CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 1 of 31

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on: 17

th

March, 2026

Pronounced on: 29

th

May, 2026

+ CRL.M.C. 4134/2025, CRL.M.A. 6465/2026

THOKCHOM GYANESHOR

Aged about 46 years,

S/o Late Th. Ibotombi Singh,

R/o Mayang, Konchak Mamang

Leikai Imphal, Manipur– 795132 .....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Siddhartha Borgohain, Mr.

Aditya Giri, Mr. Watitemjen Jamir

and Mr. Rahul Tainguria, Advocates.

versus

1. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEME NT

Through its Director General,

Pravartan Bhawan, APJ Abdul Kalam Road,

New Delhi- 110011

2. SHRI AMIT KUMAR

Assistant Director (STF),

Directorate of Enforcement, Delhi,

Pravartan Bhawan, APJ Abdul Kalam Road,

New Delhi- 110011 .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Zoheb Hossain, Spl. Counsel for

DoE with Mr. Vivek Gurnani, Panel

Counsel and Mr. Pranjal Tripathi,

Advocates.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

J U D G M E N T

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NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.

1. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution

of India read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023 (hereinafter “BNSS, 2023”) has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner

for declaration that Remand Orders commencing from 17.10.2024

culminating on 05.12.2024, under Section 187 BNSS; and Order dated

03.12.2024 of the learned Trial Court, is in violation of Section 197 BNSS

read with Section 44 of the Act, 2002, to be declared illegal. It is further

submitted that the Order of Cognizance dated 18.12.2024 and the

subsequent Remand Orders passed post cognizance, under S. 346 BNSS be

declared as illegal and violative of Article 14, 21 and 22(1) Constitution of

India.

2. The brief facts as stated in the Petition, are that the Central

Government on receiving reliable information in respect of transnational

conspiracy hatched by Myanmar based leadership of terror outfits who are

operationally active in North-Eastern Indian States, to exploit the current

ethnic unrest in the State of Manipur, to wage war against the Government

of India and to execute terrorist attacks thereby exacerbating the current

security situation in the State of Manipur, the MHA in exercise of its powers

conferred under sub-Section 5 of Section 6 read with Section 8 of National

Investigation Agency Act, 2008, directed NIA to take the investigations,

vide Order dated 19.07.2023.

3. In compliance thereof, NIA registered FIR No. RC/23/2023/NIA/DLI

under Section 120B, 121A & 122 IPC read with Section 18, 18B and 39 of

the UAPA, 1967. The NIA claimed that acting on credible information

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 3 of 31

received from the reliable source, the NIA was successful in apprehending

the Petitioner along with other accused, and arrest them on 13.03.2024 at

11:45 AM from Bir Tikendrajit International Airport, Imphal, Manipur.

4. On 14.03.2024 the Petitioner along with other accused, were produced

before the learned Special Court and 10 days police custody was granted to

NIA.

5. There being serious irregularities in the arrest process of the

Petitioners and non-compliance of Article 21 & 22(1) Constitution of India,

the Criminal Writ Petition No.975 of 2024, was filed before this Court.

After addressing arguments at length, the Petition was withdrawn, with

liberty to agitate these issues before the competent forum.

6. The Petitioner then filed a Writ Petition (Crl.) No.1929 of 2024 under

Article 226 Constitution of India before this Court and challenged the illegal

arrest of the Petitioner, on 13.03.2024 and also the remand Orders passed by

learned Special Judge.

7. This Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.1929 of 2024, vide Order dated

20.02.2024 declared the arrest of the Petitioner along with other accused by

the NIA, as illegal for non-furnishing grounds of arrest in writing and further

set aside the Remand Order dated 14.03.2024 and all other subsequent

remand, being non-est in law and directed release of the Petitioner forthwith,

in the RC.

8. Supplementary Chargesheet was filed by the NIA, against the

Petitioner under Section 120-B, 121A, 122 & 411 IPC; Section 17, 18, 18A,

18B, 20 and 38 of the UA(P) Act, 1967 and Section 25(1) of the Arms Act,

1959, in FIR No.RC-23/2023/NIA/DLI.

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9. An ECIR was recorded by the Respondent vide ECIR No.

ECIR/STF/15/2024 and thereafter, Addendum was issued and Respondent

initiated investigation against the Petitioner and the other accused, based on

the Supplementary Chargesheet in the NIA RC.

10. An Application under Section 50 of the Act was filed by the

Respondent on 18.09.2024 and again on 08.10.2024, seeking permission to

examine/record the statement of the Petitioner, which were allowed by the

Court.

11. Thereafter, the Petitioner was formally arrested in the ECIR by the

Respondents in Central Jail, Rohini where he was in judicial custody in

connection with RC/23/2023/NIA/DLI.

12. The Petitioner was produced before the learned JMFC, Patiala House

Court on 17.10.2024, without an Order under Section 302 BNSS, seeking

custody of the Petitioner for ten days. This illegality, however, was

overlooked by the learned JMFC, who granted remand of one day to Judicial

Custody. It was further directed that the Application be put up, before the

concerned Court on 18.10.2024.

13. The Petitioner was presented before the Special Court on18.10.2024,

on the allegations of being involved in the offence of money laundering, as

defined under Section 3 PMLA. Eight days custody of the Petitioner, was

granted to the Respondent. Thereafter, the Petitioner was produced before

learned Link Judge on 26.10.2024 and was remanded to 14 days Judicial

Custody.

14. The Order of first Remand dated 17.10.2024, has been challenged

on the ground that it is violative of Section 302 and 187 BNSS, 2023. The

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Petitioner was arrested on 16.10.2024 at Rohini Jail at 12:55 PM, while he

was in the Judicial Custody, in the RC case. It is settled law that a Police

Officer can formally arrest a person in relation to an offence while he is

already in custody in a different offence, as per Section 302 BNSS (Section

267 Cr.P.C.). The Respondent wanted the production of the Petitioner and

also his custody for ten days.

15. He was thereafter, produced on 17.10.2024, without an Order of a

Competent Court, as required under Section 302 BNSS. It clearly

demonstrates that learned JMFC erred in not appreciating that the Petitioner

could not be produced on the day, prior to allowing the Application under

Section 302 BNSS. The question thus, arises under what authority of law the

Petitioner was produced, prior to an Order of the Court.

16. It is further submitted that Section 187(2) BNSS deals with the power

of the Magistrate to grant remand, irrespective of whether he has or not,

jurisdiction to try the case. Likewise, Section 19(3) of the Act, 2002

mandates that every person arrested under Sub-section (1) shall be within

twenty-four hours, produced before Special Court having appropriate

jurisdiction. This is for the reason that the liberty is paramount and any

delay would amount to its curtailment. While exercising such power, the

Magistrate has discretion, but such act is a judicial function and, therefore, a

reasoned Order indicating application of mind, is certainly warranted.

17. The law as expounded in the case of Dhanraj Aswini vs. Amar S.

Mulchandani (2024) 10 SCC 336, Anwar Ali Sarkar and A.R Antulay

(supra)is a procedural law, which is sacrosanct and cannot be tweaked or

sabotaged by the Investigating Agencies or the Courts.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 6 of 31

18. It is further asserted that the subsequent Remand Orders passed by the

Court commencing from 18.10.2024, are non-est in law, being in violation

of Articles 14, 21 & 22(1) of the Constitution of India and 187 BNSS. Also,

from the chronology of subsequent Remand Applications which commenced

from 26.10.2024, it emerges that they were all non-est in law. Reliance is

placed on Natabar Parida vs. State of Orrissa (1975) 2 SCC 220;

Singeshwar Singh & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (1975) SCC OnLine Pat 58; and

Pramod Kumar vs. State of U.P 1990 SCC OnLine All 713.

19. Reliance is also placed on Kantaru Rajeevaru (Sabarimala Temple

Review-5 J.) vs. Indian Young Lawyers Assn., (2020) 2 SCC 1, wherein the

interplay between Article 141 and Article 144 of Constitution of India, was

explained, that where the Apex Court settles a position of law or declares

through its Judgment, it has to be strictly followed throughout the territory

of India and all the authorities are bound to act in aid and to give effect to

the letter and spirit of the law, as declared by the Supreme Court.

20. In the facts of present case, it is clearly demonstrated that the

Respondents did not comply with Section 187 BNSS, thereby violated the

constitutional rights of the Petitioner. The Special Court also acted in a

cavalier/ routine manner which breached the fundamental of Judicial

Discipline and struck at the heart of the Constitution.

21. The second ground for challenge of Remand is that the Remand

Application dated 17.10.2024 under Section 187 BNSS, demonstrates that

the entire allegations and the acts were allegedly committed in the State of

Manipur, which was also recorded by the learned Trial Court. Therefore,

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 7 of 31

the proper approach would have been to file a transit remand before the

nearest Magistrate, which has not been done in the present case.

22. Section 44(1)(a) of the PMLA, 2002 mandates that the offence of

money laundering under Section 4 and related offences, must be tried by the

Special Court constituted for the area, where money laundering is

committed. Mere registration of ECIR at Delhi, based on the Supplementary

Chargesheet filed by NIA in RC-23/2023/NIA/DLI, does not confer

jurisdiction on the Delhi Courts. If the proceeds of crime have been handled

elsewhere, then Special Court designated for that area, would have the

jurisdiction. The Special Court, PMLA thus, lacked the jurisdiction to

entertain the Complaint filed by the Respondents. Since the Special Judge

lacked territorial jurisdiction, it could not have exercised lawful authority

over the matter. All the Remand Order from 17.10.2024 onwards, were

non-est in the eyes of law. Reliance is placed on Rajendra Ramchandra

Kavelkar vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2009 SC 1792, Rana Ayyub vs.

Directorate of Enforcement (2023) 4 SCC 357.

23. The Petitioner then filed an Application under Section 197 BNSS

(erstwhile Section 177 Cr.P.C) read with Section 44(1) of the Act on

08.11.2024, seeking transfer of the case to the appropriate Special Court

having territorial jurisdiction in terms of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs.

Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1 and Rana Ayyub vs. Directorate of

Enforcement (2023) 4 SCC 357, as alleged offences were committed outside

the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Court.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 8 of 31

24. The response was filed by the Respondent on 21.11.2024 stating that

the investigations in ECIR was underway and the prosecution Complaint

was yet to be filed.

25. The Application under Section 197 BNSS was dismissed by the

learned Special Judge, on 03.12.2024.

26. The next aspect under challenge is that the Order of Cognizance

dated 18.12.2024, is bad in law as no pre-cognizance hearing was given

to the Petitioner.

27. It is stated that the Prosecution Complaint under Section 44 read with

Section 45 of the PML Act was filed on 13.12.2024, against the Petitioner

and the other accused. It is asserted that the cognizance was taken on the

Complaint by the learned Judge on 18.12.2024, without due compliance

of Section 223 BNSS.

28. The Order on cognizance of the offence, dated 18.12.2024, has

been challenged, as non-est in law. It is asserted that Act 2002 is a sui

generis legislation which provides the manner in which the Special Court

created under the Act, is required to take cognizance of the offences under

Section 22 of the Act. It is stated that; firstly, the learned Special Judge

has re-legislated a new procedure with respect to taking cognizance under

the PMLA Act; and secondly, the cognizance has been taken in

contradiction of the judgments in Kushal Kumar Agarwal vs. Directorate of

Enforcement 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1221; Yash Tuteja vs. Union of India

2024 SCC OnLine SC 533 and Tarsem Lal vs. Enforcement Directorate

2024 7 SCC 61.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 9 of 31

29. The Order of Cognizance breaches the fundamental judicial

discipline and strikes at the heart of the Constitutional structure, and has to

be struck down.

30. The Petitioner has further challenged the Remand Orders post

cognizance, on the ground that once a cognizance is shown to be bad in law,

any subsequent Order of remand passed while exercising the power under

Section 346 BNSS, also becomes non-est in law. This provision is a

statutory safeguard to prevent prolonged incarceration, without proper

judicial scrutiny. Section 346(2) BNSS expressly mandates that no

Accused can be remanded to Judicial Custody, exceeding 15 days at a time.

However, the Remand has been granted beyond the permissible statutory

limit, rendering the Order ex-facie illegal and unsustainable in law.

31. The prayer is, therefore, made that the pre-cognizance Remand

Orders commencing from 17.10.2024 and culminating on 05.12.2024 made

under Section 187 BNSS, be declared as illegal. Further, the Order dated

03.12.2024 concluding that Delhi Court has jurisdiction, be declared non-

est in law. Likewise, Order dated 18.12.2024 of taking Cognizance on the

Complaint, be declared as violative of Section 223 BNSS. Further, declare

the post cognizance Remand Orders, under Section 346 BNSS, as illegal and

violative of Article 21 of Constitution of India.

32. The Respondent filed a Counter-Affidavit, wherein a preliminary

objection was taken that the impugned Orders are amenable to Revisional

jurisdiction and the present Petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, has been filed solely to circumvent the

limitation prescribed for a Revision Petition.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 10 of 31

33. The present Petition to challenge to Cognizance Order dated

18.12.2024 and Remand Order dated 17.10.2024, has been filed on

20.06.2025 i.e. after a delay of more than 6 months and 8 months

respectively, without any explanation, whatsoever. The present Petition is

liable to be dismissed, on this ground itself.

34. Even otherwise, it is well settled that unexplained delay and laches

applies equally to Petitions invoking inherent jurisdiction of the Court and

the Petitioner cannot get away with the un-explained delay of 6/8 months,

merely by mischaracterizing the Petition, as one under Section 528 BNSS.

35. There is a statutory remedy under Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C/438

and 440 BNSS available and therefore, this inherent jurisdiction cannot be

invoked as an alternative.

36. Reliance is placed on Vipin Sahni vs. CBI 2024 SCC OnLine SC 511

wherein it was observed that while there is no limitation period for

invocation of inherent power of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and it

can be exercised at any time. However, an Order discharging the Appellant

in the first instance, is a revisable Order. Long after the expiry of limitation

period of 90 days, the CBI chose to invoke jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C., which was obviously to get over the period of Limitation, in filing

the Revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. It was held that when an Order is

not interlocutory in nature and can be assailed in revisional jurisdiction,

then there is a bar in invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.

37. Reliance is also placed on the case of Mohit @ Sonu vs. State of U.P.

(2013) 7 SCC 789, it was observed that the inherent powers of the Court can

be exercised, when there is no remedy provided in the Code of Criminal

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 11 of 31

Procedure for the impugned Order to be challenged, to address the

grievance.

38. A reference is also made to Padam Sen vs. State of U.P AIR 1961 SC

218 wherein the Apex Court, in the context of inherent powers under

Section 151 CPC, it was observed that “it is well recognized that the

inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to

or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.”

39. The Constitutional Bench in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Seth

Hiralal AIR 1962 SC 527 held that the inherent power of the Court to make

Orders ex debito justitiae is undoubtedly, affirmed by Section 151 of the

Code, but it cannot be exercised so as to nullify the provisions of the Code.

Where there exists a particular Section, then such provision should normally

be regarded as exhaustive.

40. Moreover, under the pretext of challenging the cognizance and

remand Orders, the Petitioner is seeking Bail, which is not permissible under

Law.

41. Reliance is also placed on Sanyam Bhushan vs. State of NCT of Delhi

2024 DHC 4868, Sushilabai vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Crl. Writ

Petition No.1703 of 2018 decided by Bombay High Court on 28.09.2022,

Neeraj Bhargava vs. State of NCT, Delhi Crl. M.C. No.3844/2015 decided

on 28.09.2015, Gopal Chauhan vs. Smt. Satya, 1979 Cri.L.J. 446 Himachal

Pradesh High Court, wherein it was held that a prayer for Bail is not

maintainable under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023 read with Article 227 Constitution of India, when a specific statutory

remedy exists.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 12 of 31

42. It is asserted that the prayer of the Petitioner for Bail under Section

528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, is wholly mis-

conceived. The statutory remedy is provided under Section 439 Cr.P.C./483

BNSS/ 45 PMLA; invocation of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227

for seeking Bail, is impermissible in law. Reliance is placed on Surendra

Singh vs. State of Bihar 1990 SCC OnLine Pat 246.

43. It is further submitted that the Petitioner has challenged the Remand

Orders, Order dated 03.04.2024 of the Special Court disposing of the

Application of the Petitioner for committal, and Order of Cognizance dated

18.12.2024, as well as Release on Bail. The Petition is liable to be

dismissed, for mis-joinder of cause of action.

44. On merits, it is stated that there is no illegality in any of the Remand

Order, sought to be challenged. Moreover, the only method for the Petitioner

to seek relief from custody, is by way of Application for Bail, which would

be judicially adjudicated by applying the rigors of Section 45 PMLA.

Reliance is placed on Pragyna Singh Thakur vs. State of Maharashtra

(2011) 10 SCC 445; Pranab Chatterjee vs. State of Bihar (1970) 3 SCC 926,

Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary & Ors. (supra) and Tarun Kumar vs.

Enforcement Directorate 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486.

45. Even otherwise, it is well settled that legality or otherwise, of the

custody of any person, can be considered when the Notice is made

returnable and the Respondent files a Counter-Affidavit. The Petitioner as

on today, is in custody pursuant to valid subsequent Remand Orders, which

are not under challenge and, therefore, the custody of the Petitioner cannot

be termed as illegal. Reliance is placed on Serious Fraud Investigation

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Office vs. Rahul Modi (2019) 5 SCC 266 and State of Maharashtra vs.

Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee (2018) 9 SCC 745.

46. It is explained that the learned Special Judge vide Order dated

08.10.2024, had allowed ED to examine the Accused in Jail and directed

that the Order shall remain enforceable for 10 days. During the process of

examination, Petitioner was formally arrested under Section 19 PMLA in

ECIR on 16.10.2024 at 12:55 P.M. As per Section 19(3) PMLA after his

arrest, he was produced before Special Judge, within 24 hours. The

Respondent Office had sent email dated 16.10.2024 to the Superintendent of

Jail to produce the Petitioner before the Duty Magistrate, Patiala House

Court on 17.10.2024.

47. Accordingly, Application dated 17.10.2024 was moved before the

Principal District & Sessions Judge, PMLA, PHC, New Delhi seeking

production and ED custody of the Petitioner. The judicial custody was

granted by learned Duty Magistrate vide Order dated 17.10.2024, for one

day, with direction to place the Application before the Court concerned.

48. In regard to the territorial jurisdiction, it is submitted that the Special

Judge vide detailed Order dated 03.12.2024, has come to the conclusion that

the Delhi Court has jurisdiction. The same issue cannot be raised in this

Petition, challenging the remand and the cognizance.

49. On merits, all the ground taken in the Writ Petition are denied. It is

submitted that there is no merit in the present Petition which is liable to be

dismissed.

50. The Rejoinder-Affidavit was filed on behalf of the Petitioner,

wherein the averments made in the Petition were re-affirmed.

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Submissions heard and record perused.

I. Whether the Present Petition under S.482, is maintainable

against the Impugned Order:

51. The preliminary objection which has been taken on behalf of the

Respondent ED is that the Order on Cognizance, is a revisable Order and

cannot be challenged by resorting to Section 482 Cr.P.C.

52. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Constitution Bench in the

case of Manohar Lal Chopra (supra) had noted that when a Revision is

instituted in the High Court, but is found to be not maintainable on one

ground or the other, the High Court may treat it as a Petition under Section

482 Cr.P.C in order to do justice in that case. However, the reverse is not

applicable as it would not be open to the High Court to blindly convert or

treat a Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as one filed under Section 397

Cr.P.C without reference to other issues including limitation. When a

specific remedy of Revision is available to the CBI, it could not have been

ignored and a Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C filed.

53. This aspect was considered in the case of Madhu Limaye v. The

State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551, wherein the Apex Court held

that the label of a petition filed by an

aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can always

examine the controversy in an appropriate case in exercise

of its inherent powers.

54. This proposition of law was re-affirmed in the case of Prabhu

Chawla v. State of Rajasthan and Another (2016) 16 SCC 30. While

examining the scope of Section 482 CrPC and Section 397 CrPC, the Apex

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Courtheld that nothing inCrPC, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitu

de of the inherent powers preserved in so many terms by the

language of Section 482 CrPC. The inherent powers should not invade

areas set apart for specific powers conferred

under CrPC but there is no total ban on the exercise of

inherent powers where abuse of process of Court or other extraordinary

situation warrants exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. Availability of alternative

remedy of criminal revision under Section 397 CrPC, by itself,

cannot be a good ground, to dismiss an application under Section

482 CrPC.

55. Similar observations were made by the Apex Court, in the case of

Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 2 SCC 370.

It was held that only because a revision petition is maintainable, the same by

itself would not constitute a bar for entertaining an Application under

Section 482 of the Code. Even where a Revision Application is barred, as

for example the remedy by way of Section 115 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908, the Apex Court has held that the remedies under Articles

226/227 of the Constitution of India would be available. (See Surya Dev Rai

v. Ram Chander Raif.) Even in cases where a second revision before the

High Court after dismissal of the first one by the Court of Session, is barred

under Section 397(2)- of the Code, the inherent power of the Court has been

held to be available.

56. In CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, 2006 (7) SCC 188, the Supreme

Court while opining that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 16 of 31

Section 482 of the Code does not function either as a court of appeal or

revision, held:

"7. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code

in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule.

The section does not confer anv new powers on the High

Court. It onlv saves the inherent power which the Court

possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages

three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction

may be exercised, namely,

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to

prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to

otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither

possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible

rule which would govern the exercise of inherent

jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with

procedure can provide for all cases that may

possibly arise. The courts, therefore, have

inherent powers apart from express provisions of

law which are necessary for proper discharge of

functions and duties imposed upon them by law.

That is the doctrine which finds expression in the

section which merely recognises and preserves

inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,

whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence

of any express provision, as inherent in their

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 17 of 31

constitution, all such powers as are necessary to

do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of

administration of justice on the principle `quando

lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id

sine quo res ipsae esse non potest' (when the law

gives a person anything it gives him that without

which it cannot exist). While exercising powers

under the section, the court does not function as a

court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction

under the section though wide has to be exercised

sparingly, carefully and with caution and only

when such exercise is justified by the tests

specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to

be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and

substantial justice for the administration of which

alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists

for advancement of justice and if any attempt is

made to abuse that authority so as to produce

injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It

would be an abuse of the process of the court to

allow any action which would result in injustice

and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of

the powers the court would be justified to quash

any proceeding if it finds that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 18 of 31

the process of court or quashing of these

proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of

justice. When no offence is disclosed by the

complaint, the court may examine the question of

fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it

is permissible to look into the materials to assess

what the complainant has alleged and whether

any offence is made out even if the allegations are

accepted in toto."

57. Likewise, in the recent judgement of Akanksha Arora v. Tanay

Maben, 2024 INSC 962, while referring to the above discussed Judgements,

the Supreme Court revisited this aspect and reiterated that the mere

availability of a revisional remedy under Section 397 CrPC, cannot be a

ground to dismiss a petition under Section 482 CrPC. The Court held that

the nomenclature of a petition is immaterial and that the High Court, in the

interest of substantive justice, ought to either entertain the Petition under its

inherent jurisdiction or convert it into an appropriate proceeding, such as a

revision. The dismissal of a Petition solely on the ground of availability of

an alternative remedy, was characterised as hyper-technical and

unsustainable, because the same has unnecessarily compelled the appellant

to approach this court by way of this appeal filed under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India, which approach cannot be appreciated. The judicious

approach would have been to convert the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

into a revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and decided the same as per law.

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58. Indisputably, issuance of summons is not an interlocutory order

within the meaning of Section 397 of the Code. While generally, the

Petitioner must follow the remedy of Revision, in accordance with law as

held in the case of Vipin Sahni (supra), Mohit @ Sonu(supra), Manohar Lal

Chopra (supra), and Padam Sen (supra), however, in the light of the

aforesaid judgements, the Petitioner cannot be non-suited on technical

grounds, especially when the challenge is to the violation of fundamental

rights and involves personal liberty of the petitioner. This objection,

therefore, has no merit.

II. Challenge to Arrest on 17.12.2024 and Pre-cognizance

Remands:

59. It has been contended on behalf of the Petitioner that he was in

Judicial Custody in the FIR case. It was claimed that the Police Officer can

formally arrest a person in relation to an offence, while he is already in

custody in a different offence, as per Section 302 BNSS. He was arrested in

this ECIR on 16.10.2024, and produced on 17.12.2024 in Rohini Court.

60. The Petitioner asserted that he could not have been arrested in this

ECIR on 16.10.2024, without the Order of the Competent Court as required

under Section 302 BNSS. Therefore, the initial arrest of the Petitioner was

without prior Application under Section 302 BNSS, and was bad in law.

61. Furthermore, Section 19(3) PMLA maintains that every person

arrested under Sub-Section 1, shall be produced before the Special Court

within 24 hours. However, neither of the procedures were followed and

therefore, the remand Orders commencing from 16.10.2024, are non-est in

law.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 20 of 31

62. It has been explained by the Enforcement Directorate that learned

Special Judge vide Order dated 08.10.2024, had allowed ED to examine the

Petitioner in Jail and the Order was enforceable for ten days. During the

process of examination, the Petitioner was formally arrested under Section

19 PMLA in ECIR on, 16.10.2024. In terms of Section 19 (3) PMLA, he

was produced before the Duty Magistrate on 17.10.2204, i.e. within 24

hours. The learned Duty Magistrate granted one day judicial remand till

18.10.2024, on which date the Petitioner was duly produced before the

learned Special Judge, PMLA.

63. The chronology of the event as explained by the ED, clearly shows

that due procedure as envisaged under Section 302 BNSS, had been duly

complied with and the remand Orders subsequent to the arrest of the

Petitioner, cannot be termed as illegal.

64. In the case of Pragyna Singh Thakur (supra), it was observed that

even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that there was any violation

by the Police in not producing the Appellant within 24 hours of arrest, the

Appellant cannot seek to be set at liberty, on the ground of non-compliance

with Article 22(2) or Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. by the Police.

65. Therefore, this contention of the Petitioner, is without merit and does

not enure to his benefit.

III. Challenge to the Order of Cognizance dated 18.12.2024:

66. The next challenge raised by the Petitioner, is that the Order dated

18.12.2024 taking cognizance on the Complaint under Section 3 & 4 PMLA

is bad in law, since the of Ld. Special Judge, PMLA declined to give Notice

under Section 223 BNSS, before taking cognizance on the Prosecution

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 21 of 31

Complaint under PMLA, by observing that PMLA takes precedence over

the general statute and has a different process, which mandates that a pre-

cognizance hearing to the Accused was not necessary. It is submitted that

because the Petitioner has been denied a pre-cognizance hearing under

Section 223 BNSS; the impugned Order of Cognizance is bad in law.

67. The central issue is: whether the Ld. Special Judge was required to

comply with Section 223 of BNSS, 2023, before taking cognizance of the

Prosecution Complaint filed by the ED.

68. In order to appreciate this legal contention it would be pertinent to

first refer to the relevant Sections of PMLA as well as BNSS.

69. Section 44 PMLA provides that offences under PMLA shall be triable

by the Special Courts. Section 44(1)(b) empowers the Authority to file a

Complaint before a Special Court, without the Accused being committed to

it for trial. Under the proviso to Section 44(1)(b), it is open to the Authority

to submit a Closure Report before the Special Court, if no offence of money

laundering is made out, upon conclusion of the investigation.

70. Section 44(1)(c) PMLA gives an option to the Authority to file a

Complaint, to seek committal of a case relating to a scheduled offence,

which is pending before the Competent Authority to the Special Court by

way of an Application. If and when the Application is filed, the Court

dealing with the Scheduled offence, has to commit the same to a Special

Court, which shall thereafter, proceed to deal with it from the stage at which

it is committed.

71. Section 44(1)(d) PMLA is relevant for the present controversy, which

reads as under :

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 22 of 31

“44. Offences triable by Special Courts

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),

(d) a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or

the offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in

accordance with the provisions of the Code of Crimina1

Procedure, 1 973, as it applies to a trial before a Court of

Session.”

72. Section 44(1)(d) makes the Cr.P.C (now BNSS) applicable to the trial

before the Special Court, as if it was a Court of Sessions.

73. Section 46 PMLA treats the Special Court to be deemed Court of

Sessions, wherein the provisions of Cr.P.C. (now BNSS) shall apply to the

proceedings under PMLA. Section 65 PMLA makes the provisions of

Cr.P.C (now BNSS), applicable to the proceedings under the PMLA.

74. Therefore, from the aforesaid provisions, it is evident that Cr.P.C

(now BNSS) is applicable, for the offences triable under PMLA. It now

becomes relevant to refer to the Section 223 of BNSS, which provides for

examination of the Complaint and the procedure for taking cognizance on

the Complaints. The relevant part of Section 223 of BNSS, 2023 reads as

follows:

“223. Examination of complainant -

(1)A Magistrate having jurisdiction while taking cognizance

of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the

complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the

substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing

and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses,

and also by the Magistrate:

Provided that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken

by the Magistrate without giving the accused an

opportunity of being heard:

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 23 of 31

……….”

75. A perusal of the impugned Order dated 18.12.2024, reveals that the

Ld. Special Judge observed that Section 223 BNSS is not applicable to

PMLA Complaints, on the premise that PMLA is a special Act and the

Complainant therein, does not have the same capacity as a private

complainant under BNSS.

76. This reasoning of the Ld. Special Judge is contrary to the law settled

by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Tarsem Lal

(supra) and Yash Tuteja (supra), held that when a Complaint under Section

46 PMLA is filed, provisions of Section 205 Cr.P.C. shall be applicable to it.

77. In Kushal Kumar Agarwal (supra), the Apex Court clarified that the

provisions of Chapter XVI of BNSS, including Section 223, apply to

Complaints under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA filed after 01.07.2024. The

Supreme Court specifically held that a Complaint filed by Enforcement

Directorate under Section 44(1)(b) PMLA, will be governed by Section 200

to 204 Cr.P.C. Therefore, provisions of Chapter 16 containing Section 223

to 226 shall also apply to a Complaint under Section 44 PMLA. Proviso to

Sub Section 1 of Section 223 puts an embargo on the power of the Court to

take cognizance by providing that no cognizance of an offence shall be

taken by a Magistrate, without giving the Accused an opportunity of being

heard. It was held:

“The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 223 puts an

embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance by

providing that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by

the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of

being heard.”

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 24 of 31

78. This aspect has been recently considered in the case of Parvinder

Singh vs. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 INSC 59 decided by the Apex

Court on 19.02.2026, wherein the aforesaid judgments have been endorsed

and it has been reaffirmed that before taking cognizance on a Complaint

under PMLA, a pre-cognizance Notice has to be mandatorily issued to the

Accused.

79. In the present case, the Prosecution Complaint was admittedly filed

on 13.12.2024, i.e., well after the enforcement of BNSS. Therefore, the Ld.

Special Judge was duty-bound to afford the accused an opportunity of being

heard, before taking cognizance. The failure to do so and the specific finding

that Section 223 is inapplicable, renders the Order dated 18.12.2024 legally

unsustainable.

80. The Order dated 18.12.2024 of taking cognizance on the Complaint,

is hereby, set aside and the Special Judge (PMLA) is hereby, directed to

give a pre-cognizance hearing to the petitioner.

IV. Challenge to Post-Cognizance Remand from the date of

Cognizance on 18.12.2024 and thereafter:

81. The Petitioner has also challenged the Order dated 01.05.2025

whereby he was remanded to judicial custody for a period of two months.

82. It is contended that as per Section 346 BNSS which deals with post-

cognizance remand, the Petitioner could not have been remanded to Judicial

Custody for more than 15 days at a time, while in this case each remand was

more than two months. Such remand was bad in law, on this account.

83. The first proviso to Section 346(2) reads as under:

“346.----- …

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 25 of 31

Provided that no Court shall remand an accused person to

custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen

days at a time:

…”

84. However, it may be noted that once the Order taking cognizance has

been set aside, the remand order dated 01.05.2025 is not governed by the

provision relating to post-cognizance remand; rather it is going to be

governed by the provision relating to pre-cognizance remand. The relevant

provision is thus, S. 187 BNSS (previously 167 Cr.P.C), which is extracted,

as under:

“187. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed

in twenty-four hours.

(1)Whenever any person is arrested and detained in

custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be

completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by

section 58, and there are grounds for believing that the

accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in

charge of the police station or the police officer making the

investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector,

shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of

the entries in the diary hereinafter specified relating to the

case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such

Magistrate.

(2)The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded

under this section may, irrespective of whether he has or

has no jurisdiction to try the case, after taking into

consideration whether such person has not been released on

bail or his bail has been cancelled, authorize, from time to

time, the detention of the accused in such custody as such

Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days

in the whole, or in parts, at any time during the initial

forty days or sixty days out of detention period of sixty

days or ninety days, as the case may be, as provided in sub-

section (3), and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 26 of 31

commit it for trial, and considers further detention

unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to

a Magistrate having such jurisdiction.

(3)The Magistrate may authorize the detention of the

accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is

satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no

Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused

person in custody under this sub-section for a total period

exceeding-(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to

an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or

imprisonment for a term of ten years or more;(ii) sixty days,

where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on

the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as

the case may be, the accused person shall be released on

bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every

person released on bail under this sub-section shall be

deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter

XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter.

(4)….”

85. However, a bare perusal of this provision reveals that the statutory

mandate, is unambiguous. The power to remand is restricted to a maximum

of fifteen days at one time. The Ld. Special Judge’s Order remanding the

Petitioner for a period of two months, is in patent violation of the express

statutory provision contained in Section 187 of BNSS, 2023. Such an order

is ex-facie illegal and cannot be sustained.

86. Now, once the remand Order is set aside, there are two consequences

that necessarily follow.

87. First and foremost, after the cognizance is taken, the Petitioner was

necessarily required to be remanded to judicial custody, under Section 346

BNSS. When the Order of Cognizance is set aside, the post- cognizance

remand under Section 346, cannot be held to be bad in law.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 27 of 31

88. This was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh

Kumar Bhikamchand Jain vs. State of Maharashtra (2013) 3 SCC 77 in the

context of default being under Section 167(2)(a)(ii), that the powers for

remand pre-cognizance was under Section 167 Cr.P.C., while post-

cognizance it was under Section 309 Cr.P.C. It was held that if the

cognizance is not taken and the person is remanded to custody beyond a

period of 60 days, this power is deemed to have exercised under Section 167

Cr.P.C.

89. The Supreme Court in, Natabar Parida & ors. v. State of Orissa,

(1975) 2 SCC 220 held that, once cognizance is taken or the trial

commences, the power to remand the accused shifts from Section 167

[corresponding to section 187 B.N.S.S.], to Section 309(2) [corresponding

to section 346(2) B.N.S.S.], of the Code. Under the first proviso to Section

309(2), no single remand may exceed fifteen days at a time. Further, the

custody contemplated by Section 309 is judicial custody alone and not

police custody, the object being that after the commencement of inquiry or

trial the accused ought not to remain under police influence.

90. The second aspect is what are the consequences of the remand being

more than 15 days, at one instance. It may be noted that there was no

objection taken to the long remand by the Petitioner, despite being presented

on every date. Secondly, it may observed that under the old Cr.P.C., the

post-cognizance remand was under Section 309 Cr.P.C, wherein there was

no limitation on the period of remand provided. The Court of Sessions

could give post-cognizance remand for any number of days. The Sessions

Judge under the PMLA enjoys the status of Sessions Judge.

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 28 of 31

91. It is no doubt, true that the position of law has been changed by the

Section 346 BNSS, which has put an embargo on post-cognizance remand

by any Trial Court being more than 15 days and, therefore, on account of

change of law apparently, there still remains some confusion with the Trial

Courts. Be as it may, this can never be a ground to discount any specific

provisions of law.

92. In the given circumstances, the Accused may claim a right to Bail; but

till then, his Judicial Custody has to be extended, in accordance with law.

93. In the present case, the Petitioner had not been granted Bail, and in

such a situation there was no option, but to remand him to Judicial Custody.

There may have been a violation of the number of days, but it cannot be held

to be a patent illegality or a ground of release. It is a mere irregularity on

which the Petitioner may seek Bail, but no such relief can be granted in

exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

94. The Petitioner is at liberty to move an Application for Bail on the

ground of the over-extended post-cognizance remand, for a period beyond

the period specified by the Legislature.

95. The Counsel for the Respondent has also argued that the delay and

laches on the part of the Petitioner, while invoking the inherent

jurisdiction of this Court, is also as aspect to be considered.

96. In the case of State of U.P. vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh (2021) 19 SCC

706, it was observed that no prejudice is caused to a person complaining of

the breach of natural justice, which such person does not dispute the case

against him. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver

and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 29 of 31

which the Court finds on facts, that no real prejudice has been caused to the

person complaining of breach of natural justice.

97. The petitioner, herein has been transferred to Guwahati, vide Order

dated 23.07.2025, wherein he is in judicial custody of the Guwahati Court.

The Petitioner may have been remanded for extended period between

January, 29 till he was shifted to Guwahati, beyond 15 days, as is permitted,

but neither the Petitioner had raised any objection nor any prejudice has

consequently, been caused to the Petitioner. There exists no ground to quash

the Complaint.

V. Whether petitioner is entitled to be released on Bail:

98. The Petitioner has contended that since his fundamental rights under

Article 14, 21 and 22(1) have been violated, he be released on Bail.

99. In this context, reference be made to Union of India vs. Kanhaiya

Prasad 2025 SCC OnLine SC 306, wherein it has been reiterated that

Section 45 of PMLA starts with a non-obstante clause and has an overriding

effect on the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of

conflict between them. Section 45 imposes two conditions for the grant of

bail to any person, accused of an offence punishable under PMLA which are

: (i) the prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application

for bail; and (ii) the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable ground

to believe that the accused person is not guilty of such offence and that he is

not liable to commit any offence while on bail.

100. Similar observations have been made by the Three Judge Bench in the

case of Vijay Madan Lal Choudhary (supra) that PMLA is a special

legislation to deal with the subject of money laundering activities, having

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 30 of 31

trans-national impact on the financial systems including sovereignty and

integrity of the country. It is no ordinary offence. To deal with such serious

offence, stringent provisions are provided in 2002 Act including for

attachment and confiscation of proceeds of crime and to prosecution the

person involved in the process or actively connected with the proceeds of

crime. The twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA though restrict the right

of the accused to grant of Bail, but it cannot be said that these conditions

impose absolute restraint on the grant of Bail. The Court while dealing with

the Application for Bail, need not get deep into the merits of the case, but

will have to weigh the evidence to conclude whether the twin conditions of

Section 45 PMLA are satisfied while granting Bail.

101. Similar observations have been made by the Supreme Court in Tarun

Kumar vs. Directorate of Enforcement 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486.

102. Therefore, no Bail can be granted in the present facts and

circumstances, but the Petitioner is at liberty to move an appropriate

Application for Bail and agitate these grounds, for seeking Bail.

103. It is also significant to refer to Lakshay Vij vs. Directorate of

Enforcement Crl. M.C.246/2025; Gaurav Khurana and Anr. vs. E.D.

Crl.M.C.2412/2025, Radhika Chanana vs. ED Crl. M.C.3164/2025; Hemant

Dahiya & Anr. vs. Directorate of Enforcement Crl. M.C.351551/2025;

Mudit Aggarwal vs. Directorate of Enforcement Crl. M.C.3564/2025;

Jaspreet Singh Bagga vs. Directorate of Enforcement Crl. M.C.1458/2025

while setting aside the Order on Cognizance on the ground of no hearing

granted under Section 223 BNSS, it has been observed that the Bail

CRL.M.C.4134/2025 Page 31 of 31

Applications, if any, may be moved by the Petitioner in the Trial Court,

which shall be decided on their own merits.

104. It is evident that while the remand has been challenged, it cannot be a

ground to forthwith release of the Petitioner for which he is at liberty to

move the Bail Application.

Conclusion:

105. In view of the aforesaid, the Order dated 18.12.2024, taking

cognizance on the Complaint, is hereby, set aside and the ld. Special Judge

(PMLA) is directed to give a hearing to the Petitioner, before proceeding to

take cognizance. The petitioner is at liberty to seek bail, in accordance with

law. The pending Application(s) are disposed of, accordingly.

(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)

JUDGE

MAY 29, 2026/va