As per case facts, a long-standing land dispute between family branches led to Appellant No. 4 lodging an FIR in 2020, followed by a charge-sheet. Subsequently, the respondent-complainant filed a ...
2026 INSC 806
Crl. A. @ SLP (Crl.) No.5592/2026 Page 1 of 19
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 5592 OF 2026)
ANITA MAURYA AND
OTHERS
… APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
AND ANOTHER
… RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal assails the judgment and
order dated 21.01.2026 (“impugned order”)
passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad (“High Court”) in Application under
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Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”) No. 756 of 2026,
whereby the High Court declined to quash
Complaint Case No. 909 of 2021 (Shankar
Maurya v. Sunil Maurya and Others) and the
summoning order dated 10.02.2025 passed
therein by the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, First, Court No. 12, Jaunpur.
3. The appellants are eight in number, all
belonging to one family and residents of Village
Sohni, Police Station Kerakat, District Jaunpur,
Uttar Pradesh. Appellants 1 to 3, namely Anita
Maurya, Meera Maurya and Saroja Devi, are the
women of the household, and Appellants 4 to 8
are Sunil Maurya, Rajesh Maurya, Ajay Maurya,
Anil Maurya and Neeraj Maurya. Respondent
No. 1 is the State of Uttar Pradesh, and
Respondent No. 2, Shankar Maurya, is the
complainant.
4. It is not in dispute that a land dispute has long
subsisted between the two branches of the
family. That the substratum of the dispute is
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civil is borne out by the record as the
respondent-complainant had himself earlier
invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court by
way of Public Interest Litigation No. 674 of 2021,
which came to be disposed of on 28.07.2021
with a direction to the Sub -Divisional
Magistrate, Kerakat, to decid e his
representation.
5. On 09.11.2020, the day of the incident that
forms the subject matter of the present
proceedings, Appellant No. 4, Sunil Maurya,
lodged First Information Report No. 405 of 2020
(“FIR”) at Police Station Kerakat against the
respondent-complainant and three others
under Sections 188, 323, 504, 506 and 342 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), alleging
assault and wrongful confinement. The
investigation culminated in chargesheet dated
30.11.2020 against those named, and the trial
arising therefrom has since commenced.
6. It was thereafter, in the year 2021, that the
respondent-complainant instituted Complaint
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Case No. 909 of 2021 (“complaint”) in respect of
the very same incident of 09.11.2020, levelling
counter-allegations of assault and house -
trespass against the entire appellant-family,
including the three women. The complaint did
not disclose the pre-existing FIR lodged by the
appellants’ side on the day of the incident, or the
charge-sheet dated 30.11.2020 that had
followed upon it.
7. Vide order dated 10.02.2025, the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, First, Court No. 12,
Jaunpur, after recording the statement of the
complainant under Section 200 and the
statements of two witnesses under Section 202
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(“CrPC”), summoned the appellants to face trial.
Appellants 4 to 8 were summoned under
Sections 323, 354 and 452 IPC, and Appellants
1 to 3, the three women, under Sections 323
and 452 IPC.
8. The appellants’ Criminal Revision Application
No. 191 of 2025 was dismissed on 26.11.2025
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by the Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.S, 1
st
(Crimes Against Women), Jaunpur, who
affirmed the summoning order.
9. The appellants then invoked the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528
BNSS. By the impugned order dated
21.01.2026, the High Court declined to quash
the complaint, the summoning order and the
proceedings taking the view that it could not be
said that no offence was made out, that the
contentions urged related to disputed questions
of fact which could not be adjudicated at that
stage, and that the power to quash was to be
exercised only where there was a failure of
justice or an abuse of process. The High Court,
however, granted liberty to the appellants to
seek discharge at the appropriate stage, and
issued consequential directions in regard to
bail. Aggrieved, the appellants are before this
court.
10. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellants
submits that the complaint is, in truth, a
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counterblast to the FIR lodged by the appellants’
side on the very day of the incident and upon
which a charge-sheet had already been filed and
the trial had commenced. It is urged that the
complaint, though founded on the same
incident of 09.11.2020, came to be instituted
only in the year 2021, and that no explanation
was forthcoming for the intervening delay. It is
further pointed out that the complaint had
deliberately suppressed the antecedent FIR and
the charge-sheet, a suppression which,
according to the appellants, pointed to the want
of bona fides.
11. He further submits that the dispute between the
parties is, at its foundation, a civil dispute over
land, in which the entire family, including the
three women, has been arrayed as an
instrument of harassment. The appellants
contend that the summoning order had been
passed mechanically and without the
application of judicial mind, and that the
continuation of the complaint in these
circumstances is nothing but an abuse of the
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process of the court, thereby praying for
quashing of complaint and consequent criminal
proceedings.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent-State and
the respondent-complainant, on the other hand,
submit that the statements recorded under
Sections 200 and 202 of CrPC prima facie
disclose the ingredients of the offences for which
the appellants have been summoned. It is
contended that the existence of a cross-version
does not efface an otherwise triable case, and
that the pendency of the appellants’ own FIR is
a matter of defence to be established at the trial
and not a ground for quashing the complaint
and the proceedings at the threshold.
13. It is further submitted that there are concurrent
findings of the Magistrate, the Revisional Court
and the High Court that a prima facie case is
made out against the appellants, and that at the
stage of summoning the Magistrate is not
required to weigh or evaluate the evidence
meticulously. On this basis it is contended that
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the High Court had rightly declined to quash the
complaint and that the appeal be dismissed.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties
and perused the material on record. The
question that falls for our consideration is
whether the continuation of complaint against
the appellants would amount to an abuse of the
process of the court.
15. The inherent power preserved by Section 482 of
CrPC, now Section 528 of BNSS, is exercisable
to prevent the abuse of the process of any court
and to secure the ends of justice. In State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
1, this Court set out the
illustrative categories in which the power may
be exercised, the relevant paragraph is
reproduced as follows:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we have given the following
1
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
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categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either
to prevent abuse of the process of any court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and suff iciently
channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the
accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non -cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where
there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
16. The power is undoubtedly to be exercised
sparingly, with circumspection, and never to
throttle a legitimate prosecution or to conduct a
mini trial at the threshold. These self-imposed
restraints, however, do not require the court to
shut its eyes to a proceeding that is a manifest
abuse. Where mala fide or an oblique motive is
alleged, the court is not confined to the four
corners of the complaint. In Mahmood Ali v.
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State of U.P.
2, this Court held that in such a
situation the court owes a duty to examine the
complaint with care and a little more closely,
and, where necessary, to read in between the
lines.
17. The same principle was reiterated in
Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P.
3, where it
was observed:
“30. At this stage, we would like to observe
something important. Whenever an accused
comes before the Court invoking either the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly
frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then
in such circumstances the Court owes a duty
to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely. We say so because once the
complainant decides to proceed against the
accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking
personal vengeance, etc., then he would
ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well
drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The
complainant would ensure that the averments
made in the FIR/complaint are such that they
disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it
will not be just enough for the Court to look
2
(2023) 10 SCC 544
3
2023 INSC 683
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into the averments made in the
FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the necessary
ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look
into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and
above the averments and, if need be, with due
care and circumspection try to read in
between the lines. The Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC
or Article 226 of the Constitution need not
restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is
empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as
the materials collected in the course of
investigation. Take for instance the case on
hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over
a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances the registration of
multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby
attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance
out of private or personal grudge as alleged.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. It is equally settled that a dispute essentially
civil in character is not to be permitted to be
clothed as a criminal offence, and that the
criminal process is not a substitute for the
remedies available in law. In G. Sagar Suri v.
State of U.P.
4, this Court cautioned that before
issuing process a criminal court must exercise
4
(2000) 2 SCC 636
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a great deal of caution, and that it is for the
court to see whether a matter essentially of a
civil nature has been given the cloak of a
criminal offence.
19. Delay in setting the criminal law in motion,
when it is deliberate and unexplained, is a
circumstance that may itself justify the
quashing of the proceeding. In Kishan Singh
(Dead) through Legal Representatives v.
Gurpal Singh
5, this Court observed:
“22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging
an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible
explanation for such delay. In the absence of
such an explanation, the delay may be fatal.
The reason for quashing such proceedings
may not be merely that the allegations were
an afterthought or had given a coloured
version of events. In such cases the court
should carefully examine the facts before it for
the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed
to succeed before the civil court may initiate
criminal proceedings just to harass the other
side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior
motive of wreaking vengeance on the other
party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants
should not be permitted to give vent to their
frustrations by cheaply invoking the
jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court
proceedings ought not to be permitted to
degenerate into a weapon of harassment and
persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is
5
(2010) 8 SCC 775
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lodged clearly with a view to spite the other
party because of a private and personal
grudge and to enmesh the other party in long
and arduous criminal proceedings, the court
may take a view that it amounts to an abuse
of the process of law in the facts an d
circumstances of the case.”
20. This principle has been applied by this Court
very recently in Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State
of U.P.
6, where, this Court while setting aside
an order of the same High Court , held that
although civil and criminal remedies may co-
exist upon the same cause of action, there ought
not to be an unreasonable or inordinate gap
between the institution of the two, the time-
factor being an indicator of whether the criminal
proceeding is genuine and bona fide or a mere
pressure tactic, and that the complainant is
obliged to satisfactorily explain the delay. This
Court there expressly approved and applied
Kishan Singh (supra).
21. A complaint that suppresses a pre-existing FIR
lodged by the accused in respect of the same
incident, and that is instituted after such report
6
2026 INSC 619
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has ripened into a charge-sheet, bears the
hallmark of a retaliatory counterblast. In
Anukul Singh v. State of U.P.
7, this Court
quashed the proceedings, holding that the plea
that the case was a retaliatory counter-blast to
the proceedings legitimately initiated by the
accused carried substantial weight, that a
proceeding so maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive falls within categories (1) and (7)
of Bhajan Lal (supra), and that the
suppression of a material antecedent
proceeding is itself indicative of the want of bona
fides.
22. Turning to the facts in the case in hand, the
chronology is not in dispute. The incident is that
of 09.11.2020. On that very day the appellants’
side lodged the FIR, and a charge-sheet followed
on 30.11.2020, upon which the trial has
commenced. The complaint of the respondent,
founded on the identical incident, was
instituted only in the year 2021, and no
explanation has been offered for the intervening
7
2025 INSC 1153
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delay. Such deliberate and unexplained delay,
set against a subsisting antecedent proceeding
on the same facts, is precisely the circumstance
which, in Kishan Singh (supra) and Nazibul
Rahim Khan (supra), was held to point to an
oblique motive rather than to a genuine
grievance.
23. Another aspect which requires consideration is
the matter of suppression. The complaint as
filed by the respondent No.2, did not disclose
the pre-existing FIR or the charge-sheet dated
30.11.2020. When read a little more closely, the
sequence of events assumes significance. The
complainant, whose own side was already facing
a charge-sheeted FIR arising out of the same
occurrence, set the criminal law in motion
afresh against the entire opposing family,
including the three women, over the identical
incident. A proceeding of this character answers
to the description of the retaliatory counterblast
that was deprecated in Anukul Singh Case
(supra).
Crl. A. @ SLP (Crl.) No.5592/2026 Page 17 of 19
24. Lastly, there remains the civil substratum of the
controversy. The dispute between the parties
has, at its root, a long-standing quarrel over
land, agitated by the complainant even by way
of a public interest litigation. To permit a private
complaint, belatedly instituted and suppressing
the earlier FIR, to proceed against an entire
family in these circumstances would be to allow
a matter essentially civil to be pursued through
the criminal process as an instrument of
harassment, a course against which this Court
in G. Sagar Suri case (supra) cautions. The
summoning of the entire family, including the
three women, upon a solitary and belated
version, does not reflect the careful application
of mind by the Magistrate that the issuance of
process demands.
25. The High Court confined itself to the bare
averments of the complaint and treated the
material placed by the appellants as raising only
disputed questions of fact for trial. Where,
however, the indicia of mala fide and abuse of
process appear on the record, the court is not
Crl. A. @ SLP (Crl.) No.5592/2026 Page 18 of 19
merely entitled but obliged to look beyond the
averments and to prevent the perpetuation of
the abuse. Taking the cumulative effect of the
unexplained delay, the suppression of the
antecedent FIR, the counter-blast character of
the complaint and the essentially civil nature of
the dispute, we are of the considered view that
the case falls squarely within categories (1), (5)
and (7) of Bhajan Lal Case (supra), and that
the continuation of the complaint against the
appellants would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of the court.
26. In view of the foregoing discussion, the
impugned order dated 21.01.2026 passed by
the High Court cannot be sustained and is set
aside.
27. The appeal is allowed. Complaint Case No. 909
of 2021, pending on the file of the Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, First, Court No. 12,
Jaunpur, together with the summoning order
dated 10.02.2025 and all proceedings
consequent thereto, stands quashed.
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28. We clarify that nothing in this judgment shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the
merits of First Information Report No. 405 of
2020 or the connected charge-sheet, or on the
civil dispute between the parties, all of which
shall be dealt with on their respective merits in
accordance with law, uninfluenced by this
judgment.
29. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
.……..………..………………..J.
[ SANJAY KAROL ]
.……..………..………………..J.
[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]
NEW DELHI;
JULY 23, 2026.
Legal Notes
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