ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 1 of 18

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment reserved on:10.11.2025

Judgment pronounced on:26 .02.2026

+ ARB. P. 1035/2024

BENETTON INDIA PVT LTD ....Petitioner

Through: Mr. Vinam Gupta, Ms. Pragya Narayan,

Ms. Nabam Yama, Advs.

versus

GINI AND JONY LTD ....Respondent

Through: Ms. Renuka Sahu, Mr. Shivam Singh,

Advs.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH

JUDGMENT

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”), seeking directions for the

appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the

parties arising out of a Distribution Agreement dated 01.08.2014 and

Settlement Agreements dated 29.06.2016, 01.10.2019 and 29.12.2020 due

to the failure of the parties to mutually appoint an Arbitrator within a

period of 30 days.

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 2 of 18

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The petitioner herein, Benetton India Private Limited, incorporated under

the Companies Act, 1956,is a subsidiary of Italy based Benetton Group,

known fashion company in the world and is engaged in a business of

manufacturing, distributing and sale of apparel and accessories in India.

3. The respondent is a company incorporated under Companies Act, 1956

and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution of

textiles apparels and luxury goods.

4. The parties entered into a Distribution Agreement (“DA”) dated

01.08.2014. Under the said DA the petitioner had appointed the

respondent as its distributor to sell and distribute products under the

brand, interalia, United Colors of Benetton and any other brand owned

by the petitioner company through the respondent owned multi brand

retail outlets which were located in different locations across India.

5. In terms of the DA, the petitioner supplied the products and raised

invoices against each supply. As per General Conditions of Sale, as

specified in Clause 10 of Schedule I of the DA, the respondent was bound

to make payments against the invoices raised.

6. The respondent failed to make payments as per the invoices raised,

thereby failing to discharge the liability under the DA to the tune of Rs.

8,97,57,566/- Crores along with the interest rate of 2% per month on the

unpaid amount.

7. The parties, thereafter, agreed to extend the payment deadlines and thus

entered into various Settlement Agreements (“SA”), the details of which

are as follows:

a. SA 1 dated 29.06.2016 for an outstanding amount of Rs. 8,97,57,566/-

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 3 of 18

Crores to the petitioner

b. SA 2 dated 01.10.2019 for an outstanding amount of Rs. 3,91,81,453/-

Crores

c. SA 3 dated 29.12.2020 for an outstanding amount of Rs. 2,70,81,454/-

Crores

8. Despite the repayment schedule as per SA 3, a sum of Rs. 96,21,454/-

Lakhs remained due and payable. In furtherance of the default made by

the respondent, the petitioner issued a demand notice dated 09.02.2024

for the release of outstanding amount of Rs. 96,21,454/- Lakhs.

9. Since the respondent failed to clear the outstanding amount, the petitioner

issued a legal notice dated 14.03.2024, invoking arbitration and called

upon the respondent to mutually appoint an Arbitrator in terms of Clause

No. 10 (j) of the DA. The Clause No. 10 (j) reads as under:

“10. GENERAL PROVISIONS:

….

(j) In the event of any difference, dispute, claim or question

arising out of this Agreement or touching any matter or

thing, hereunder during, the continuance of this Agreement

or upon or after the termination thereof, such difference or

dispute shall be referred to arbitration in New Delhi, to the

arbitration of a sole Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by

the Parties to the difference or dispute who shall be retired

Judge of High Court. In the event the Parties are not

mutually agreeable to such appointment, one arbitrator

shall be nominated by both the Parties and such two (2)

arbitrators shall jointly nominate the third arbitrator whose

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 4 of 18

decision shall be binding on the Parties.This reference shall

be deemed to be a submission to the Arbitration within the

meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and

all the provision of that Act so far as applicable or of any

Act of legislature of the time being in force and passed any

modification thereof shall apply to every reference

hereunder. Any suit, reference or other filing permitted or

required to be made pursuant to the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 in respect of matters arising out of

this agreement shall be instituted only in competent courts

at New Delhi, which are competent courts to hear disputes

arising out of this Agreement and parties specifically agree

to exclude the jurisdiction of any competent court. All

proceedings of arbitration shall take place in English

language and held in New Delhi only. Subject to the

foregoing, the courts at New Delhi shall have jurisdiction.”

10. On 19.04.2024 the respondent paid Rs. 5,00,000/-, however, a sum of Rs.

91,21,454/- Lakhs remained unpaid and parties have failed to mutually

agree upon the appointment an Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration

clause of the DA. Hence, the present petition.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

11. Mr. Vinam Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the

respondent does not dispute either the execution of the DA or the

existence of the arbitration clause contained in Clause No. 10 (j) thereof.

Thus, the petition satisfies the “prima facie” or “first look” test with

regard to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. In view of the

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 5 of 18

doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, he urges that the dispute be referred to

the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator must be permitted to rule upon its own

jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in Sanjiv Prakash v. Seema Kukreja, (2021) 9 SCC 732

12. Learned counsel further places reliance on Vidya Drolia v. Durga

Trading Corpn.,(2021) 2 SCC 1 and reiterates his reliance on Sanjiv

Prakash (Supra), to submit that issues relating to the formation,

existence, validity of the contract, as well as questions of non-

arbitrability, are often intertwined with the merits of the dispute. He

contends that such issues involve disputed questions of fact and law

which fall within the domain of the Arbitrator. Reliance is also placed on

BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India)(P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738 to contend

that the Court may refuse reference to arbitration only in a narrow and

limited category of cases. Where even the slightest doubt exists, the

referral Court ought to lean in favour of reference to arbitration.

13. It is also stated that the Subsequent Agreements (SA I, SA II and SA III)

executed between the parties were confined to restructuring or

determining the schedule of payments and did not supersede or novate the

original DA. According to the petitioner, the payment schedules were

intrinsically linked to and flowed from the DA, the substantive terms of

which continued to bind the parties. The SAs are arrangements only

limited to payments operating within the umbrella of the principal DA,

and consequently, the arbitration clause contained therein continues to

govern the parties. Therefore, it would be misconceived to contend that

the execution of the SAs had the effect of extinguishing or rendering

inoperative the arbitration clause. In support of this submission, reliance

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 6 of 18

is placed on Collegedunia Web Private Limited v. PDM University &

Ors., ARB. P. 244/2020 and Balasore Alloys Ltd. V. Medima LLC,

(2020) 9 SCC 136.

14. He further states that even in a situation where the DA stands terminated,

substituted, or its performance discharged, the arbitration clause survives

for the purpose of adjudicating disputes arising out of or in connection

with the DA. In this regard, reliance is placed on PVR Ltd. v. Imperia

Wishfield (P) Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3947 to submit that an

arbitration clause is separable and survives the termination of the

underlying contract.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

15. Per Contra, Ms. Renuka Sahu, learned counsel for the respondent, at the

outset states that the present petition under Section 11 of the 1996 Act is

not maintainable as there is no arbitration clause to govern the disputes

between the parties. She states that SA I, SA II and SA III are fresh,

distinct and independent contracts, executed after the commercial

relationship between the parties under the DA had come to an end. The

SAs constitute complete and self-contained agreements governing the

rights and obligations of the parties, particularly with respect to payment

obligations and jurisdiction. Accordingly, the terms embodied in the SAs

are materially different and were consciously agreed upon, thereby giving

rise to independent contractual arrangements unconnected with the earlier

DA.

16. She points out that none of the SAs makes any reference to the DA.

Moreover, the said SAs neither incorporate nor preserve the arbitration

clause contained in the DA, nor do they provide that such clause would

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 7 of 18

survive or govern disputes arising thereafter. On the contrary, each of the

SAs contains an express and independent jurisdiction clause conferring

exclusive jurisdiction on specified courts, which are as follows:

SA I: “All disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of Courts at Mumbai.”

SA II: “All disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of Courts at Delhi.”

SA III: “All disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of Courts at Delhi.”

17. She further states that the execution of SAs between the parties amounts

to a novation of the original DA within the meaning of Section 62 of the

Indian Contract Act, 1872, and once a contract is superseded by a

subsequent agreement, the rights and obligations arising under the earlier

contract ceases to operate, and the relationship between the parties is

thereafter governed exclusively by the terms of the new contract, Thus, in

the present case, by virtue of such novation, the earlier DA stands

extinguished and substituted by the new contractual arrangements

embodied in the SAs. Consequently, all terms and stipulations of the

original DA, including the arbitration clause contained therein, stand

extinguished.

18. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in

Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros., AIR (1959) SC 1362

wherein it has been held that if a contract is superseded or novated by a

new agreement, the arbitration clause, being a component of the old

contract, perishes along with it and cannot be invoked for disputes arising

thereafter. The Supreme Court further held that where a contract is

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 8 of 18

repudiated, discharged, or substituted by mutual consent, the arbitration

clause also ceases to have effect. Further she places reliance on

I. Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 10

SCC 535;

II. B.L. Kashyap And Sons Ltd. v. Mist Avenue Private Ltd. (2023)

SCC Online Del 3518;

III. L&T Ltd Vs. IREO Victory Valley Private Limited 2024 SCC

Online Del 2882;

IV. Zhuhai Hansen Technology Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd., Delhi

High Court: (2025) DHC 2490.

19. It is also stated that the parties have consciously and expressly substituted

arbitration with the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts, thereby

establishing a clear and unequivocal intention to exclude arbitration as the

agreed dispute resolution mechanism. The same is evident from the

jurisdiction clauses contained in all three SAs.

20. Learned counsel states that, by mutual consent, the parties have

consciously and expressly substituted the earlier dispute resolution

mechanism from the arbitral mechanism with a stipulation conferring

exclusive jurisdiction upon competent civil courts. This clearly manifests

the intention of the parties to exclude the recourse to arbitration. Reliance

to substantiate this contention is placed on Vidya Drolia v. Durga

Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 and Wellington Associates Ltd. v.

Kirit Mehta, (2000) 4 SCC 272.

21. She also states that Section 11(6A) of the 1996 Act, as interpreted by the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port

Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 limits the scope of examination by the Court at

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 9 of 18

the pre-reference stage to a singular and foundational issue, namely, the

existence of an arbitration agreement. While exercising jurisdiction under

Section 11of the 1996 Act, the Court must confine itself to determining

whether a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement exists between the

parties. In the present case, the operative and governing contract between

the parties is the SA III dated 29.12.2020, which admittedly contains no

arbitration clause. On the contrary, the said Agreement expressly

stipulates that disputes arising there under shall be subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi. In such circumstances, the

statutory condition precedent under Section 11(6A) of the 1996 Act, i.e.,

the existence of an arbitration agreement governing the disputes in

question, is absent. It is, thus, contended that the petition is liable to be

dismissed at the threshold, as the very foundation for reference to

arbitration is lacking. An Arbitrator, cannot assume jurisdiction in the

absence of a valid arbitration agreement, and the power to determine the

existence of such an agreement vests exclusively in the referral Court.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

22. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

on record.

23. The question that falls for consideration is whether a valid arbitration

agreement exists between the parties.

24. Before examining the question in hand, it is important to set out the scope

of Section 11 of the 1996 Act. In Interplay Between Arbitration

Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6

SCC 1, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court categorically held that the scope of

examination at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to a

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 10 of 18

prima facie assessment of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement:

“81. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to

minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral

process. Party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an

Arbitral Tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law.

Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to

have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick,

efficient and effective manner by minimising judicial

interference in the arbitral proceedings. [Food Corpn. of

India v. Indian Council of Arbitration, (2003) 6 SCC 564.]

Parliament enacted Section 5 to minimise the supervisory

role of Courts in the arbitral process to the bare minimum,

and only to the extent “so provided” under the Part I of the

Arbitration Act. In doing so, the legislature did not

altogether exclude the role of Courts or judicial authorities

in arbitral proceedings, but limited it to circumstances

where the support of judicial authorities is required for the

successful implementation and enforcement of the arbitral

process. [Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.,

(2001) 8 SCC 470; P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju,

(2000) 4 SCC 539] The Arbitration Act envisages the role of

Courts to “support arbitration process” [Swiss Timing Ltd.

v. Commonwealth Games 2010 Organising Committee,

(2014) 6 SCC 677 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 642] by providing

necessary aid and assistance when required by law in

certain situations.”

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 11 of 18

25. A similar position was reiterated in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd.v.

Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 and Goqii Technologies

Private Limited v. Sokrati Technologies Private Limited, (2025) 2 SCC

192 where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that the Arbitrator

should be the preferred first authority to look into the questions of

arbitrability and jurisdiction, and the courts at the referral stage should

not get into contested questions involving complex facts.

26. Further, in Sanjiv Prakash (Supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court dealt

with the arbitrability of disputes at the stage of reference. The Hon‟ble

Court categorically held that the issue with respect to the novation of

contract containing arbitration clause cannot be decided by a prima facie

perusal of existence of arbitration clause in contract between the parties.

The relevant paragraphs read as under:

“21. Likewise, in BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd.

[BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC

738 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 352] , another Division Bench of

this Court referred to Vidya Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga

Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549]

and concluded : (BSNL case [BSNL v. Nortel Networks

(India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ)

352] , SCC pp. 765-66, paras 46-47)

“46. The upshot of the judgment in Vidya Drolia

[Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC

1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] is affirmation of the

position of law expounded in Duro Felguera

[DuroFelguera, S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017)

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 12 of 18

9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764] and Mayavati

Trading [Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb

Burman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 441] ,

which continue to hold the field. It must be understood

clearly that Vidya Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga

Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ)

549] has not resurrected the pre-amendment position

on the scope of power as held in SBP & Co. v. Patel

Engg. Ltd. [SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8

SCC 618]

47. It is only in the very limited category of cases,

where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the

claim is ex facie time-barred, or that the dispute is

non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make the

reference. However, if there is even the slightest doubt,

the rule is to refer the disputes to arbitration,

otherwise it would encroach upon what is essentially a

matter to be determined by the tribunal.”

22. Judged by the aforesaid tests, it is obvious that whether

the MoU has been novated by the SHA dated 12-4-1996

requires a detailed consideration of the clauses of the two

agreements, together with the surrounding circumstances in

which these agreements were entered into, and a full

consideration of the law on the subject. None of this can be

done given the limited jurisdiction of a court under Section

11 of the 1996 Act. As has been held in para 148 of Vidya

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 13 of 18

Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2

SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] , detailed arguments on

whether an agreement which contains an arbitration clause

has or has not been novated cannot possibly be decided in

exercise of a limited prima facie review as to whether an

arbitration agreement exists between the parties. Also, this

case does not fall within the category of cases which ousts

arbitration altogether, such as matters which are in rem

proceedings or cases which, without doubt, concern minors,

lunatics or other persons incompetent to contract. There is

nothing vexatious or frivolous in the plea taken by the

appellant. On the contrary, a Section 11 court would refer

the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability

are plainly arguable, or when facts are contested. The court

cannot, at this stage, enter into a mini trial or elaborate

review of the facts and law which would usurp the

jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.

23. The impugned judgment was wholly incorrect in

deciding that the plea of doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz

and reliance on Section 11(6-A) of the 1996 Act, as

expounded in Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera, S.A. v.

Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC

(Civ) 764] and Mayavati Trading [Mayavati Trading (P)

Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb Burman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 : (2019) 4

SCC (Civ) 441] were not applicable to the case in hand.

Apart from going into a detailed consideration of the MoU

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 14 of 18

and the SHA, which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of

the Arbitral Tribunal, the learned Single Judge, while

considering Clause 28 of the SHA to arrive at the finding

that any kind of agreement as detailed in Clause 28.2

between the parties shall stand superseded, does not even

refer to Clause 28.1. No consideration has been given to the

separate and distinct subject-matter of the MoU and the

SHA. Also, Kishorilal Gupta [Union of India v. Kishorilal

Gupta & Bros., (1960) 1 SCR 493 : AIR 1959 SC 1362] and

Damodar Valley Corpn. [Damodar Valley Corpn. v. K.K.

Kar, (1974) 1 SCC 141] are judgments which deal with

novation in the context of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which

had a scheme completely different from the scheme

contained in Section 16 read with Section 11(6-A) of the

1996 Act.

(emphasis supplied)

27. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments delineates the settled and

contemporary position of law governing the scope of jurisdiction under

Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The referral Court, at the pre-reference stage,

is required to undertake only a prima facie examination with respect to

the existence of an arbitration agreement. The legislative mandate,

particularly post the insertion of Section 11(6A) of the 1996 Act, confines

the scrutiny of the Court to ascertaining whether an arbitration agreement

exists between the parties; it does not extend to an in-depth adjudication

of issues touching upon the issue of novation, as relevant in the present

case, of the underlying contract.

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 15 of 18

28. It is well settled in law that questions relating to novation or substitution

of an earlier agreement by any subsequent agreement(s) ordinarily

involve disputed questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.

Such issues are intrinsically connected with the merits of the dispute and

require appreciation of evidence, examination of contractual intent of the

parties, and consideration of surrounding circumstances. These are

matters which fall squarely within the domain of the Arbitrator in view of

the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz. The referral Court, while

exercising powers under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, cannot embark upon

a detailed enquiry akin to a trial or conduct what would effectively

amount to a “mini trial” on the question whether the original contract

stands novated or extinguished. To do so would be to transgress the

limited jurisdiction conferred at the pre-reference stage. Once a prima

facie arbitration agreement is shown to exist, and the plea of novation or

supersession is not ex facie established so as to render the arbitration

clause non-existent, such objections are required to be left open for

determination by the Arbitrator.

29. In the present case, prima facie it is evident that there exists an arbitration

clause being Clause No. 10. (j) of the DA. The subsequent Agreements

i.e. SA I, SA II and SA III were only entered into on the limited aspect of

restructuring of payment obligation of the respondent. Whether the said

SAs will supersede the original DA and the original DA would stand

novated is purely a question that falls within the domain of the Arbitrator

as it requires the Court to examine the unequivocal intention of the parties

to novate the terms under the original DA. It would also require the Court

to examine whether the original DA survives after the alteration of terms

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 16 of 18

of the agreement with respect to payment. A court under Section 11 of the

1996 Act is bound by the statutory restrictions and thus cannot transgress

into the merits of the case.

30. The judgment of Kishorilal Gupta & Bros (Supra) and Young Achievers

(Supra) has been considered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sanjiv

Prakash (Supra) and the law laid down is clear that at the stage of

Section 11 of the1996 Act cannot examine the question of novation of

Contract, thus, does not help the case of the respondent.

31. In my considered view, the reliance placed by the respondent on B.L.

Kashyap (Supra), L&T Ltd. (Supra), and Zhuhai Hansen Technology

Co Ltd (Supra), is also misplaced. None of the aforesaid decisions were

rendered in the context of proceedings under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.

In particular, B.L. Kashyap (Supra) arose at the stage of challenge under

Section 34 of the 1996 Act, where the Arbitral Award had already been

rendered and the issue of novation had been duly examined and

adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. The scope of judicial scrutiny under

Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which lays down grounds to challenge an

Award, stands on an entirely different footing from the limited and prima

facie examination contemplated under Section 11. Similarly, the

principles enunciated in L&T Ltd. (Supra) and Zhuhai Hansen

Technology Co. Ltd. (Supra) cannot be mechanically applied at the

referral stage under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, where this Court is

confined to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement and is

not required, nor permitted, to enter into a detailed examination of

contentious issues on merits. At this juncture, the Court cannot adjudicate

upon the substantive plea of novation.

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 17 of 18

32. Whether by mutual consent, the parties have consciously and expressly

substituted the earlier dispute resolution mechanism from the arbitral

mechanism and conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon civil court is also a

question of fact that is to be examined by the Arbitrator. It is a well

settled law that if the arbitration agreement is contained in a single

undisputed document, the referral court need not conduct a mini trial,

rather only a prima facie proof is required to establish the existence of the

Arbitration Agreement on the touchstone of Section 7 of the 1996 Act.

The undisputed DA, from which the payment obligation flows, contains

an arbitration clause which satisfies the requirements as envisaged under

Section 7 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, whether any deviation is made from

the consensus ad idem of the parties to refer the disputes to Arbitration

shall also be considered by the Arbitrator.

33. For the said reasons, and without commenting on the merits of the case,

the petition is allowed and the following directions are issued:-

i) Mr. Varun Kumar Chopra (Advocate) (Mob. No. 9811851711) is

appointed as a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the

parties.

ii) The arbitration will be held under the aegis and rules of the Delhi

International Arbitration Centre, Delhi High Court, Sher Shah Road,

New Delhi (hereinafter, referred to as the „DIAC‟).

iii) The remuneration of the learned Arbitrator shall be in terms of

DIAC (Administrative Cost and Arbitrators‟ Fees) Rules, 2018.

iv) The learned Arbitrator is requested to furnish a declaration in terms

of Section 12 of the 1996 Act prior to entering into the reference.

v) It is made clear that all the rights and contentions of the parties,

ARB. P. 1035/2024 Page 18 of 18

including as to the arbitrability of any of the claim, any other

preliminary objection, as well as claims/counter-claims and merits of

the dispute of either of the parties, including the issue whether the

arbitration clause is superseded by SA I, II and III, are left open for

adjudication by the Arbitrator.

vi) The parties shall approach the Arbitrator within two weeks from

today.

34. The petition is disposed of in aforesaid terms.

JASMEET SINGH, J.

FEBRUARY 26 , 2026/(MU)