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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRA No.42 of 2002

(From judgment dated 24.1.2002 passed by the learned Sessions

Judge, Dhenkanal in Sessions Trial Case No.22-D of 1998)

(1) Urmila Sahoo

(2) Madhusudan Sahoo ……. Appellants

- Versus-

State of Orissa ……. Respondent

Advocates appeared in the case through hybrid mode:

For Appellants: Miss Bini Mishra, Advocate

For Respondent: Miss Suvalaxmi Devi,

[Additional Standing Counsel]

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CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

Date of Hearing:02.7.2026 Date of Judgment:23.7.2026

Sashikanta Mishra,J. Appellants Nos.1 and 2, who are mother and

son respectively, have filed this appeal questioning the correctness

of the judgment dated 24.1.2002 passed by learned Sessions

Judge, Dhenkanal-Angul in S.T. Case No.22-D of 1998, convicting

them under Sections 498-A/304-B/302 read with 34 of I.P.C. and

Section 4 of the D.P. Act. Further, the appellants were sentenced

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to rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in

default, to undergo R.I. for three months under Section 4 of the

D.P. Act read with Section 34 of I.P.C.; R.I. for two years and fine

of Rs.2,000/-, in default to undergo R.I. for 6 months under Section

498-A read with Section 34 of I.P.C.; imprisonment for life under

Section 304-B read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and imprisonment for

life under Section 302 I.P.C. read with Section 34 of I.P.C. The

above sentences were also directed to run concurrently.

2. The prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows:-

The accused-appellant Madhusudan Sahoo had married

Anusuya Behera (deceased), the daughter of Narayan Behera of

village Dhirapatna. At the time of marriage, dowry of Rs.20,000/-

in cash, gold ornaments, a small T.V. and other household items

were given by the father of the deceased, but there was demand for

further dowry resulting in physical assault on the deceased by her

in-laws. Letters were also sent by them to her paternal home

seeking dowry. The matter was attempted to be resolved amicably

in the presence of village gentries.

On 20.8.1997, Mahendra Kumar Behera, brother of the

deceased, received information around 6.00 P.M. that his sister

had died. Immediately, he rushed to Dhirapatna along with his

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relations and found that his sister was hanging from the roof in her

kitchen. Her legs were touching the ground and several marks of

injury were on her body. Mahendra suspected that the appellants

had killed his sister. Accordingly, he went to Bhapur Outpost and

lodged a report. After making Station Diary Entry, the report was

sent to Sadar P.S., where it was registered as P.S. Case No.133 of

1997 followed by investigation. In course of investigation, the

complicity of the accused persons having come to light, charge-

sheet was submitted against them.

3. The accused persons took the plea of denial and false

implication. Additionally, they took the plea of alibi to the effect

that both of them had been to Cuttack on the date of occurrence

for treatment of appellant No.1’s back ailment and to buy utensils.

4. To prove its case, prosecution examined thirteen witnesses

and proved fifteen documents. It also proved five material objects.

Defence, on the other hand, examined two witnesses from its side.

5. Considering the evidence adduced, the trial Court first took

up the plea of alibi for consideration. After noting the settled

position of law vis-à-vis the evidence, it held that the plea did not

inspire confidence at all. As regards the cause of death, the trial

Court; mainly relying on the evidence of the autopsy surgeon

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arrived at the conclusion that the deceased was physically tortured

which caused her death. It was thus held that the death was

homicidal in nature.

On the question whether there was demand for dowry and the

deceased was subjected to cruelty because of its non-fulfillment,

the trial Court, after analyzing the evidence was convinced that

the prosecution was able to prove both the points. On the question

as to if dowry death was caused, taking note of the evidence

particularly, the letter written by the accused Madhusudan to the

deceased demanding further dowry some months prior to the

occurrence and the manner in which the injuries were inflicted, the

trial Court held that it was a case of dowry death.

As regards authorship of the crime, the trial Court found that

no one other than the accused persons would have committed the

offence and that both the accused persons having killed the

deceased attempted to project it as a case of suicide by hanging her

dead body with a rope. It was, according to the trial Court, a pre-

planned act revealing their intention to cause the death of the

deceased. The trial Court, therefore, found the accused persons to

have caused the homicidal death of the deceased punishable under

Section 302 of I.P.C. Basically, on such findings, both the accused-

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appellants were convicted and sentenced as already stated

hereinbefore.

6. Heard Miss Bini Mishra, learned counsel for the accused-

Appellants and Miss Suvalaxmi Devi, learned Additional Standing

Counsel for the State-Respondent.

7. Miss Mishra vehemently argues that the impugned order of

conviction and sentence cannot be sustained in law as the trial

Court has stretched the evidence on record to somehow record

findings of guilt ignoring material discrepancies and gaps therein.

In particular, she advances the following arguments: -

(i) The evidence of P.W.s 1, 2, 4, 7 and 10 reveals

that the relationship between the accused and the

deceased was normal and/or good and therefore,

there was no motive for them to cause any harm

to the deceased.

(ii) The trial Court rejected the defence plea of

alibi on flimsy grounds, ignoring the fact that even

the prosecution witnesses such as P.Ws. 1, 2 , 3

and 4 supported it.

(iii) The I.O. admitted that he did not verify the

plea of alibi as he did not believe the witnesses,

which is nothing but a serious gap in investigation

which the trial Court completely ignored.

(iv) Reliance placed by the trial Court on the

so-called letter demanding dowry marked Ext.2 is

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untenable in view of the fact that there is no

corroboration at all.

(v) The evidence relating to dowry death as

deposed by the witnesses was found to be

improvements of their own version before the I.O.

for which no reliance could have been placed on

them.

Miss Mishra sums up her argument by submitting that this

being a case of circumstantial evidence, the so-called incriminating

circumstances referred to by the trial Court are such as not to

exclude the possibility of someone else committing the crime.

8. Per contra, Miss Suvalaxmi Devi argues that the plea of alibi

was required to be proved to the hilt, but the defence miserably

failed to do so. The trial Court therefore, rightly rejected the plea.

The so-called improvements made by some prosecution witnesses

regarding the demand for dowry are actually not improvements

since all of them have referred to dowry demand in their statements

before the police. The evidence clearly shows demand and torture

of the deceased by the accused persons for dowry. The nature of

death, injury sustained and the manner in which the dead body

was found unerringly points at the guilt of the accused perrons.

9. This is a case where prosecution has attempted to prove its

case through circumstantial evidence in the absence of any eye-

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witness to the occurrence. We have given our anxious

consideration to the rival contentions noted hereinbefore and have

also perused the evidence on record carefully. We find that the trial

Court framed the following six points for determination in this

case:-

“(a) Whether the defence has been able to prove the plea of

alibi?

(b) As to how the death of the deceased was caused?

(c) Whether there was demand of dowry?

(d) Whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the

accused persons due to non fulfilment of dowry demand?

(e) As to whether dowry death has been caused?

(f) As to who has caused the death of the deceased?”

Having seen the evidence and considering the contentions

raised, we feel that the answer to the above questions would

determine the case adequately.

10. On the first point, i.e. the plea of alibi, we may briefly take

note of the position of law. In the case of State of Maharashtra

v. Narsingrao Gangaram Pimple

1, the Supreme Court held as

follows:-

“It is well settled that a plea of alibi must be proved with

absolute certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility

of the presence of the persons concerned at the place of

occurrence.”

11. In the case at hand, both the accused persons have taken the

plea of alibi to the effect that on the fateful day they had been to

1

(1984) 1 SCC 446

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Cuttack to treat the back problem of accused Urmila and to

purchase utensils. They further claim to have returned to

Dhirapatna on a bus called ‘Maa Mangala’. To prove such plea, the

defence elicited from the mouth of P.Ws.1 and 3 in cross-

examination that both the accused persons were standing at

Dhirapatna Bus Stand when the informant and others, after

hearing about the death of the deceased, were proceeding to the

said village on a Trekker. They stated that both the accused

persons were picked up in that Trekker to their house by the

informant and others. It is also stated that the accused persons

were waiting with a gunny bag full of utensils. The brother of the

deceased, P.W.5, however, denied the defence suggestion in this

regard. To further prove the plea of alibi, defence examined two

witnesses-D.Ws.1 and 2. According to D.W. 1, on the date of

occurrence when he was in the outer room of his house, the

accused persons passed that way and on his asking they said that

they were going to Cuttack to purchase steel utensils. D.W.2

deposed that he is an aluminum utensils seller and used to come

to village Dhirapatna once or twice in a month. He stated that on

the date of occurrence at about 7.00 A.M., both the accused

persons came to Kalaragada Chhak to catch a bus to Cuttack and

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at about 7.30. A.M. he, along with them boarded a private bus

named ‘Maa Mangala’ to Cuttack. On his asking, the accused

persons said that they had come to Cuttack to purchase steel

utensils for business purpose. He went with them to a shop at

Pithapur, Cuttack and left them there. At about noon, he returned

to the shop when the accused persons were present and gave

Rs.250/- to accused Urmila to pass it on to his wife at Dhirapatna.

He finally said that the accused persons left Cuttack with the

utensils at about 5.30 P.M. by ‘Maa Mangala’ bus. In cross-

examination by prosecution, he stated that the accused persons

had purchased stainless steel utensils worth more than

Rs.14,000/-.

12. We are now required to consider whether the plea as

advanced is acceptable. Firstly, we find that despite taking a

specific plea that both the accused persons had gone to Cuttack

for two purposes, one, for treatment of accused Urmila and second,

for purchase of utensils, the same does not find mention in the

evidence we have just discussed. In other words, none of the

witnesses referred above have whispered a word regarding the so-

called treatment of accused Urmila. On the contrary, D.W.2 stated

that both the accused persons were engaged in purchasing utensils

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in a shop at Pithapur. Even otherwise, no medical prescription or

document showing the ailment and treatment of accused Urmila

was proved shown by the accused persons. That apart, not a scrap

of paper much less any acceptable documentary proof of purchase

of utensils of such high value (considering the year of so-called

purchase, that is 1997) was put forth such as, cash memo to

support the stand taken. Though it is stated by P.Ws.1 and 3 that

they were standing at Dhirapatna Bus Stand with a bag full of

utensils, yet what happened to the said utensils thereafter is not

forthcoming from the evidence at all. The Investigating Officer has

not seized any such utensils. He also stated that no bus comes

from Cuttack side to Bhapur through Dhirapatna and that the

villagers of Dhirapatna had to come to Kalaragada Chhak in order

to catch any bus. All the above aspects raise considerable doubts

as to the veracity of the plea of alibi. Reading of the impugned

judgment reveals that the trial Court has meticulously analyzed

the evidence in this regard and rejected the plea of alibi on reasons

similar to what we have arrived at independently. The defence

argument as laid before us is, therefore, not acceptable.

13. Coming to the second point for determination, we feel the

same shall not detain us for long in view of the undisputed and

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unchallenged medical evidence on record regarding cause of death

of the deceased. The autopsy surgeon P.W.6 stated as follows: -

“3. Fracture and dislocation and disease of the muscles and

bones absent. All the injuries are antemortem in nature.The

opinion as to the cause of death is due to shock and

haemorrhage resulted from the injuries noted in anorectal

region. The time since death is within 18 to 24 hours since

from the time of P.M. examination. This is the P.M.

examination report by my colleague doctor Amiya Ch. Swain

in his hand and I have agreed with the said report and the

finding. The report is marked Ext.7 and Ext.7/1 is the

signature of Doctor Swain and Ext.7/2 is my signature.”

He ruled out suicidal hanging as being a cause of death in

cross-examination. We therefore, find no reason to discard the

medical evidence, which unequivocally states that the cause of

death was due to injuries in the anorectal region. We are persuaded

to concur with the inference drawn by the trial Court that the

injuries found on the deceased are suggestive of insertion of some

foreign blunt substance into the anorectal part of the victim in

order to torture her. Under such circumstances and particularly,

in the absence of any ligature mark on the neck of the deceased as

well as internal injury to the neck structure or signs of asphyxia,

we are also inclined to accept the trial Court’s finding that after

severely torturing the deceased and causing injuries resulting in

her death, the culprits hung her dead body to project it as suicidal

hanging.

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14. We find that the trial Court considered Point Nos.(c) and (d)

together as they are interlinked. It was argued that though there is

proof of some cash and gold articles etc. being given at the time of

marriage yet, there is no evidence of subsequent demand for dowry

by the accused persons or of subjecting the deceased to cruelty in

connection with the same. Prosecution has relied upon the

evidence of P.Ws. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in this regard. Besides, the

prosecution also relied upon a letter allegedly written by the

accused to the deceased demanding dowry.

We find that all these witnesses have consistently deposed

about the payment of cash of Rs.20,000/-, T.V. set, gold ornaments

etc. at the time of marriage. Learned counsel for the appellants has

referred to the evidence of the I.O. to argue that several statements

of such witnesses were found to be improvements. In order to

satisfy ourselves, we perused the statements of the aforementioned

witnesses recorded by the I.O. under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. We find

that all of them, except P.W.10 had consistently stated about the

further demand by the accused persons for dowry and of subjecting

the deceased to cruelty in such connection. True, there are some

discrepancies and even embellishments, but then the statements

of witnesses are not to be weighed technically or sentence by

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sentence, but are required to be read as a whole. Put differently,

only because a witness is found to have improved upon his original

version before the I.O. to some extent does not mean that his entire

evidence is to be rejected. There is no reason to discard his evidence

in so far as it is consistent with his earlier version. Even otherwise,

the sum and substance of the statement must also be taken into

account. Tested in the above background, we find no reason to

discard the evidence of these witnesses.

15. Insofar as the letter marked Ext.2 is concerned, prosecution

claims that the same was written by the accused to the deceased

which contains demand for gold chain and fan. Learned counsel

for the appellants argues that no conclusive proof was adduced to

show that the letter was actually written by accused Madhu. Even

assuming that it was written, the date mentioned on it shows that

it was long before the date of occurrence and therefore, cannot be

said to have any proximate nexus with the offence.

We have carefully perused the letter. From its recitals, it is

apparent that there was some sort of dissension between the two

families. Further, there is an explicit demand for a gold chain and

a fan. As regards the identity of the writer, we find that the trial

Court took the pain of comparing the admitted signatures and

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handwriting of accused Madhu with the signature and writing in

the letter to be convinced that it was written by the same person.

Obviously, the Court did not see any ambiguity or harbor any

doubt in this regard so as to be prompted to get the letter analyzed

by a handwriting expert. Be it noted that the Court is considered

to be the expert of experts and therefore, can make its own analysis

based on observations. Such a course is not unknown to law. In

the case of Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka

2, the

Supreme Court held as follows;

“38. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety,

the Court should not normally take upon itself the

responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that

of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of

the slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of

experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the

power to compare the disputed signature with the admitted

signature as this power is clearly available under Section

73 of the Act.”

[Emphasis added]

We therefore, fully concur with the findings of the trial Court

under Point Nos. (c) and (d).

16. Coming to Point No. (e) i.e., whether it can be said that dowry

death was caused, we have already discarded the defence plea of

alibi. It is not disputed that the dead body of the deceased was

found in the kitchen apparently in a hanging condition. We have

2

(1997) 7 SCC 110

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already held that the medical evidence has ruled out the possibility

of the death due to hanging which fosters the prosecution

allegation that it was a post-mortem act. The deceased was found

with several injuries on her body all of which were ante-mortem

and from their nature, it cannot be said that they were self-

inflicted. In fact, her death was caused, according to the autopsy

surgeon, because of severe injury to her anorectal region resulting

from insertion of blunt object inside her anus. We have seen and

accepted the evidence relating to demand for dowry and of the sour

relationship between the accused persons and the deceased and

her family for such reason.

Defence has tried to project alternative theories while cross-

examining prosecution witnesses. For instance, according to

P.W.2, who turn hostile, stated that after death of the deceased her

father went to the house of the accused persons, blackmailed and

demanded cash of Rs.20,000/- and since they did not pay, the case

was initiated. P.W.4 stated in cross-examination that the accused

Madhu was inimical to many of the villagers due to land disputes

and that there was threat given to him to eliminate his family and

set fire to his house. It was suggested to P.W.7 in cross-

examination that she had proposed the marriage of her next

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daughter with accused Madhu after death of the deceased and

since he did not agree, this case was foisted falsely.

Coming to the defence evidence, D.W.1 stated in cross-

examination that he cannot say if the deceased had enmity with

anyone but volunteered to say that there were some enemies of the

accused persons namely, Radha Mohan Sahu and Duryodhan

Rout, but he clarified that both of them are good souls and the

enmity was not such as to prompt them to commit murder of the

deceased.

Thus, we find that the defence has taken prevaricating pleas

regarding the probable reason for someone other than the accused

persons to cause the death of the deceased. It shows that defence

does not really have a definite stand in the matter. Under such

circumstances, presence of the accused persons in the village at

the so-called bus stand though not in the house itself, is by itself

adequate to raise a strong suspicion against them. From the

evidence laid, it can be safely concluded that both the accused

persons subjected the deceased to severe physical cruelty resulting

in her death and thereafter attempted, unsuccessfully, to give it a

colour of suicide before fleeing from the house. However, because

of arrival of the family members of the deceased in the village and

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their meeting with the accused persons, they were unable to leave

the village entirely. We find from the impugned judgment that the

trial Court has analyzed the evidence in the proper perspective to

arrive at the conclusion that the accused persons committed dowry

death of the deceased. For the reason indicated, there is nothing

for us to differ.

17. Coming to Point No.(f), in view of what has been discussed in

detail hereinbefore regarding manner of death of the deceased and

the fact that the accused persons were the authors thereof, it is to

be considered whether such death can also be treated as ‘murder’

within the meaning of Section 300 of I.P.C.

18. The evidence reveals that an attempt was made by the

accused persons to project the death of the deceased as suicide,

some tiles of the roof of the kitchen were removed and a bamboo

ladder was also placed on one of its walls. Evidently, it was to

suggest that somebody had entered into the kitchen from the roof

by removing the tiles but from the evidence of the I.O. it was clearly

proved that the gap created by removal of the tiles was not wide

enough to admit any person to pass through it. We have seen the

degree of cruelty meted out to the deceased and manner of its

commission. All these facts can only suggest that the act of the

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accused persons was premeditated with planning and preparation.

We have already accepted that they had a motive too. All these

make it a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder apart

from being dowry death. The trial Court has also arrived at the

same conclusion with which we fully concur.

19. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of evidence on record

in the light of the contentions advanced by the parties, we are not

persuaded to take a different view than what was taken by the trial

Court so as to interfere in the matter.

20. In the result, the appeal fails and is therefore, dismissed. The

appellants being on bail shall be taken to custody forthwith to serve

the remaining part of their sentences. Their bail bonds be

cancelled.

………………………………...

(Sashikanta Mishra, J)

Manash Ranjan Pathak, J I agree.

….........................................

(Manash Ranjan Pathak, J)

Ashok Kumar Behera