STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

A

v.

ANAND CHINTAMAN DIGHE

MAY2, 1991

[RANGANATH MISRA, CJ., KULDIP SINGH AND B

P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987:

Sections 3 and 4-Bail-Grant of-By the Designated Court-Validity

of-Appreciation of evidence collected at the investigating stage, fore­

closing the trial-Whether proper.

The respondent was arrested by the police in connection with the

murder of a Corporator, nnder

Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 read· with

120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist

and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. The prosecution

alleged

that the respondent conspired and hatched the plot to murder

the deceased. This was based on the respondent's repeated statements

to the Press, which were also published in the local newspaper/

magazine

and interview given to another paper, dubbing those party

Corporators who had voted against the respondent's party candidates

for the offices of the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of the local civic body,

resulting in their defeat as traitors and threatening them with death.

The Designated Court, released the respondent on bail, but this

Court cancelled the bail. Thereafter, the respondent moved another

application for bail before the Designated Court, which granted bail on

the view that from the newspaper reports it could not be assumed or

inferred that the respondent was in any manner involved in the

conspi­

racy, that there was no justification to record the First Information

Report, that the statements of witnesses recorded by the investigating

officer, could not be relied upon.

Allowing the appeal preferred by the State, this Court·

HELD: 1: 1 The police Investigation prima facie shows that mafia­

type terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold-blooded

murder of the deceased. The Judge, Designated Court acted illegally in

appreciating the statements

of witnesses and material collected by the

investigating officer

at the·investigaiion stage. He should have dealt

with

the same in accordance with law. [ 623F]

1.2 The Judge virtually pre-empted the trial by delivering the

judgment oo the culpability _of respondent. The Jndge grossly erred in

(il9

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

fore-closing the trial by pre-judging the evidence which was yet to come

on record. l'jo doubt, while cancelling the bail order, this Court

observed that the cancellation

of bail was without pre-judice to the

rights

of the respondent to move the Designated-Court for bail at any

subsequent stage, but that was only in the event

of any further evidence

being recorded by the court

or any fresh material being made available

during the investigation or before the court. This Court also directed

that it

was necessary for the Designated-Court to consider further mate­

rial collected by the investigating agency, by recording statements of

witnesses. The Designated-Court did not record any evidence and there

was no fresh material available before the Court. The Judge, Desi­

gnated-Court, by putting his own gloss over the same material has

again granted bail to the res:iondent. The manner in which the Judge

has dealt with the matter cannot be appreciated.

[623D-E]

1.3

Tlli' bail granted to the respondent is accordingly cancelled. I 623G I

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal

0

No. 336 of 199 I.

E

F

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.2. 1990 of the Designated

Court, Pune in Crl. Misc. Application No. 5 of 1990.

V.V. Vage, V.N. Patil and A.S. Bhasme for the Appellant.

R.K. Jain, P.M. Hegde, Satish Samant and Kailash Vasdev for

the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KULDIP SINGH, J. Special Leave granted.

Shridhar Khopkar a Shiv Sena Corporator in the Municipal

Corporation Thane was murdered on April 21,

1989. The First

Infor·

mation Report was lodged at Waghle Police Station Thane on the

same date.

Anand

Chintaman Dighe, the respondent before us, was

arrested by the police· in connection with the said case on charges

G

under sections 147, 148, 149,

302 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal ~

H

Code and sections 3 and 4 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1987. The allegations against Dighe are that he

conspired and hatched the plot to murder Shridhar Khopkar.

The prosecution case is that election to the office of Mayor and

Deputy Mayor, Municipal Corporation T!Jane, was held on March 20,

1989. The Shiv Sena party, majority in the Corporation, was expecting

-

STATE OF MAHARASTRA v. CHINTAMAN DIGHE [SINGH, J.} 621

to win the election. The party was, however, defeated. The defeat was

imputed

to the cross-voting on the part of one or two, members of the

Shiv Sena. The said cross voting had angered the

Shiv Sena leaders.

The cross-voters were dubbed as traitors. It is alleged that Dighe had

issued repeated statements to the press saying that the traitors' life

would be made difficult and probably they would be killed. These

statements were published in Marathi Daily "Navakal" dated March

22,

1989 and were repeated in a weekly magazine

"Lokprabha" on

April 9,

1989. Again in an interview to Daily

"Urdu Times" dated

April

16, 1989 the respondent Dighe had asserted that he knew the

names

of the traitors but could not disclose the same. He had also

asserted

in the said statement that the punishment for traitors was

death and it would be difficult for them to survive.

The learned Judge, Designated Court,

Pune, by his order dated

April

18, 1989 released Dighe on bail. This Court by an order dated

January

16,

1990 cancelled the bail with the following observations:

A

B

c

"In the present case the learned Judge observed that D

it

is a case of respectable person of a big political organisa­

tion, his freedom cannot be curtailed if he

is entitled to

bail. His liberty cannot be curbed

if enlarged on bail and,

therefore, no kind

of condition

·is required to be imposed.

The Court also observed that being a leader of the big

political organisation one cannot expect that the respon-E

dent will commit

any-offence if enlarged on bail and he

cannot be called to be a criminal. The learned Judge was

obsessed by the fact that the respondent was associated

with a political party and was oblivious

of the nature of the

allegations made against him and the relevant materials

indicating that the respondent had been making utterances F

inciting violence. The respondent gave repeated statements

to the

Press saying that the traitors' life will be made dif­

ficult and probably they will be killed. This was published

in Marathi Daily 'Navakal' on 22.3.89.

He repeated his

threat and this appeared

in an interview given to the repor-

ter

of the Weekly Magazine 'Lokprabha' in its issue G

of 9.4.1989. In an interview in daily

'Urdu Times' dated

16.4.1989 the respondent asserted that he knew the names

of the traitors but c_ould not disclose the same. He also

asserted that the punishment for traitors

is death and they

would be killed and

this decision has not been taken by him

in anger. H

A

B

c

D

E

F

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

In the backdrop of such assertions, it

was necessary

for the Court

to consider the further materials collected by

the investigating agency by recording statements of witnes­

ses. The court below misdirected itself

in refusing to look

into such statements and concluding that

it is a case for

granting bail taking into account only the position held

by

the respondent in the party. The court clearly erred in dis­

posing of the application for

bail."

Thereafter Dighe moved an application before the Designated

Court on January 23, 1990 for grant of time to surrender. Dighe sur­

rendered on February 5, 1990 and on the same day he moved an

application for bail before the said Court. The application was heard

on February 8, 1990 and the orders were pronounced on February 9,

1990 releasing Dighe on bail. It is the said order which has been chal­

lenged before us

in this appeal.

The learned Judge, Designated-Court, after lengthy discussion

came to the conclusion that from the newspaper reports it could not

be

assumed or inferred that Dighe was in any manner involved in

the

conspiracy. The learned Judge observed as under:

"By such statement to the press, it cannot be

assumed,

or no inference can be drawn as such that Shri

Anand Dighe was the person who was trying to

kill the

traitor." "Mere statement does not amount to any kind of con-

spiracy. So, this cannot be the evidence of their agreement ,~

or meeting two minds to commit any kind of offence."

"I cannot take these newspaper cuttings into con­

sideration.''

The learned Judge further discussed the First Information

Report and came to the findings that there was no justification to

G ·record the same. The observations of the learned Judge are as under:

H

"The only thing that had happened on that day, was

the murder of Shri Shridhar Khopkar. He could very well

register the offence that such a murder had taken place. He

could not register the offence under Section 3 and 4 of the

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987

STATE OF MAHARASTRA v. CHINTAMAN DIGHE {SINGH, l.] 623

because he was not possessed of any kind of substantial

A

material to register this offence. So,

in short, this F.I.R. is

...

. of no use to the prosecution, at least for the purpose of this -. offence under Section 3 and 4 of the Act, ibid."

"

The learned Judge further discussed the statements of witnesses

recorded by the investigating officer. The Judge scrutinized the state-

B

ments of Arnn Jagtap, Smt. Sangita Khopkar and Miss Sujata

Khopkar and treating those statements to be evidence before the

Court, came to the conclusion that the statements could not be relied

-1

upon. The learned Judge virtually pre-empted the trial by delivering

the judgment on the culpability of respondent Dighe. We are of the

view

that the Learned Judge grossly erred in fore-closing the trial by

c

pre-judging the evidence which was yet to come on record.

It is no doubt correct that this court in its order dated January 16, 1990 observed that the cancellation of bail was without prejudice to

the rights of Dighe to· move the Designated-Court for bail at any

subsequent stage, but that was only

in the event of any further evi-

D

deuce being recorded by the Court or any fresh material being made

-;•

available during the investigation or before the Court. This Court also

directed

that it was necessary for the Designated-Court to consider

further material collected

by the investigating agency, by recording

statements

of witnesses. The Designated-Court did not record any

J·-1- evidence and there was no fresh material available before the Court.

E

The learned Judge Designated-Court by putting his own gloss over the

same material has again granted bail to the respondent. We do not

appreciate the manner in which the learned Judge has dealt with the

matter. The police investigation prima facie shows that mafia-type

terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold-blooded

,

murder of Shridhar Khopkar. The learned Judge acted illegally in

F

appreciating the statements of witnesses and material collected by the

investigating officer at the investigation stage. He should have permit-

ted the evidence to be recorded and thereafter

deal( witlt'fhe same in

accordance with law.

"

We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the

G

Designated-Court and cancel the bail granted to Dighe. He is directed

to surrender himself to custody immediately. In case he does not so

surrender within ten days from today, the Designated-Court shall issue

non-bailable warrant for his apprehension.

N.P.V. Appeal allowed.