for reasons to

be recorded in writing, in the

opinion of the Enquiry' Officer

such records are not relevant for

the purpose or it is against the

public interest to allow his access

thereto.

(4)On receipt of the written statement of

defence or if any such statement is not

received within the time specified, the

disciplinary authority may himself

enquire into such of the charges as are

not admitted or appoint an Enquiry

Officer to hold the inquiry and forward

to him his report and, if advised, his

recommendation alongwith all the

inquiry papers.

(5)The disciplinary authority may

18

nominate any person to present the

case in support of the charges before

the Enquiry Officer. The member of the

Panchayat Service may present his

case with the assistance of any other

Panchayat Servant of State

Government Servant approved by the

Enquiry Officer but may not engage a

legal practitioner for the purpose,

unless the person nominated by the

disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a

legal practitioner or unless the

disciplinary authority having regard to

the circumstances of the case so

permits.

(6)If the servant of the Panchayat

Service desires to be heard in person,

he shall be so heard. If he so desires or

if the disciplinary authority so directs,

an oral enquiry shall be held by the

Enquiry Officer. At such inquiry,

evidence shall be heard as to such of

the allegations as are not admitted and

the person charged shall be entitled to

cross examine the witness, to give

19

evidence in person, to produce

documentary evidence, if any and to

have such witness called as he may

wish :

Provided that the Enquiry Officer

may, for reasons to be recorded

in writing, refuse to call a witness.

(7)At the conclusion of the inquiry, the

Enquiry Officer shall prepare a report of

the inquiry, recording his findings on

each of the charges together with

reasons therefor.

(8)The proceedings conducted against

the persons charged shall contain a

sufficient record of :-

(i)the charges framed against

such person and the statement of

allegations;

(ii)the written statement of

defence if any;

(iii)the oral evidence taken in the

course of the inquiry;

(iv)the documentary evidence

considered in the course of the

20

inquiry;

(v)the orders, if any, made by the

Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary

authority, as the case may be,

with regard to the inquiry;

(vi)a report setting out the findings

on each charge and the reasons

therefor.

(9)The Enquiry Officer, if he is other

than the disciplinary authority, shall

submit the records of the proceedings

mentioned in clause (8) above to the

disciplinary authority without

recommendation relating to the penalty

to be imposed. The disciplinary

authority shall consider the record of

the enquiry and its findings on each

charge, having regard to the findings on

the charges and the record (if the

proceedings) if he is of the opinion that

any of the penalties specified in clauses

(iv) to (vii) of Rule 5 should be imposed,

it shall furnish to the person charged a

copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer,

and where the disciplinary authority is

21

not the Enquiry Officer a statement of

its findings together with brief reasons

for disagreement, if any, with the

findings of the Enquiry Officer.

(10)The disciplinary authority shall

consider the representation, it any,

made by the person charged in

response to the notice and determine

the penalty, if any, should be imposed

and shall pass appropriate order on the

case.

(11)The orders passed by the

disciplinary authority shall be

communicated lo the member of the

Panchayat Service, who shall also be

supplied with a copy of the report of the

Enquiry Officer and where disciplinary

authority is not the Enquiry Officer, a

statement of its findings together with

the brief reasons for disagreement, if

tiny, with the findings of the Enquiry

Officer, unless they have already been

supplied to the person charged.

10.It is not in dispute that the petitioner was initially appointed as

22

Shikshakarmi Grade-III vide order dated 16.06.2010 and that her

service conditions were governed by the Chhattisgarh Panchayat

Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 2007.

It is also an admitted position that her services were regularised in

the year 2013 and that she was thereafter working as Assistant

Teacher (Panchayat). Once the services of the petitioner stood

regularised, she acquired a substantive status, and her services

could not have been terminated except by following the procedure

prescribed under the applicable statutory rules and in consonance

with the principles of natural justice. This Court finds substantial

force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that

the termination order dated 24.12.2021 has been passed by

invoking Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Shikshak (Panchayat)

Samvarg (Recruitment & Service Conditions) Rules, 2012,

whereas admittedly the petitioner was governed by the Rules,

2007. The action of the respondents in terminating the services of

the petitioner under a statutory framework which was admittedly

inapplicable to her case goes to the root of the matter and renders

the impugned termination order legally unsustainable. An order

passed under an inapplicable rule is void ab initio and cannot be

sustained merely on the basis of alleged misconduct.

11.Further, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the

respondents that the petitioner’s services could be terminated

solely on the basis of a resolution passed by the General Body /

23

General Administration Committee of the Janpad Panchayat. The

record clearly reflects that no charge-sheet was ever issued to the

petitioner, no regular departmental enquiry was initiated, and no

enquiry officer was appointed. Even assuming that the petitioner

remained absent for a prolonged period, such absence could only

have been dealt with by initiating disciplinary proceedings as

contemplated under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, particularly where the

proposed penalty was a major penalty of removal from service.

12.This Court also finds merit in the submission that no notice

whatsoever was issued to the petitioner informing her about the

proposed consideration of her case in the General Body Meeting

dated 08.04.2021. The decision affecting the civil rights and

livelihood of the petitioner was taken behind her back, without

affording her any opportunity of personal hearing at that stage.

Such action is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice,

particularly the rule of audi alteram partem, which mandates that

no person shall be condemned unheard. The reliance placed by

the respondents on the circulars dated 22.03.2018 and

21.12.2020 also does not advance their case. A circular cannot

override statutory rules. Even the said circulars contemplate

initiation of disciplinary proceedings in cases of long unauthorised

absence.

13.In the present case, admittedly, no disciplinary enquiry as

24

mandated under the applicable rules was ever conducted.

Termination of a regular employee without conducting a full-

fledged enquiry, without framing charges, and without affording an

opportunity to lead evidence or cross-examine witnesses is

impermissible in law. This Court further finds that the medical

certificates submitted by the petitioner, though disputed by the

respondents, were never subjected to verification by following a

fair and transparent procedure in the presence of the petitioner.

Even if the respondents had doubts regarding the genuineness or

sufficiency of the medical documents, the proper course was to

hold a disciplinary enquiry and allow the petitioner to explain her

case, rather than straightaway imposing the extreme penalty of

termination. The doctrine of proportionality has also been ignored

by the authorities below. The petitioner’s absence, as pleaded,

was on account of prolonged illness and not a case of wilful

abandonment of service. Whether the absence was justified or not

is a matter requiring adjudication in a properly conducted enquiry.

Such a determination could not have been made unilaterally by

the employer by presuming voluntary abandonment. This Court

finds that both the appellate authorities, namely the Collector and

the Commissioner, have failed to examine these crucial legal

infirmities. They have mechanically upheld the termination order

without addressing the core issue of non-compliance with the

mandatory statutory procedure and violation of principles of

natural justice. The impugned order dated 28.02.2023 passed by

25

the learned Commissioner, therefore, cannot be sustained in the

eyes of law.

14.A Division Bench of this Court, in Rooplal Nayak v. State of

Chhattisgarh and Others, reported in 2006 (4) M.P.H.T. 99

(C.G.), has clearly held that no major penalty, as prescribed under

Rule 5(b)(iv) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline

and Appeal) Rules, 1999, can be imposed on a member of the

Panchayat service governed by the said Rules without conducting

a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with Rule 7 thereof.

15.In an identical petition coordinate bench of this Court has passed

an order in case of Prakash Chand Soni Vs. State of

Chhattisgarh and others in WPS No.1846/2011 on 15/07/2015

and it was held as under:-

“(3)The short issue arisen for

determination is - whether services of a

Panchayat Secretary can be dispensed

with or terminated without conducting

any enquiry as envisaged under Rule 7

of the C.G. Panchayat Service

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (in

short "the Rules, 1999")?

(4)Admittedly, on certain allegations, an

enquiry was conducted against the

26

petitioner and eventually, an enquiry

report was submitted vide Annexure

R/4 and thereafter, show cause notice

was issued to him on 28.04.2008 vide

Annexure R/3, therefore before

removing him the principles of natural

justice have been complied with.

However, at the same time, it is to be

seen that a Division Bench of this Court

in the matter of Rooplal Nayak vs. State

of Chhattisgarh and others, 2006(4)

M.P.H.T. 99 (C.G.) has held that any of

the major penalty prescribed under

Rule 5(b) (iv) of the Rules, 1999 cannot

be imposed on a member of Panchayat

service to whom the said Rules are

applicable without conducting regular

Departmental Enquiry as envisaged

under 7 of the Rules, 1999.

(5)In the case at hand, an enquiry

officer was appointed, who conducted

some sort of enquiry and submitted an

enquiry report, however, that runs short

of a departmental enquiry as

contemplated under Rule 7. The said

27

provisions uses the words "formal

inquiry" with further stipulation that

when an order for 'formal enquiry has

been made, the disciplinary authority

shall frame Definite charges,

communicate the same to the

delinquent along with the statement of

allegations, requiring him to submit

within the specified time a written

statement of defence and also to state

whether he desires to be heard in

person. Thereafter, the defence is

required to be permitted to inspect and

take extracts from the records, which

can be refused for reasons to be

recorded in writing. On submission of

reply by the delinquent, the disciplinary

authority may himself enquire or

appoint an enquiry officer. Appointment

of Presenting Officer and seeking

assistance of some other officers by the

delinquent is also contemplated therein.

The enquiry officer is also enabled to

record evidence and thereafter, at the

conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry

28

officer is supposed to prepare enquiry

report, the copy of which is required to

be furnished to the delinquent. Thus,

the 'formal inquiry' envisaged under the

Rules is akin to the procedure

prescribed for a regular enquiry under

Rule 14 of the C.G. Civil Services

(Classification, Control and Appeal)

Rules, 1966.”

16.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak

Investment Advisors Ltd., reported in (2021) 10 SCC 401 has

further held that an action taken in breach of natural justice or de

hors jurisdiction warrants interference under Article 226 of the

Constitution.

17.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sandeep Kumar vs.

GB Pant Institute of Engineering and Technology Ghurdauri

& others, 2024 SCC Online SC 541, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has observed as under:-

“19. In this background, we are of the firm view that

the termination of the services of the appellant

without holding disciplinary enquiry was totally

unjustified and dehors the requirements of law and in

29

gross violation of principles of natural justice. Hence,

the learned Division Bench of the High Court fell in

grave error in dismissing the writ petition filed by the

appellant on the hypertechnical ground that the

minutes of 26

th

meeting of the Board of Governors

dated 16

th

June, 2018 had not been placed on

record.

20. As a consequence, we pass the following

directions:—

(i) The impugned judgments dated 4

th

August, 2022

and 21

st

February, 2023 passed by the High Court

are quashed and set aside.

(ii) The order dated 19

th

May, 2022 whereby, the

services of the appellant on the post of Registrar of

the Institute were terminated is also declared to be

illegal and as a consequence, the same is quashed

and set aside.

(iii) That the appellant shall forthwith be reinstated on

the post of Registrar of G.B. Pant Institute of

Engineering and Technology, Ghurdauri. He shall be

entitled to all consequential benefits.

(iv) The respondent-Institute is left at liberty to

30

conduct disciplinary proceedings against the

appellant as per law, if so desired.”

18.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chhel Singh vs.

MGB Gramin Bank, Pali and others, (2014) 13 SCC 166, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-

“9. The learned counsel for the appellant while

placing reliance on the inquiry report and finding of

the learned Single Judge submitted that the inquiry

was conducted in violation of principles of natural

justice and hence the learned Single Judge rightly

directed the reinstatement of the appellant. Whereas

according to the learned counsel for the respondent

Bank, the Division Bench rightly set aside the order

of reinstatement and remitted the matter for fresh

enquiry.

10. After giving our careful consideration to the facts

and circumstances of the case and the submission

made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are

of the view that the Division Bench was wrong in

setting aside the order of reinstatement. The Division

Bench has accepted that the inquiry stood vitiated by

disallowing the request of the appellant to summon

31

the rest of the five witnesses. For the said reason,

the Division Bench has not interfered with such part

of the finding and order passed by the learned Single

Judge whereby the impugned order of termination

dated 17-10-1994 and the appellate authority order

dated 26-12-1994 were quashed. The order of

termination being quashed by the High Court, in

absence of any observation and grounds to refuse

the reinstatement, the appellant automatically stood

reinstated. Without reinstatement in service, the

question of further inquiry does not arise. There was

no occasion for the Division Bench of the High Court

to direct further inquiry without reinstatement of the

appellant.

12. From a plain reading of the charges we find that

the main allegation is absence from duty from 11-12-

1989 to 24-10-1990 (approximately 10½ months), for

which no prior permission was obtained from the

competent authority. In his reply, the appellant has

taken the plea that he was seriously ill between 11-

12-1989 and 24-10-1990, which was beyond his

control; he never intended to contravene any of the

provisions of the service regulations. He submitted

the copies of medical certificates issued by doctors

in support of his claim after rejoining the post. The

32

medical reports were submitted after about 24 days.

There was no allegation that the appellant's

unauthorised absence from duty was wilful and

deliberate. The inquiry officer has also not held that

the appellant's absence from duty was wilful and

deliberate. It is neither a case of the disciplinary

authority nor the inquiry officer that the medical

reports submitted by the appellant were forged or

fabricated or obtained for any consideration though

he was not ill during the said period. In absence of

such evidence and finding, it was not open to the

inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority to

disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the

doctors without any valid reason and on the ground

of 24 days' delay.”

19.It is a settled position of law that unless and until the procedure

prescribed under the relevant service rules is strictly followed, an

order of removal or termination from service cannot be said to be

in consonance with law. Any action taken in breach of the

prescribed procedure is arbitrary and liable to be set aside.

20.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the termination of the petitioner is vitiated on account

of non-compliance with the mandatory statutory procedure and

33

violation of the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the

impugned order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the learned

Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, as well as the orders

dated 25.03.2022 passed by the Collector, Narayanpur, and

24.12.2021 terminating the services of the petitioner, are hereby

set aside. However, it is clarified that this Court has not

expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations levelled

against the petitioner.

21.The respondents are at liberty to proceed afresh against the

petitioner strictly in accordance with law, after granting due and

reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and by

following the procedure prescribed under the applicable statutory

rules. In the meanwhile, the petitioner shall be reinstated in

service forthwith. Such reinstatement shall be subject to the

outcome of the fresh proceedings, if any, initiated by the

respondents in accordance with law.

22.Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge

The date when the

judgment is reserved

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judgment is

pronounced

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14.1.2026 28.2.2026 - 28.2.2026

Raghu Jat

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