As per case facts, the Petitioner, an Assistant Teacher (Panchayat), suffered a prolonged illness from 2014-2019, leading to unauthorized absence. Despite submitting medical certificates and replies to show cause notices, ...
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NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 2597 of 2023
Order Reserved on: 14.01.2026
Order Delivered on : 28.2.2026
•Smt. Shipra Mandal W/o Shri Ranjan Kumar Mandal Aged About
37 Years Resident Of P.V.-73, Pakhanjur, Post- Pakhanjur, Tehsil-
Pakhanjur, District : Kanker, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1.State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Department Of Panchayat
And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, New
Raipur (C.G.).
2.The Commissioner Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, District :
Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh.
3.The Collector District - Narayanpur (C.G.).
4.Chief Executive Officer Janpad Panchayat (Wrongly Mentioned As
Zila Panchayat), Office Orchha, District : Narayanpur,
Chhattisgarh.
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... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner :Ms. Sharmila Singhai, Sr. Advocate
assisted by Ms. Kanchan Karwani,
Advocate
For Respondent/
State
:Mr. Devesh G. Kela, Panel Lawyer.
For Respondent
No. 4
:Mr. Himanshu Yadu, Advocate holding
brief on behalf of Ms. Astha Shukla,
Advocate.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C.A.V. Order
1.The present petition is directed against the order dated
28.02.2023 (Annexure P/1), whereby the appeal preferred by the
petitioner has been dismissed, without appreciating the illegality
and arbitrariness committed by respondent Nos. 3 and 4, and in
gross violation of the principles of natural justice, hence, this writ
petition is preferred seeking following reliefs :
“10.1 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be
pleased to call the entire records of
subject matter of the present case, from
the respondents.
10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be
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pleased to quash/set- aside the
impugned order dated 28.02.2023
passed by respondent no. 2 (Annexure
P/1) and further be pleased to direct the
respondent authorities allow the
petitioner to resume her duties on the
post of Shikshakarmi.
10.3 Any other relief/order which may
deem fit and just in the facts and
circumstances of the case including
award of the costs of the petition may
be given.”
2.Facts of the case, as canvased, are that the petitioner was initially
appointed to the post of Shikshakarmi Grade-III by the Chief
Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Narayanpur, vide
appointment order dated 16.06.2010. A perusal of the
appointment order clearly reveals that the service conditions of
the petitioner are governed by the provisions of the Chhattisgarh
Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions of Service)
Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 2007”).
Subsequently, in the year 2013, the services of the petitioner were
regularized, and she was appointed as Assistant Teacher
(Panchayat) and posted at Primary School, Gumiyabeda, District
Narayanpur. It is submitted that unfortunately, in the year 2014,
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the petitioner suffered from a serious and prolonged illness, which
continued intermittently till the year 2019. Owing to her
deteriorating health condition, she was compelled to remain under
continuous medical treatment and was unable to attend her duties
during the said period. The petitioner was regularly examined and
treated by the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre,
Bhopalpattnam, District Bijapur. A perusal of the said certificates
clearly establishes their authenticity and the genuineness of the
petitioner’s illness. For the first time, a show cause notice dated
11.06.2018 was issued to the petitioner. Due to her serious health
condition, she could not submit a reply within the stipulated time.
However, upon improvement in her health, the petitioner
submitted a detailed reply on 29.07.2019, enclosing all relevant
medical certificates covering the period from 2014 to 2019. In her
reply, the petitioner specifically explained that she had remained
absent from duties w.e.f. 16.06.2014 solely on account of her
medical condition and further assured the authorities that her
health had improved and she was willing and able to rejoin her
duties. Thereafter, vide letter dated 17.12.2020, the Block
Education Officer called upon the petitioner to submit a further
explanation along with a medical certificate issued by a Medical
Board. From the said communication, it is evident that the Block
Education Officer was not satisfied with the reply already
submitted by the petitioner and sought additional medical
verification, despite the fact that authentic medical certificates had
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already been placed on record. To the utter shock and surprise of
the petitioner, she was served with an order of termination dated
24.12.2021. In the said order, it was stated that since the
petitioner had allegedly failed to submit replies to various notices,
a proposal for termination of her services had been passed in the
General Body Meeting of Janpad Panchayat, Orchha dated
08.04.2021. Consequently, by placing reliance on the Circular
dated 21.12.2020 and Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Shikshak
(Panchayat) Samvarg (Recruitment & Service Conditions) Rules,
2012, the services of the petitioner were terminated. It is
submitted that the said termination order is ex facie illegal and
arbitrary, as the services of the petitioner are governed by the
Rules, 2007, whereas the impugned order has been passed
under the Rules of 2012, which are wholly inapplicable to the
petitioner’s case. Being aggrieved by the illegal and arbitrary
termination order dated 24.12.2021, the petitioner preferred an
appeal before the Collector, Narayanpur (Respondent No.3). After
granting an opportunity of hearing to the parties, the learned
Collector, vide order dated 25.03.2022, dismissed the appeal. The
learned Collector erroneously held that sufficient opportunities
had been granted to the petitioner and further observed that her
conduct amounted to indiscipline in violation of Civil Services
Conduct Rules. Against the order passed by the learned Collector,
the petitioner preferred a second appeal before the
Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur. After hearing the
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parties, the learned Commissioner, vide impugned order dated
28.02.2023, dismissed the second appeal and affirmed the
findings recorded by the learned Collector, holding the termination
to be just and proper. Being left with no other efficacious
alternative remedy, the petitioner has been constrained to invoke
the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court by filing the present
petition.
3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the learned Commissioner,
Bastar Division, Jagdalpur (Annexure-P/1) is ex facie illegal,
arbitrary, erroneous, and discriminatory in nature. The said order
has been passed without proper appreciation of facts and settled
principles of law and, therefore, is liable to be set aside on this
ground alone. It is vehemently contended that while deciding the
second appeal, the learned Commissioner has completely
overlooked a fundamental and crucial aspect of the matter,
namely that the petitioner was appointed and governed under the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions
of Service) Rules, 2007. However, the termination order dated
24.12.2021 has been passed by invoking the provisions of the
Chhattisgarh Shikshak (Panchayat) Samvarg (Recruitment &
Service Conditions) Rules, 2012, which are wholly inapplicable to
the petitioner. The action of terminating the petitioner’s services
under an inapplicable statutory framework is patently illegal,
arbitrary, and unsustainable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel
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further submits that the learned Commissioner has failed to
appreciate that no proper or effective opportunity of hearing was
ever granted to the petitioner before passing the proposal for
termination in the General Body Meeting of Janpad Panchayat,
Orchha, District Narayanpur. The decision affecting the civil rights
of the petitioner was taken behind her back, rendering the entire
proceedings vitiated. It is further submitted that no notice
whatsoever was issued to the petitioner regarding the General
Body Meeting dated 08.04.2021. In absence of any prior
intimation or opportunity to present her case, an ex parte proposal
for termination of the petitioner from the post of Shikshakarmi
Grade-III was passed. Such action is in blatant violation of the
principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram
partem. Learned counsel submits that the learned Commissioner
has also failed to properly consider the Circular dated 21.12.2020,
which clearly mandates that in cases of long unauthorised
absence, disciplinary proceedings must be initiated. In the present
case, admittedly, no disciplinary enquiry was ever initiated, no
charge-sheet was served, and no opportunity was afforded to the
petitioner to explain the allegations against her. Instead, the
extreme penalty of termination was imposed solely on the basis of
a proposal passed in a General Body Meeting, which is wholly
impermissible in law. It is further submitted that while passing the
order of termination, the respondent authorities have completely
ignored the fact that the petitioner had submitted her reply to the
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show cause notice along with medical certificates covering the
period from 2014 to 2019. The said certificates were duly issued
by the Medical Officer, Community Health Centre, Bhopalpattnam,
District Bijapur, and their authenticity has never been disputed. In
such circumstances, the authorities were required to take a
compassionate and sympathetic view rather than resorting to a
harsh and disproportionate punishment.
4.Learned counsel further contended that that the punishment
imposed upon the petitioner is grossly disproportionate to the
alleged misconduct, especially in view of her prolonged and
genuine medical condition. The petitioner’s absence was neither
wilful nor deliberate but was compelled by circumstances beyond
her control. The doctrine of proportionality has been completely
ignored by both the authorities below. It is contended that the
learned Commissioner has overlooked the fact that the petitioner
was never afforded an opportunity of hearing prior to the General
Body Meeting, wherein the proposal for her termination was
passed. Such action strikes at the very root of fair play and justice
and is contrary to settled legal principles governing service
jurisprudence. Learned counsel further submits that the
petitioner’s services had already been regularised as Assistant
Teacher (Panchayat) in the year 2013. Once an employee attains
regular status, her services cannot be terminated without
conducting a full-fledged departmental enquiry as per the
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applicable service rules. In the present case, no such enquiry was
conducted, making the impugned termination order legally
untenable. It is not a case where the petitioner had concealed her
illness or failed to inform the authorities. As early as September
2014, the petitioner had duly informed the Block Education
Officer, Janpad Panchayat Orchha, and the Chief Executive
Officer, Narayanpur, about her illness through speed post. This
fact has been completely ignored by both the appellate
authorities. Learned counsel submits that both the authorities
below have failed to appreciate the documentary evidence filed by
the petitioner in its correct perspective and have mechanically
upheld the termination without assigning cogent and legally
sustainable reasons. Even a contractual employee is entitled to a
proper departmental enquiry before passing any stigmatic or
punitive order, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the
present case, the petitioner being a regular employee was entitled
to a higher degree of procedural protection. The impugned
termination order has been passed in gross violation of Article
311(2) of the Constitution of India, as no reasonable opportunity of
hearing was provided and no enquiry was conducted to establish
the alleged misconduct. Learned counsel also submits that while
imposing the major penalty of termination, the respondent
authorities have completely ignored the provisions of the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules,
1999, particularly Rule 7, which prescribes the mandatory
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procedure for imposing major penalties. Non-compliance with the
statutory procedure renders the impugned order void ab initio. In
support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
petitioner has relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matters of Sandeep Kumar vs. G.B. Pant Institute
of Engineering and Technology Ghurdauri and Others ,
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 541, Krishna Kumar Kosaria
vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Writ Appeal No. 450 of 2021, Chhel
Singh vs. MGB Gramin Bank, Pali and Others , reported in
(2014) 13 SCC 166. On the basis of the aforesaid facts,
submissions, and settled position of law, it is prayed that this
Court may be pleased to quash the impugned orders and grant
appropriate relief to the petitioner in the interest of justice.
5.Learned State counsel as also the learned counsel for the
respondent No. 4 jointly submit that the petitioner has challenged
the impugned order dated 28.02.2023 mainly on the grounds that
no proper opportunity of hearing was granted to her and that the
learned Commissioner failed to consider the medical certificates
filed by the petitioner along with her reply to the show cause
notice. It is submitted that the said contentions are misconceived,
factually incorrect, and contrary to the record. At the very outset, it
is submitted that the present writ petition, as framed and filed, is
devoid of any merit or substance and is liable to be dismissed at
the threshold. The impugned order has been passed after due
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consideration of all relevant facts, documents, and applicable
rules, and does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness, or
procedural infirmity. It is an admitted and undisputed fact that the
petitioner was appointed on the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade-III
and was posted at Primary School, Gudarapara (Garpa), vide
order dated 16.06.2010 issued by the respondent No.4. While
posted at the said school, the petitioner proceeded on leave
without submitting any leave application and without obtaining
prior permission from the competent authority. The petitioner
remained absent from her duties unauthorizedly with effect from
16.06.2014 onwards. Learned counsel submits that upon noticing
the prolonged unauthorized absence of the petitioner, the
competent authority promptly issued a show cause notice dated
10.01.2017, calling upon the petitioner to submit her explanation
within three days regarding her absence from duty. Despite
service of the said notice, the petitioner failed to submit any
explanation or disclose any reason for her continued absence.
Subsequently, another show cause notice dated 10.03.2017 was
issued to the petitioner, calling upon her to explain as to why
proceedings for termination of her services should not be initiated
by placing her case before the General Administration Committee.
Even to this notice, the petitioner did not submit any reply. It is
further submitted that since the petitioner continued to remain
absent from duty unauthorizedly for a prolonged period, yet
another show cause notice dated 11.06.2018 was issued to her,
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requiring her to submit an explanation within three days as to why
disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated and her services
terminated. Learned counsel submits that after a lapse of more
than one year, the petitioner, for the first time, submitted a reply
dated 29.07.2019, wherein she herself admitted her unauthorized
absence from duty with effect from 16.06.2014. Along with the
said reply, the petitioner for the first time enclosed medical
certificates. The said medical certificates were forwarded to the
Block Education Officer, Orchha, for verification and submission of
a report in accordance with law. Upon examination of the records
and documents, several discrepancies were noticed. The
petitioner claimed absence from duty from 16.06.2014, whereas
the medical certificates submitted by her pertained to the period
from 15.08.2014 to 29.07.2019. Further, a fitness certificate dated
29.07.2019 was allegedly issued by the Medical Officer, CHC
Bhopalpattanam, whereas the distance between the said CHC
and the office of the Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat
Orchha, is approximately 400 kilometers, making it improbable for
the petitioner to submit the same on the very same date. In view
of these discrepancies, the Block Education Officer, Orchha,
issued a letter dated 25.08.2019 directing the petitioner to submit
clarification on eight specific points along with a Medical Board
certificate, as the petitioner had remained absent for more than
five years. Despite this, the petitioner deliberately chose not to
respond. It is submitted that the said letter dated 25.08.2019 was
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followed by another letter dated 17.12.2020, directing the
petitioner to appear before the office along with explanation on
eight points and a Medical Board certificate within one week,
failing which termination proceedings would be initiated. Once
again, the petitioner failed to submit any reply or comply with the
directions. From the aforesaid sequence of events, it is
abundantly clear that the petitioner was afforded more than
adequate opportunities to explain her prolonged unauthorized
absence, but she failed to submit any satisfactory explanation or
comply with the directions issued by the authorities.
6.Learned counsel further submits that during the pendency of the
matter, the Director, Panchayat, issued instructions dated
21.12.2020 regarding disciplinary action against Teacher
(Panchayat) who remain absent from duty for prolonged periods.
The said instructions provided that upon receipt of a proposal
from the General Administration Committee of the concerned Zila
or Janpad Panchayat, appropriate action shall be taken. In
compliance with the aforesaid instructions and considering the
prolonged unauthorized absence of the petitioner and her failure
to submit satisfactory explanation, the matter was placed before
the General Administration Committee of Janpad Panchayat,
Orchha, in its meeting dated 08.04.2021. The Committee
unanimously resolved to terminate the services of the petitioner,
and the said resolution was duly implemented by the respondent
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No.4 by issuing the termination order dated 24.12.2021. Learned
counsel submits that the termination order was assailed by the
petitioner before the Collector, District Narayanpur, under the
provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision)
Rules, 1995. After providing due opportunity of hearing and
considering the material on record, the learned Collector found no
merit in the appeal and dismissed the same vide order dated
25.03.2022. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a second appeal
before the learned Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur,
under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam,
1993. The learned Commissioner, after hearing the petitioner and
after appreciating all documents and relevant circulars, including
the circular dated 22.03.2018 issued by the Department of
Finance, dismissed the appeal. The learned Commissioner has
rightly observed that where a government servant remains absent
from duty unauthorizedly for more than three years, it shall be
presumed that such employee has voluntarily abandoned service.
In the present case, the petitioner remained unauthorizedly
absent for more than five years and failed to submit any
satisfactory explanation despite repeated opportunities. Thus, the
termination of the petitioner is legal, justified, and in accordance
with law. In view of the aforesaid facts and settled position of law,
it is submitted that the impugned order dated 28.02.2023 is just,
proper, and legal and does not suffer from any infirmity. The
present writ petition, being devoid of merit and substance,
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deserves to be dismissed at the threshold.
7.I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned orders, and examined the record with due care.
8.The question that falls for consideration is whether the termination
of the petitioner satisfies the requirements of Rule 7 of the
Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 ?
9.Rule 5(b)(vi) of the Rules of 1999 clearly prescribes removal from
service as a major penalty. Rule 7 mandates that no major penalty
can be imposed without a formal enquiry. Such an enquiry
necessarily requires framing of definite charges, communication
of allegations to the delinquent employee, opportunity to inspect
records, oral hearing with right to cross-examine witnesses,
submission of enquiry report, and supply of findings to the
delinquent for his representation before passing of final orders.
Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 is quoted below for ready
reference :
5. Penalties. - The following penalties
may, for good and sufficient reasons,
and as hereinafter provided by imposed
on a member of the Panchayat Service
namely :-
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xxx xxx xxx
(b) Major Penalties-
xxx xxx xxx
(vi)Removal from service not
disqualifying for future employment;
7. Procedure for imposing major
penalties. - (1)No order, imposing on a
member of the Panchayat Service, any
of the penalties specified in clauses (iv)
to (via) of Rule 5 shall be passed
except after a formal inquiry is held as
far as may be, in the manner
hereinafter provided.
(2)When an order for formal inquiry has
been made, the disciplinary authority
shall frame Definite charges on the
basis of allegations and shall
communicate such charges, alongwith
the statement of the allegations, to the
member of the Panchayat Service and
also require him to submit, within such
time as may be specified a written
statement of defence and also to state
whether he desires to be heard in
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person.
(3)The person against whom inquiry is
to be held shall, for the purpose of
preparing to defence, be permitted to
inspect and take extracts from such
records as he may specify :
Provided that such permission
may be refused if, for reasons to
be recorded in writing, in the
opinion of the Enquiry' Officer
such records are not relevant for
the purpose or it is against the
public interest to allow his access
thereto.
(4)On receipt of the written statement of
defence or if any such statement is not
received within the time specified, the
disciplinary authority may himself
enquire into such of the charges as are
not admitted or appoint an Enquiry
Officer to hold the inquiry and forward
to him his report and, if advised, his
recommendation alongwith all the
inquiry papers.
(5)The disciplinary authority may
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nominate any person to present the
case in support of the charges before
the Enquiry Officer. The member of the
Panchayat Service may present his
case with the assistance of any other
Panchayat Servant of State
Government Servant approved by the
Enquiry Officer but may not engage a
legal practitioner for the purpose,
unless the person nominated by the
disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a
legal practitioner or unless the
disciplinary authority having regard to
the circumstances of the case so
permits.
(6)If the servant of the Panchayat
Service desires to be heard in person,
he shall be so heard. If he so desires or
if the disciplinary authority so directs,
an oral enquiry shall be held by the
Enquiry Officer. At such inquiry,
evidence shall be heard as to such of
the allegations as are not admitted and
the person charged shall be entitled to
cross examine the witness, to give
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evidence in person, to produce
documentary evidence, if any and to
have such witness called as he may
wish :
Provided that the Enquiry Officer
may, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, refuse to call a witness.
(7)At the conclusion of the inquiry, the
Enquiry Officer shall prepare a report of
the inquiry, recording his findings on
each of the charges together with
reasons therefor.
(8)The proceedings conducted against
the persons charged shall contain a
sufficient record of :-
(i)the charges framed against
such person and the statement of
allegations;
(ii)the written statement of
defence if any;
(iii)the oral evidence taken in the
course of the inquiry;
(iv)the documentary evidence
considered in the course of the
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inquiry;
(v)the orders, if any, made by the
Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary
authority, as the case may be,
with regard to the inquiry;
(vi)a report setting out the findings
on each charge and the reasons
therefor.
(9)The Enquiry Officer, if he is other
than the disciplinary authority, shall
submit the records of the proceedings
mentioned in clause (8) above to the
disciplinary authority without
recommendation relating to the penalty
to be imposed. The disciplinary
authority shall consider the record of
the enquiry and its findings on each
charge, having regard to the findings on
the charges and the record (if the
proceedings) if he is of the opinion that
any of the penalties specified in clauses
(iv) to (vii) of Rule 5 should be imposed,
it shall furnish to the person charged a
copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer,
and where the disciplinary authority is
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not the Enquiry Officer a statement of
its findings together with brief reasons
for disagreement, if any, with the
findings of the Enquiry Officer.
(10)The disciplinary authority shall
consider the representation, it any,
made by the person charged in
response to the notice and determine
the penalty, if any, should be imposed
and shall pass appropriate order on the
case.
(11)The orders passed by the
disciplinary authority shall be
communicated lo the member of the
Panchayat Service, who shall also be
supplied with a copy of the report of the
Enquiry Officer and where disciplinary
authority is not the Enquiry Officer, a
statement of its findings together with
the brief reasons for disagreement, if
tiny, with the findings of the Enquiry
Officer, unless they have already been
supplied to the person charged.
10.It is not in dispute that the petitioner was initially appointed as
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Shikshakarmi Grade-III vide order dated 16.06.2010 and that her
service conditions were governed by the Chhattisgarh Panchayat
Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 2007.
It is also an admitted position that her services were regularised in
the year 2013 and that she was thereafter working as Assistant
Teacher (Panchayat). Once the services of the petitioner stood
regularised, she acquired a substantive status, and her services
could not have been terminated except by following the procedure
prescribed under the applicable statutory rules and in consonance
with the principles of natural justice. This Court finds substantial
force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that
the termination order dated 24.12.2021 has been passed by
invoking Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Shikshak (Panchayat)
Samvarg (Recruitment & Service Conditions) Rules, 2012,
whereas admittedly the petitioner was governed by the Rules,
2007. The action of the respondents in terminating the services of
the petitioner under a statutory framework which was admittedly
inapplicable to her case goes to the root of the matter and renders
the impugned termination order legally unsustainable. An order
passed under an inapplicable rule is void ab initio and cannot be
sustained merely on the basis of alleged misconduct.
11.Further, this Court is unable to accept the contention of the
respondents that the petitioner’s services could be terminated
solely on the basis of a resolution passed by the General Body /
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General Administration Committee of the Janpad Panchayat. The
record clearly reflects that no charge-sheet was ever issued to the
petitioner, no regular departmental enquiry was initiated, and no
enquiry officer was appointed. Even assuming that the petitioner
remained absent for a prolonged period, such absence could only
have been dealt with by initiating disciplinary proceedings as
contemplated under the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, particularly where the
proposed penalty was a major penalty of removal from service.
12.This Court also finds merit in the submission that no notice
whatsoever was issued to the petitioner informing her about the
proposed consideration of her case in the General Body Meeting
dated 08.04.2021. The decision affecting the civil rights and
livelihood of the petitioner was taken behind her back, without
affording her any opportunity of personal hearing at that stage.
Such action is in clear violation of the principles of natural justice,
particularly the rule of audi alteram partem, which mandates that
no person shall be condemned unheard. The reliance placed by
the respondents on the circulars dated 22.03.2018 and
21.12.2020 also does not advance their case. A circular cannot
override statutory rules. Even the said circulars contemplate
initiation of disciplinary proceedings in cases of long unauthorised
absence.
13.In the present case, admittedly, no disciplinary enquiry as
24
mandated under the applicable rules was ever conducted.
Termination of a regular employee without conducting a full-
fledged enquiry, without framing charges, and without affording an
opportunity to lead evidence or cross-examine witnesses is
impermissible in law. This Court further finds that the medical
certificates submitted by the petitioner, though disputed by the
respondents, were never subjected to verification by following a
fair and transparent procedure in the presence of the petitioner.
Even if the respondents had doubts regarding the genuineness or
sufficiency of the medical documents, the proper course was to
hold a disciplinary enquiry and allow the petitioner to explain her
case, rather than straightaway imposing the extreme penalty of
termination. The doctrine of proportionality has also been ignored
by the authorities below. The petitioner’s absence, as pleaded,
was on account of prolonged illness and not a case of wilful
abandonment of service. Whether the absence was justified or not
is a matter requiring adjudication in a properly conducted enquiry.
Such a determination could not have been made unilaterally by
the employer by presuming voluntary abandonment. This Court
finds that both the appellate authorities, namely the Collector and
the Commissioner, have failed to examine these crucial legal
infirmities. They have mechanically upheld the termination order
without addressing the core issue of non-compliance with the
mandatory statutory procedure and violation of principles of
natural justice. The impugned order dated 28.02.2023 passed by
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the learned Commissioner, therefore, cannot be sustained in the
eyes of law.
14.A Division Bench of this Court, in Rooplal Nayak v. State of
Chhattisgarh and Others, reported in 2006 (4) M.P.H.T. 99
(C.G.), has clearly held that no major penalty, as prescribed under
Rule 5(b)(iv) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1999, can be imposed on a member of the
Panchayat service governed by the said Rules without conducting
a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with Rule 7 thereof.
15.In an identical petition coordinate bench of this Court has passed
an order in case of Prakash Chand Soni Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and others in WPS No.1846/2011 on 15/07/2015
and it was held as under:-
“(3)The short issue arisen for
determination is - whether services of a
Panchayat Secretary can be dispensed
with or terminated without conducting
any enquiry as envisaged under Rule 7
of the C.G. Panchayat Service
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (in
short "the Rules, 1999")?
(4)Admittedly, on certain allegations, an
enquiry was conducted against the
26
petitioner and eventually, an enquiry
report was submitted vide Annexure
R/4 and thereafter, show cause notice
was issued to him on 28.04.2008 vide
Annexure R/3, therefore before
removing him the principles of natural
justice have been complied with.
However, at the same time, it is to be
seen that a Division Bench of this Court
in the matter of Rooplal Nayak vs. State
of Chhattisgarh and others, 2006(4)
M.P.H.T. 99 (C.G.) has held that any of
the major penalty prescribed under
Rule 5(b) (iv) of the Rules, 1999 cannot
be imposed on a member of Panchayat
service to whom the said Rules are
applicable without conducting regular
Departmental Enquiry as envisaged
under 7 of the Rules, 1999.
(5)In the case at hand, an enquiry
officer was appointed, who conducted
some sort of enquiry and submitted an
enquiry report, however, that runs short
of a departmental enquiry as
contemplated under Rule 7. The said
27
provisions uses the words "formal
inquiry" with further stipulation that
when an order for 'formal enquiry has
been made, the disciplinary authority
shall frame Definite charges,
communicate the same to the
delinquent along with the statement of
allegations, requiring him to submit
within the specified time a written
statement of defence and also to state
whether he desires to be heard in
person. Thereafter, the defence is
required to be permitted to inspect and
take extracts from the records, which
can be refused for reasons to be
recorded in writing. On submission of
reply by the delinquent, the disciplinary
authority may himself enquire or
appoint an enquiry officer. Appointment
of Presenting Officer and seeking
assistance of some other officers by the
delinquent is also contemplated therein.
The enquiry officer is also enabled to
record evidence and thereafter, at the
conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry
28
officer is supposed to prepare enquiry
report, the copy of which is required to
be furnished to the delinquent. Thus,
the 'formal inquiry' envisaged under the
Rules is akin to the procedure
prescribed for a regular enquiry under
Rule 14 of the C.G. Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966.”
16.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak
Investment Advisors Ltd., reported in (2021) 10 SCC 401 has
further held that an action taken in breach of natural justice or de
hors jurisdiction warrants interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
17.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sandeep Kumar vs.
GB Pant Institute of Engineering and Technology Ghurdauri
& others, 2024 SCC Online SC 541, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has observed as under:-
“19. In this background, we are of the firm view that
the termination of the services of the appellant
without holding disciplinary enquiry was totally
unjustified and dehors the requirements of law and in
29
gross violation of principles of natural justice. Hence,
the learned Division Bench of the High Court fell in
grave error in dismissing the writ petition filed by the
appellant on the hypertechnical ground that the
minutes of 26
th
meeting of the Board of Governors
dated 16
th
June, 2018 had not been placed on
record.
20. As a consequence, we pass the following
directions:—
(i) The impugned judgments dated 4
th
August, 2022
and 21
st
February, 2023 passed by the High Court
are quashed and set aside.
(ii) The order dated 19
th
May, 2022 whereby, the
services of the appellant on the post of Registrar of
the Institute were terminated is also declared to be
illegal and as a consequence, the same is quashed
and set aside.
(iii) That the appellant shall forthwith be reinstated on
the post of Registrar of G.B. Pant Institute of
Engineering and Technology, Ghurdauri. He shall be
entitled to all consequential benefits.
(iv) The respondent-Institute is left at liberty to
30
conduct disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant as per law, if so desired.”
18.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chhel Singh vs.
MGB Gramin Bank, Pali and others, (2014) 13 SCC 166, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“9. The learned counsel for the appellant while
placing reliance on the inquiry report and finding of
the learned Single Judge submitted that the inquiry
was conducted in violation of principles of natural
justice and hence the learned Single Judge rightly
directed the reinstatement of the appellant. Whereas
according to the learned counsel for the respondent
Bank, the Division Bench rightly set aside the order
of reinstatement and remitted the matter for fresh
enquiry.
10. After giving our careful consideration to the facts
and circumstances of the case and the submission
made by the learned counsel for the parties, we are
of the view that the Division Bench was wrong in
setting aside the order of reinstatement. The Division
Bench has accepted that the inquiry stood vitiated by
disallowing the request of the appellant to summon
31
the rest of the five witnesses. For the said reason,
the Division Bench has not interfered with such part
of the finding and order passed by the learned Single
Judge whereby the impugned order of termination
dated 17-10-1994 and the appellate authority order
dated 26-12-1994 were quashed. The order of
termination being quashed by the High Court, in
absence of any observation and grounds to refuse
the reinstatement, the appellant automatically stood
reinstated. Without reinstatement in service, the
question of further inquiry does not arise. There was
no occasion for the Division Bench of the High Court
to direct further inquiry without reinstatement of the
appellant.
12. From a plain reading of the charges we find that
the main allegation is absence from duty from 11-12-
1989 to 24-10-1990 (approximately 10½ months), for
which no prior permission was obtained from the
competent authority. In his reply, the appellant has
taken the plea that he was seriously ill between 11-
12-1989 and 24-10-1990, which was beyond his
control; he never intended to contravene any of the
provisions of the service regulations. He submitted
the copies of medical certificates issued by doctors
in support of his claim after rejoining the post. The
32
medical reports were submitted after about 24 days.
There was no allegation that the appellant's
unauthorised absence from duty was wilful and
deliberate. The inquiry officer has also not held that
the appellant's absence from duty was wilful and
deliberate. It is neither a case of the disciplinary
authority nor the inquiry officer that the medical
reports submitted by the appellant were forged or
fabricated or obtained for any consideration though
he was not ill during the said period. In absence of
such evidence and finding, it was not open to the
inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority to
disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the
doctors without any valid reason and on the ground
of 24 days' delay.”
19.It is a settled position of law that unless and until the procedure
prescribed under the relevant service rules is strictly followed, an
order of removal or termination from service cannot be said to be
in consonance with law. Any action taken in breach of the
prescribed procedure is arbitrary and liable to be set aside.
20.In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the termination of the petitioner is vitiated on account
of non-compliance with the mandatory statutory procedure and
33
violation of the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the
impugned order dated 28.02.2023 passed by the learned
Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, as well as the orders
dated 25.03.2022 passed by the Collector, Narayanpur, and
24.12.2021 terminating the services of the petitioner, are hereby
set aside. However, it is clarified that this Court has not
expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations levelled
against the petitioner.
21.The respondents are at liberty to proceed afresh against the
petitioner strictly in accordance with law, after granting due and
reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and by
following the procedure prescribed under the applicable statutory
rules. In the meanwhile, the petitioner shall be reinstated in
service forthwith. Such reinstatement shall be subject to the
outcome of the fresh proceedings, if any, initiated by the
respondents in accordance with law.
22.Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
The date when the
judgment is reserved
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judgment is
pronounced
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website
Operative Full
14.1.2026 28.2.2026 - 28.2.2026
Raghu Jat
Legal Notes
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