2026:JHHC:24347

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P.(S) No. 4395 of 2025

….…..

Surendra Prasad, Aged about 65 Yrs S/o Late Pran Mohan

Yadav, Resident of Bajpayee Path, Shukla Colony, Hinoo,

Po- Hinoo, Ps- Doranda, Dist- Ranchi (Jharkhand)

..… Petitioner (s)

Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand, Through the Chief Secretary,

Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.

& P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi (Jharkhand)

2. The Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department,

Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.

& P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi (Jharkhand)

3. The Principal Secretary, Rural Development Department

(now Rural Works Department), Government of

Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-

Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi (Jharkhand)

4. The Deputy Secretary to the Government, Road

Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand,

Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist.

Ranchi (Jharkhand) ..... Respondent(s)

With

W.P.(S) No. 4521 of 2025

….…..

Surendra Prasad, Aged about 65 Yrs S/o Late Pran Mohan

Yadav, Resident of Bajpayee Path, Shukla Colony, Hinoo,

Po- Hinoo, Ps- Doranda, Dist- Ranchi (Jharkhand).

..… Petitioner (s)

Versus

1. The State of Jharkhand, Through the Chief Secretary,

Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.

& P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi (Jharkhand)

2. The Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department,

Government of Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O.

& P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist. Ranchi (Jharkhand)

3. The Principal Secretary, Rural Development Department

(now Rural Works Department), Government of

Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-

Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi (Jharkhand)

4. The Deputy Secretary to the Government, Road

Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand,

Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Dist.

Ranchi (Jharkhand) ..... Respondent(s)

….…..

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

….…

For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ajit Kr., Sr. Advocate

Mr. Rajeev Kr. Sinha, Advocate

Mr. Vishnu Kr. Mehta, Advocate

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For the Respondents : Md. Sahabuddin, S.C.-VII

Mr. Baibhaw Gahalut, A.C. to Sr. AAG

C.A.V. ON: 17/06/2026 PRONOUNCED ON:14/08/2026

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Since, common issues are involved in the writ petitions

filed by the same petitioner, they were heard together and are

being disposed of by this common order, and the facts

relevant to decide the main lis has been taken from W.P.(S)

No. 4395 of 2025.

3. In W.P.(S) No. 4395 of 2025, the petitioner has made the

following prayer:

(i) For quashing of the order dated 28.10.2015 wherein the Respondent

No. 4 vide Memo No. 7434 imposed punishment against the Petitioner

in the light of departmental proceeding for reduction of pay of the

Petitioner to minimum pay scale of his post and also quash the

consequential order with regard to proportionate recovery of amount

from the Petitioner as loss caused to the Government Exchequer

(Annexure-7).

(ii) For direction upon the concerned Respondent to pay the Petitioner

the amount which was deducted from his actual salary or deferential

arrears of salary & other benefits which has not been paid to the

Petitioner as he found guilty on the ground that the Petitioner made

countersigned over the alleged 12 fake invoices placed by the

contractor before the Executive Engineer with regard to purchasing of

Bitumen.

(iii) For quashing of entire departmental proceeding as the same is utter

violation of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, control &

Appeal) Rule, 1930 (Herein after called as C.C & A Rule 1930);

(iv) For grant of such other relief/reliefs for which the Petitioner would

be entitled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

4. In W.P.(S) No. 4521 of 2025, the petitioner has made the

following prayer:

(i) For quashing of the order dated 23.10.2015 wherein the Respondent

No. 4 vide Memo No. 7335 imposed punishment against the Petitioner

in the light of departmental proceeding for reduction of pay of the

Petitioner to minimum pay scale of his post and also quash the

consequential order with regard to proportionate recovery of amount

from the Petitioner as loss caused to the Government Exchequer

(Annexure-7).

(ii) For direction upon the concerned Respondent to pay the Petitioner

the amount which was deducted from his actual salary or deferential

arrears of salary & other benefits which has not been paid to the

Petitioner as he found guilty on the ground that the Petitioner made

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countersigned over the alleged 4 fake invoices placed by the contractor

before the Executive Engineer with regard to purchasing of Bitumen.

(iii) For quashing of entire departmental proceeding as the same is utter

violation of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, control &

Appeal) Rule, 1930 (Herein after called as C.C & A Rule 1930);

(iv) For grant of such other relief/reliefs for which the Petitioner would

be entitled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading in W.P.(S)

No. 4395 of 2025 are that petitioner served as an Assistant

Engineer in the Rural Engineering Organisation, now the

Rural Works Department, and retired from service in the year

2019. The controversy arises from the maintenance and

repair of Bano P.W.D. Road to Pabura-Nimtur-Pangur Path,

Km. 0 to 10, executed during 2004-05 through a contractor.

6. Pursuant to the order dated 30.06.2009 passed in

W.P.(PIL) No. 803 of 2009, the Central Bureau of Investigation

registered R.C. Case No. 17(A)/2009(R) on 16.09.2009 and

submitted Charge-sheet No. 10 of 2010 dated 30.11.2010

against the contractor, the petitioner and the concerned

Junior Engineer. On substantially the same factual

foundation, a departmental proceeding was initiated under

Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and

Appeal) Rules, 1930 vide Memo No. 8918(S)WE dated

26.09.2013.

7. The departmental enquiry culminated in a report holding

the charge proved. After a second show-cause notice and

consideration of the petitioner's reply, the disciplinary

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authority issued Memo No. 7434 dated 28.10.2015, reducing

the petitioner to the minimum of the pay scale of his post and

directing proportionate recovery of the alleged loss caused to

the Government revenue.

8. The petitioner was also facing criminal trial and was

convicted vide order dated 28.11.2019 against which he

preferred an appeal and this Court in its appellate jurisdiction

has acquitted the petitioner vide order dated 15.05.2024.

Upon examining the evidence relating to the identical invoices

and road work, this Court recorded that there was no

material to show that the petitioner knew that the invoices

were forged, and that prior to 2008 no duty was cast upon the

engineers to verify the authenticity or source of the invoices,

and that the allegation of conspiracy to facilitate clearance of

the contractor's bills was not proved.

9. The petitioner thereafter submitted a fresh representation

seeking withdrawal of the punishment and restoration of

consequential benefits, but the same was rejected by Letter

No. 26(S), giving rise to the present writ petition.

Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner

10. Ld. Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner

submitted that the departmental enquiry is vitiated at its

foundation because no departmental witness was examined to

prove the charges; the disputed invoices, their alleged falsity,

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the petitioner's knowledge, the alleged loss or the duties

attached to the post of Assistant Engineer. The Inquiry officer

treated the C.B.I. charge-sheet and investigation material as

substantive evidence without having the documents proved

through any competent witness and without affording an

effective opportunity of cross-examination.

11. It was further submitted that Rule 55 contemplates a real

and effective enquiry in which the department must first lead

evidence in support of the charge. A First Information Report,

charge-sheet, investigation report or collection of documents

cannot prove itself. The finding of guilt, having been reached

merely upon the allegations contained in the C.B.I. papers

and upon the petitioner's reply, is a finding based on no

evidence and is contrary to the law laid down in Roop Singh

Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 , wherein

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that documents collected

during investigation cannot be treated as evidence unless

their contents are proved in the disciplinary enquiry.

12. Ld. Sr. Counsel further submitted that the applicable

departmental instructions did not impose upon an Assistant

Engineer the duty to authenticate the source or genuineness

of the invoices. Government Memo Nos. 718 dated 21.03.2001

and 1680 dated 26.03.2002 placed the obligation to purchase

packed bitumen from public-sector oil companies upon the

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contractor. The Executive Engineer's letter dated 03.09.2005

and Letter No. 391 dated 31.03.2010 of the Chief Engineer

demonstrate that the communication and verification

mechanism concerning procurement was centered in the

office of the Executive Engineer and that no separate pre-

2008 direction required the Assistant Engineer to verify the

source of the invoices.

13. It was argued that the petitioner's function was confined

to technical supervision, physical verification of the material

used and quality of construction. The road was found to be in

good and motorable condition even years after completion,

and the criminal appellate judgment also recorded that

procurement did not compromise the quality of road

construction. Therefore, the mere fact that the petitioner

countersigned the invoices after physical verification could

not, without proof of knowledge or a prescribed verification

duty, establish misconduct or complicity.

14. Ld. Sr. Counsel also submitted that the criminal

prosecution and the departmental charge are founded upon

the same twelve invoices, the same agreement, the same

contractor, the same alleged wrongful payment and the same

allegation of conspiracy. The judgment dated 15.05.2024

specifically negates the essential elements of the departmental

charge by holding that knowledge of forgery, a duty to verify

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authenticity and conspiracy were not established.

Consequently, the departmental conclusion cannot be

sustained by merely invoking the different standards of proof

applicable to criminal and disciplinary proceedings.

15. The direction for proportionate recovery was assailed

independently. No technical witness, accounts witness or

competent authority was examined to prove any deficiency in

the executed work, to quantify the alleged loss, or to establish

a causal connection between the petitioner's countersignature

and the sum sought to be recovered. The contractual record

further indicates that deductions for non-return of empty

bitumen drums were to be made from the contractor's bills. A

pecuniary recovery having serious civil consequences cannot

be imposed upon the petitioner on an unproved or

unquantified assumption.

16. Lastly, it was submitted that the present proceeding is

founded upon a supervening cause of action. The earlier writ

and review were decided long before the judgment of acquittal

dated 15.05.2024. The L.P.A. was withdrawn after the said

judgment with liberty, and the respondents thereafter passed

a fresh order rejecting reconsideration. The present challenge

is therefore directed not merely against the original

punishment in isolation but also against its continued

enforcement despite the subsequent judicial findings which

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strike at the very substratum of the charge.

17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

Respondent Nos. 2 and 4, relying upon the counter affidavit,

submitted that the writ petition is devoid of merit and

deserves to be dismissed. It was contended that the

departmental proceeding originated from the investigation

directed by this Court in W.P.(PIL) No. 803 of 2009 and from

the C.B.I. charge-sheet alleging that the petitioner had

countersigned twelve fake bitumen invoices bearing the same

assignment number, thereby facilitating pecuniary advantage

to the contractor and corresponding loss to the State.

18. The respondents submitted that the petitioner failed to

ensure return of the requisite number of empty bitumen

drums, which according to them indicated lesser utilization of

bitumen and showed his involvement in the irregular

execution of the work. Resolution No. 1680 dated 26.03.2002

required the contractor to procure packed bitumen from

IOC/BPCL/HPCL, and the petitioner, despite being an

Assistant Engineer, countersigned the invoices without

verifying their truthfulness. The bills were thereafter prepared

by the Junior Engineer on the basis of such invoices and

illegal payment was made to the contractor.

19. It was further submitted that a regular departmental

proceeding under Rule 55 was conducted by the Inquiry

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officer, the charges were reported as proved, the enquiry

report was supplied to the petitioner along with the second

show-cause notice, and his reply was duly examined. Since

the petitioner did not place any new fact sufficient to disprove

the charges, the disciplinary authority-imposed reduction to

the minimum pay of the pay scale and proportionate recovery

of the Government loss. According to the respondents, the

punishment is commensurate with the gravity of the proved

misconduct and there was no violation of the principles of

natural justice.

20. The respondents also relied upon the earlier dismissal of

W.P.(S) No. 7453 of 2013 and submitted that criminal and

departmental proceedings operate in distinct fields. Relying

upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.,

(1999) 3 SCC 679, they contended that the standard of proof

in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of

probabilities, whereas the criminal charge must be proved

beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, an acquittal in a

criminal case does not automatically obliterate a finding of

misconduct recorded in a departmental enquiry.

21. Finally, the respondents contended that the Jharkhand

Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)

Rules, 2016 contain no provision for reconsideration or

revision of a punishment already imposed merely because the

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employee has subsequently been acquitted in the criminal

case. On that basis, the petitioner's fresh representation was

rejected by Letter No. 26(S) dated 03.01.2025, and the

respondents maintain that such rejection is lawful.

Findings

22. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon

consideration of the writ petition, counter affidavit and the

documents on record, the principal controversy is whether the

punishment can lawfully continue after the departmental

finding was reached without proof of the foundational

evidence and the criminal appellate court subsequently

negated the essential ingredients of the identical allegation.

The following issues arise for consideration:

i. Whether the departmental finding can be sustained when no

witness was examined and the C.B.I. papers and disputed

invoices were not proved in accordance with Rule 55?

ii. Whether the respondents can sustain the punishment merely

by relying upon the different standards of proof after the

criminal appellate judgment specifically found absence of duty,

knowledge and conspiracy on the same factual foundation?

iii. Whether the reduction of pay and proportionate recovery are

sustainable without proof and quantification of the loss

individually attributable to the petitioner?

23. In regard to the first issue, the counter affidavit states

that the Inquiry officer conducted the proceeding and reported

the charge as proved, but it does not answer the central

allegation that no departmental witness was examined to

prove the invoices, the C.B.I. documents, the alleged shortage,

the petitioner's duty or the alleged loss. The mere existence of

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a charge-sheet or an investigation report is not substantive

proof. A departmental enquiry may not be governed by the

strict technical rules of the Evidence Act, but it remains a

quasi-judicial proceeding and its conclusion must rest upon

some evidence having a rational nexus with the charge.

24. In Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2

SCC 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an inquiry

officer performs a quasi-judicial function and that material

collected during investigation does not become evidence merely

because it is placed before the inquiry officer. The contents of

the documents must be proved through witnesses, particularly

where the charge depends upon disputed facts, knowledge and

intention. Applying the said principle, the departmental

finding against the petitioner is unsustainable because the

central documents and allegations were never proved by any

witness capable of being cross-examined. For ready reference

the relevant paragraph is quoted herein below:

“14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi-

judicial proceeding. The enquiry officer performs a quasi-

judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent

officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry officer

has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into

consideration the materials brought on record by the parties.

The purported evidence collected during investigation by the

investigating officer against all the accused by itself could not

be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding. No

witness was examined to prove the said documents. The

management witnesses merely tendered the documents and

did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was

placed by the enquiry officer on the FIR which could not have

been treated as evidence.”

25. The issue of examination of oral witness has been dealt

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repeatedly by the Hon’ble Apex Court right from the case of

Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank [(2009) 2 SCC

570] and further reiterated in the case of State of Uttar

Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha [(2010) 2 SCC 772] .

However, it has been seen in many cases that the authorities

have not yet understood the importance of evidence of oral

evidence. Thereafter, again in the case of Satyendra Singh

Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another reported in 2024

SCC OnLine SC 3325 and Jai Prakash Saini v. Managing

Director, U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. reported in 2026

SCC OnLine SC 505 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

reiterated the importance of examining the oral witnesses to

prove the documents.

26. The respondents rely upon the petitioner's

countersignature as sufficient proof. However, the act of

countersigning is admitted only as a technical endorsement

following physical verification; the misconduct alleged by the

department required proof that the petitioner was under a

duty to authenticate the source of the invoices and knowingly

facilitated a false claim. Neither component was proved in the

enquiry. In the absence of a notified duty and evidence of

knowledge, the conclusion of complicity is only an inference

built upon another unproved inference.

27. The allegation regarding empty bitumen drums also

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cannot cure the evidentiary defect. The pleadings indicate that

the contractual mechanism contemplated recovery from the

contractor for non-return of drums. The respondents have not

shown that any technical measurement, stock verification or

accounts evidence was produced before the Inquiry officer to

prove lesser consumption of bitumen or to connect such

alleged shortage with the petitioner. The road work itself was

reported to be in good condition and no deficiency in quality

was established.

28. In regards to the second issue the proposition that

departmental and criminal proceedings are distinct is

unexceptionable. Mere acquittal does not automatically

invalidate every disciplinary action. The respondents are,

however, not entitled to treat this general proposition as an

absolute rule divorced from the facts. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine

SC 1618, held that where the charges, evidence and

circumstances are identical and the criminal court, after full

consideration of the prosecution evidence, finds that the

charge has failed, the writ court may interfere if allowing the

disciplinary finding to stand would be unjust, unfair and

oppressive. Relevant paragraph is extracted hereinbelow:-

“12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and

the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence,

witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the

matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court in judicial

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review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding

was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that

the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in

judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The

Court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if

it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary

proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each

case will turn on its own facts. (See G.M. Tank v. State of

Gujarat [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006

SCC (L&S) 1121] , State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao [State

Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 : (2009) 2

SCC (L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram [State of T.N. v. S.

Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013)

1 SCC (L&S) 229] .)”

29. The present matter falls within the above exception. The

criminal appeal concerned the very same invoices, the same

contractor, the same work and the same allegation of

conspiracy and wrongful payment. This Court, after

examining the evidence, recorded that beyond countersigning

the invoices there was no material to infer that the petitioner

knew them to be forged; and further before 2008, no duty

was cast upon the engineers to verify the authenticity and

source of such invoices; and that conspiracy to facilitate

clearance of the bills was not proved. These findings do not

merely reflect a higher criminal standard of proof; rater they

also negate the existence of the duty and knowledge which

constitute the foundation of the departmental charge.

30. The respondents' reliance upon Capt. M. Paul Anthony

(supra) is therefore incomplete. That decision recognizes the

independence of the two jurisdictions, but it also recognizes

the significance of an acquittal where both proceedings rest

on the same factual and evidentiary foundation.

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31. Further, in the present case, the departmental enquiry is

not supported by independent evidence different from the

criminal case. On the contrary, it rests upon the C.B.I.

material which was neither independently proved in the

enquiry; nor found sufficient to establish the petitioner's

involvement in the criminal appeal.

32. The plea that the charges were framed under Rule 55,

whereas the criminal case involved offences under the Penal

Code and Prevention of Corruption Act; does not create a real

factual distinction. The labels and legal consequences differ,

but the factual imputation remains identical: knowing

countersignature of forged invoices, facilitation of payment

and conspiracy with the contractor. Once the appellate court

found that knowledge, verification duty and conspiracy were

not proved, the disciplinary authority could not mechanically

continue the punishment without demonstrating any

independent departmental evidence supporting misconduct.

33. In regard to the third issue, the order directing

proportionate recovery is unsupported by a reasoned

quantification. No evidence has been shown regarding the

exact quantity of bitumen allegedly not used, the value

thereof, the amount recoverable under the contract, the share

of responsibility of each officer, or the causal connection

between the petitioner's act and the alleged loss. Recovery

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from salary and pensionary benefits cannot be founded upon

a generalized allegation of loss, particularly when the

contractor was the party responsible for procurement and the

contractual deductions were recoverable from his bills.

34. The second show-cause process also does not validate an

enquiry otherwise based on no evidence. A delinquent

employee cannot be expected to disprove charges which the

department has not first established through evidence. The

disciplinary authority's observation that the petitioner failed

to produce a new fact merely reverses the burden but does

not amount to an independent consideration of the

evidentiary deficiencies pointed out in his defence.

35. For the aforesaid reasons, the respondents' objections

based on separate standards of proof and absence of a

statutory review provision cannot sustain the impugned

action. The departmental finding suffers from a basic no-

evidence defect, while the subsequent criminal appellate

judgment directly displaces the factual assumptions of duty,

knowledge and conspiracy. Allowing the punishment and

recovery to continue would therefore be arbitrary, unfair and

oppressive.

Relief

36. Accordingly, in W.P.(S) No. 4395 of 2025 the Memo No.

7434 dated 28.10.2015 and in W.P.(S) No. 4521 of 2025 the

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Memo No. 7335 dated 23.10.2015 imposing reduction to the

minimum of the pay scale and proportionate recovery,

together with the enquiry report and the subsequent order

contained in Letter No. 26(S) dated 03.01.2025 rejecting

reconsideration, deserve to be, and, is hereby, quashed and

set aside.

37. This Court holds that the petitioner is entitled for all

consequential reliefs what has not been given to him due to

the impugned order of punishment, which has been quashed

in the preceding paragraphs.

38. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to verify the

records of the case to quantify the consequential reliefs and

pass necessary order and extend the same to the petitioner

within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of

this order.

39. Accordingly, both the writ petitions are allowed. Pending

interlocutory application(s), if any, may also stand disposed

of.

(Deepak Roshan, J.)

Dated:14/08/2026

Amardeep/

A.F.R

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14.08.2026