HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

***

WRIT-C No. 30608 of 2018

Date of Order : September 05, 2022

Sursati ….. Petitioner

Through: M/s Tanuj Dwivedi and Ajay Kumar Singh,

Advocates

v/s

State of U.P. and others ….. Respondents

Through: Mr. Neeraj Tripathi, Additional Advocate General,

with Mr. Shashank Shekhar Singh, Additional Chief

Standing Counsel and Mr. Manoj Tripathi, Standing

Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 4

Mr. Devendra Kumar, Advocate for respondent

Nos. 5 & 6 and

Mr. Pramod Kumar Pandey, Advocate for

respondent No.7

CORAM : HON’BLE RAJESH BINDAL, CHIEF JUSTICE

HON’BLE PRAKASH PADIA, JUDGE

HON’BLE PIYUSH AGRAWAL, JUDGE

x x xx

RAJESH BINDAL, C.J.

1. The matter has been placed before this Bench on a reference

made by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated January 22, 2020,

seeking opinion on the following questions:-

“(i) Whether a subsequent purchaser of the land acquired under

the National Highways Act, 1956, after publication of

declaration under Section 3D(1), is not entitled to receive

compensation on the strength of his vendor's title in view

of Section 3D(2)?

Chief Justice's Court

Serial No.301

2 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

(ii) Which of the judgments (i) Surendra Nath Singh Yadav

(supra) or (ii) Vipin Kumar Agarwal, Asha Devi and Smt.

Gyanti Singh, lay down the law correctly?”

2. For the purposes of clarity, Question Nos. (i)

1

and (ii) referred

to above, are reframed as follows:

“1A. Whether the purchaser of the land, after publication of the

declaration under Section 3-D(1) of the National Highways

Act, 1956 is entitled to receive compensation on strength

of his vendor's title?

1B. Whether the purchaser of the land, after determination of

amount of compensation under Section 3-G of the National

Highways Act, 1956 is entitled to receive compensation on

strength of his vendor’s title from competent authority?

II.Which of the judgments (i) Surendra Nath Singh Yadav

Vs. Union of India and others, [2018 (2) ADJ 760 (DB)] or

(ii) Vipin Agarwal Vs. Union of India and others, Writ-C

No. 10958 of 2018 (DB), dated 27.03.2018, Asha Devi Vs.

National Highway Authority of India and others, Writ-

C No. 9874 of 2018 (DB), dated 16.03.2018 and Smt.

Gyanti Singh Vs. State of U.P. and others, Writ-C No.

12158 of 2018 (DB), dated 03.04.2018, lay down the law

correctly?”

3. Brief facts, as emerge from the order of reference, are that one

Ram Dulari, widow of late Pataru, executed a sale deed on January 21, 2016

in favour of the petitioner for an area of 0.430 hectare of Gata No. 535

situated in Mauja Pirthipur, Pargana Pachotar, District Ghazipur. After the

name of the petitioner was entered in the revenue record, she came to know

that the land in question had already been acquired by the National Highway

Authority for which notification under Section 3-A of the National

Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1956 Act’) was issued on

December 1, 2014. It was followed by a notification issued under Section 3-

D of the 1956 Act on November 27, 2015. The award was also announced

on December 25, 2015. The land was purchased by the petitioner vide sale

deed dated January 21, 2016, after the issuance of notification under Section

1Reframed as 1A and 1B

3 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

3-D of the 1956 Act and passing of the award by the competent authority, on

December 25, 2015.

4. The amount of compensation having not been paid to the

petitioner, she raised an issue. The stand of the respondents was that on

issuance of the notification under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act, the land

having been vested in the Central Government, any sale transaction

thereafter is void and will not confer any right on the vendee.

5. The vendor of the petitioner was also impleaded as respondent

No.7 in the writ petition, who died during pendency thereof and her legal

representative has been substituted thereafter.

6. The argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that

even if the sale deed executed by the vendor of the petitioner is held to be

void but still she has a right to receive compensation on the strength of the

vendor’s title, in whose name the land was admittedly recorded before

issuance of notification under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act. The position is

anomalous as Section 3-D of the 1956 Act provides that on publication of

notification thereunder, the land shall vest in the Central Government free

from all encumbrances, without even assessment or payment of

compensation. In the case in hand, the vendor of the petitioner does not have

any objection, in case the amount of compensation is paid to the petitioner.

In the circumstances, the Government should not have any objection. He has

referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Surendra Nath Singh

Yadav Vs. Union of India and others

2

, wherein it has been held that the

subsequent purchaser has no right to challenge the acquisition of land,

however, he can claim compensation for the acquired land. He further

referred to the judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in V.

Chandrasekaran and another Vs. Administrative Officer and others

3

, and

Union of India and another Vs. Tarsem Singh and others

4

, in support of his

arguments.

2[2018 (2) ADJ 760 (DB)]

3(2012) 12 SCC 133

4AIR 2019 SC 4689

4 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the National Highway

Authority of India, submitted that the provisions of Section 3-D(2) of the

1956 Act, clearly provide that on issuance of notification thereunder, the

land shall vest in the Central Government. Thereafter, the landowner loses

his right to transfer the title thereof. Hence, any sale transaction entered into

between the parties after issuance of notification under Section 3-D of the

1956 Act on November 27, 2015, is void. He further submitted that the view

expressed by the three Division Benches of this Court in Asha Devi Vs.

National Highways Authority of India and others

5

; Smt. Gyanti Singh Vs.

State of U.P. and others

6

and Vipin Agrawal Vs. Union of India and others

7

is

correct. He also submitted that the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court

in Government (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Manav Dharam Trust and another

8

was

overruled by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar and another Vs.

Union of India and others

9

.

8. Learned counsel for the State referred to a Division Bench

judgment of this Court in Riyazuddin and another Vs. Union of India and

others

10

, wherein it was held that the transferee of land after issuance of

notification under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act, will not have any right to

receive compensation. There is no challenge to the vires of the provisions of

the 1956 Act.

9. While referring to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1894 Act’), the learned counsel for the

State submitted that the scheme of the 1894 Act is different, as the land in

that case vests in the State after the award is announced under Section 11 of

the said Act. Prior to that, the owner can deal with the same. It is only after

that any sale transaction is void. Hence, any judgment dealing with the

provisions of the 1894 Act will be distinguishable.

5Writ-C No. 9874 of 2018 (DB), decided on March 16, 2018

6Writ-C No. 12158 of 2018 (DB), decided on May 3, 2018

7Writ-C No. 10958 of 2018 (DB), decided on March 27, 2018

8(2017) 6 SCC 751

9(2019) 10 SCC 229

10[2018 (8) ADJ 358 (DB)]

5 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

10. In response, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

amount of compensation is determined and payable in terms of Section 3-G

of the 1956 Act. Section 3-G(3) provides that before determining the

compensation under sub-section (1) thereof on account of acquisition of

land, the competent authority is required to give a public notice inviting

claims from all persons interested in the land to be acquired. Sub-section (4)

thereof provides that the persons interested, whose land is acquired, can

appear before the competent authority and state before him the nature of

their interest in the land to be acquired. After the sale deed is registered, the

petitioner certainly became person interested in the land, hence, could file

her claim and has a right to receive the compensation.

11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant

referred record.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT, 1956

12. The relevant provisions of Sections 3-A, 3-D, 3-E and 3-G of

the 1956 Act, are extracted below:-

“3-A. Power to acquire land, etc. – (1) Where the Central

Government is satisfied that for a public purpose any land is

required for the building, maintenance, management or

operation of a national highway or part thereof, it may, by

notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to

acquire such land.

(2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall give a

brief description of the land.

(3) The competent authority shall cause the substance of the

notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of

which will be in a vernacular language.

x x x x

6 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

3-D. Declaration of acquisition.—(1) Where no objection

under sub-section (1) of section 3-C has been made to the

competent authority within the period specified therein or where

the competent authority has disallowed the objection under sub-

section (2) of that section, the competent authority shall, as soon

as may be, submit a report accordingly to the Central

Government and on receipt of such report, the Central

Government shall declare, by notification in the Official

Gazette, that the land should be acquired for the purpose or

purposes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 3-A.

(2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-

section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central

Government free from all encumbrances.

(3) Where in respect of any land, a notification has been

published under sub-section (1) of section 3-A for its acquisition

but no declaration under sub-section (1) has been published

within a period of one year from the date of publication of that

notification, the said notification shall cease to have any effect:

Provided that in computing the said period of one year, the

period or periods during which any action or proceedings to be

taken in pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section

(1) of section 3-A is stayed by an order of a Court shall be

excluded.

(4) A declaration made by the Central Government under

sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or by

any other authority.

3-E. Power to take possession.—(1) Where any land has

vested in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of

section 3-D, and the amount determined by the competent

authority under section 3-G with respect to such land has been

7 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

deposited under sub-section (1) of section 3-H, with the

competent authority by the Central Government, the competent

authority may by notice in writing direct the owner as well as

any other person who may be in possession of such land to

surrender or deliver possession thereof to the competent

authority or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf

within sixty days of the service of the notice.

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any direction

made under sub-section (1), the competent authority shall

apply-

(a) in the case of any land situated in any area falling

within the metropolitan area, to the Commissioner of

Police;

(b) in case of any land situated in any area other than the

area referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of a

District,

and such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may be, shall

enforce the surrender of the land, to the competent authority or

to the person duly authorised by it.

x x x x

3-G. Determination of amount payable as compensation.

—(1) Where any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be

paid an amount which shall be determined by an order of the

competent authority.

(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of an

easement on, any land is acquired under this Act, there shall be

paid an amount to the owner and any other person whose right

of enjoyment in that land has been affected in any manner

whatsoever by reason of such acquisition an amount calculated

8 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

at ten per cent of the amount determined under sub-section (1),

for that land.

(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under

sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent authority shall

give a public notice published in two local newspapers, one of

which will be in a vernacular language inviting claims from all

persons interested in the land to be acquired.

(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land and

shall require all persons interested in such land to appear in

person or by an agent or by a legal practitioner referred to in

sub-section (2) of section 3-C, before the competent authority,

at a time and place and to state the nature of their respective

interest in such land.

(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority

under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to

either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by

either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be

appointed by the Central Government.

(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall

apply to every arbitration under this Act.

(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while determining

the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), as the case

may be, shall take into consideration—

(a) the market value of the land on the date of publication

of the notification under section 3-A;

(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at

the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of

the severing of such land from other land;

9 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the person interested at

the time of taking possession of the land, by reason of

the acquisition injuriously affecting his other

immovable property in any manner, or his earnings;

(d) if, in consequences of the acquisition of the land, the

person interested is compelled to change his residence

or place of business, the reasonable expenses, if any,

incidental to such change.”

13. There are two sets of judgments of this Court dealing with the

issue. In Surendra Nath Singh Yadav’s case (supra), the notification under

Section 3-D of the 1956 Act was published on September 24, 2015 and the

sale deed was registered subsequent thereto, on July 22, 2016. The Division

Bench was of the opinion that subsequent buyer is a person interested only

to the extent of claiming compensation. The relevant paras thereof are

extracted below:-

“(4) It is well settled proposition of law by judicial

pronouncement of the Apex Court that purchaser of the land

subsequent to initiation of the acquisition proceedings has no

locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings but

certainly he is a person interested in the compensation.

(5) Reference may be made to the decision of the Apex

Court in the case of V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative

Officer, (2012) 12 SCC 133, wherein it has been held as under:

“18. In view of the above, the law on the issue

can be summarised to the effect that a person who

purchases land subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4

notification with respect to it, is not competent to

challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on

any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale-deed

executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title

10 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

and at the most he can claim compensation on the basis

of his vendor's title.”

(6) The same view has been reiterated in a recent

decision of the Apex Court in the case of Government (NCT of

Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust and another, (2017) 6 SCC 751.

(7) In view of the settled law on the subject,

subsequent purchaser is a person interested only to the extent of

making a claim of compensation of the land, subject matter of

acquisition.

(8) In view of above, right of compensation being

claimed by the petitioner is worthy of being considered.

However, since the issue involves adjudication into a question

of fact, we feel appropriate that the fact finding authority may

consider the claim of the petitioner at the initial stage.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. In the other set of judgment, i.e. Vipin Agrawal’s case (supra),

the aforesaid judgment in Surendra Nath Singh Yadav’s case (supra) was

referred to and it was opined that after issuance of the notification under

Section 3-D of the 1956 Act, the land vests in the Central Government free

from all encumbrances, leaving no title with the vendor to transfer. The sale

deed being void ab initio, the same will not confer any right on the

subsequent buyer to receive compensation. Relevant paras of the said

judgment are reproduced below:-

“It is, therefore, clear that on receipt of the report, the

Central Government declares by notification in the official

gazette that the land should be acquired for the purpose

mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 3A. Sub-section (2) of

Section 3 provides that on the publication of the declaration

under sub-section (1), the land shall vest absolutely in the

Central Government free from all encumbrances. Thus, on

11 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

publication of the declaration in the official gazette on 7 August

2012, the land stood vested in the Central Government free

from all encumbrances and the erstwhile owner did not have

any right to execute the sale deed in favour of the petitioner.

The sale deed was executed by the petitioner is void ab initio

and does not confer any right upon the petitioner to receive

compensation.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance

upon a Division Bench of this Court in Surendra Nath Singh

Yadav v. Union of India and Others reported in 2018 (2) ADJ

760. This decision relies upon the decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of Government (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav

Dharam Trust and Another reported in (2017) 6 SCC 751 which

is in connection with the acquisition under the provisions of the

National Highways Act, 1956. Unlike the provisions of sub-

Section 3D(2) of the Act under the Land Acquisition Act, the

property vests in the State Government free from all

encumbrances either under Section 16 or under Section 17, on

possession being taken and not on the publication of the

declaration under Section 6 of the Act.

Thus, the decision in the case of Surender Nath, does not

help the petitioners. The petitioners can initiate appropriate

proceedings against the erstwhile owner.” (emphasis supplied)

15. Similar view was expressed in Smt. Gyanti Singh’s, Asha

Devi’s, and Riyazuddin and another’s cases (supra).

THE SCHEME OF THE 1956 ACT

16. As per the scheme of the 1956 Act, the process for acquisition

of land starts with the issuance of notification under Section 3-A thereof, a

declaration of its intent to acquire the land. Thereafter, Section 3-C of the

1956 Act provides for hearing of objections against the proposed acquisition.

12 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

After the procedure prescribed in Section 3-C is concluded, a declaration is

issued under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act by way of a notification that the

land should be acquired. Sub-section (2) thereof, on which much reliance

has been placed upon by the respondents, provides that on publication of

declaration under Section 3-D(1), the land shall vest in the Central

Government, free from all encumbrances.

17. After issuance of declaration under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act,

the procedure as prescribed under Section 3-G for determination of

compensation is to be followed. The competent authority is to determine the

compensation. However, before that, a public notice is given in two local

newspapers inviting claims from all persons interested in the land to be

acquired. They can submit their claims before the competent authority with

respect to their interest in the land. After the amount is determined under

Section 3-G of the 1956 Act, the same is to be deposited by the Central

Government with the competent authority in terms of Section 3-H of the

1956 Act, before taking possession of the land.

18. The power under Section 3-E of the 1956 Act is to be exercised

by the competent authority for issuing a notice in writing directing the owner

or any person who may be in possession to surrender or deliver possession

thereof to the competent authority. The power can be exercised only after the

provisions of Section 3-H(1) are satisfied. Section 3-H(1) provides that the

amount of compensation as determined under Section 3-G shall be deposited

by the Central Government.

19. Section 3 in the 1956 Act was substituted vide Amendment Act

No. 16 of 1997 with effect from January 24, 1997. New provisions in the

form of Sections 3-A to 3-J were added. Section 3-J provided for non-

applicability of the 1894 Act to the acquisition under the 1956 Act. The

validity thereof was challenged. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Tarsem

Singh and others’ case (supra) examined the issue with reference to the

argument that there was discrimination in award of compensation under two

13 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

Statutes namely the 1894 Act and the 1956 Act, though both provided for

acquisition of land. As a result, for two portions of land situated adjoining to

each other and acquired under the provisions of two different Statutes, the

result may be assessment of different compensation. Section 3-J of the 1956

Act was held to be ultra vires.

20. The difference in the scheme of the 1894 Act and the 1956 Act

was that under the 1894 Act, vesting of land and right to take possession is

provided for in Section 16 thereof. It reads as under:-

“16. Power to take possession. – When the Collector has made

an award under section 11, he may take possession of the land,

which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free

from all encumbrances.”

21. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that right to take

possession accrues to the Collector only after the award has been made

under Section 11 thereof and thereupon the land shall vest in the

Government free from all encumbrances. The 1956 Act provides that

immediately after issuance of declaration under Section 3-D of the said Act,

the land shall vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances

even though Section 3-E, which is similar to the provisions of the 1894 Act

with reference to taking over of possession is concerned, provides that after

the land is vested in the Central Government in terms of Section 3-D(2) and

the amount of compensation has been determined under Section 3-G and the

same has been deposited with the competent authority under Section 3-H(1),

the competent authority may direct the owner or the person in possession of

the land to deliver the same to the competent authority. As per Section 3-

H(2), the amount deposited by the Central Government with the competent

authority under sub-section (1) will be paid by the competent authority to the

person/persons entitled for the said compensation. As per sub-section (3),

where several persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under

sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the persons who are

entitled to receive amount payable to each of them and if there arises any

14 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

dispute regarding entitlement of the amount payable, the competent

authority shall refer the dispute for decision to the Principal Civil Court of

original jurisdiction, as provided under sub-section (4). Under sub-section

(6), in case the amount determined by the Arbitrator is in excess of the

amount determined by the competent authority, the excess amount together

with interest, if any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be deposited by the

Central Government in such manner, as may be prescribed by rules made in

that behalf. Thus, after deposit of the amount by the Central Government

with the competent authority, the liability of payment of interest is not of the

Central Government. In case of dispute amongst the claimants, the amount

deposited by the Central Government with the competent authority shall

remain deposited with the competent authority.

LEGAL POSITION UNDER THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894

22. Section 4 of the 1894 Act provides for a notification to be

published in the official gazette and local newspapers whenever it appears to

the appropriate Government that the land in any locality is needed or likely

to be needed for any public purpose. After considering the objection under

Section 5A of the person interested, a notification of declaration is issued

under Section 6. The notice to person interested for determination of

compensation is issued under Section 9. Thereafter, enquiry and award is

made by the Collector under Section 11 of the 1894 Act. Under Section 16

thereof, when the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may

take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in

Government free from all encumbrances. The Supreme Court in V.

Chandrasekaran and another’s case (supra) opined that the transferee of such

a land after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act will not

have any right to challenge the acquisition thereof but will have right to

receive compensation as he steps into the shoes of the original landowner.

The relevant paragraph thereof is extracted herein below:-

“18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be

summarised to the effect that a person who purchases land

15 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with

respect to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the

acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the

reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer

upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation

on the basis of his vendor’s title.” (emphasis supplied)

23. In U.P. Jal Nigam and another Vs. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. and

others

11

, M/s Kalara Properties had purchased the land after the notification

under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was published. It was held that the sale

was void against the State and M/s Kalara Properties acquired no right, title

or interest in the land. It could not challenge the validity of the notification

or the irregularity in taking possession of land before publication of the

declaration under Section 6. Any encumbrance created by the owner after

Section 4(1) notification is published does not bind the Government and

such a purchaser does not acquire any title on the property. The purchaser is

a person interested in the compensation, since he steps into the shoes of

erstwhile owner, and is entitled to claim compensation. Relevant parts of

paragraphs 3 and 4 of the U.P. Jal Nigam’s case (supra) are being reproduced

as under:-

"3. … It is settled law that after the notification under

Section 4(1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance

created by the owner does not bind the Government and the

purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In this case

notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973,

possession of the land admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and

pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration

under Section 6 was published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly

power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the

enquiry under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under

11(1996) 3 SCC 124

16 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

Section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute, viz.,

pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood

water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under

Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further settled

law that once possession is taken, by operation of Section 17(2),

the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances unless a

notification under Section 48(1) is published in the Gazette

withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A, as amended by

Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply and the acquisition

does not lapse. The notification under Section 4(1) and the

declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no

other provision under the Act to have the acquired land

divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification under Section

48(1) was published and the possession is surrendered pursuant

thereto. That apart, since M/s. Kalra Properties, respondent had

purchased the land after the notification under Section 4(1) was

published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired no

right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law

that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the

regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of

the declaration under Section 6 was published.

4. The next question is: whether the respondent is

entitled to compensation and, if so, from what date and at what

rate? The original owner has the right to the compensation

under Section 23(1) of the Act. Consequently, though the

respondent acquired no title to the land, at best he would be

entitled to step into the shoes of the owner and claim payment

of the compensation, but according to the provisions of the Act.

It is settled law that the price prevailing as on the date of the

publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is the price to

which the owner or person who has an interest in the land is

17 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

entitled to. Therefore, the purchaser as a person interested in the

compensation, since he steps into the shoes of erstwhile owner,

is entitled to claim compensation.” (emphasis supplied)

24. In Sneh Prabha (Smt.) and others Vs. State of U.P. and

another

12

, Hon'ble the Supreme Court reiterated that any alienation of land

after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act did

not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the acquisition. It was also

held that if any subsequent purchaser acquires land, his/her only right would

be subject to the provisions of the Act and/or to receive compensation for the

land. Relevant paragraph 5 is extracted herein below:-

"5. Though at first blush, we were inclined to agree with

the appellant but on deeper probe, we find that the appellant is

not entitled to the benefit of the Land Policy. It is settled law

that any person who purchases land after publication of the

notification under Section 4(1), does so at his/her own peril. The

object of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) is

notice to everyone that the land is needed or is likely to be

needed for public purpose and the acquisition proceedings point

out an impediment to anyone to encumber the land acquired

thereunder. It authorises the designated officer to enter upon the

land to do preliminaries etc. Therefore, any alienation of land

after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) does

not bind the Government or the beneficiary under the

acquisition. On taking possession of the land, all rights, titles

and interests in land stand vested in the State, under Section 16

of the Act, free from all encumbrances and thereby absolute title

in the land is acquired thereunder. If any subsequent purchaser

acquires land, his/her only right would be subject to the

provisions of the Act and/or to receive compensation for the

12(1996) 7 SCC 426

18 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

land. In a recent judgment, this Court in Union of India v.

Shivkumar Bhargava, (1995) 2 SCC 427 : JT (1995) 6 SC 274

considered the controversy and held that a person who

purchases land subsequent to the notification is not entitled to

alternative site. It is seen that the Land Policy expressly

conferred that right only on that person whose land was

acquired. In other words, the person must be the owner of the

land on the date on which notification under Section 4(1) was

published. By necessary implication, the subsequent purchaser

was elbowed out from the policy and became disentitled to the

benefit of the Land Policy." (emphasis supplied)

25. To the same effect are the decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme

Court in Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. New Pink City Nirman Sahkari

Samiti Ltd. and another

13

and M. Venkatesh and others Vs. Commissioner,

Bangalore Development Authority

14

, wherein it has been held that the legal

position about the validity of any sale, post issuance of a preliminary

notification is fairly well settled by long line of decisions. The sale in such

cases is void and non est in the eyes of the law giving to the vendee the

limited right to claim compensation and no more. Relevant paragraph 16 of

the judgment in M. Venkatesh and others’ case (supra) is extracted herein

below:

“16. That brings us to the question whether Prabhaudas

Patel and other respondents in SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013 were

entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents claim to

have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale deed dated

22-8-1990, i.e. long after the issuance of the preliminary

Notification published in July 1984. The legal position about

the validity of any such sale, post issuance of a preliminary

notification is fairly well settled by a long line of the decisions

of this Court. The sale in such cases is void and non-est in the

13(2015) 7 SCC 601

14(2015) 17 SCC 1

19 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

eyes of law giving to the vendee the limited right to claim

compensation and no more. Reference may in this regard be

made to the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra

Properties (P) Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1170, wherein this Court

said : (SCC pp. 126-27, para 3)

“3. … It is settled law that after the notification under

Section 4(1) is published in the gazette any encumbrance

created by the owner does not bind the Government and

the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In

this case, Notification under Section 4(1) was published

on 24-3-1973, possession of the land admittedly was

taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station house was

constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was

published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly power under

Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry

under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under

Section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute,

viz. pumping station house was to be constructed to drain

out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in

the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances.

It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by

operation of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free

from all encumbrances unless a notification under Section

48(1) is published in the Gazette withdrawing from the

acquisition. Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984,

therefore, does not apply and the acquisition does not

lapse. The notification under Section 4(1) and the

declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain valid.

There is no other provision under the Act to have the

acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier,

notification under Section 48(1) was published and the

20 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

possession is surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart,

since M/s Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the

land after the notification under Section 4(1) was

published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired

no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is

settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the

notification or the regularity in taking possession of the

land before publication of the declaration under Section 6

was published.” (emphasis supplied)

26. In Shiv Kumar and another’s case (supra), Hon'ble the Supreme

Court held that Government (NCT of Delhi) Vs. Manav Dharam Trust and

another’s case (supra) does not lay down the law correctly. It was held that

purchase of land after issuance of notification under Section 4 of the 1894

Act is void and the buyer cannot seek any declaration that the acquisition

under the 2013 Act has lapsed due to illegality/irregularity of taking

possession under the 1894 Act. Relevant paras 19 to 24 are extracted

below:

“19. The 2013 Act presupposes that a person is required

to be rehabilitated and resettled. Such a person who has

purchased after Section 4 notification as sale deed is void under

the 1894 Act, cannot claim rehabilitation and resettlement as per

policy envisaged under the 2013 Act, as his land has not been

acquired, but he has purchased a property which has already

been acquired by the State Government, he cannot claim even

higher compensation, as per proviso to Section 24(2) under the

2013 Act. An original landowner cannot be deprived of higher

value under the 2013 Act, which higher compensation was not

so contemplated when the void transaction of sale had been

entered, and right is conferred under proviso to Section 24(2) on

recorded owners under the 1894 Act. We have come across

21 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

instances in which after notifications under Section 4 were

issued and, the property was purchased at throwaway prices by

the builders and unscrupulous persons, such purchases are void

and confer no right even to claim higher compensation under

Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as it is to be given to the owner as

mentioned in the notification.

20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after

Section 4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land,

such incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of Section 24. As

the sale transaction did not clothe them with the title when the

purchase was made; they cannot claim “possession” and

challenge the acquisition as having lapsed under Section 24 by

questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings of taking

over of possession under the 1894 Act. It would be unfair and

profoundly unjust and against the policy of the law to permit

such a person to claim resettlement or claim the land back as

envisaged under the 2013 Act. When he has not been deprived

of his livelihood but is a purchaser under a void transaction, the

outcome of exploitative tactics played upon poor farmers who

were unable to defend themselves.

21. Thus, under the provisions of Section 24 of the

2013 Act, challenge to acquisition proceeding of the taking over

of possession under the 1894 Act cannot be made, based on a

void transaction nor declaration can be sought under Section

24(2) by such incumbents to obtain the land. The declaration

that acquisition has lapsed under the 2013 Act is to get the

property back whereas, the transaction once void, is always a

void transaction, as no title can be a acquired in the land as such

no such declaration can be sought. It would not be legal, just

and equitable to give the land back to purchaser as land was not

capable of being sold which was in process of acquisition under

22 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

the 1894 Act. The 2013 Act does not confer any right on

purchaser whose sale is ab initio void. Such void transactions

are not validated under the 2013 Act. No rights are conferred by

the provisions contained in the 2013 Act on such a purchaser as

against the State.

22. “Void is, ab initio,” a nullity, is inoperative, and a

person cannot claim the land or declaration once no title has

been conferred upon him to claim that the land should be given

back to him. A person cannot enforce and ripe fruits based on a

void transaction to start claiming title and possession of the land

by seeking a declaration under Section 24 of the 2013 Act; it

will amount to conferment of benefit never contemplated by the

law. The question is, who can claim declaration/rights under

Section 24(2) for the restoration of land or lapse of acquisition.

It cannot be by a person with no title in the land. The provision

of the 2013 Act cannot be said to be enabling or authorizing a

purchaser after Section 4 to question proceeding taken under the

Act of 1894 of taking possession as held in U.P. Jal Nigam v.

Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 124, which is followed

in M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1 : (2017) 5 SCC

(Civ) 387 and other decisions and consequently claim

declaration under Section 24 of the 2013 Act. What cannot be

done directly cannot be permitted in an indirect method.

23. The provisions of the 2013 Act aimed at the

acquisition of land with least disturbance to the landowners and

other affected families and to provide just and fair

compensation to affected families whose land has been acquired

or proposed to be acquired or are affected and to make adequate

provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and

resettlement. The provisions of 2013 Act aim at ousting all

23 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

inter-meddlers from the fray by ensuring payment in the bank

account of landholders under Section 77 of the Act.

24. The intendment of the 2013 Act is to benefit

farmers, etc. Subsequent purchasers cannot be said to be

landowners entitled to restoration of land and cannot be termed

to be affected persons within the provisions of 2013 Act. It is

not open to them to claim that the proceedings have lapsed

under Section 24(2).”

27. It is the consistent opinion of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in

various judgments referred to above and lastly in Shiv Kumar and another’s

case (supra) that a sale deed registered after issuance of notification under

Section 4 of 1894 Act is void and does not confer upon the transferee any

title. However, at the most, he can claim compensation on the basis of title

of the vendor. He is not entitled to challenge the validity of the acquisition or

claim any other benefits as may be available to the original landowner.

28. The only difference sought to be pointed out by learned counsel

for the respondents was that under the 1956 Act, any sale after the issuance

of notification under Section 3-D would be void as, by operation of law, in

terms of Section 3-D(2) thereof, the land is vested in the Central

Government free from all encumbrances. Another fact, which was not

disputed at the time of hearing was that there was no entry made in the

revenue record with reference to issuance of notifications under Section 3-A

or 3-D of the 1956 Act so as to enable any prospective buyer to know as to

whether any land is under acquisition especially in the case in hand where

the vesting of land takes place merely after issuance of notification under

Section 3-D of the 1956 Act and before the announcement of the award. But

the rights of the parties are taken care of, as actual physical possession could

be taken only after the award is announced and the amount is deposited with

the competent authority.

24 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

29. The only issue is as to whether the buyer of the land, after

issuance of notification under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act, has right to

receive compensation.

PERSONS INTERESTED

30. Section 3-C of the 1956 Act deals with hearing of objections

after issuance of notification under Section 3-A thereof which talks of person

interested to file objection to the proposal for acquisition of land. Such an

objector has a right of hearing as well.

31. Section 3-G(3) of the 1956 Act, which deals with determination

of compensation payable on account of acquisition or right to enjoyment of

the land also provides that claims ought to be invited from all persons

interested in the land to be acquired. Sub-section (4) thereof further provides

that such persons interested are entitled to appear before the competent

authority to present their respective claims. Sub-sections (7)(b), (c) and (d)

thereof provide that the competent authority or the arbitrator, while

determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-section (5), shall take

into consideration the damages suffered by the person interested at the time

of taking over possession of the land; injuriously affecting his other

immovable property or earnings; compulsion to change his residence or

place of business, the reasonable expenses on account of change of residence

or place of business.

32. Section 3-H(3) of the 1956 Act provides that where several

persons claim to be interested in the amount deposited under sub-section (1),

the competent authority shall determine the persons who, in his opinion, are

entitled to receive the same. In terms of sub-section (4), in case of dispute as

to the apportionment or the person to whom the compensation in full or part

is payable, the dispute is to be referred for decision to the court of Principal

Civil Judge of original jurisdiction within whose jurisdiction the land is

situated.

25 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

33. Section 3-G(3) of the 1956 Act provides that before

determination of compensation, the competent authority shall give notice in

two local newspapers inviting claims from all the persons interested in the

land to be acquired. The words used therein ‘all persons interested’ and ‘the

land to be acquired’, establish that the land has not been acquired. The

claims can be filed by all persons interested. A person in whose favour a sale

deed has been registered before announcement of award, will certainly fall

in that category. The term ‘person interested’ has not been defined under the

1956 Act though it has been repeatedly used in various provisions of the Act,

such as Sections 3-C(1) and 3-G(7)(b), (c) and (d).

34. Despite the fact that the phrase ‘person interested’ has been used

in the 1956 Act in number of Sections, but still the same has not been

defined. Section 3 of the 1956 Act contains only two definitions, i.e.

‘competent authority’ and ‘land’. In the absence thereof, to give true

meaning to the term ‘person interested’ with reference to the spirit of the

Act, in our opinion, help can be taken from the Statutes which are pari

materia.

35. The word “person interested” has been defined under Section

3(b) of the 1894 Act. Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act has enlarged the definition

of the word “persons interested”.

36. The 1894 Act dealt with acquisition of land prior to its repeal

with the enactment of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in

Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short ‘the

2013 Act’). The expression ‘person interested’ was defined in Section 3(b) of

the 1894 Act to include all persons claiming interest in compensation of the

land on account of its acquisition. The same reads as under:-

“3. Definition. – In this Act, unless there is something repugnant

in the subject or context,–

(a) … … …

26 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

(b) the expression “person interested” includes all persons

claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of

the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be

deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement

affecting the land;”

37. Section 3(x) of the 2013 Act has an exhaustive definition of

‘person interested’ including all persons claiming interest in compensation

on account of acquisition of land. The same reads as under:-

“3. Definitions.– In this Act, unless the context otherwise

requires,–

(a) … … …

(x) “persons interested” means–

(i) all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be

made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act;

(ii) the Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest

dwellers, who have lost any forest rights recognised

under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest

Dwellers (recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (2 of

2007);

(iii) a person interested in an easement affecting the land;

(iv) persons having tenancy rights under the relevant

State laws including share-croppers by whatever name

they may be called; and

(v) any person whose primary source of livelihood is

likely to be adversely affected;”

PARI MATERIA

38. The issue is also required to be considered with reference to the

doctrine of “pari materia”. The term “person interested” has not been

27 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

defined in the 1956 Act. In case, two different statutes are pari materia, help

can be taken from each other for interpretation. Two statutes are pari materia

to each other in case these deal with the same subject matter. The rational

behind the doctrine of “pari materia” is based on the interpretative

assumption that words employed in legislation are used in an identical sense.

Preamble of the 1894 Act, reads as under:

“An Act to amend the law for the acquisition of land for

public purposes and for companies”

39. The aforesaid Act was replaced by the 2013 Act. The Preamble

thereof reads as under:

“An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of

local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under the

Constitution, a humane, participative, informed and transparent

process for land acquisition for industrialisation, development

of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the

least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected

families and provide just and fair compensation to the affected

families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be

acquired or are affected by such acquisition and made adequate

provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and

resettlement and for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of

compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons become

partners in development leading to an improvement in their post

acquisition social and economic status and for matters

connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

40. Extensive amendment was carried out in the aforesaid 1956 Act

vide National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 adding the

provisions enabling the Government to carry out acquisition of the land

under this Act with a view to expedite the process of acquisition. The objects

and reasons for introducing the amendment reads as under:

28 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

“In order to create an environment to promote private

investment in national highways, to speed up construction of

highways and to remove bottlenecks in their proper

management, it was considered necessary to amend the National

Highways Act, 1956 and the National Highways Authority of

India Act, 1988.

2.One of the impediments in the speedy implementation of

highways projects has been inordinate delay in the acquisition

of land. In order to expedite the process of land acquisition, it is

proposed that once the Central Government declares that the

land is required for public purposes for development of a

highway, that land will vest in the Government and only the

amount by way of compensation is to be paid and any dispute

relating to compensation will be subject to adjudication through

the process of arbitration.

3.It was also felt necessary to ensure continuity of the status

of bypasses built through private investment. To achieve this, it

is proposed to amend the National Highways Act, 1956 so as to

include the highway stretches situated within any municipal

area as a part of national highway. Further, as the National

Highways Act, 1956 permits participation of the private sector

in the development of the national highways, it became

imperative to amend the National Highways Authority of India

Act, 1988 so as to provide that the National Highways Authority

of India may seek the participation of the private sector in

respect of the highways vested in the Authority.

4.With a view to provide adequate capital and loans to the

National Highways Authority of India by the Central

Government, it is proposed to make amendment in the National

Highways Authority of India Act, 1988.

29 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

5.With a view to achieve the above objectives and also as

both Houses of Parliament were not in session and the President

was satisfied that circumstances existed which rendered it

necessary for him to take immediate action, the National

Highways Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1997 was

promulgated by the President on the 24

th

day of January, 1997.”

41. A perusal of the aforesaid Objects and Reasons shows that the

amendments were carried out when the 1894 Act was in existence which

was subsequently substituted by the 2013 Act. The only difference being the

aforesaid two statutes were general in nature providing for acquisition of

land in general whereas under the 1956 Act the acquisition was for a specific

purpose, namely for construction of national highways. The scheme of the

1956 Act has already been discussed above with reference to procedure to be

adopted for acquisition.

42. Before proceeding further, we may usefully refer to the well-

recognised doctrine of “pari materia” whereby and whereunder, reference to

the decisions dealing with other statutes on the same subject is regarded as a

permissible aid to the construction of provisions in a statute. Suffice would

be, in this regard, to refer to the decision in Ahmedabad Pvt. Primary

Teachers’ Assn Vs. Administrative Officer and others

15

, wherein this Court

applied the doctrine of “pari materia” with reference to the relevant

observations in Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh as

follows (at page 760 of SCC):-

“12…. On the doctrine of “pari materia”, reference to other

statutes dealing with the same subject or forming part of the

same system is a permissible aid to the construction of

provisions in a statute. See the following observations contained

in Principles of Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (8th

Edn.), Syn. 4, at pp. 235 to 239:

15(2004) 1 SCC 755

30 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

“Statutes in pari materia

It has already been seen that a statute must be read as a

whole as words are to be understood in their context.

Extension of this rule of context permits reference to

other statutes in pari materia i.e. statutes dealing with the

same subject-matter or forming part of the same system.

Viscount Simonds in a passage already noticed conceived

it to be a right and duty to construe every word of a

statute in its context and he used the word context in its

widest sense including ‘other statutes in pari materia’. As

stated by Lord Mansfield ‘where there are different

statutes in pari materia though made at different times, or

even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be

taken and construed together, as one system and as

explanatory of each other’.

* * *

The application of this rule of construction has the merit

of avoiding any apparent contradiction between a series

of statutes dealing with the same subject; it allows the use

of an earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a

phrase used in a later statute in the same context; it

permits the raising of a presumption, in the absence of

any context indicating a contrary intention, that the same

meaning attaches to the same words in a later statute as in

an earlier statute if the words are used in similar

connection in the two statutes; and it enables the use of a

later statute as parliamentary exposition of the meaning of

ambiguous expressions in an earlier statute.”

43. The following judgments throw light on the issue that the

National Highways Act, 1956 as well as the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and

31 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 are pari materia:

(i) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nagpur Improvement

Trust and another Vs. Vithal Rao and others

16

, has held that

it is immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another

Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the

existence of two Acts could enable the State to give one owner

different treatment from another equally situated, the

discriminated owner can claim the protection of Article 14.

(ii) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dilawar Singh and

others Vs. Union of India and others

17

, while considering the

Acquisition of Land under Requisitioning and Acquisition of

Immovable Property Act, 1952 adopted the principles of the

1894 Act for the grant of solatium or interest and held that

though the provisions of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of

Immovable Property Act, 1952 do not make any provision for

the grant of solatium or interest to the expropriated landowners,

the award of solatium and interest is permissible when the

owners who have lost land in similar circumstances and for the

same purpose have been given such a benefit.

(iii)The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India and

another Vs. Tarsem Singh and others

18

, held that the object of

the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 was to

speed up the process of acquiring lands for National Highways

which has been achieved. The awarding of solatium and interest

has nothing to do with achieving this object. Non-grant of

solatium and interest to lands acquired under the National

Highways Act, which is available if lands are acquired under the

1894 Act, was held to be bad in law and consequently Section

16(1973) 1 SCC 500

17(2010) 14 SCC 357

18(2019) 9 SCC 304

32 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

3-J of the National Highways Act, 1956 was truck down as

being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

(iv)The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Project Director,

National Highways Authority of India Vs. M. Hakeem and

another

19

, while considering the scope of powers of Court

under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, held

that the object of Amendment Act, 1997 in National Highways

Act, 1956 is to expedite the process of acquisition which has

been achieved by cutting down the period of hearing of

objections and by vesting of land in the Central Government as

soon as notification under Section 3D(2) of the National

Highways Act is made.

(v) The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Devi Prasad Singh

Vs. State of M.P.

20

, while interpreting the expression ‘building,

maintenance or operation of National Highway’ used in Section

3A of the 1956 Act, held that the words used in a statute must be

constructed in its context and the word ‘context’ means not only

the statute in which the word is used but also other pari materia

statutes made at different times. Accordingly the aforesaid

expression has been construed in the context of the provisions

of the National Highway Authority Act, 1988.

44. From the aforesaid fact, the only inescapable conclusion is that

the 1894 Act, the 2013 Act and the 1956 Act are pari materia.

45. It is settled that two Acts, which are pari materia have to be read

in complementary manner so that they do not create contradictions while

operation in the same field. The Apex Court in the case of Board of Trustees

of the Port of Bombay and others Vs. Sriyanesh knitters

21

, held that:

19(2021) 9 SCC 1

20W.A. 92/2008, D.O.J. 10.04.2008

21(1999) 7 SCC 359

33 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

“11. The MPT Act is not, in our opinion, an exhaustive

and comprehensive code and the said Act has to be read

together with other Acts wherever the MPT Act is silent in

respect of any matter. The MPT Act itself refers to other

enactments which would clearly indicate that the MPT Act is

not a complete code in itself which ousts the applicability of

other Acts. The preamble of the Act does not show that it is a

codifying Act so as to exclude the applicability of other laws of

the land. Even if it is a codifying Act unless a contrary intention

appears it is presumed not to be intended to change the law.

(See Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., p. 444.)

Furthermore where codifying statute is silent on a point then it

is permissible to look at other laws. In this connection it will be

useful to refer to the following observation of the House of

Lords in Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd. Vs. Secy. of State for

the Environment and others (1984) 2 All ER 358, 363 (HL) :

(All ER at p.363):

“Planning law, though a comprehensive code imposed in

the public interest, is, of course, based on land law.

Where the code is silent or ambiguous, resort to the

principles of private law (especially property and contract

law) may be necessary so that the courts may resolve

difficulties by application of common law or equitable

principles. But such cases will be exceptional. And, if the

statute law covers the situation, it will be an

impermissible exercise of the judicial function to go

beyond the statutory provision by applying such

principles merely because they may appear to achieve a

fairer solution to the problem being considered. As ever

in the field of statute law it is the duty of the courts to

34 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

give effect to the intention of Parliament as evinced by

the statute, or statutory code, considered as a whole.”

12. In J.K. Steel Ltd. V. Union of India AIR 1970 SC

1173 : (1969) 2 SCR 481 it was held that cognate and pari-

materia legislation should be read together as forming one

system and as interpreting and enforcing each other. In

Vidyacharan Shukla V. Khubchand Baghel AIR 1964 SC 1099 :

(1964) 6 SCR 129 it was held that the Code of Civil Procedure

has to be read along with the Limitation Act. In State of Madras

v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61:(1958 SCR 580,590)

SCR at p. 590 it was held that Prevention of Corruption Act

should be read along with the Evidence Act. In Mannan Lal v.

Chhotaka Bibi (1970) 1 SCC 769 : (1971) 1 SCR 253 it was

held that the Code of Civil Procedure has to be read along with

the Court Fees Act. In Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal

Jayanand Thakkar (1974) 2 SCC 323 : (1975) 1 SCR 534 this

Court observed that the Companies Act should be read along

with the Transfer of Property Act.

13. From the aforesaid decisions it clearly follows that it is

permissible to read the provisions of the two Acts together when

the same are complementary to each other. In fact some

provisions of the MPT Act themselves show that other laws are

applicable.”

46. It is also settled that the application of Rule of construction has

the merit of avoiding any apparent contradiction between a series of statutes

dealing with the same subject, it allows the use of an earlier statute to throw

light on the meaning of phrase used in a later statute in the same context, it

permits raising of a presumption, in the absence of any context indicating a

contrary intention that the same meaning attaches to the same words in a

later statute as in an statute.

35 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

47. The issue to be considered in the present case is not with

reference to the title of the land or as to whether the person, who was the

recorded owner of the land, had right to transfer the ownership after issuance

of notification under Section 3-D of the 1956 Act before the award is

announced, rather it is only with reference to the right to receive

compensation. In terms of the consistent view of Hon’ble the Supreme Court

as referred to earlier, any sale of land after issuance of notification under

Section 4 of the 1894 Act is void. Similar is the effect of the provisions of

the 1956 Act as, in the 1956 Act, Section 3-A is pari materia to Section 4 of

the 1894 Act, whereas Section 6 of the 1894 Act is pari materia to Section 3-

D of the 1956 Act. Section 3-D(2) of the 1956 Act provides that after

issuance of notification under Section 3-D(1), the land shall vest in the

Central Government. In the Land Acquisition Act 1894, vesting of the land

takes place after acquisition in terms of Section 16 after the award is

announced. In the case in hand, we are not examining that issue. Rather, the

matter is being considered only for the limited purpose of right to receive

compensation. It is not in dispute that the competent authority is required to

pay compensation on account of acquisition of land to any person who may

be entitled to it with reference to the acquisition of land. The only issue is as

to who will be paid that compensation. In our view, in case the principles of

law laid down in various judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court dealing

with the provisions of the 1894 Act are considered, in the case of acquisition

of land under the 1956 Act also, the subsequent buyer of the land, after

issuance of notification under Section 3-D but before announcement of the

award, will certainly have the right to receive compensation. He will step

into the shoes of the vendor only for the limited extent of receiving

compensation. He will not get any right to challenge the acquisition as such.

48. From the legal position settled by various pronouncements of

Hon’ble the Supreme Court, it is clear that a person who has purchased the

land after issuance of the notification under Section 3-A of the 1956 Act has

no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings, however, he being person

36 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

aggrieved may claim compensation to be awarded by the competent

authority. While laying down the aforesaid proposition, Hon’ble the

Supreme Court considered the definition the words "person interested" and

held that he is entitled to claim compensation from the competent authority.

However, there may be cases where the purchaser has purchased the land

after determination of compensation under Section 3-G of the 1956 Act.

Such person could not be included in the definition of the words "person

interested”, as he had purchased the land when the entire proceedings had

been concluded and the land was vested with the Government. He has no

right to claim compensation from the Government/Competent Authority.

Such a person may have remedy under Common Laws to claim damages or

the sale consideration paid by him to the vendor as the transaction is void ab

initio.

ANSWER

49. Question No. 1A is answered in the affirmative. It is held that a

subsequent purchaser of the land after publication of the notification under

Section 3-D of the National Highways Act, 1956 shall be entitled to receive

only compensation on strength of his vendor's title. He will not have any

right to question the acquisition or claim any other benefits. However, it

shall be subject to notice to the vendor and his no objection.

Question No. 1B is answered in the negative. The person who has

purchased the land after determination of the compensation under Section

3-G of the National Highways Act, 1956 is not entitled to claim any

compensation from the competent authority. His remedy may be under the

common law to claim damages or any other amount from his vendor.

As regards Question No.2, it is held that the judgment in Surendra

Nath Singh Yadav Vs. Union of India & others, [2018 (2) ADJ 760 (DB)],

lays down the law correctly. The judgments in Vipin Agarwal Vs. Union of

India and others, Writ-C No. 10958 of 2018 (DB), dated 27.03.2018, Asha

Devi Vs. National Highways Authority of India and others, Writ-C No. 9874

37 Writ-C No. 30608 of 2018

of 2018 (DB), dated 16.03.2018 and Smt. Gyanti Singh Vs. State of U.P. and

others, Writ-C No. 12158 of 2018 (DB), dated 03.04.2018 do not lay down

the law correctly, hence, overruled.

50. The matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench for

disposal in light of the questions so answered, on September 26, 2022 as per

roster.

(Piyush Agrawal, J.) (Prakash Padia, J.) (Rajesh Bindal, C.J.)

Allahabad

September 05, 2022

AHA

Whether the order is speaking : Yes/No

Whether the order is reportable : Yes