As per case facts, aggrieved landowners challenged the acquisition of their land for the Jaipur Metro Rail Project, arguing that the Land Acquisition Officer failed to provide an effective personal ...
2026 INSC 682
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8269 OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 16742 OF 2026]
ALOK KOTAHWALA & ORS . … APPELLANTS
VS.
JAIPUR METRO RAIL COR PORATION
LIMITED & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8270 OF 2026
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.16743 OF 2026]
ALOK KOTAHWALA & ORS . … APPELLANTS
VS.
JAIPUR METRO RAIL CORPORATION
LIMITED & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
THE APPEALS
1. These appeals, by special leave, are at the instance of the aggrieved
landowners
1
. Appellants assail the correctness of the common
judgment and order dated 30
th
April, 2026
2
of a Division Bench of the
1
Appellants/appellants
2
impugned judgment
2
High Court of Rajasthan
3
allowing two intra-court appeals. One appeal
4
was preferred by the Jaipur Metro Rail Corporation Limited
5
while the
other appeal
6
was at the instance of State of Rajasthan, Jaipur
Development Authority
7
and its Land Acquisition Officer
8
. The
impugned judgment set aside the judgment and order dated 9
th
May,
2023 of a Single Judge of the High Court allowing the writ petition
9
of
the appellants, thereby resulting in its dismissal.
2. It is noted that the Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition of the
appellants, interfered with a process of acquisition of lands initiated
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
10
by the Urban Development
Department, Government of Rajasthan
11
and quashed the relevant
notification/declaration/notice issued under such enactment. An order
was also passed restraining the respondents in the writ petition from
interfering with the appellants’ rights in respect of the land owned by
them, which were sought to be acquired.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. Subject matter of the appeal is relatable to acquisition of 27 hectares
of land
12
owned by both sets of appellants, situated in Village
3
High Court
4
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 502/2023
5
JMRCL
6
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 739/2023
7
JDA
8
LAO
9
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10544/2012
10
LA Act
11
UDD
12
subject land
3
Sheopura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur for the proposed
construction of a metro car depot by the JMRCL as part of Phase II of
the Jaipur Metro Rail Project.
4. The facts, leading to institution of the writ petition before the High
Court, are undisputed. For the sake of completeness, we briefly refer
to the same below:
a. Notification 26
th
May, 2011 was issued under Section 4(1) of the LA
Act by the UDD proposing to acquire the subject land.
b. Pursuant to the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the LA Act,
the appellants filed identical objections under Section 5A(1) of the
LA Act
13
before the LAO on or about 27
th
/28
th
June, 2011. The LAO,
pursuant to receipt of objections from the appellants, fixed various
dates
14
. Appellants claimed to be present on those dates. JMRCL
filed a reply on 18
th
August, 2011 dealing with one objection while
it filed another reply on 9
th
March, 2012 dealing with the other
objection.
c. Upon filing of two sets of reply by the JMRCL on 18
th
August, 2011
and 9
th
March, 2012 and service thereof on the appellants, the LAO
posted the matter to 9
th
April, 2012 to enable them file their
rejoinder.
13
the objections filed only by M/s Shubh Agro Farms and Properties Private Limited are
on record.
14
28
th
June, 2011, 5
th
July, 2011, 11
th
July, 2011, 28
th
July, 2011, 24
th
August, 2011, 14
th
September, 2011, 9
th
November, 2011, 8
th
December, 2011, 13
th
January, 2012 and 15
th
February, 2012
4
d. Admittedly, on 9
th
April 2012, the appellants did neither appear
before the LAO nor filed any rejoinder to the reply of the JMRCL.
The LAO’s order dated 9
th
April 2012 did not record any next date
in the matter; however, it was recorded that “the file be put at the
time of sending recommendation under the provisions of section 5-
A to the state government.”
e. On 18
th
May 2012, the LAO in its order noted that “Jaipur Metro Rail
Corporation Limited is in need of the land for public purpose,
therefore, the objections are not being considered and report under
Section 5-A be sent to the State Government.” On the same date,
the LAO forwarded its report prepared under Section 5A(2) of the
LA Act to the UDD. Therein, the LAO observed that “objections
received are not being considered and recommendation is sent to
the State Government for issuing declaration under section 6 in
accordance with notification under Section 4.”
f. Thereafter, the note sheet of the Government file dated 4
th
July,
2012 recorded that the report of the LAO was placed before the
officials concerned and that pursuant to a careful consideration of
the said report, the State Government was of the view that the
appellants’ land was essential for the construction of the metro car
depot. It was proposed to issue a declaration under Section 6 of the
LA Act. On 5
th
July 2012, the UDD issued the requisite declaration
under Section 6(1) of the LA Act for acquiring the subject land,
5
following which a notice dated 11
th
July 2012 was issued under
Section 9(3) of the LA Act by the LAO.
g. Aggrieved, the appellants invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High
Court challenging the aforesaid notification/declaration/notice
issued under the LA Act, on the ground of non-compliance with the
mandatory provisions of the statute by the LAO. They specifically
alleged denial of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5A of the
LA Act.
h. On 11
th
September, 2012, the Single Judge of the High Court
granted interim stay of acquisition of the subject land, pending the
final adjudication of the writ petition. This interim order was later
vacated by a Division Bench of the High Court while hearing an
intra-court appeal
15
, vide order dated 6
th
November, 2012.
Appellants then filed a special leave petition
16
before this Court,
challenging the Division Bench’s order. The same was disposed of
vide order dated 1
st
January, 2014 with a direction to the Single
Judge of the High Court to commence hearing of the writ petition
within 1 (one) week of production of the order and adjudicate the
same expeditiously, preferably within 2 (two) months of the date of
commencement of hearing . Status quo in respect of the subject
land was directed to be maintained. However, the writ petition
remained pending on the file of the High Court until the year 2022.
15
D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) 1294/2012
16
SLP (Civil) No. 37292/2012
6
i. On 9
th
May 2023, the Single Judge quashed the
notification/declaration/notice issued under the LA Act, observing
that the appellants had not been given an effective and proper
opportunity of hearing by the LAO. It was further observed that no
date of hearing had been fixed by the LAO and instead, the LAO
had decided to straight away forward its report under Section 5A to
the State Government. The Single Judge also observed that the LAO
had failed to consider the substantive objections raised by the
appellants before the LAO and failed to forward the entire record to
the State Government, as a result of which the State Government
did not have the complete or relevant material before taking a
decision for issuance of declaration under Section 6, LA Act.
j. Intra-court appeal came to be carried challenging the Single Judge’s
order allowing the writ petition. The Division Bench, vide the
impugned judgment, held that in writ jurisdiction, the court is only
concerned with the decision-making process and not the final
decision itself, and observed that the Single Judge had examined
the LAO’s report as if it were sitting in appeal. The Division Bench
held that once the LAO submitted its report stating that the
objections were rejected on the ground that the land was being
acquired for a public purpose, the same should be treated as a
sufficient decision on his part, particularly since the appellants had
failed to file a rejoinder on the date fixed by the LAO. As the
appellants had failed to pursue their objections between 9
th
April,
7
2012 and 18
th
May, 2012, they could not be permitted to challenge
subsequent actions of the authorities under the LA Act. Accordingly,
the Division Bench reversed the judgment of the Single Judge and
directed the JMRCL to take possession of the subject land.
Additionally, in light of several trees having grown on the subject
land, the Division Bench also directed that the said trees be
transplanted and regrown at appropriate sites earmarked by the
JDA and the Forest Department; also, the JMRCL was directed to
undertake additional plantation by growing twice the number of
trees which were to be relocated from the subject land.
k. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench has given rise to
these appeals.
l. In course of pendency of the present proceedings, this Court was
informed that the LAO on 7
th
May 2026 has passed an award in
relation to the acquired lands and owing to the appellants’
purported refusal to accept the amount of compensation, the same
has been deposited before the competent court under Section 11 of
the LA Act.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THIS COURT
5. We have heard learned senior counsel Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr. Shyam
Divan and Mr. Abhay Kumar Bhandari appearing for the appellants, as
well as Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General and other learned
counsel appearing for the respondents.
8
6. Appellants’ contentions are summarized hereinbelow:
a. No personal hearing was granted to the appellants as required under
Section 5A of the LA Act. The LAO had not given any next date of
hearing in its order dated 9
th
April, 2012 and instead abruptly took
up the matter on 18
th
May, 2012. Section 5A of the LA Act casts a
positive duty on the LAO to provide a personal hearing. Since the
LAO acts in a quasi-judicial capacity under Section 5A, hearing was
all the more required.
b. The LAO failed to apply its mind to the objections raised by the
appellants and merely copy pasted the entire reply of the JMRC in
its report. Such report did not contain any recommendation, and the
objections of the appellants and the reply of the JMRCL were simply
summarized with the explicit conclusion that “objections received
are not being considered”.
c. Section 5A of the LA Act contemplates that after hearing the
objections of the landowners, the LAO is required to make further
inquiry. However, in the present case, no such inquiry was
conducted.
d. A landowner is entitled in law to place all materials for convincing
the LAO that his land is not suitable and that there are other more
suitable parcels of land for the concerned project. Appellants had
pointed out the suitability of alternate lands such as those belonging
to Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment
9
Corporation Limited
17
, Indian Oil Corporation Limited
18
, Stone Mart,
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited, JDA and Rajasthan Housing Board for
acquisition, but such objection was never considered.
e. Objection as to ecological impact was also raised referring to the
need to fell several trees on the subject land, which was not
considered.
f. The LAO was required to give reasons as to why a particular land
should or should not be acquired, which is lacking.
g. Since neither the entire record, nor the objections of the appellants
were placed before the State Government, the declaration under
Section 6(1) of the LA Act was issued without application of mind.
The use of the expression “required or likely to be required” in the
declaration issued under Section 6(1) shows that the State
Government was not sure of how much land is actually needed to
be acquired.
h. Respondents have failed to show any urgency in acquiring the
subject land. Till date there is no final approved Detailed Project
Report
19
and since the metro line has now been extended to 41 km,
with the new terminal point of the metro being 12 km away from
the subject land, there is no immediate requirement to acquire the
17
RIICO
18
IOCL
19
DPR
10
subject land and the metro car depot can easily be shifted anywhere
across the metro line.
i. In the DPR of 2020, it was mentioned that the land earmarked for
the metro car depot had land which was more than the actual
requirement and that such extra land would be used for property
development and commercial renting. Usage of the subject land for
property development or commercial renting does not qualify as
“public purpose” under the LA Act. The subject land is a highly
fertile, multi crop low lying agricultural land with several trees, and
is, as such, an ecologically sensitive land.
7. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Kamal Trading v. State of
West Bengal
20
, Farid Ahmed vs. Municipal Corporation of
Ahmedabad
21
, Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal
22
,
Gojer Brothers Private Limited v. State of West Bengal
23
,
Surinder Singh Brar & Ors. v. Union of India
24
, Women
Education Trust v. State of Haryana
25
, Shyam Nandan Prasad v.
State of Bihar
26
and State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan
27
to support
the appellants’ contentions that the Single Judge was justified in
interfering with the acquisition proceedings, while the Division Bench
was unjustified in interfering with the Single Judge’s judgment.
20
(2012) 2 SCC 25
21
(1976) 3 SCC 719
22
(2017) 11 SCC 601
23
(2013) 16 SCC 660
24
(2013) 1 SCC 403
25
(2013) 8 SCC 99
26
(1993) 4 SCC 255
27
(1976) 2 SCC 895
11
8. Per contra, the respondents contended:
a. Under Section 5A of the LA Act, the LAO does not act as a court or
as a quasi-judicial authority and, thus, no detailed order is required
to be passed either accepting or rejecting the objections raised. The
only requirement is to prepare a report containing recommendations
on the objections of the landowners. Further, the recommendations
of the LAO are not binding on the State Government.
b. The LAO’s report recorded the detailed objections of the appellants
and the responses of the JMRCL and considered the overall public
purpose of the project to recommend acquisition of the subject land.
c. The LAO provided an opportunity of hearing a s well as an
opportunity to submit rejoinder. However, the appellants did not avail
the opportunity. They were wilfully absent on 9
th
April 2012 and, as
such, it cannot be said that an opportunity of hearing was not granted
to the appellants. Since the LAO is not a court or a quasi-judicial
authority, it is not required to issue any separate notice of hearing to
the appellants.
d. The State Government independently applied its mind to the LAO’s
report and, as such, all the requirements for issuing a declaration
under Section 6(1) of the LA Act stood fulfilled.
e. The lands of RIICO and IOCL as suggested by the appellants cannot
be utilized for the construction of the metro car depot. The land
belonging to RIICO has been utilized for the purpose of developing
an Exhibition cum Convention Centre in accordance with th e State
12
Government’s policy, on a public private partnership basis, while the
land belonging to IOCL has a crude pipeline pumping station on the
said land, and as such, this land is being utilized to pump crude
petroleum from the Mathura pipeline to the Panipat refinery. The
other lands were not considered suitable and such decision is not
justiciable.
f. Based on the drone survey conducted under the directions of this
Court vide order dated 15
th
May 2026, it is evident that the subject
land is mostly vacant and the trees are planted on a small part of the
land. The impugned judgment has issued directions with respect to
plantation of trees which may be uprooted on account of construction
of the metro car depot. The acquisition proceedings cannot be
quashed on account of uprooting trees on a small area of the subject
land.
9. Respondents relied on the decisions in Aircraft Employees Housing
Co-op Society Ltd. v. Secretary, Rural Development
28
, Rambhai
Lakhabai Bhakt v. State of Gujarat
29
, Jayantilal Amratlal
Shodhan v F.N. Rana
30
, Sam Hiring Co. v. A.R. Bhujbal
31
, HUDA
v. Abhishek Goyal
32
, and National Highways Authority of India
v. Madhukar Kumar
33
in support of their contentions that the
28
(1996) 11 SCC 475
29
(1995) 3 SCC 752
30
AIR 1964 SC 648
31
(1996) 8 SCC 18
32
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2991
33
(2022) 14 SCC 661
13
impugned judgment being well -considered and well-reasoned needs
no interference.
Analysis
10. The first question that arises for consideration is, whether there has
been a colourable compliance/substantial non-compliance of the
mandate of Section 5A of the LA Act by the LAO, if not a flagrant
violation, or, whether there has been substantial compliance of such
mandate?
11. Since the answer to the first question lies at the heart of the
controversy before us, it would be apposite to reproduce Section 5A
of the LA Act hereunder:
5A. Hearing of objections. - (1) Any person interested in any land
which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being
needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company
may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the
notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the
locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the
Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an
opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorized by
him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such
objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks
necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been
notified under section 4, sub-section (1), or make different reports
in respect of different parcels of such land, to the appropriate
Government, containing his recommendations on the objections,
together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the
decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate
Government on the objections shall be final.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be
interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in
compensation if the land were acquired under this Act.
(emphasis ours)
12. The marginal note of Section 5A is an indicator of what is
contemplated by the provision. A plain reading of sub-section (1)
14
gives a right to a landowner, aggrieved by the proposal of acquisition
of his land to object in writing, and sub-section (2) of Section 5A
leaves little room for doubt that an opportunity of hearing has to be
given. It is the command of the statute, which the Collector has to
obey faithfully.
13. However, before we proceed further, the multiple precedents cited
on either side need to be noticed.
14. We shall first advert to the precedents relied on by Mr. Rohatgi, not
in the order they were cited, but in the order of their age for a better
appreciation of how the law on the point has evolved.
15. In V.K. Kangan (supra), this Court was called upon to consider
Section 5A, LA Act. After observing that all laws are mandatory since
they impose duties and command obedience from them within the
purview of such laws, this Court indicated the factors dependant
whereupon determination as to whether a provision is mandatory or
directory could be made. The relevant passage reads:
10. In determining the question whether a provision is mandatory or
directory, one must look into the subject -matter and consider the
importance of the provision disregarded and the relation of that provision
to the general object intended to be secured. No d oubt, all laws are
mandatory in the sense they impose the duty to obey on those who come
within its purview. But it does not follow that every departure from it shall
taint the proceedings with a fatal blemish. The determination of the
question whether a provision is mandatory or directory would, in the
ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law-maker. And that has
to be gathered not only from the phraseology of the provision but also by
considering its nature, its design and the consequences whic h would
follow from construing it in one way or the other. We see no reason why
the rule should receive a permissible interpretation instead of a pre-
emptory construction. As we said, the rule was enacted for the purpose
of enabling the Deputy Commissioner (Land Acquisition Collector) to have
all the relevant materials before him for coming to a conclusion to be
15
incorporated in the report to be sent to the Government in order to enable
the Government to make the proper decision. …
16. Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad (supra) is a precedent for the
proposition that Section 5A of the LA Act does not rest on a person’s
demand for a personal hearing. The mandatory nature of the
provision is captured in the following words:
24. We are clearly of opinion that Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act
is applicable in the matter of acquisition of land in this case and since no
personal hearing had been given to the appellants by the Commissioner
with regard to their written objections the order of acquisition and the
resultant confirmation order of the State Government with respect to the
land of the appellants are invalid under the law and the same are
quashed. It should be pointed out, it is not a case of failure of the Rules
of natural justice as such as appeared to be the only concern of the High
Court and also of the city civil court. It is a case of absolute non-
compliance with a mandatory provision under Section 5 -A of the Land
Acquisition Act which is clearly applicable in the matter of acquisition
under the Bombay Act.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Rohatgi)
17. To the same effect is the decision in Shyam Nandan Prasad (supra),
where compliance of provisions of Section 5A being mandatory was
held to be beyond dispute. This Court held that affording of
opportunity of being heard to the objector is a must, since Section
5A embodies a just and wholesome principle that a per son whose
property is being, or is intended to be, acquired should have the
occasion to persuade the authorities concerned that his property be
not touched for acquisition.
18. Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. (supra) is eloquent in laying down the law
that the proceedings under the LA Act are based on the principle of
eminent domain and Section 5A is the only protection available to a
16
person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is a minimal
safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from arbitrary
acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that
the important ingredient, namely, “public purpose” is absent in the
proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. The LA Act being
an expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly
construed.
19. In Surinder Singh Brar (supra), this Court reiterated that hearing
contemplated by Section 5A has to be an effective hearing by holding,
inter alia, as follows:
84. What needs to be emphasised is that hearing required to be given
under Section 5-A(2) to a person who is sought to be deprived of his land
and who has filed objections under Section 5-A(1) must be effective and
not an empty formality. The Collector who is enjoined with the task of
hearing the objectors has the freedom of making further enquiry as he
may think necessary. In either eventuality, he has to make report in
respect of the land notified under Section 4(1) or make different reports
in respect of different parcels of such land to the appropriate Government
containing his recommendations on the objections and submit the same
to the appropriate Government along with the record of proceedings held
by him for the latter’s decision. The appropriate Government is obliged to
consider the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and then record
its satisfaction that the particular land is needed for a public purpose. This
exercise culminates into making a declaration that the land is needed for
a public purpose and the declaration is to be signed by a Secretary to the
Government or some other officer duly authorised to certify its orders.
The formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for a public purpose
and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue of a declaration under
Section 6(1). Any violation of the substantive right of the landowners
and/or other interested persons to file objections or denial of opportunity
of personal hearing to the objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made
by the Collector and the decision taken by the appropriate Government
on such recommendations. The recommendations made by the Collector
without duly considering the objections filed under Section 5-A(1) and
submissions made at the hearing given under Section 5-A(2) or failure of
the appropriate Government to take objective decision on such objections
in the light of the recommendations made by the Collector will denude
the decision of the appropriate Government of statutory finality. To put it
differently, the satisfaction recorded by the appropriate Government that
the particular land is needed for a public purpose and the declaration
17
made under Section 6(1) will be devoid of legal sanctity if statutorily
engrafted procedural safeguards are not adhered to by the authorities
concerned or there is violation of the principles of natural justice. The
cases before us are illustrative of flagrant violation of the mandate of
Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1). Therefore, the second question is answered in
the affirmative.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Rohatgi)
20. This Court in Women’s Education Trust (supra) surveyed earlier
precedents and culled out the principles emerging therefrom. Such
principles are:
5.1. The rule of audi alteram partem engrained in the scheme of Section
5-A of the Act ensures that before depriving any person of his land by
compulsory acquisition, an effective opportunity must be given to him to
contest the decision taken by the State Government/competent authority
to acquire the particular parcel of land.
5.2. Any person interested in the land, which has been notified under
Section 4(1) of the Act, can file objections under Section 5-A(1) and show
that the purpose specified in the notification is really not a public purpose
or that in the guise of acquiring the land for a public purpose the
appropriate Government wants to confer benefit upon private persons or
that the decision of the appropriate Government is arbitrary or is vitiated
due to mala fides.
5.3. In response to the notice issued by the Land Acquisition Collector
under Section 5-A(2) of the Act, the objector can make all possible
endeavours to convince the Land Acquisition Collector that the acquisition
is not for a public purpose specified in the notification issued under
Section 4(1); that his land is not suitable for the particular purpose; that
other more suitable parcels of land are available, which can be utilised for
execution of the particular project or scheme.
5.4. The Land Acquisition Collector is duty-bound to objectively consider
the arguments advanced by the objector and make recommendations,
duly supported by brief reasons, as to why the particular piece of land
should or should not be acquired and whether the plea put forward by the
objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made
by the Land Acquisition Collector should reflect objective application of
mind to the entire record including the objections filed by the interested
persons.
5.5. The Land Acquisition Collector is required to submit his report and
the recommendations to the State Government along with the record of
proceedings to enable the latter to take final call on the desirability,
propriety and justification for the acquisition of the particular parcel(s) of
land.
5.6. The declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act can be issued only if
the appropriate Government, on an objective application of mind to the
objections filed by the interested persons including the landowners and
the report of the Land Acquisition Collector, is satisfied that the land is
18
needed for the particular purpose specified in the notification issued under
Section 4(1) of the Act.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Rohatgi)
Thereafter, this Court expressed lament in the following words:
6. It is unfortunate that despite repeated judicial pronouncements, the
executive authorities entrusted with the task of acquiring private land for
any specified public purposes have time and again exhibited total lack of
seriousness in the performance of their duties under the statute. Often
they do not comply with the mandate of Section 5-A of the Act, which is
sine qua non for making a valid declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act.
This batch of appeals is illustrative of the malady that has afflicted the
State authorities who are keen to acquire private lands in the name of
planned development of various urban areas, but do not bother to comply
with the relevant statutory provisions and the rules of natural justice.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Rohatgi)
21. The relevant passage from Gojer Bros. (P) Ltd. (supra) is
reproduced below to comprehend the reason which persuaded this
Court to interfere. It reads:
22. … Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed
serious error by approving the acquisition proceedings ignoring that the
report was prepared in clear violation of mandate of Section 5-A and the
State Government mechanically accepted the report leading to the issue
of declaration issued under Section 6(1). In the original and
supplementary objections filed by it, the appellant had claimed that the
entire exercise of acquisition was vitiated due to mala fides and colourable
exercise of power. The history of litigation between the parties was also
cited by the appellant to substantiate its plea that the acquisition
proceedings were initiated only after the management of the School lost
legal battle up to this Court. It was also pleaded that the acquisition was
meant to bypass the direction given by this Court to the management of
the School to hand over the possession of the School. Unfortunately, the
Land Acquisition Collector did not deal with any of the objections and
summarily rejected the same as if compliance with Section 5-A(2) was an
empty formality. The State Government also did not apply mind and
mechanically approved the one-line recommendation made by the Land
Acquisition Collector.
21. In our view, non-consideration of the objections filed under Section
5-A(1) has resulted in denial of effective opportunity of hearing to the
appellant. The manner in which the Joint Secretary to the Government
approved the recommendation made by the Land Acquisition Collector
favouring acquisition of the property is reflective of total non-application
of mind by the competent authority to the recommenda tion made by the
Land Acquisition Collector and the report prepared by him.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Rohatgi)
19
22. In Kedar Nath Yadav (supra), this Court upon consideration of the
relevant facts and circumstances noticed that individual hearing
notices were not served on all the objecting landowners and that the
same have been rejected without assigning any clear reasons or
application of mind. The report of the Collector was held not to be a
valid report in the eye of the law. The Court also held that the State
Government mechanically accepted the same without application of
mind independently before issuing the notification under Section 6 of
the LA Act declaring that the lands are required for establishment of
an automobile industry. Eventually, the acquisition proceedings were
invalidated.
23. It would now be useful to look into the precedents cited by Mr. Mehta,
as per their dates of origin.
24. Mr. Mehta cited Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan (supra) for the
proposition that the nature of proceedings under Section 5A of the LA
Act are of an administrative nature and the Collector is not required
to arrive at a decision but merely submit the report to the
Government with record of proceedings and recommendations.
Portion of the decision relied on reads as follows:
20. … Again the Collector is not required to arrive at any decision. He has
to submit the case for the decision of the appropriate Government
together with the record of the proceedings, held by him and a report
containing his recommendations, on the objections. Prima facie, such a
report would be an administrative report, relying upon which the
Government makes its decision under Section 6 whether or not to notify
the land for acquisition. The decision that any particular land is needed
for a public purpose is an administrative decision and it is for the purpose
20
of arriving at that decision that the Act requires that certain inquiries be
made. It is true that the Collector is required to follow the procedure
prescribed and to give an opportunity to the objector of being heard in
person or by a pleader. It is, however, open as Section 5A expressly
provides to the Collector to make an independent inquiry, apart from the
enquiry on the objections submitted. It cannot in the circumstances be
said that the inquiry is a judicial or a quasi-judicial inquiry. …
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Mehta)
25. Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt (supra) was cited where this Court
declined to grant relief considering the landowner’s conduct. This
Court held as follows:
6. Notice in the present case did indicate that the petitioner was at liberty
to file his objections within 30 days from the date of the publication of the
notice and in case he wished to and at the time when he filed the
objections, he was also asked to appear either in person or through
authorised representative or advocate and he would be heard on his
objections. Admittedly, the petitioner had not appeared, either in person
or through advocate but had chosen to file his objections through post. It
would be obvious he did not intend to avail the benefit of hearing while
submitting objections. If it were a case that he personally appeared and
filed objections and requested for hearing, but for one reason or other he
was not heard, then time should be granted and perhaps it may be
requested to be adjourned to a next short date to be heard. That would
be a different circumstance to consider i.e. whether failure to give such a
date for hearing violates Section 5-A(2). The petitioner having chosen to
send the objections through post and when the notice does indicate that
he was to appear either in person or through advocate or authorised
representative along with objections but failed, then there would be no
need to give any further date of hearing.
7. Right of hearing is mandatory under Section 5 -A(2) and the Land
Acquisition Officer is enjoined to give the opportunity of hearing to the
owner or person known to be interested in the land. The ratio laid down
by this Court in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar also referred by
Shri Divan, is unexceptional and has to be complied with. Accordingly, the
Land Acquisition Officer has not taken it lightly or casually in issuing the
notice but the parties had not chosen to appear either in person or
through counsel. No fault could be laid at the door of Land Acquisition
Officer for not giving opportunity of hearing.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Mehta)
26. This Court in Sam Hiring Co. (supra) declared that the Land
Acquisition Officer exercises power under Section 5 -A as an
21
administrative authority; he is not a judicial authority or a quasi-
judicial authority. The LA Act requires that the Land Acquisition
Officer should consider the objections and, if asked, to give an
opportunity of hearing. However, it was found in the facts of the case
before the Court that opportunity of hearing was given and the
objections raised were considered. The principle of natural justice
was, thus, held to have been complied with. Mr. Mehta laid stress on
the ruling that the Land Acquisition Officer was not required to
elaborately deal with each of the objections and submit the report.
27. The decision in Aircraft Employees’ Housing Coop. Society Ltd.
(supra) is along similar lines as Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt (supra).
One of the questions arising for decision was whether the failure to
give opportunity of hearing to the counsel for the respondent vitiated
the inquiry under Section 5A. This Court held that the relevant high
court had not correctly interpreted the legal position. It was noted
that the respondent was given opportunity thrice to file his objections
and at his instance, the case was posted for hearing on 30
th
November, 1981 on which date neither the respondent nor his
counsel was present. Under such circumstances, it was held that the
respondent having failed to present himself either in person or
through counsel on 30
th
November, 1981, the omission to give a right
of hearing to him does not vitiate enquiry under Section 5-A; on the
other hand, it was the respondent who denied himself of the
opportunity of being heard. This Court, therefore, concluded that the
22
enquiry under Section 5-A is not vitiated by error of law and,
consequently, the declaration under Section 6 is also not vitiated by
any error of law.
28. In National Highway Authority of India (supra), this Court held
that unless provided in the statute, there is no general duty to give
reasons when an administrative action is taken and the Court may
not strike down administrative action for the mere reason that no
reasons are to be found recorded. Relevant paragraphs from such
decision read as follows:
69. We would hold that as noticed by the Bench of three Judges in
Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. [Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. v. Shibban Lal Saxena,
(1975) 2 SCC 818 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 460], there is no general duty, when
an administrative decision is taken, to give reasons. A statute may,
however, explicitly provide that the executive authority must provide
reasons and it must be recorded in writing. A case in point is the first
proviso to Rule 8 of the Rules itself. The desirability of a general duty, in
the case of administrative action to support decisions with reason, is open
to question. One of the most important reason is, the burden it would put
on the administration.
70. It is apposite, at this juncture, to notice that administrative decisions
are made in a wide spectrum of situations and contexts. The executive
power of the Union and States are provided in Articles 73 and 162 of the
Constitution of India, respectively. Undoubtedly, in India, every State
action must be fair, failing which, it will fall foul of the mandate of Article
14. It is, at this juncture, we may also notice that the duty to give
reasons, would arise even in the case of administrative action, where legal
rights are at stake and the administrative action adversely affects legal
rights. There may be something in the nature or the context, under which,
the administrative action is taken, which may necessitate the authority
being forthcoming with rational reasons. There are other decisions, which
essentially belong more to the realm of executive policy-making, which
ordinarily may not require the furnishing of reasons.
***
73. The Constitution does not contemplate any public authority,
exercising power with caprice or without any rationale. But here again, in
the absence of the duty to record reasons, the Court is not to be clothed
with power to strike down administrative action for the mere reason that
no reasons are to be found recorded. In certain situations, the reason for
a particular decision, may be gleaned from the pleadings of the authority,
when the matter is tested in a court. From the materials, including the
file notings, which are made available, the court may conclude that there
23
were reasons and the action was not illegal or arbitrary. From admitted
facts, the court may conclude that there was sufficient justification, and
the mere absence of reasons, would not be sufficient to invalidate the
action of the public authority. Thus, reasons may, in certain situations,
have to be recorded in the order. In other contexts, it would suffice that
the reasons are to be found in the files. The court may, when there is no
duty to record reasons, support an administrative decision, with reference
to the pleadings aided by materials.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Mehta)
29. Reliance has also been placed upon a recent decision of this Court in
Haryana Urban Development Authority (supra) in which the
Court interpreted the different stages present in Section 5A as well
as the different roles which are accorded by the section to the LAO
and the State Government. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced
below:
13. It would be pertinent to understand the object that Section 5A of the
1894 Act seeks to fulfil. A plain reading of the provision indicates that it
codifies the fundamental safeguard of audi altrem partem. Landowners
have the opportunity to demonstrate that the acquisition is against public
purpose or marred by mala fides. In the event the landowner presents a
cogent case, the appropriate government may exempt such land from
acquisition. By enabling landowners to put forward their perspective and
elucidate their remonstrances, Section 5A envisions a modus of
deliberation and consultation, which must therefore be construed to be
mandatory, akin to a right. [Women's Education Trust v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 8 SCC 99, para 1]
14. Objections under Section 5A of the 1894 Act most often proceed in
four distinct stages:
i. The filing stage : Landowners can file objections within thirty days of
the notification issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act; [Section 5A (1),
1894 Act]
ii. The hearing stage : The Collector must provide an oral hearing to the
objecting landowners, either in person or through a pleader/authorized
representative; [NOIDA v. Darshan Lal Bora, 2024 INS 508]
iii. The recommendation stage : The Collector—after hearing objections
and upon further inquiry—makes a report to the appropriate government
containing their recommendations; and
iv. The decision stage : The appropriate government considers the
Collector's report and takes a final decision on the objections.
15. Reverting to the case in hand, although the Respondents have
averred that their right under Section 5A has been infringed, however,
they have failed to substantiate such claim. Onus was on the Respondents
24
to identify any fault in the procedure adopted by the State, which we find
tracks closely with the aforementioned four-stage process. When the
Section 4 notification was issued on 16.03.1999, objections were invited
from the landowners. These objections were duly heard, and a report was
prepared by the Collector. Subsequently, the State Government
constituted a High-Powered Committee, and based on its findings and
opinion, the Government ultimately took a final decision to acquire the
Respondents' land. Section 5A mandates a procedure, not a particular
outcome. The landowners in this case were thus certainly guaranteed a
hearing and consideration, not relief.
16. Regarding the fourth stage, the Respondents have specifically argued
that since the Collector had recommended the release of their land and
the State Government deviated from such recommendation without any
valid and sufficient reasons, its decision is bad in law. In effect, their claim
seems to be that the Collector's recommendation ought to be final and
binding on the Government. However, such an interpretation is at odds
with the bare text of Section 5A, ... .
17. The choice of different terminologies for the role of the Collector and
the role of the Government makes it evident that the Legislature intended
different roles for each of them. The Collector has no power to “decide”
the case and can only give “recommendations” to the Government. It is
the Government which is the ultimate arbiter for determining whether the
land is to be released or not. No other authority can dictate the outcome
of Section 5A proceedings–neither the Collector nor the landowner [Shri
Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 298, para 5].
While the Collector's report can form the “basis” of such decision, the
Government is free to independently evaluate and take a final decision,
of course, based on relevant and lawful considerations.
18. It is therefore patently clear that the State Government possessed
the ability to disagree with the Collector's report and decide a different
course. This is not to say that the Government's decision cannot be
challenged or is beyond judicial review. Indeed, had the Respondents
demonstrated that the decision was arbitrary or passed without due
application of mind, then they could have been victorious in their
challenge. However, the Respondents have not placed any evidence on
record to lay such foundation. On the contrary, the State
Government/Appellant have demonstrated that their decision was not
whimsical but was predicated on the findings of a High -Powered
Committee, which comprised qualified individuals, like officers of the
Indian Administrative Services, officials working with the Appellant,
experts from the Town Planning Department and the Department of
Agriculture, etc. Having duly inspected the subject land, this Committee
deduced that the building structures on the land were unauthorized and
not in conformity with the Development Plan. Relying on this analysis, the
Government deviated from the Collector's recommendation and
proceeded with the acquisition. We are of the considered view that such
departure was made in public interest, with due application of mind and
was fully justified.
(emphasis supplied by Mr. Mehta)
25
30. Though not cited by the parties, we may profitably take note of two
other decisions of this Court of fairly recent origin in land acquisition
cases.
31. In Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah
34
, the
appellant-Corporation contended that Section 352 of the K olkata
Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, when read together with Section
363 thereof providing for compensation, constituted a complete code
for acquisition of property and, therefore, vested in the Corporation
the power to compulsorily acquire land for the purposes
contemplated therein. Examining the scheme of the KMC Act, this
Court was unable to accept the contention. It was held that Section
352 merely empowers the Municipal Commissioner to identify or
earmark land required for specified municipal purposes, such as the
opening, widening or improvement of streets and other public works.
The provision, however, does not confer any power of compulsory
acquisition. In arriving at such conclusion, the Court also took note
of Section 537 of the KMC Act, which expressly contemplates that
where immovable property cannot be acquired by agreement,
proceedings may be initiated under the LA Act. The existence of such
a provision, according to the Court, clearly indicated that the power
of compulsory acquisition was not traceable to Section 352 itself. The
submission that such power could be implied from Section 352 was,
therefore, rejected. Proceeding further, the Court observed that even
34
(2024) 10 SCC 533
26
assuming Section 352 were to be construed as authorising
compulsory deprivation of property, the provision was conspicuously
silent as regards the procedure to be followed before such deprivation
could take place. Although Section 363 made provision for payment
of compensation, the mere existence of a compensatory mechanism
could not cure the constitutional infirmity arising from the absence of
a fair, just and reasonable procedure. A person cannot be deprived
of his property save by authority of law, and such authority must
prescribe and adhere to a constitutionally compliant procedure. It
was in this context that the Court elaborated upon the various
constituent protections embedded in the constitutional guarantee
against arbitrary deprivation of property and identified a set of sub-
rights that must ordinarily accompany any valid process of
compulsory acquisition. Among these was the right of the affected
person to receive notice and to be afforded a meaningful opportunity
of being heard before being deprived of property.
32. The set of sub-rights that this Court identified are:
30. What then are these sub -rights or strands of this swadeshi
constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub-
rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are:
(i) The duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to
acquire his property — the right to notice,
(ii) The duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition
— the right to be heard,
(iii) The duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to
acquire — the right to a reasoned decision,
(iv) The duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is
for public purpose — the duty to acquire only for public
purpose,
(v) The duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate — the right
of restitution or fair compensation,
27
(vi) The duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition
efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings
— the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and
(vii) The final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting —
the right of conclusion.
33. Insofar as the right to notice, the right to be heard, the right to a
reasoned decision and the duty of the State to acquire only for a
public purpose, we quote the instructive passage below (without the
footnotes):
33.1. The Right to notice
33.1.1. A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State
intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a
linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a).
The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The
notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the
statutes reflect this right.
33.1.2. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 11 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and
Section 3-A of the National Highways Act, 1956 are examples of such
statutory incorporation of the right to notice before initiation of the
land acquisition proceedings.
33.1.3. In a large number of decisions, our constitutional courts
have independently recognised the right to notice before any process
of acquisition is commenced.
33.2. The Right to be heard
33.2.1. Following the right to a meaningful and effective prior notice
of acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his
objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This
right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be
meaningful and not a sham.
33.2.2. Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(1)
of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act,
1952, Section 15 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and
Section 3-C of the National Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory
embodiments of this right.
33.2.3. Judicial opinions recognising the importance of this right are
far too many to reproduce. Suffice it to say that that the enquiry in
which a landholder would raise his objection is not a mere formality.
28
33.3. The Right to a reasoned decision
33.3.1. That the authorities have heard and considered the
objections is evidenced only through a reasoned order. It is
incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and
communicate the same to the objector.
33.3.2. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 3(2) of
the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952,
Section 19 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 a nd
Section 3-D of the National Highways Act, 1956, are the statutory
incorporations of this principle.
33.3.3. Highlighting the importance of the declaration of the decision
to acquire, the Courts have held that the declaration is mandatory,
failing which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to have effect.
33.4. The Duty to acquire only for public purpose
33.4.1. That the acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent
and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to
acquire. This requirement, which conditions the purpose of
acquisition must stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals
of a welfare State and distributive justice.
33.4.2. Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections
3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Sections 2(1), 11(1), 15(1)(b) and 19(1) of the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Section 3-A(1) of the
National Highways Act, 1956 depict the statutory incorporation of the
public purpose requirement of compulsory acquisition.
33.4.3. The decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject to
judicial review and the Court will examine and determine whether
the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the Court arrives at a
conclusion that that there is no public purpose involved in the
acquisition, the entire process can be set aside. This Court has time
and again reiterated the importance of the underlying objective of
acquisition of land by the State to be for a public purpose.
34. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Darshan Lal
Bohra
35
is the other decision. In that case, a notification under
Section 4 of the LA Act was issued in respect of certain lands in the
same village. The respondent-landowner objected to the proposed
35
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1690
29
acquisition under Section 5A on the ground that his land constituted
an abadi area and, therefore, deserved exclusion from the acquisition
proceedings. Similar objections were also filed by other landowners
and fell for consideration before the LAO. The notices fixing the dates
of hearing were sought to be communicated to the interested persons
through the Gram Pradhan. However, the hearing had to be deferred
repeatedly since only a few landowners appeared. Eventually, after
granting what was described as a final opportunity for hearing, the
LAO rejected the objections and submitted his report under Section
5A(2) of the LA Act, whereupon a declaration under Section 6 came
to be issued. Challenging the acquisition proceedings, the landowners
approached the relevant high court by way of writ petitions. The High
Court allowed the challenge, holding that the mandate of Section 5A
had not been duly complied with. Although notices were stated to
have been issued through the Gram Pradhan, there was no material
on record to establish that the landowners had, in fact, be en
effectively informed of the dates fixed for hearing. On such reasoning,
the declaration issued under Section 6 was quashed and the
authorities were directed to afford a fresh opportunity of hearing to
the landowners. Aggrieved thereby, the acquiring authority carried
the matter in appeal before this Court.
35. In allowing the appeal preferred by the acquiring authority, this Court
undertook a detailed examination of the alleged non-compliance with
the mandate of Section 5A as well as the reasoning adopted by the
30
high court. This Court invoked the presumption embodied in Section
114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 insofar as the issue of service
of notices was concerned and held that once the authorities had
demonstrated that notices were duly issued, the burden shifted to
the landowners to establish that the mode of communication adopted
was ineffective.
36. We consider it proper to quote a few paragraphs from the said
decision dealing with the aspect of service of notice of hearing
hereinbelow:
38. It is timeworn law that the person who submits objections under
Section 5A must be accorded an opportunity of personal hearing.
Such a hearing must precede with an advance notice served upon
the objector. As a necessary corollary, the failure to serve the notice
would be sufficient to infer the defiance of Section 5A of the 1894
Act. Consequently, the acquisition process would be liable to be
hammered.
39. However, it is essentially a question of fact as to whether or not
an advance notice of hearing has been served upon an “objector”.
Where the Collector has taken a specific stand that notices were duly
served upon the persons concerned and the record of service of such
notices has been duly maintained, the statutory presumption
inscribed under Section 114 of the Evidence Act shall be drawn, which
inter alia provides that the Court may presume the existence of facts,
including “that judicial and official acts have been regularly
performed”.
40. The rule of statutory presumption is a well-rooted principle in
Common Law and founded upon the dictum ‘omnia praesumuntur
rite esse acta’, namely, that the act can be presumed to have been
rightly and regularly done. The Court would presume that the official
act was done rightly and effectively and the burden to prove contrary
lies on the party who disputes the sanctity of such act. The High
Court unfortunately misconstrued this legal proposition while
observing that there should be a presumption regarding notices not
being served on the respondents.
41. The onus thus lay on the landowners to demonstrate that the
issuance or service of notices was inefficacious. The official record
suggests that several landowners were present at the hearings on
25.04.2014 and 05.06.2014, and the proceedings were further
postponed at their request. Had the notices not been served, these
landowners could not have been aware of the date of hearing or
attended such proceedings. Given their presence at the time of
31
hearings, it can be safely inferred that they were duly served. The
burden to prove otherwise (sic, lay) on the respondents, which they
have failed to discharge.
42. In the absence of any allegation of mala fide exercise of power,
the vague and overly broad claim of being unaware of the acquisition
proceedings taken by the respondents during the course of hearing
cannot be countenanced. This is especially noteworthy that only a
small fraction of landowners have contested the acquisition, with
nearly 90% not objecting to the proceedings. We are thus satisfied
that the proceedings carried out under Section 5A ought not to have
been set at nought on this ground.
43. We may also hasten to add that even where the notices were not
served as per the procedure known in law, that by itself may not
vitiate the acquisition proceedings unless it is shown that severe
prejudice was caused to the landowners. This Court, in Tej Kaur v.
State of Punjab, viewed that even when there was no material to
show that the landowner was heard, it would not invalidate the
acquisition proceedings because the objections were duly
considered:
“6. It is true that Section 5-A inquiry is an important stage in
the acquisition proceedings and a person who is aware of
Section 4(1) notification can raise objection to the effect that
his property is not required for acquisition and he is also at
liberty to raise the contention that the property is not required
for any public purpose. It is also true, that the objector must
also be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and any
violation of the procedure prescribed under Section 5-A would
seriously prejudice the rights of the owner of the property
whose land is sought to be acquired. In the instant case,
however, it is pertinent to note that the Collector had,
in fact, conducted the Section 5-A inquiry, though there
is no material on record to show that the appellants in
Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998 were heard in person. The
facts and circumstances of Civil Appeal No. 66 of 1998
clearly show that the objection raised by the appellants
was considered and partly allowed by the Collector.
About eight acres of land was sought to be acquired from the
appellants as per the notification, but out of that, an extent of
six acres was excluded from acquisition and only one-and-a-
half acres of land was actually acquired by the authorities.
This would clearly show that the objection filed by the
appellants was considered by the Collector.”
(emphasis supplied in original)
44. Although Taj Kaur (supra) does support the NOIDA/State with
reference to the issue of compliance of Section 5A in its letter and
spirit, we need not dependent (sic, depend) on the said reasoning in
the instant case in view of overwhelming material on record which
shows that the procedure as mandated by Section 5A has been
substantially complied with. We shall now accordingly, analyse
whether the Collector had disposed of the objections fairly and
effectively?
(emphasis ours)
32
37. Then, this Court proceeded to examine the question whether the
Collector had fairly and effectively dealt with the objections under
Section 5A. The relevant high court had taken exception to the
manner in which the objections were disposed of, observing that they
had been grouped together instead of being considered individually.
Reversing this finding, this Court held that the grouping of objections
was both logical and permissible, having regard to the fact that the
objections pertained to the same parcel of land and raised
substantially similar grounds. Interference on this count would have
been justified only if it were demonstrated that the consolidation of
objections was arbitrary or had compromised the fairness of the
adjudicatory process. This Court also observed that the absence of a
formal order dealing with a few objections would not, in the peculiar
facts of the case, render the acquisition proceedings vulnerable.
38. The principles emerging from the aforesaid precedents may now be
crystallised, with expression of our opinion wherever divergent .
Irrefragably, the provision in Section 5A of the LA Act engrafts a very
valuable right for every landowner, who is faced with the immediate
prospect of acquisition of his land. The provision is a mandatory
safeguard, not only on its own terms, but because of the object and
purpose that it seeks to achieve. Since a landowner is sought to be
deprived of his property, the legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to
afford to such landowner the only opportunity in the entire process
33
to object to the necessity of the acquisition as well as the suitability
of the land proposed to be acquired. By raising a valid defence, the
landowner can show cause why his land should not be acquired and
the proposal dropped. While filing of an objection in writing is enabled
by Section 5A(1), the landowner is assured of a hearing pertaining to
his said objection under Section 5A(2). He need not ask for it; it is
the duty of the Collector to give notice of hearing. Though in Sam
Hiring Co. (supra) this Court has held that it is for the landowner to
ask for a hearing, we respectfully disagree with such a view not only
based on the terms of Section 5A but also in light of the dictum of
the 3-Judge Bench in Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad (supra). The
settled legal position is that once objections under Section 5A(1) are
filed, it is for the Collector to fix a date of hearing and intimate the
landowner. Absent conclusive proof of service of notice of hearing,
the Court in New Okhla Industrial Development Authority
(supra) presumed service
36
. That is, however, a debatable
proposition and has to cautiously applied having regard to the facts
of each case. The Collector, though does not act in a judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity but as an administrative authority, is bound to
consider the objections upon granting an opportunity of hearing
before embarking on a further inquiry, if need be; and bearing in
mind all the relevant factors , he is required to furnish his
recommendation, for or against the proposal, to the Government for
36
official acts are regularly performed
34
its consideration. In furnishing the recommendation, the Collector is
neither required to give a decision nor write a detailed order. All that
is required of him is a consideration of each objection followed by
brief reasons in support of its acceptability/non-acceptability and a
recommendation as to the desirability of dropping the
proceedings/proceeding for issuance of a declaration under Section
6. Though not bound by the recommendation of the Collector, the
Government has to consider the records, apply its mind and,
thereafter, form an opinion as to the imperative for issuing a
declaration under Section 6. Since affectation of a landowner’s
property right is involved and the LA Act being an expropriatory
legislation, the Courts are cautioned to strictly construe the
provisions thereof.
39. A landowner’s right to object is, however, neither unqualified nor
unlimited. The right is subject to the overarching principle that the
State’s power of eminent domain for public purpose should prevail.
It is circumscribed by the purpose of the provision itself, which is to
enable the Collector to consider the objections and opine whether the
acquisition should proceed. The objection(s) of the landowner must,
therefore, be germane to the purpose of acquisition. He cannot
dictate which land the State should acquire. Land acquisition can be
resisted only on grounds such as no real public purpose is involved,
or that the land is not suitable for the purpose for which it is intended
to be acquired, or that the proceedings smack of legal and/or factual
35
malice (attracting colourable exercise of power, excessive
acquisition, etc.) or that the acquisition is likely to cause
disproportionate hardship. Beyond this, the right does not seem to
extend.
40. To sum up, the right to lodge an objection followed by the right to
hearing and a right to fair and proper consideration of the
objection(s) raised under Section 5A flow directly from the twin
principles of natural justice and due process. Denial of either limb
could vitiate the acquisition.
41. Drawing guidance from the above, let us now answer the question
noted at the beginning of this segment.
42. In the present case, the LAO, being under a statutory obligation to
afford the objector an opportunity of being heard, either in person or
through an authorised representative or a pleader , posted the
objections on several dates to take the proceedings ahead. Appellants
were present on all but one of the days. So runs the case set up by
the appellants: after their absence on 9
th
April, 2012, the LAO
proceeded to make his report dated 18
th
May, 2012 without fixing a
further date for hearing in the interregnum.
43. From the factual narrative, it is clear that the appellants apart from
attending proceedings before the LAO on various dates had received
the reply of the JMRCL on 18
th
August, 2011 and 9
th
March, 2012 but
defaulted in filing their rejoinder and in causing appearance on 9
th
April, 2012. We accept Mr. Rohatgi’s submission that 9
th
April, 2012
36
was the date fixed for filing rejoinder and it was not the designated
hearing date. The submission that no notice fixing a further date of
hearing was ever served upon the appellants is also not seriously
disputed by Mr. Mehta. However, nothing much turns on it.
44. What assumes significance in the present context is that not only did
the appellants not file their rejoinder or appear on 9
th
April 2012, they
did not make any effort to find out the outcome of the proceedings
following their non-appearance till the order and the report of the
LAO came to be made/forwarded on 18
th
May, 2012.
45. In our view, the trajectory of the proceedings does not evince any
intention of the LAO to deprive the appellants of an opportunity of
hearing. Had it been so, and considering the importance of the metro
rail project and the urgency to complete it, we wonder whether the
proceedings at the stage of Section 5A would have lingered on for
nearly a year. In any event, the material available on record does
not, in any manner, indicate a flagrant violation of the statutory
mandate in Section 5A to afford hearing to the appellants.
46. Next, turning to the question of colourable compliance or substantial
non-compliance of the Section 5A mandate on the LAO to extend
opportunity of hearing, we need to test the worth of Mr. Rohatgi’s
submission that the LAO should have put the appellants on notice for
a hearing of their objections post 9
th
April, 2012; more so, because
the proceedings at the stage of consideration of the objections were
pending before it right from 28
th
June, 2011.
37
47. Issuance of initial notice and subsequent appearances of the
appellant before the LAO, on more than a couple of dates, are not
disputed. Even otherwise, it is not the appellants’ case that they
attended before the LAO on every date pursuant to receipt of any
notice. The orders recorded in the proceedings by the LAO indicate
the next date, of which the appellants must be presumed to have
knowledge upon appearing before it. And, this is how the appellants
went on appearing before the LAO without insisting for separate
notices of hearing being served prior to each fixed date.
48. In such view, what does not escape our attention is the lack of
diligence and interest on the part of the appellants after 9
th
March,
2012, when they received the second set of reply of the JMRCL. It is
well-known that rights carry responsibilities. When the rejoinder was
not ready by 9
th
April, 2012, and had the appellants not intended to
file a rejoinder but still wished to attend a personal hearing, they
ought to have communicated the same to the LAO immediately or
soon after receiving the reply on 9
th
March, 2012. Neither did the
appellants seek an adjournment nor requested to be heard on the
objections alone, without the rejoinder.
49. A party might choose not to prosecute its own objection; but the LAO
cannot be expected to compel such party to prosecute its objection.
Absence of the appellants on 9
th
April, 2012 coupled with their
subsequent silence, appears to have goaded the LAO to proceed on
38
the footing that the appellants had nothing further to submit beyond
the written objections. We see no infirmity in the approach.
50. On the face of such lack of diligence and interest of the appellants,
there is no basis to hold that there was colourable compliance or
substantial non-compliance of Section 5A, so much so that the very
essence and purpose of the right of hearing was defeated. In the
absence of any request from the appellants, we find no breach of
duty by the LAO and, consequently , no violation of the right of
hearing.
51. A subsidiary submission on behalf of the appellants was that the law
did not require the LAO to invite any reply/rejoinder and it should
have proceeded to hear the appellants and conduct the requisite
inquiry before making its recommendation. We fail to see merit in
this argument. Though the LAO was not presiding over a court but
acting as an administrative authority, calling for the reply of the
JMRCL and rejoinder from the appellants was merely to ensure a
wholesome consideration of the objections raised. In our view, this is
a facet of fair procedure and cannot be seen as a vice for being
faulted.
52. Why did the appellants abstain from appearing before the LAO on 9
th
April, 2012 has not been explained. In a judicial setting, a court would
have ordinarily granted one more opportunity as ex parte
adjudication is generally disfavoured. However, the LAO is not a
court. It is an administrative authority, whose role is limited to
39
considering objections and making a recommendation. T he absence
of trappings of a court is material. Even assuming that granting one
more date would have caused no prejudice, the failure to do so is at
best an indiscretion. A mere error of discretion or indiscretion is not
malice in law. Such non -exercise of discretion cannot, without
anything more, be elevated to a breach of Section 5A resulting in
violation of the statutory right of hearing and vitiating the acquisition.
The non-grant of another opportunity, by itself, in the facts of this
case cannot be urged as a ground to invalidate the acquisition.
53. Bearing in mind the decisions in Rambhai Lakhabai Bhakt (supra)
and Aircraft Employees’ Housing Coop. Society Ltd. (supra), the
submission of Mr. Rohatgi that a further date should have been fixed
does not impress us.
54. We, thus, hold that the mandate of Section 5A was not ignored by
the LAO and that there was substantial compliance; also, no fault can
be attributed to the LAO in forwarding the recommendation without
the appellants being personally heard. Appellants, by their own
conduct, abandoned their right of hearing; they cannot now be heard
to complain of denial of hearing when they themselves failed to avail
the same.
55. Having held so, we need to now focus on two connected questions:
(a) whether the appellants’ objections were duly considered by the
LAO and the State Government?
and
40
(b) whether the objections raised by the appellants have substance?
Notwithstanding our finding and conclusion in respect of the question
immediately dealt, the appellants could still succeed in their appeals
if any one of the two questions formulated above is answered in their
favour.
56. We begin our consideration with a preliminary observation as to the
need for formulation of question (b). Having noticed in the previous
segment as to what the precedents hold requiring protection of the
right of a landowner, what are the grounds on which an acquisition
could validly be resisted, and what is the nature of consideration that
should follow culminating in the recommendation, yet, we have not
been referred to any direct authority where this Court proceeded to
invalidate acquisition proceedings solely on the ground of breach of
the right of hearing contemplated by Section 5A, notwithstanding
that a preliminary scrutiny of the landowners’ objections by the Court
revealed the same being without substance. The reason is not far to
seek. Law is settled that rules of natural justice and the right to be
heard are required to be followed for doing substantial justice and
not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any
change in the decision of the case on merits. We may also add that
in order to assess the consequence of any lapse, this Court would be
remiss in not extending its inquiry to the substance of the objections
presented by the landowners. Incidentally, in New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (supra), this Court proceeded to examine
41
the merits of the objections raised by the landowners considering that
some of them had claimed non-service of notice; and having found
the same to lack merit allowed the appeal of the acquiring body.
57. The two questions [ (a) and (b) ] are now proposed to be considered
together bearing in mind what Mr. Rohatgi has argued.
58. On 18
th
May, 2012, the LAO considered the objections of the
appellants and the reply of JMRCL, rejected the objections primarily
on the ground of public purpose, and forwarded his report to the
State Government in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 5A of the LA
Act.
59. The State Government, upon considering the report and after
undertaking the requisite inter-departmental consultation, as is
borne out from the relevant note-sheets forming part of the record,
concurred with the recommendation of the LAO and proceeded to
issue the declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act.
60. Did the LAO and the State Government arrive at their respective
conclusions after due consideration of the appellants' objections and
upon recording reasons in support thereof? During the course of
hearing, Mr. Rohatgi strenuously contended that neither the report
submitted by the LAO nor the decision ultimately taken by the State
Government discloses adequate application of mind to the objections
raised and, therefore, both stand vitiated.
42
61. We have perused the report of the LAO . Though it is in Hindi, the
English version thereof has been made available by the appellants.
Parties are ad idem that the translation of the Hindi version is correct.
62. Our attention has first been drawn by Mr. Rohatgi to the concluding
part of the order/report of the LAO where it was recorded that the
“objections are not being considered”. According to Mr. Rohatgi, the
failure to consider the objections is palpable and brazen and no
amount of argument is necessary to establish that this itself
constitutes a ground for the Court to set the acquisition proceedings
at naught.
63. Looking to the order/report of the LAO, at first blush, the argument
is attractive. However, the semantics behind the phrase “objections
are not being considered” in the LAO’s order cannot be pressed into
service by equating it to a situation that the objections themselves
were not taken on record and/or bore no application of mind by the
LAO, so as to vitiate the principles of natural justice itself and the
duty to consider and record reasons. Having read the entire report,
what is discerned is that the LAO noticed, in seriatim, the objections
raised by the appellants and recorded the response furnished by the
JMRCL thereto. The LAO thereafter concluded that the JMRCL requires
the subject land for the metro rail project and having regard to the
public purpose the project seeks to cater, the objections are not being
considered. What “objections are not being considered” could be
taken to mean is that the objections were considered on their own
43
footing but they did not merit acceptance, and not that they have not
been looked into or considered. Had it been so, a detailed report
setting out the rival versions together with recording of an opinion
that the subject land is indeed required for a public purpose would
not have been prepared for consideration by the State Government
for issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the LA Act. The
argument, thus, stands rejected.
64. The next argument advanced by Mr. Rohatgi was that there are no
reasons in the order/report of the LAO evincing minimal consideration
of each and every objection. While it is true that the reasoning of the
LAO is brief and each objection has not been dealt with individually,
we do not consider the argument worthy of acceptance. Reference to
the contents of the report has been made hereinbefore. While the
report of the LAO could have been more elaborate, it must be
remembered that a report under Section 5A need not be a speaking
order in the judicial sense. The requirement is to form an opinion and
recommend. Brevity of reasons is not synonymous with absence of
reasons. Read as a whole, it cannot be said that the LAO failed to
advert to the objections or that it failed or omitted to record the
requisite opinion. The brevity of the report does not vitiate it. The
purpose of Section 5A, which is to aid the State Government in taking
a final decision, stands fulfilled in this case.
65. Notwithstanding what we have held above and independently of the
procedural challenge, we also consider it appropriate to assess
44
whether the objections raised by the appellants before the LAO and
reiterated before us are of such substance that the acquisition itself
ought to be annulled. We, however, make it clear that this exercise
is being undertaken to allay any apprehension of injustice, even on
the appellants’ own case that their objections had substance which
should have been accepted.
66. Assuming, arguendo, that each objection was to be examined
individually and on its own merit and not in a rolled up manner, we
are unable to persuade ourselves to hold that any of them furnishes
a legally sustainable ground for dropping the acquisition qua the
subject land, the reasons for which are adumbrated hereafter as
regards each objection raised by the appellants.
67. The first objection pertains to the publication of the notification under
Section 4. Appellants contended that a prior newspaper publication
did not precede the issuance of the notification. We find no merit in
this objection.
68. The report of the LAO itself records that publication was made in the
Dainik Bhaskar and Rajasthan Patrika on 28
th
May, 2011, preceded
by a gazette notification on 27
th
May, 2011. Thereafter, under section
4(1) of the LA Act, for the purpose of intimation of the general public,
a public notice was issued on 7
th
July, 2011.
45
69. We may profitably refer to the decision in Narinderjit Singh v.
State of U.P.
37
, wherein the law in this regard has been exposited
as follows:
2. The law as settled by this court is that such a notice under second
part of Section 4(1) is mandatory and unless that notice is given in
accordance with the provisions contained therein the entire
acquisition proceedings are vitiated. We may refer in this connection
to Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1967 SC 1074 : (1967) 1
SCR 120]. In that case this court pointed out that the object is to
give intimation to a person whose land is sought to be acquired of
the intention of the officer to enter the land. Under Section 4(2) such
a notice is a necessary condition for the exercise of the power of
entry. Non-compliance with that condition makes the entry unlawful.
In State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib [ CA 2361 of 1968, dated
August 11, 1972 : (1973) 3 SCC 196] no notices as required by
Section 4(1) of the Act were published in the locality till after the
lapse of about 10 weeks. The question for consideration was whether
the notification issued under Section 4 was a valid one. This court
held that in the case of a notification under Section 4 the law has
prescribed that in addition to publication of a notice in the Official
Gazette the Collector must also give publicity of the substance of the
notification in the concerned locality. Unless both these conditions
are satisfied Section 4 of the Act cannot be said to have been
complied with. The purpose behind such a notice was that interested
persons should know that the land is being acquired so as to prefer
any objections under Section 5-A which confers a valuable right.
(emphasis ours)
70. More importantly, the appellants never pleaded that publication in
the newspapers was altogether omitted. Their grievance is confined
to the assertion that such publication ought to have preceded the
issuance of the notification. We are unable to find any statutory
prescription in the LA Act mandating prior newspaper publication as
a condition precedent to the issuance of a notification under Section
4. Law only mandates both the requirements to be satisfied, but does
not predicate the validity of the notification under Section 4 upon the
37
(1973) 1 SCC 157
46
prior publication in the locality. In the absence of any such legal
requirement, the objection as to lack of prior publication in the
newspapers falters.
71. Besides, admittedly, the appellants had due notice of the acquisition
proceedings and filed detailed objections under Section 5A within the
prescribed time limit. No prejudice, therefore, can be said to have
been engendered on this count.
72. The second objection relates to the existence of a genuine public
purpose. We find the objection devoid of any substance. The
jurisprudential compass is furnished by the decision in Daulat Singh
Surana v. Collector (LA)
38
, wherefrom the relevant paragraphs are
extracted hereinbelow:
65. Broadly speaking the expression “public purpose” would however
include a purpose in which the general interest of the community as
opposed to the particular interest of the individuals is directly and
virtually concerned.
***
68. The right of eminent domain is the right of the State to reassert
either temporarily or permanently its dominion over any piece of land
on account of public exigency and for public good.
***
73. Public purpose cannot and should not be precisely defined and
its scope and ambit be limited as far as acquisition of land for the
public purpose is concerned. Public purpose is not static. It also
changes with the passage of time, needs and requirements of the
community. Broadly speaking, public purpose means the general
interest of the community as opposed to the interest of an individual.
***
76. Public purpose for which the premises was required in the instant
case was not questioned seriously. As a matter of fact, the State of
West Bengal has been using the premises in question for more than
six decades for the safety and security of the people by having an
office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Security Control).
Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the
premises was not required by the State Government for the interest
38
(2007) 1 SCC 641
47
and welfare of the people or there was no public purpose involved in
acquiring the premises in question.
73. The present acquisition is for construction of a depot constituting
Phase II of the Jaipur Metro Rail Project. A depot is not an ancillary
commercial venture, but an indispensable operational component
without which the metro system itself cannot function. Appellants
sought to contend that the project has undergone changes over the
years and that the DPR has not attained finality. Such circumstances
may, at its best, evince an evolving infrastructural planning, but they
do not detract from the essential public purpose undergirding the
acquisition.
74. Appellants next contended that no proper survey preceded the
issuance of the notification under Section 4, LA Act. This contention
falters when tested against the plain statutory text of Section 4 of
the LA Act. Section 4 reads:
4. Publication of preliminary notification and power of officers
thereupon. –
(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government the land in
any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose
or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in
the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that
locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and
the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such
notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public
notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of
the notification).
(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or
specially authorized by such Government in this behalf, and for his
servants and workman, to enter upon and survey and take levels of
any land in such locality;
to dig or bore in the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is
adapted for such purpose;
48
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the
intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting
trenches; and,
where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels
taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear
away any part of any standing crops, fence or jungle:
***
(emphasis ours)
75. The objection grounded on the alleged absence of a prior survey
before issuance of the notification under Section 4 is equally
untenable. The phraseology of Section 4 itself furnishes the answer.
Sub-section (2) opens with the expression "Thereupon", thereby
making it lawful for the authorised officers to enter upon the land,
survey it, take levels, dig or bore into the sub-soil and undertake such
other acts as may be necessary to ascertain whether the land is
adapted for the intended public purpose. The use of the expression
"Thereupon" unequivocally signifies that the statutory power to
survey kicks in, upon the publication of the notification under Section
4(1). The legislative sequence is thus clear: publication of the
notification first; exercise of the powers of entry and survey
thereafter. The statute does not posit the conduct of a comprehensive
survey as a condition precedent to the issuance of the notification
under Section 4. To read such a requirement into the provision would
amount to supplying words which the legislature has consciously
omitted. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the
acquisition process is flawed merely because no survey preceded the
notification.
49
76. Appellants have then urged that several alternative parcels of land,
including lands belonging to RIICO, IOCL, JDA and other
governmental agencies, were available and that the respondents
ought to have utilised such lands instead of acquiring the appellants’
property. We are apprehensive that such a contention traverses a
domain where judicial restraint is particularly warranted. Judicial
intervention in this regard essentially has to yield to a host of
technical and operational considerations, subsuming ali gnment
connectivity, maintenance logistics, future expansion, inter alia. This
position was pithily encapsulated in State of Punjab v. Gurdial
Singh
39
as follows:
8. First, what are the facts? A grain market was the public purpose
for which government wanted land to be acquired. Perfectly valid.
Which land was to be taken? This power to select is left to the
responsible discretion of government under the Act, subject to
Articles 14, 19 and 31 (then). The court is handcuffed in this
jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a
foolish choice. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the
executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court lock-jawed
save where power has been polluted by oblique ends or is otherwise
void on well established grounds. The constitutional balance cannot
be upset.
(emphasis ours)
77. This position was reiterated in Sooraram Pratap Reddy v.
Collector
40
as follows:
119. In our judgment, in deciding whether acquisition is for “public
purpose” or not, prima facie, the Government is the best judge.
Normally, in such matters, a writ court will not interfere by
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government.
39
(1980) 2 SCC 471
40
(2008) 9 SCC 552
50
78. Quite recently, a similar view was expressed by a co-ordinate Bench
while dismissing a special leave petition
41
vide order dated 8
th
June,
2022. It was held there that public interest being of paramount
consideration, the National Highway Authority is the best judge to
decide which land is to be acquired and which is not to be acquired
for the purpose of construction of highways.
79. Thus, the determination of the particular parcel of land required for
acquisition falls squarely within the domain of the expert planning
authorities exercising powers of eminent domain.
80. Keeping the position of law aside for a moment, the learned Solicitor
for the respondents has submitted that the lands belonging to IOCL
and RIICO, which according to the appellants could have been
acquired instead, are being utilised for other purposes, as noticed in
the summary of his submission above. Appellants have contended
that such a stand has been advanced for the first time before this
Court and, therefore, lacks credibility. We are unable to agree. A
perusal of the record reveals that even before the High Court, in the
reply filed to the writ petition, the respondents had specifically
averred that the lands of IOCL and RIICO were earmarked and being
utilised for purposes other than the project in question. The
contention, therefore, cannot be said to be an afterthought.
41
SLP (C) Nos. 9314-15/2022 [G. Narsing Rao (Died) Thr. LRS. V. The National Highways
Authority of India & anr.]
51
81. Although the respondents have justified why the suggested
alternative lands were not suited nor available for the intended
purpose, merely because another parcel of land may appear feasible
to the landowner, the same cannot be pressed into service by the
landowner, to persuade the Court to substitute its own opinion for
that of the authorities entrusted with the planning and execution of
the project.
82. Appellants have next contended that the extent of land sought to be
acquired is far in excess of what is actually required for the project.
According to them, while the DPR of April, 2011 envisaged a
requirement of 19.79 hectares of land, the DPR of June 20 11
enhanced such requirement to 27 hectares without any discernible
basis. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept this contention.
Appellants themselves acknowledge that the revised DPR assessed
the land requirement at 27 hectares. The determination of the extent
of land necessary for execution of a public project is essentially a
matter falling within the province of the concerned aut horities
possessing the requisite technical expertise. It is not for the Court to
substitute its view for that of such authorities in the absence of
manifest arbitrariness, mala fides, or demonstrable error. Besides,
the respondents, upon receipt of the report of the LAO under Section
5A, again reconsidered the requirement of the land requirement and
came to the same conclusion. The record does not disclose any
material placed by the appellants to substantiate the assertion that
52
the enhanced requirement was unwarranted or excessive. The LAO
has also rightly noticed the absence of any supporting material in this
regard. The objection, therefore, remains a bare assertion
unsupported by evidence and does not merit acceptance.
83. We now come to the final objection, which is premised upon the
alleged disturbance to the extant tree cover and the ecological
character of land being altered . Such contention is equally
misconceived. This issue stands authoritatively settled by a decision
in Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority
42
,
wherein it was held that the determination of whether a parcel
constitutes “forest” or “deemed forest” must essentially be informed
by the original character of the land and the relevant statutory
planning framework governing it. The relevant passages fro m the
said decision are extracted hereunder:
45. The law does not contemplate or conceive, nor can it afford such
instability in the planning processes. While the principle laid down in
T.N. Godavarman (supra) continues to operate with full force and
ensures that forest land is not diverted without compliance with the
statutory safeguards, the determination of whether a particular
parcel of land answers the description of “forest” or “deemed forest”
must necessarily take into account the original nature of the land and
the planning framework within which the land is situated and sought
to be utilised.
46. The position would naturally be different when the Master Plan
itself records the existence of forest land or specifically identifies land
containing a substantial number of trees. Where the Master Plan, at
the time of its formation, records that a particular parcel of land
contains tree cover or indicates the existence of a significant number
of trees, such land may well fall within the understanding of deemed
forest. However, where the Master Plan does not record the existence
of trees or describe the land as containing forest cover, the
subsequent emergence or proliferation of vegetation over a period of
42
2026 SCC OnLine SC 45
53
time cannot, by itself, bring the land within the ambit of deemed
forest so as to unsettle the planning framework already put in place.
***
48. This interpretation preserves the principle laid down in T.N.
Godavarman (supra) while at the same time ensuring that the
concept of deemed forest is not applied in a manner that destabilises
statutory planning instruments conceived for the holistic
development of urban area because of changes which came about or
are brought about in an unplanned, unregulated, unconceived
manner, whether natural or otherwise.
84. The afore-stated exposition squarely countervails the objection urged
by the appellants. Photographs, still and drone, submitted by the
JMRCL, evinces existence of trees or vegetation upon a portion of the
subject land but mere existence thereof cannot ipso facto elevate it
to the status of a “forest” or “deemed forest”. Unless the statutory
planning instruments, including the applicable Master Plan, recognise
the land as forest land or specifically record the existence of such
ecological features at the time of their inception, the subsequent
proliferation of vegetation cannot be permitted to subvert or
invalidate the expert planning framework. To hold otherwise would
enable unanticipated and fortuitous changes in vegetation to
frustrate duly sanctioned public projects and import uncertainty into
the planning process.
85. In the present case, there is no material to establish that the subject
land has ever been identified as a forest land in any of the revenue
records or in any Master Plan or in any statutory record. Any removal
of trees, if required, would necessarily rema in subject to the
applicable statutory permissions and compensatory measures under
the relevant environmental and forest laws. The apprehension qua
54
the loss of tree cover is bereft of any substance, since the competent
authority has already directed that any such cover affected by the
execution of the project shall be duly compensated by undertaking
compensatory plantation at designated alternative sites in
accordance with the applicable statutory and environmental norms.
86. Therefore, upon an independent consideration of the objections on
their own merits, we find no compelling ground that would justify de-
acquisition of the land or warrant interference with the decision taken
by the LAO and the State Government.
87. Questions (a) and (b) are, thus, answered against the appellants.
CONCLUSION
88. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Single Judge erred in
interdicting the acquisition proceedings on the sole ground of non-
compliance with Section 5A, LA Act. The successful attempt of the
appellants to invalidate the acquisition proceedings and thereby
derail a metro rail project by raising an unmeritorious claim did not,
however, escape the attention of the Division Bench which rightly
interfered and set aside the judgment of the Single Judge. We see no
reason to cause interference therewith.
89. In the result, the appeals stand dismissed. Interim order stands
vacated forthwith.
55
90. Appellants shall, however, be at liberty to pursue their remedy in
accordance with law if they wish to have the award set aside and
enhanced compensation awarded.
………………………………J .
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
……….……….……………………J .
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA )
New Delhi;
July 13, 2026.
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