[2026:RJ-JP:43128-DB]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

D.B. Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 212/2023

CNR: RJHC020597862023 | URN: CRLAD / 351U / 2023

1. Sonu @ Sawan Sulaniya S/o Prahlad, R/o Kandoli,

Rajgarh, Distt., Alwar, Rajasthan. (At Present In Central

Jail, Alwar)

2. Rajendra Kumar @ Raju S/o Kailash Chand, R/o

Chandupura, Rajgarh, Distt. Alwar, Rajasthan.(At Present

In Central Jail, Alwar)

3. Pankaj Kumar @ Prem S/o Ram Kripal, R/o Chandupura,

Rajgarh, Distt. Alwar, Rajasthan.(At Present In Central

Jail, Alwar)

4. Anil Kumar S/o Chetram, R/o Dubbi, Rajgarh, Distt.

Alwar, Rajasthan.(At Present In Central Jail, Alwar)

----Appellants

Versus

State of Rajasthan Through P.P.

----Respondent

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajeev Surana, Sr. Adv. assisted

by Mr. Sankalp Sogani-appellant nos.1

to 3.

Mrs. Pankaj Sharma-appellant no.4.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rhishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP

Mr. Dharmendra Kumar for Mr. Kapil

Gupta

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHUWAN GOYAL

Judgment

Date of Conclusion of Arguments : : 14/10/2026

Judgment Reserved On : : 14/10/2026

Whether the full judgment or

only the operative part is pronounced : : Full Judgment

Judgment Pronounced On : : 26/10/2026

Per Hon’ble Mahendar Kumar Goyal, J.

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Under challenge in this appeal is the judgement of conviction

and the order of sentence dated 02.06.2023 passed by the

learned Special Judge, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences

Act, 2012 and the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act,

2005 No.2, Alwar, Rajasthan (for short-`the learned trial court), in

Sessions Case No.25/2020 (05/2020) whereby each of the

accused-appellants (for short-`appellants’) has been convicted

and sentenced as under:

1. Section 363 IPC: Seven years’ simple

imprisonment and fine of Rs.50,000/-; in default

whereof, six months’ additional simple

imprisonment.

2. Section 366 IPC: Ten years’ simple

imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,00,000/-; in default

whereof, one year’s additional simple

imprisonment.

3. Section 366A IPC: Ten years’ simple

imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,00,000/-; in default

whereof, one year’s additional simple

imprisonment.

4. Section 376 D IPC and Sections 5(G)/6 of

the Protection of Children from Sexual

Offences Act, 2012: Rigorous imprisonment for

Life and fine of Rs.5,00,000/-; in default whereof,

five years’ rigorous imprisonment.

Sentences to run concurrently.

Succinctly stated, the relevant facts are that on 28.09.2019

at about 09.24 AM, the complainant/prosecutrix (for brevity

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`complainant’) submitted a written report-Ex.P1 at Police Station

Rajgarh, Alwar wherein it was stated that she was 16 years of age

and on the previous day at about 10.30 PM, she was taken away

from her home in a vehicle by the appellants, who first subjected

her to rape in a bada (enclosure) in Alaktarpura Village and

thereafter in a deserted place in the village river. It was averred

that thereafter, she was dropped near her home wherefrom she

straightway went to the Chowki and the Chowki personnel brought

her to Police Station. It was alleged that she was threatened that

a video made by them of the wrongful act done to her would be

made viral. It was further alleged that she was also threatened

that if she informed her family members, they would eliminate

Alok and would subject his sister to similar wrongful act. Based

thereupon an FIR No.0456 dated 28.09.2019-Ex.P2 was registered

for the offences under Section 376D IPC and Sections 3/4 of the

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for brevity

`the Act of 2012’). After investigation, the appellants were

chargesheeted under Section 376D IPC and Sections 5/6 of the

Act of 2012. Charges under Sections 363, 366, 366A, 376D IPC

and Sections 5(g)/6 of the Act of 2012 were framed against them.

The appellants pleaded not guilty. After trial, they have been

convicted and sentenced, as stated hereinabove.

Assailing the impugned judgment, learned Senior Counsel

Shri Rajeev Surana submitted that the learned trial court gravely

erred in assessing the age of the complainant and treating her to

be minor. Inviting the attention of this Court towards the ocular

and documentary evidence tendered by the prosecution in this

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regard, he contended that although, in her matriculation

marksheet-Ex.P11 her date of birth was shown as 03.01.2003 but,

the prosecution did not lead any evidence to establish its basis.

Referring to the school admission form of the complainant-Ex.P51

wherein the date of birth was mentioned as 03.01.2003, Shri

Surana submitted that Smt. Chameli (PW3), mother of the

complainant, had stated that the date of birth at the time of

admission in the school was written by the complainant’s father

but she was unaware as to its basis. He submitted that neither the

father of the complainant nor the concerned Headmaster nor any

concerned staff member from the school was examined by the

prosecution to prove the basis of recording her date of birth as

03.01.2003. He further stated that the PW3 had also admitted

during her cross-examination that when the complainant was sent

to school, her age was about 10-12 years.

Referring to and relying upon the judgments of Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India in the cases of Rishipal Singh Solanki

vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.:AIR 2022 SC 630 and Birka

Shiva vs. State of Telangana: MANU/SC/0931/2025 ,

learned Senior Counsel asserted that it was obligatory upon the

prosecution to have proved the basis of recording the date of birth

in the matriculation mark-sheet and in the absence thereof, the

same could not have been treated as the conclusive proof of the

age of the complainant.

Learned Senior Counsel argued that the learned trial court

failed to appreciate that the written report-Ex.P1 was hit by

Section 162 Cr.P.C. In this regard, he referred to the statement of

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the complainant (PW1) wherein she had stated that when the

appellants dropped her near her home at about 2.00 AM, she

straightaway went to the Police Chowki Kothinarayanpur and

submitted a report. He canvassed that a statement in similar

terms was made by her sister namely Reema Bai (PW2), as also

by her uncle Sugraram (PW5) but, neither was any such report

tendered in evidence nor was the Chowki In-charge or any police

personnel from the Chowki examined to depose as to what was

stated in the report. He contended that the Investigating Officer-

Ms. Anjali Ajeet Jorwal (PW19) also admitted that before

submitting the Ex.D1, the complainant had informed the Chowki

In-charge about the incident. Referring to a judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Allarakha Habib

Memon & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat-(2024) 9 SCC 546 , Shri

Surana urged that in view thereof, the First Information Report

was hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.

Shri Rajeev Surana further canvassed that the allegation of

subjecting her to rape, first in an enclosure at the village was

disbelieved by the prosecution itself and the charge framed

against them was confined only to subjecting her to rape in a four-

wheeler near the village river. Inviting the attention of this Court

towards the testimony of the complainant (PW1), learned Senior

Counsel urged that the same was full of contradictions and

improvements on material aspects of the case rendering the same

not to be trustworthy. He submitted that her testimony could not

be corroborated by the medical evidence though she was

subjected to medical examination soon after the alleged incident.

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Elaborating his submissions on this aspect, learned Senior Counsel

contended that although in the Forensic Science Laboratory

report-Ex.P101, the male DNA profile obtained from the blood

samples of the appellants were accounted in mixed DNA profile

obtained from the underwear, the salwar and the sanitary pad

allegedly worn/used by the complainant at the time of incident as

also obtained from the samples lifted from the driver seat of the

car and the seat cover found in its carboot but, in this regard, the

learned trial court did not appreciate that the prosecution was not

able to prove the chain of their safe custody. He canvassed that no

seizure memo of the blood samples collected from the appellants

was produced. Further, as per the prosecution story, the samples

were sent to FSL on 17.10.2019 but, there was no evidence to

demonstrate where the samples were kept from the date of their

collection, i.e., 01.10.2019, till they were sent to FSL on

17.10.2019. He also argued that similarly, the prosecution did not

lead any evidence to demonstrate who had collected the samples

from the car which was recovered from an abandoned place.

Learned senior counsel, in this regard, also canvassed that before

seizure of the car, no material was available with the prosecution

to show its involvement in the offence. To buttress his

submissions, Shri Surana relied upon the judgements in the cases

of Prakash Nishad vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2023 SC

2938 and Meghraj vs. State of Rajasthan and connected

matters : MANU/RH/1255/2023 .

Lastly, learned Senior Counsel argued that the prosecution

could not prove that the complainant was abducted from her

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home. Drawing the attention of this Court towards the testimony

of the complainant (PW1) and her sister (PW2), he submitted that

it proved that both were sleeping in a room at the relevant time,

i.e., at about 10.30 PM on 27.09.2019 when the complainant

slipped out of the room without raising any alarm and had gone

with the appellants in a car and, therefore, no case of abduction

was made out.

In the aforesaid factual and legal context, learned senior

counsel for the appellants prayed that the appeal may be allowed,

the judgement of conviction and order of sentence may be

quashed and set aside and they may be acquitted of the charges

framed against them.

Smt. Pankaj Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant-Anil

Kumar adopting the arguments advanced by learned senior

counsel for the other appellants, submitted additionally that

although it was alleged that the incident of rape was captured by

the appellants in a video but, no such video was recovered. She

further contended that although, in the written report, it was

alleged that she was threatened not to disclose the incident to the

family members lest they would eliminate Alok and would subject

his sister to the similar offence but as admitted by the

Investigating Officer (PW19), no investigation in this regard was

made. Inviting the attention of the Court towards the ocular

testimony, she canvassed that though, the complainant knew at

least two of the appellants but, she had painted a picture as if

except one of the appellants, she knew none. She also prayed for

relief in similar terms.

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Shri Rhishi Raj Singh Rathore, learned Public Prosecutor,

assisted by Shri Dharmendra Kumar, learned counsel for the

complainant, opposing the submissions and supporting the

findings recorded by the learned trial court, canvassed that the

findings are well reasoned and based on cogent material available

on record. Referring to the provisions of Section 94 of the Juvenile

Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for brevity-

`the Act of 2015’), he submitted that the date of birth recorded in

the matriculation certificate has to be treated as conclusive proof

of the date of birth and in view thereof, the learned trial court did

not err in treating the complainant as a minor on the date of the

incident. He also argued that from the testimony of the

complainant (PW1) which stood corroborated by the scientific

evidence in the shape of DNA report, it was proved beyond

reasonable doubt that she was subjected to the offences of

kidnapping and also of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. He,

therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

Heard. Considered.

Whether the FIR was hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.:

First, we would like to deal with the submission of the

learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the FIR was hit by

Section 162 Cr.P.C.

The FIR-Ex.P2 is based on the written report-Ex.P1

submitted by the complainant at the Police Station Rajgarh on

28.09.2019 at 09.24 AM. In the written report and in her

deposition as PW1, the complainant had stated that after

subjecting her to the offence of gang rape, the appellants had

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dropped her nearby her home at about 2.00 AM and from there,

she straightaway went to the Police Chowki Kothinarayanpur and

submitted a report. Further, during her cross-examination

conducted on 15.12.2020, she had stated that she orally informed

the police personnel at the Police Chowki of the incident happened

with her whereas in her cross-examination conducted on

17.12.2020, she had categorically stated that she submitted a

report at the Police Chowki. Further, the PW1 had stated that after

lodging the report-Ex.P1, first they went to the place where the

site plan-Ex.P3 was prepared, thereafter, at the site where Ex.P4

was prepared and thereafter, at the river where the site plan-

Ex.P5 was prepared. While, in her cross-examination dated

17.12.2020, she stated that thereafter, she went to Rajkiya Balika

Grah, Alwar but, in her cross-examination dated 21.12.2022,

contradicting her earlier statement, she stated that after

preparation of the site plans, she was taken for medical

examination. However, her sister Reema Bai as PW2 stated that

her medical examination took place at the Police Station itself.

Taking a somersault in her cross-examination, the PW2 stated that

first the police took her to hospital and about half an hour or an

hour thereafter, they lodged the report which was written by her

sister in consultation with her in her presence. Further, her sister

Reema Bai (PW2) had stated that on receipt of a telephonic call

from the Police Chowki, she and her uncle went there and the

complainant submitted a report at the Police Chowki. She very

specifically stated that whatever the complainant disclosed to her

and their uncle, was reduced to writing by the police personnel at

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Chowki Kothinarayanpur and she had also admitted that her sister

had disclosed the entire incident which happened with her at the

Chowki. However, their uncle Sugraram (PW5) stated during his

cross-examination that they did not lodge any report at

Kothinarayanpur rather, submitted it at Police Station Rajgarh.

Thus, we find material contradictions in the aforesaid

testimony as to whether an oral or a written report was submitted

at the Police Chowki Kothinarayanpur or no report was submitted

at all. The Investigating Officer Anjali Ajeet Jorwal (PW19) had

admitted that the complainant had gone to the Police Chowki

however; she neither obtained any report from the daily diary nor

recorded the statement of the Chowki In-charge Shri Rajendra

Sharma. It is trite law that every police personnel is under a

statutory duty to record a report if it discloses commission of a

cognizable offence. In the instant case, as per the prosecution

story, the complainant-a minor girl was subjected not only to the

offence of kidnapping in the night but, also to gang rape and

therefore, despite having her reached the Police Chowki

Kothinarayanpur, in absence of any report or non-production of

the daily diary or non-recording of the statement of the Chowki

In-charge, casts a doubt on veracity of the written report-Ex.P1.

Further, we find that there were material contradictions as to

the time at which the written report-Ex.P1 was submitted. As per

the “karyawahi police” endorsed on it, it was submitted on

28.09.2019 at 09.24 AM. In her cross-examination, the

complainant (PW1) had stated that though they had reached the

Police Station at about 5-6.00 AM but, she informed the police

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about the incident at about 9-10.00 AM. However, Sugraram

(PW5) stated during his cross-examination that after reaching the

Police Station Rajgarh at about 4-5.00 AM, the report was lodged

after half to three quarters of an hour. In this regard, the

Investigating Officer (PW19) had stated that the family members

were talking to each other before submitting the report.

From the aforesaid evidence, it is not proved beyond doubt

as to when the written report-Ex.P1 was submitted despite

endorsement on it that it was done so at 09.24 AM. Further, it is

revealed that before its submission, the complainant had

deliberated with her sister and her uncle, who, as per the PW2,

was working in the police department still, it lacked essential

details which raises a serious doubt as to its veracity.

There is one more important aspect of the matter. The FIR

(Ex.P2) was registered on 28.09.2019 at 09.34 AM but, as per the

endorsement on it, the same was received by the jurisdictional

Court on 24.12.2019, i.e., with a delay of almost three months for

which no explanation was furnished.

Their Lordships have, in the case of Allarakha Habib

Memon & Ors. (supra), held that if the actual complaint filed with

the police seems to have been withheld, there are genuine

reasons to hold that the FIR is a post investigation document. In

that case, reliance was placed on the precedent of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs.

Punati Ramulu : 1994 Suppl 1 SCC 590 wherein it was held

that once it is found that the Investigating Officer has deliberately

failed to record the FIR on receipt of the information of a

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cognizable offence of serious nature and had prepared the FIR

after reaching the spot after due deliberation, consultations and

discussion, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the

investigation is tainted and it would, therefore, be unsafe to rely

upon such a tainted investigation as one would not know where

the Police Officer would have stopped to fabricate evidence and

create false clues. Their Lordships also relied on the judgement in

the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar vs. State of

Karnataka : (2024) 8 SCC 149 wherein, in the backdrop that

close relatives of the deceased had gone to the Police Station but,

no FIR was lodged then and there, it was held that if the daily

diary or the roznamcha entry of the Police Station corresponding

to visit of the so-called relatives of the deceased was not brought

on record, it created a grave doubt on the genuineness of the FIR.

It was also held that the complainant admitted in the cross-

examination that Poujadar came to his house and that he narrated

the incident to the officer who scribed the same and thereafter,

the complainant appended his signatures on the writing. However,

the ASI testified on oath that the complainant had come to the

Police Station and the written report submitted by him was taken

as the complaint of the incident. He did not state anything about

any complaint having been recorded at the house of the

complainant prior to lodging the report. In that backdrop, the non-

production of the daily diary maintained at the Police Station was

reckoned of great significance and the FIR was treated as a post

investigation document not inspiring confidence.

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In the instant case also, almost similar facts exist.

Indisputably, the complainant had first reached the Police Chowki

Kothinarayanpur, the police personnel there summoned her family

members whereupon her sister (PW2) and her uncle (PW5)

reached the Police Chowki and there, the entire incident was

narrated to the police personnel. However, as already observed, it

is doubtful whether this was done in writing or orally. Be that as it

may, neither was the daily diary of the Police Chowki produced

nor, the Police Chowki In-charge or any other police personnel

from there was examined by the prosecution the absence whereof

does not inspire confidence as to genuineness of the report-Ex.P1,

rendering the FIR-Ex.P2 to be hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.

In the aforesaid factual context, we have no hesitation in

recording a finding that the Investigating Agency has suppressed

the true genesis of the case.

Age of the complainant:

The second important aspect involved in the matter is age of

the complainant.

The prosecution has claimed her date of birth to be

03.01.2003 and therefore, below 17 years of age on the date of

the incident. To prove her age, the prosecution has relied upon her

matriculation mark-sheet-Ex.P11, school admission application

form-Ex.P51 and her Transfer Certificate-Ex.P52 as the

documentary evidence and the testimony of the complainant

herself (PW1), her sister (PW2) and her mother (PW3).

Ex.P11 reflects her date of birth as 03.01.2003 and it is

based on the date of birth recorded in her school admission

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application form-Ex.P51. Smt. Chameli (PW3) had stated that the

complainant’s age was mentioned in the admission application

form by her father and she was not aware of its basis. Another

document, i.e., the Transfer Certificate-Ex.P52 only reiterates the

date of birth as mentioned in the school admission application

form. The documents-Ex.P51 and Ex.P52 have been exhibited by

the Investigating Officer (PW19). Neither, father of the

complainant nor, Headmaster of the school, nor any other

concerned staff member from the school appeared in the witness

box to prove the basis of the date of birth entered in the

admission form. The evidentiary value of the date of birth in the

matriculation mark-sheet, which was a derivative entry, was only

as good as that of the entry from which it was copied. If its base

entry was not proved and/or its source was not known, a later

document that reproduced it added no corroborative/independent

value to the date of birth in the matriculation mark-sheet. Though,

it is a well settled legal principle that the admission form and the

Transfer Certificate being certified copies of the original record of a

Government school, were admissible in evidence under Section 35

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for brevity-`the Act of 1872’)

but, mere admissibility would not entail proof of the contents

thereof.

In the case of Rishipal Singh Solanki (supra), the accused

Nishant Solanki @ Nishu (respondent no.2) was declared a

juvenile delinquent by the Principal Magistrate (Juvenile Justice

Board), Baghpat. The criminal appeal preferred thereagainst by

the appellant was dismissed by the learned Additional District and

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Sessions Judge, Special Judge, POCSO Act, which was

unsuccessfully challenged before the High Court by way of a

criminal revision petition. While dismissing the appeal taking into

consideration a catena of precedents, their Lordships held that the

basis of proof required before the Juvenile Justice Board while

dealing with an application raising a claim of juvenility is different

and is lower than that required in a trial before the concerned

criminal court before which the case regarding commission of

offence is pending. It was further held that when a claim of

juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim

to satisfy the Court so as to discharge the initial burden. However,

the documents mentioned either in the Rule 12 of the Juvenile

Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (for short-

`the Rules of 2007’) or sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the Act of

2015 shall be sufficient only for prima facie satisfaction of the

Court on the basis whereof a presumption of juvenility may be

raised which would not be conclusive proof of the age and the

same may be rebutted by the opposite side. It was specifically

held that any document which is in consonance with the public

document, such as the matriculation certificate, could be accepted

by the Court or the Juvenile Justice Board provided such public

document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Act

of 1872 viz., Section 35 and other provisions.

In the case of Birka Shiva (supra), the criminal appeal was

preferred by the accused-appellant who was convicted under

Sections 376, 363 and 342 IPC by the learned Sessions Judge and

the appeal preferred thereagainst by him came to be dismissed by

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the High Court. Therein, the prosecution had relied on the birth

certificate issued by the Zila Parishad High School to establish the

minority of the victim. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that

though such an entry made in public or official registers is

admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence

Act, 1872; however, admissibility is distinct from probative value.

It was observed that the evidentiary weight of such a

document would depend on proof of its authenticity and the

source of underlying information. Mere production and

marking of a document as exhibit by the Court does not

amount to proof of its contents. Its execution has to be

proved by leading substantive evidence, that is, by the

evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth

of facts in issue.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to and relied upon the

judgement rendered in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand

Purohit:1988 Supp SCC 604, wherein it was observed as under:

“14. … If entry regarding date of birth in the scholar's

register is made on the information given by parents or

someone having special knowledge of the fact, the same

would have probative value. … The date of birth mentioned

in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the

person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is

examined. The entry contained in the admission form or the

scholar's register must be shown to be made on the basis of

information given by the parents or a person having special

knowledge about the date of birth of the person concerned.

If the entry in the scholar's register regarding date of birth is

made on the basis of information given by parents, the entry

would have evidentiary value, but if it is given by a stranger

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or by someone else who had no special means of knowledge

of the date of birth, such an entry will have no evidentiary

value. …

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The courts have consistently held that the date of birth

mentioned in the scholar's register or secondary

school certificate has no probative value unless either

the parents are examined or the person on whose

information the entry may have been made, is

examined…" (Emphasis supplied)

Another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case

of Allamelu vs. State: (2011) 2 SCC 385 was also referred

wherein it was held that though, a transfer certificate issued by a

Government school and duly signed by the Headmaster may be

admissible under Section 35 but, it would not be of much

evidentiary value to the prove age of the girl in absence of the

material on the basis of which age was recorded. The date of birth

mentioned in the T.C. would have no evidentiary value unless the

person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is

examined.

Thus, after referring to a catena of judgements in this

regard, their Lordships proceeded to hold that the evidentiary

value of the date of birth in the certificate issued by the school

was significantly undermined in absence of corresponding material

inasmuch as the prosecution had failed to examine the person

who had made the entry in the admission register to ascertain on

what basis such an entry was made. It was observed that there

was nothing on record to corroborate the date of birth of the

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victim as recorded in the school birth certificate and, therefore, it

could not be relied upon to definitely determine the age of the

victim and hold with certainty that she was below 16/18 years of

age at the relevant time.

From the aforesaid precedential law, we find that it has been

authoritatively held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that entries as

to date of birth in the school register/documents, though are

admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Act of 1872, but

their probative value would depend upon the authenticity and

veracity of such entries which can be proved only by the

underlying basis on which such entries were made. In the instant

case, the learned trial court has relied upon the testimony of the

complainant herself (PW1), her sister (PW2) and her mother

(PW3) coupled with her matriculation mark-sheet-Ex.P11.

However, we find that deposition of the complainant (PW1) as to

date of birth is based solely upon the Ex.P11. She, during her

cross-examination, feigned ignorance as to when she took

admission in Class I. Although, PW2 had stated complainant’s date

of birth as 03.01.2003 but, she did not disclose the basis thereof.

Smt. Chameli (PW3) had claimed the complainant to be aged 15-

16 years, but in her cross-examination, she stated that

complainant’s father had recorded the date of birth in the

admission form but she was unaware of its basis. She had further

stated that when the complainant first went to school, her age

was about 10-12 years. However, in the same breath, she had put

a question mark on her own statement. As already observed,

neither the father of the complainant nor the concerned

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Headmaster or any staff member of the school was examined to

disclose the underlying basis of the date of birth mentioned in the

school admission application form which was, indisputably, the

basis of recording the date of birth in the matriculation mark-

sheet. In the conspectus of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the

considered opinion that it was not safe to hold the complainant to

be a minor on the date of incident relying upon the date of birth

recorded in the Ex.P11 and we hold that the prosecution could not

prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that she was a minor at the

relevant time.

Whether the allegation of gang rape was proved:

Another contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for

the appellants was that the prosecution had failed to establish that

the complainant was subjected to gang rape.

In her written report-Ex.P1, the complainant had alleged that

she was subjected to gang rape by all the four appellants, first in

an enclosure in the village and thereafter, in a deserted place in

the village river. However, during her court deposition as PW1, she

had stated that only the appellants Raju and Sonu subjected her

to rape in the first instance, that too in the vehicle and not in the

enclosure. Thereafter, two other appellants joined them in the

vehicle and all four of them took her to the river where they all

subjected her to rape. However, the story of her being subjecting

to rape, either in the enclosure by all four of them or in the vehicle

by two of the appellants in the first instance was not accepted by

the prosecution itself and the trial court had framed no charge

against any of the appellants of subjecting her to rape twice, i.e,

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in the first instance in the village and in the second instance near

the river. The charge framed pertained only to gang rape in the

vehicle near the river.

As PW1, the complainant stated that all the four appellants

took her in a vehicle to the river, where the vehicle was parked

and she was subjected to gang rape. She did not specifically allege

rape in the vehicle. During her cross-examination, she admitted

that it was not mentioned in the written report that after the

vehicle reached the river, all the four appellants committed rape

upon her. She further stated that it was wrongly mentioned in her

police statement-Ex.D1 that she was subjected to rape in the river.

She also admitted during her cross-examination that neither in the

written report-Ex.P1 nor in her police statement-Ex.D1, was it

mentioned that she was subjected to rape inside the vehicle.

Though, the written report lodged at the Police Station Rajgarh at

about 09.24 AM on the day following the incident, did not mention

that the rape was committed inside the vehicle but, the sister of

the complainant (PW2) stated in her examination-in-chief that at

the Police Chowki, her sister had disclosed in detail the entire

incident including that she was subjected to rape near the river

inside a four-wheeler; but, very conspicuously, it was not

mentioned in the written report which creates a grave doubt as to

the veracity of the prosecution case.

Further, we noted that while passing the impugned

judgement, the learned trial court held that the allegation of rape

stood corroborated by the medical evidence. However, we find

otherwise. In her medical examination report-Ex.P9 with regard to

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sexual assault, it was reported that there were no injury marks on

her body. On genitals, though no injuries were found but, a slight

abrasion in the vagina was noted. Dr. Sunita Verma (PW8), one of

the Members of the Medical Board who examined the complainant,

stated that menstrual blood was present in the vagina and there

were no marks of injuries. In her cross-examination, she stated

that there was no mark of semen on the pubic hair. She also

stated that the complainant did not inform her about any sexual

intercourse. Another member of the Medical Board namely, Dr.

Meena Gupta (PW9) had stated during her cross-examination that

there was no fresh injury in the vagina and there was no sign of

recent intercourse. She accepted the suggestion that the abrasion

in the vagina could be on account of friction with cloth. It explains

the minor abrasion in the vagina inasmuch as, as per the

prosecution story, the complainant was in her menstrual cycle and

was using a sanitary pad at the relevant time.

Moreover, PW9 had opined that since, as per the FSL report,

no semen was found in the vaginal swab of the complainant, she

was not subjected to rape. On that premise, we do not find that

the allegation of gang rape stood corroborated medically.

The impugned judgement reflects that the learned trial court

has heavily relied upon the Rajasthan State Forensic Science

Laboratory (FSL) report-Ex.P101 as the corroborating piece of

evidence with regard to the allegation of gang rape. We find it

profitable to reproduce the relevant part of the report as under:

1.Male DNA profile obtained from exhibit no. 10 (Blood sample

of accused (Sawan urf Sonu)), 11 (Blood sample of accused

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(Rajendra urf Raju), 12(Blood sample of accused (Anil

Kumar)) & 13(Blood sample of accused (Pankaj urf Prem))

are accounted in the mixed DNA profile obtained from exhibit

no. 2(Underwear of victim).

2.Male DNA profile obtained from exhibit no.11(Blood sample

of accused (Rajendra urf Raju)) is accounted in the mixed

DNA profile obtained from stains detected on exhibit no.

1(Salwar of victim).

3.Male DNA profile obtained from exhibit no. 10 (Blood sample

of accused (Sawan urf Sonu)) and 12(Blood sample of

accused (Anil Kumar)) is accounted in the mixed DNA profile

obtained from exhibit no. 3(Pad of victim).

4.Male DNA profile obtained from exhibit no.12(Blood sample

of accused (Anil Kumar)) is accounted in the mixed DNA

profile obtained exhibit no. 14(Driver seat of the car).

5.Male DNA profile obtained from exhibit no.11(Blood sample

of accused (Rajendra urf Raju)) and 12(Blood sample of

accused (Anil Kumar)) is accounted in the mixed DNA profile

obtained exhibit no. 19(Seat cover found in carboot).

Thus, we find that as per the report, the male DNA profile

obtained from the blood samples of all the appellants accounted in

the mixed DNA profile obtained from the underwear of the victim.

The male DNA profile obtained from the blood sample of

appellant-Rajendra @ Raju accounted in the mixed DNA profile

obtained from stains detected from the salwar of the victim. The

male DNA profile obtained from blood samples of appellant Sawan

@ Sonu and appellant Anil Kumar accounted in the mixed DNA

profile obtained from the sanitary pad of the victim. The male DNA

profile obtained from the blood samples of some of the appellants

accounted in the mixed DNA profile obtained from the Driver seat

of the car and the seat cover found on the carboot.

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Dr. Shailendra Sharma (PW14), the Medical Officer,

Community Health Centre, Rajgarh, stated that he collected the

blood samples of all the appellants on 01.10.2019, sealed them

separately and handed over all the sealed samples to the police.

During his cross-examination, he stated that the letter given by

him along with the samples bore neither his seal nor the dispatch

number nor the date of the dispatch. Shri Vishnu Kumar (PW15),

a Constable working in the Circle Office, Rajgarh, stated that he

had taken the sealed samples on 02.10.2019 and denied

specifically to have received the same on 01.10.2019. Although,

Dr. Shailendra Sharma did not specify to which police person he

handed over the sealed samples but, had categorically stated the

same were handed over on 01.10.2019 whereas, Vishnu Kumar

claimed to have received the same on 02.10.2019. Thus, there is

contradiction as to when the blood samples were handed over to

the police. Moreover, the prosecution is completely silent as to

where the samples were kept from the time they were handed

over by Dr. Shailendra Sharma to the police on 01.10.2019 till

they were seized at the Police Station on 02.10.2019 vide memo-

Ex.P30. Further, as per the Ex.P30, 4 sealed cloth bags containing

the samples and 4 sealed envelopes were received but, they were

marked only as “A”, “B” and “C”. The prosecution did not furnish

any explanation as to who had marked the packets as “A”, “B” and

“C” and as to how the four sealed cloth bags and 4 sealed

envelopes could only be marked as “A”, “B” and “C”.

Further, as per the testimony of Shri Vikram Singh (PW12), a

Constable in the CO Office, Rajgarh, on 15.10.2019 the blood

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samples were again sent after addressing the objection raised. As

per the seizure memos-Ex.P32 to Ex.P39, the packets marked `A’,

`B’ and `C’ were brought to the Police Station by Shri Vikram

Singh along with the objection letter of the FSL and were seized

there in presence of motbir witnesses Shri Vikram Singh and Amin

Khan, both Constables. Vikram Singh (PW12) had stated that the

sealed packets were received by the CO on 15.10.2019. During his

cross-examination, he stated that an objection was raised (by the

FSL) as all the packets belonging to all the four appellants were

sent in one packet which were to be remitted again after

segregating them. He further stated that after getting the

objection removed, he brought the samples from M.O. and

thereafter the samples were sent again on 15.10.2019. He feigned

ignorance as to whether the samples were sealed again by the

MO. Another motbir witness Amin Khan (PW16) corroborated the

statement of PW12 to the extent that the samples were received

in the CO office on 15.10.2019. However, during his cross-

examination, he feigned ignorance as to when Vikram brought

these articles. He further feigned ignorance as to the custody of

these articles from 01.10.2019 to 15.10.2019. The Investigating

Officer (PW19) had also stated that she received the packets

marked `A’, `B’ and `C’ on 15.10.2019 which were seized vide

memos Ex.P32 to Ex.P39. During her cross-examination, she

admitted that she did not put any seal impression on these seizure

memos, but stated that there was a seal impression by the Doctor

on these documents. However, a perusal of the seizure memos,

i.e., Ex.P32 to Ex.P39, does not reflect that the packets were

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sealed again with the seal impression either of the Investigating

Officer or the Medical Officer as claimed by the prosecution.

Further, the prosecution led no evidence to corroborate the

statement of Vikram Singh (PW12) that he brought these samples

from the MO after getting the objection rectified. As a matter of

fact, there is no evidence on record to show as to when, in the

first instance, the blood samples of the appellants were sent to the

FSL for examination, who took the same, when the samples

reached the FSL and what objection was raised by the FSL except

the oral testimony of PW12 that it pertained to sending of the

samples in one packet. However, no such objection letter was

produced by the prosecution. Further, there is no letter from the

MO rectifying the objection as claimed by PW12. It is also not

reflected that after receipt of the samples back in the CO office,

when the packets were opened, when the samples were

segregated and whether the same were sealed again properly or

not? As per Vikram Singh (PW12), the samples were sent again on

15.10.2019 after addressing the objection, but as per Ex.P21-the

receipt of the FSL, 22 sealed packets were received on 17.10.2019

through Constable Rajnesh along with a letter of the SP Alwar

dated 17.10.2019.

Rajnesh (PW6) stated that he deposited 22 sealed packets

on 17.10.2019 after receiving them from the malkhana. However,

the Investigating Officer feigned ignorance during her cross-

examination as PW19 as to when the samples were sent to the

FSL. Furthermore, as per the FSL report-Ex.P101, the blood

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samples constituted a part of the 22 packets received on

17.10.2019.

Thus, from the aforesaid prosecution testimony, we find that

there were contradictions with regard to the date on which the

samples were re-sent to FSL. As per PW12, the samples were sent

back on 15.10.2019 whereas, as per PW6 and the receipt Ex.P21,

the same were sent and received at the FSL on 17.10.2019 while

the Investigating Officer feigned ignorance as to the date when

the same were re-sent.

There is another important aspect of the matter. As per the

testimony of Rajnesh (PW6), he collected 22 sealed packets from

the malkhana and deposited the same at the FSL on 17.10.2019

along with the even dated forwarding letter of the SP Alwar. His

testimony stood corroborated by the FSL receipt-Ex.P21. However,

the malkhana register-Ex.P50 did not reflect that the packets

containing blood samples of the appellants marked `A’, `B’ and

`C’ seized vide memo-Ex.P30 on 02.10.2019, were ever deposited

in the malkhana. Further, as per the prosecution case, on

15.10.2019, they were received back from the FSL with an

objection letter. At the cost of repetition, we may observe here

that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to show that as to

when, by whom and from where these samples were taken to the

FSL in the first instance. Even the objection letter of the FSL was

not produced. The malkhana register did not show that they were

deposited in the malkhana after the same were remitted back by

the FSL. However, an entry in it shows that vide receipt

13629/DNA/17.10.2019, 22 sealed packets were deposited at the

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FSL by the Constable Rajnesh. In these circumstances, it becomes

highly doubtful as to how Rajnesh collected these samples from

the malkhana and how the samples constituted part of the 22

sealed packets deposited by him with the FSL on 17.10.2019.

Furthermore, the malkhana In-charge was not examined by the

prosecution to dispel all these ambiguities. Even otherwise, the

entries in the malkhana register do not inspire confidence as to

genuineness of the Ex.P50. The first two entries are dated

28.09.2019. Thereafter, the entries are dated 30.09.2019 and

02.10.2019. However, entry made thereafter shows that the

sealed packets 1, 2 and 3 were received on 28.09.2019. If the

entries were made in chronological order, we find no explanation

on record as to how after 02.10.2019, the samples could have

been received and deposited on 28.09.2019.

We need not underline the significance and importance

attached to the chain of safe custody of the samples before any

scientific report based thereupon can be relied upon by the courts.

Their Lordships have, in the case of Prakash Nishad (supra),

held that the samples collected by the Investigating Agency must

be sent to the FSL with promptitude and without any delay to rule

out the possibility of contamination and the concomitant prospect

of diminishment in value and the prosecution must establish the

chain of custody, which implies that right from the time of taking

of the samples to the time their role in the investigation and

processes subsequent is complete, each person handling such a

piece of evidence must duly be acknowledged in the

documentation, so as to ensure that the integrity is

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uncompromised. It was observed that the alertness with which the

samples are sent to the FSL and the maintenance of the chain of

custody are vital aspects which are indispensable to the vitality of

such evidence. It was further held that a document should be duly

maintained, cataloging the custody and the document should

include name or initials of the individual collecting the evidence,

each person or entity subsequently having custody of it, dated the

items were collected or transferred, agency and case number, the

victim’s or the suspect’s name and the brief description of the

item. Relying upon the aforesaid precedent, a co-ordinate Bench

of this Court, in the case of Meghraj (supra), held that it was

necessary for the prosecution to establish that the blood sample

was taken, kept in the malkhana and sent to the FSL. In the

absence of a seizure memo of the blood sample and entry in the

malkhana register, this Court found the FSL report to be doubtful.

A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,

in the case of Manoj & Ors. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh:

(2023) 2 SCC 353 , held that if DNA evidence is not properly

documented, collected, packaged and preserved, it will not meet

the legal and scientific requirement for admissibility in a court of

law. Because extremely small samples of DNA can be used as

evidence, greater attention to contamination issues is necessary

while locating, collecting, and preserving DNA evidence for, it can

be contaminated when DNA from another source gets mixed with

DNA relevant to the case. This can happen when someone sneezes

or coughs over the evidence or touches his/her mouth, nose, or

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other part of the face and then touches an area that may contain

the DNA to be tested.

From the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, a clear

legal position emerges that to establish the integrity of the

samples collected for DNA examination, the prosecution is under

an obligation to show a chain of safe custody in absence whereof,

the DNA report cannot be relied upon. As is apparent from the

evidence analysed hereinabove, in the instant case, the

prosecution has miserably failed to lead evidence to show that an

unbroken chain of custody qua the blood samples of the

appellants was maintained and therefore, we do not find it

prudent to rely upon the DNA report to prove complicity of the

appellants in the crime leaving explained large gap in the

prosecution case.

Although the aforesaid observations are sufficient to deal

with the DNA examination qua the samples collected from the car

allegedly used in commission of the offence as well but, we would

like to examine the same to demonstrate the reckless and

irresponsible manner in which the investigation was conducted in

the instant case leaving explained large gap in the prosecution

case.

A white Datsun car was seized vide memo-Ex.P41 on

02.10.2019 from village Rambas in an abandoned condition on

verification of the appellant-Raju @ Rajendra. It is worth noting

here that neither was any disclosure statement of the appellant

Raju @ Rajendra recorded nor, was any site plan of the seizure

prepared by the Investigating Agency. The seizure memo was

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proved by S/Shri Vikram Singh (PW12) and Heeralal (PW13), both

Constables. Conspicuously, neither in the seizure memo nor in the

testimony of the aforesaid two witnesses, there was even a

whisper of averment with regard to the seizure of the car along

with the key. In the mechanical inspection conducted by Shri

Hawa Singh (PW18) vide memo-Ex.P43, no incriminating evidence

was found in the car. The car was taken to FSL by Shri Ramveer

Singh (PW17) on 23.10.2019 as is evident from the FSL receipt-

Ex.P42. Though there is an entry of the receipt dated 23.10.2019

in the malkhana register-Ex.P50 but, there is no corresponding

entry of the car’s deposit in the malkhana. Be that as it may, a

while Datsun car was seized by the Investigating Agency on

02.10.2019.

In the written report-Ex.P1, the complainant had simply

stated that the appellant took her in a vehicle from her home.

She, as PW1, denied having disclosed in her police statement-

Ex.D1, that the subject vehicle was a Maruti and feigned ignorance

as to why it was so mentioned therein. None of the other

prosecution witnesses had disclosed before 02.10.2019, i.e.,

seizure of the subject car, that it was a white Datsun car leaving a

gap in the prosecution story as to how the investigating agency

came to know that it was the same car which was used in the

commission of the offence. When the Investigating Officer (PW19)

was confronted on this aspect, while admitting that neither in

Ex.P1 nor in Ex.D1 nor in the Section 164 statement was even the

word `car’ or its make mentioned, stated that it was so revealed

from Ex.P22 and the statement of the wife of Vishram. Ex.P22 is

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the notice issued to Smt. Narangi Devi W/o Vishram under Section

133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Conspicuously, it is dated

16.10.2019, i.e., 14 days after the date of the seizure of the

subject car. Her police statement-Ex.P25 was also recorded on

16.10.2019. Smt. Narangi Devi had turned hostile as PW7.

However, nothing emerges from her cross-examination by the

learned Special Public Prosecutor to demonstrate that on or before

02.10.2019, it was revealed to the police that the subject car was

used by the appellants in the commission of the offence. On that

premise, we find the allegation of the use of the subject vehicle in

the commission of the crime to be doubtful.

Furthermore, as per the FSL report-Ex.P101, the mixed DNA

profile obtained from the driver seat of the car and the seat cover

found in the carboot accounted for in the male DNA profile

obtained from the blood samples of the three appellants. However,

the prosecution did not lead any evidence to show as to when and

by whom the samples from the car were collected. No seizure

memo of the samples was produced. The malkhana register-

Ex.P50 also does not reflect that any such samples were ever

deposited in the malkhana. In view thereof, we are of the

considered opinion that the learned trial court erred in relying

upon the FSL report to record a finding that the complainant was

subjected to gang rape by the appellants in the car recovered vide

Ex.P41.

There is one more important aspect of the matter.

Indisputably, the FSL report was not proved by the expert(s) who

had prepared it. While dealing with an identical situation, a three-

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Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of

Irfan alias Bhayu Mevati vs. State of Madhya Pradesh: 2025

INSC 150, held as under:

“22. It is an admitted position that the DNA profiling

report (Exhibit-157) was formally exhibited by the

Superintendent of Police(PW-31) in his evidence. None of

the scientific experts involved in the process of

conducting the DNA profiling examination and issuing the

report have been examined by the prosecution.

23. The DNA profiling report is a document on which the

entire fulcrum of the prosecution case is based. The

defence has claimed grave prejudice on account of non-

examination of these scientific witnesses and the non-

production of the experts in evidence, thereby creating a

grave doubt on the probative value of the report.

24. The aspect concerning evidentiary value of DNA

report has been explained by this Court in Rahul v. State

of Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs MANU/SC/1455/2022:

2022: INSC:1176: (2023) 1 SCC 83, wherein it was held

as under: -

"36. The learned Amicus Curiae has also

assailed the forensic evidence i.e. the report

regarding the DNA profiling dated 18-4-2012

(Ext. P-23/1) giving incriminating findings. She

vehemently submitted that apart from the fact

that the collection of the samples sent for

examination itself was very doubtful, the said

forensic evidence was neither scientifically nor

legally proved and could not have been used as a

circumstance against the appellant-accused. The

Court finds substance in the said

submissions made by the Amicus Curiae.

The DNA evidence is in the nature of opinion

evidence as envisaged under Section 45 and

like any other opinion evidence, its

probative value varies from case to case .

38. It is true that PW 23 Dr B.K. Mohapatra, Senior

Scientific Officer (Biology) of CFSL, New Delhi had

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stepped into the witness box and his report regarding

DNA profiling was exhibited as Ext. PW 23/A, however

mere exhibiting a document, would not prove its

contents. The record shows that all the samples

relating to the accused and relating to the deceased

were seized by the investigating officer on 14-2-2012

and 16-2-2012; and they were sent to CFSL for

examination on 27-2-2012. During this period, they

remained in the malkhana of the police station. Under

the circumstances, the possibility of tampering with the

samples collected also could not be ruled out. Neither

the trial court nor the High Court has examined the

underlying basis of the findings in the DNA reports nor

have they examined the fact whether the techniques

were reliably applied by the expert. In the absence of

such evidence on record, all the reports with regard to

the DNA profiling become highly vulnerable, more

particularly when the collection and sealing of the

samples sent for examination were also not free from

suspicion." (emphasis supplied)

Although, in the aforesaid judgement, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court was pleased to remand the matter to the learned trial court

to examine the expert(s) who had prepared the DNA report but,

we do not find it just and expedient to do so in the instant case for

the reason that the prosecution could not prove the chain of

custody of the samples before they were sent to the FSL.

It is a well settled legal principle that a conviction for the

offence of rape can be recorded on the sole testimony of the

prosecutrix provided it is trustworthy, of sterling worth, natural

and consistent right from the inception till her deposition in the

Court. However, in the present case, we do not find deposition of

the complainant (PW1) to be so rather, to be suffering from

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contradictions and improvements on material aspects of the case.

Further, the allegation is not found to be corroborated medically or

scientifically or by any other evidence.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are not convinced

that the prosecution was able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,

that the complainant was subjected to offence of gang rape / rape

by the appellants.

Offence of kidnapping/abduction:

Now we are left with the issue as to whether the appellants

are guilty of kidnapping/abduction. Since, we have already held

that the prosecution could not prove the complainant to be minor

on the date of incident, we will examine the evidence in that light.

In the written report, it was stated that on the previous day,

i.e., 27.09.2019 at about 10.30 pm, four appellants took her away

from home with no allegation that it was forcible or against her

wishes or after enticing her. In her court statement, she stated

that on that day, she received a phone call at about 01.30 PM

from Sonu Sawan Sulania asking her not to inform anybody that

he used to talk to her. She further averred that the same night, at

about 10.30 PM, he again telephoned and asked her to come out

of the home failing which she would be defamed in society on

account of her relationship with her friend Priyanka’s brother Alok,

whereas she had no relationship with him. Under threat, she came

out of the house where she found a white car. When she reached

the car, she noticed a person sitting inside whose name, she later

came to know, was Raju. Sonu pushed her inside the car from

behind and took her to Raju Ka Bada, Chandupura. There, Raju

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and Sonu both subjected her to rape in the vehicle and thereafter,

two more persons came in the car from the bada, who disclosed

their name as Prem and Anil. She, during her cross-examination,

admitted that all these averments were absent in her written

report-Ex.P1. She further admitted that Raju was sitting in driver

seat who was brother-in-law of her cousin “Collector”. She denied

to have stated in her police statement-Ex.D1 that she asked Raju

why he had come at night and said if her family members were

alarmed, she would be defamed. Thus, according to her deposition

as PW1, she came out of the house under threat of being defamed

in the society on account of her relationship with Alok but, not

only she had denied to have any relationship with Alok but, also

no investigation was carried out by the Investigating Agency in

this regard as admitted by the Investigating Officer (PW19). She

had further denied to have stated in Ex.D1 that two boys namely

Prem R/o Chandupura and Anil Dubey were following the car on a

motorcycle. She had also stated that when she sat in the car, she

raised an alarm but, Sonu covered her mouth. Further, she

admitted that she and her sister were sleeping in a room. In the

same breath, she stated that her sister was studying and accepted

the suggestion that she had come out of the house at 10.30 PM

without informing anybody. Moreover, she feigned ignorance when

suggested that she had talked to the appellant on his mobile

number from her sister’s mobile phone for about 28 minutes on

19.09.2019. She had stated that the appellant Pankaj has two

sisters who are her sisters-in-law being wives of her cousins. Her

sister Reema Bai (PW2), during her cross-examination, denied

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having stated in her police statement-Ex.D2 that the complainant

asked her to sleep and that at about 10.00 PM, she slept. She

further denied to have stated in Ex.D2 that her sister looked

towards her many times lifting the bedsheet. She also admitted

that the room in which they were sleeping, was latched from

inside but she did not hear any sound of it being opened.

In the conspectus of the aforesaid evidence, a grave doubt is

raised as to the prosecution case that the complainant was

kidnapped/abducted from her home either forcefully or by enticing

her. On that premise, we do not concur with the findings recorded

by the learned trial court with regard to the guilt of the appellants

under Sections 363, 366 or 366A IPC.

In the conspectus of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the

considered view that the prosecution could not establish the guilt

of the appellants, beyond reasonable doubt, for the offences with

which they were charged and the appeal deserves to be allowed.

In the result, the appeal filed by the appellants is allowed,

the judgement of conviction and order of sentence dated

02.06.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Protection of

Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Commission for

Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005 No.2, Alwar, Rajasthan in

Sessions Case No.25/2020 (05/2020) is quashed and set aside.

The appellants are acquitted of the charges framed against them.

Since, they are in jail, they shall be set at liberty forthwith if not

required to be detained in any other case.

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A CrPC (Section 481

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), each of the appellants

[2026:RJ-JP:43128-DB] (37 of 37) [CRLAD-212/2023]

`

are directed to furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.25,000/-

and a surety in the like amount within four weeks before the

Registrar (Judl.) of this Court which shall be effective for a period

of six months with the stipulation that in the event of a Special

Leave Petition being filed against this judgement or on grant of

leave, the appellants aforesaid, on receipt of notice thereof, shall

appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

(BHUWAN GOYAL),J (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J

1/RAVI SHARMA