CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 1 -

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

CASE NO.: CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M)

Dr. Rajesh Kumar Jain

......Petitioner

Versus

Sandeep Mehra

......Respondent

1.Date when Order / Judgement was reserved22.01.2026

2.Date of Decision / pronouncement of Order /

Judgement

11.02.2026

3.Date of uploading Order / Judgement 11.02.2026

4.Whether operative part or full Order /

Judgement is pronounced

FULL

5.Delay, if any, in pronouncing of full Order /

Judgement, and reasons thereof

NOT APPLICABLE

6.Whether Speaking/Reasoned YES

7.Whether Reportable YES

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY VASHISTH

Present:Dr. Rajesh Kumar Jain, petitioner-in-person.

Mr. Vivek Salathia, Advocate,

Amicus Curiae.

****

SANJAY VASHISTH, J.

1. Petitioner – Dr. Rajesh Kumar Jain has filed instant petition

under Section 528 and 395 of BNSS, 2023, for quashing of an

interlocutory order dated 15.05.2025 (Annexure P-1), passed by learned

Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, in CRM No. 129 of 2024, in case

titled as “Dr. Rajesh Jain v. Sandeep Mehra”, whereby

complainant/petitioner Dr. Rajesh Kumar Jain has been directed to

engage a trained advocate and to make any future appearance in the

matter only through an advocate.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 2 -

Besides, praying for issuance of directions to the learned

District Judge, Jind, as also the Trial Court Magistrate, petitioner has

prayed for grant of compensation also.

FACTUAL MATRIX :-

2. Relevant facts of the present case, as this Court has been

able to culled out, are that in the year 2018 the petitioner had instituted a

complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

(for short, ‘NI Act’), bearing case No. NACT-694-2024, against Sandeep

Mehra (respondent herein) regarding bouncing of a cheque amounting to

Rs. 5,00,000/-. The said case was finally decided by the Court of Mr.

Vivek Singh, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, vide judgement dated

12.11.2024, acquitting the accused/respondent Sandeep Mehra. Feeling

aggrieved, petitioner firstly filed CRM-A-97-2025, challenging the

judgement dated 12.11.2024, seeking leave to appeal.

In view of the law laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court, in

the case of M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran etc.

[Criminal Appeal Nos. 1868-70 of 2025, decided on 08.04.2025,

reported as 2025 (3) RCR (Criminal) 208 : Law Finder Doc Id #

2737710 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1320], CRM-A-97-2025 was disposed

of by this Court, vide order dated 09.07.2025, directing the learned

Sessions Judge, Jind, to treat the said leave to appeal as an appeal filed

under Section 372 of the Cr.P.C. and entrust the same to any appropriate

Court to try the same. Thereupon, said dispute is pending adjudicating

before the lower Appellate Court as CRA No. 393 of 2025, in the Court

of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jind.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 3 -

3. During pendency of Complaint No. NACT-694-2024, under

Section 138 of the NI Act, petitioner filed an application dated

05.09.2024, under Sections 195 and 340 Cr.P.C., for punishing the

accused/respondent Sandeep Mehra, for furnishing false information in

the course of judicial proceedings, willfully and intentionally, by false

statements under oath, knowing them to be false, and willfully

obstructing the administration of justice.

When said application came up for consideration on

15.05.2025, impugned order was passed by the Court of Mr. Vivek Singh,

learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, which reads as under:-

“CNR No.HRJN030041782024 CIS No.CRM/129-2024

Dr. Rajesh Jain Versus Sandeep Mehra

Present:Complainant Dr. Rajesh Jain in person.

Shri Ankush Sharma, Advocate for accused

Sandeep.

Arguments on the application under Section

195 and 340 of Cr.P.C. not advanced.

The court asked the complainant to engage a

counsel so that he may be in the position to represent his

case properly before the Court. The complainant has been

offered to take help of legal aid counsel. The complainant

submitted that he is in the good position to represent his

case and well conversant with the law. The complainant

stated that he does not want to engage a lawyer.

Heard, after considering the conduct of

complainant, this Court deems it proper to issue certain

directions to him. The complainant has claimed himself to

be a senior doctor and specialist Orthopedic Surgeon who is

engaged in private practice in Delhi and NCR region. The

complainant has not taken any legal assistance despite

being offered. The complainant appears before this Court

regularly in several cases and has been asked to take help of

a trained advocate but, the complainant has clearly refused.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 4 -

This Court has taken note of the conduct of

complainant in the Court on several occasions. Hence, this

Court is of the view that the complainant might be aware of

some of the legal provisions but he has acute deficiency of

the knowledge about the court processes. The complainant

is not a formally trained person in law and does not have

understanding of legal procedure and therefore, in order to

decide the controversy correctly and to preserve the dignity

of court during the judicial process, this Court believes that

the complainant must take assistance of a trained advocate

who, will be able to present the case of complainant before

this Court properly.

The Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in

Satish Kumar Saini and Anr. Versus State of Punjab and

Ors, CRM-M19799 of 2024 (O&M) decided on 17.12.2024

has held that there is no indefeasible right vested in litigant

to appear on his/her own before Court and it is within the

discretion of such Court to grant or not to grant permission

to such litigant to appear on his own. The guidelines

postulated in the said judgment of the Hon’ble Punjab and

Haryana High Court are reproduced as under:

“I. (i)There is no right nay indefeasible right

vested in litigant to appear on his/her own

before a Court and it is within the discretion of

such Court to grant or not to grant permission

to such litigant to appear on his own.

(ii)It is neither axiomatic nor fathomable to

lay down any exhaustive set of guidelines for

exercise of such direction by a Court as every

case has its own peculiar factual matrix.

II.No written/specific application is

required to be moved by a litigant to appear on

his/her own.

III.In case a litigant wishes to appear on

his/her own but it is not permitted by the Court

and such litigant expresses financial

constraint(s) for availing assistance/services of

an Advocate; he/she ought to be provided the

assistance of a free Legal Aid Counsel in case

he/her is unable to engage a Counsel”.

In view of the same, the complainant is directed

to engage a trained advocate and to make any future

appearance in the matter only through an advocate.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 5 -

Now, the adjourned to 10.07.2025 for

consideration on the application under Section 195 and 340

of Cr.P.C.

Sd/-

(Vivek Singh)

Date of Order: 15.05.2025 JMIC,Jind

Pooja, Stenographer Gr.III UID NO.HR0388”

Challenging the impugned order dated 15.05.2025

(Annexure P-1), petitioner has filed the instant petition.

APPOINTMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE:-

4. After going through the pleadings of the petitioner, who is

appearing before this Court in person in the present petition, this Court

noticed that certain serious allegations/imputations have been levelled by

him against the Judicial Officer (named above). Accordingly, before

examining the prayer of the petitioner, and to determine whether the

allegations mentioned in the petition, carry any credibility, truth, and

correctness, or if they are merely vague or unfounded, this Court deemed

it appropriate to appoint Mr. Vivek Salathia, Advocate, as an Amicus

Curiae, vide order dated 09.07.2025, which reads thus:-

“Present:Petitioner in person.

-.-

The present petition under Section 528 and 395

of BNSS has been filed for quashing of the order dated

15.05.2025 (Annexure P/1), passed by JMIC Jind, Mr. Vivek

Singh in pending CRM-129-2024 and also for appropriate

directions to the learned District Judge Jind, as also the

trial Court Magistrate and for compensating the petitioner.

Before examining the prayer of the petitioner, it

becomes necessary for this Court to understand the

allegations against the Judicial Officer, whose order has

been challenged through the instant petition by the

petitioner-Dr. Rajesh Jain himself, who is appearing before

this Court in person. It is to be determined whether the

allegations mentioned in the petition, carry any credibility,

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 6 -

truth, and correctness, or if they are merely vague or

unfounded.

Mr. Vivek Salathia, Advocate, is deputed to

assist this Court as Amicus Curiae. He shall be supplied

with the complete set of the petition during the course of the

day.

The matter is adjourned to 15.07.2025.

Meanwhile, the petitioner is directed to place

on record the details, in the form of an affidavit, regarding

all the litigations filed at the instance of the petitioner,

including the ongoing litigations, by furnishing details of

their nature and substance and the Court where same is/are

pending.”

5. Thereafter, in compliance to the direction dated 09.07.2025,

petitioner filed an affidavit dated 14.07.2025, annexing therewith the

chart of his pending/decided cases, which contains details of total 38

cases.

Another additional affidavit, dated 06.10.2025 was also filed

by the petitioner, alongwith a chart containing details of 09 cases, stated

to be pending in the Court of Mr. Vivek Singh, Judicial Magistrate Ist

Class, Jind. Alongwith his additional affidavit, petitioner has also

annexed the following documents:-

1.Copy of the letter dated 01.04.2025, sent by the

learned District and Sessions Judge, Jind, to the

Registrar General of High Court, intimating loss of

record in case bearing CIS No. COMI/91-2024, titled

as ‘R.K. Jain alias Rajesh Jain vs. Rambir Khatkar

and another’, pending in the Court of Mr. Vivek

Singh, JMIC, Jind;

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 7 -

2.Copy of an e-mail dated 20.03.2025, sent by the

petitioner, vide which reply to the show cause notice,

issued to him by the Court of Mr. Vivek Singh in case

No. COMI/91/2024, was given;

3.Copy of order dated 19.04.2025 passed in case No.

COMI/91/2024;

4.Copy of order dated 18.03.2021, passed in case No.

NACT-436-2018;

5.Copy of statement of Sandeep Kumar Mehra;

6.Copies of the reports, dated 25.05.2024 and

31.05.2024, made by the process serving agency

regarding non residing of said Sandeep Kumar Mehra

at the address given by him in his statement; and

7.Particulars of 05 Complaints, under Section 138 of the

NI Act, filed by the petitioner against accused

Sandeep Mehra (respondent herein)

SUBMISSIONS OF AMICUS CURIAE:

I.Re: challenge by the petitioner:-

6. Mr. Vivek Salathia, learned Amicus Curiae, while assisting

this Court in the present case submitted that for challenging the

impugned order dated 15.05.2025 (Annexure P-1), petitioner has levelled

direct allegations/imputations against Mr. Vivek Singh, learned Judicial

Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, such as judicial misconduct, systematic

targeting of the petitioner, malice, biased attitude, preset-mind, illegal

acts, and tampering/manipulation of judicial record etc. Other than this,

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 8 -

petitioner has claimed that he is a qualified doctor and specialist

Orthopaedic Surgeon, engaged in private practice in Delhi and NCR

region; well versed with the court procedures & law; and was/is regularly

appearing before various judicial and quasi-judicial fora, such as District

Courts, High Courts and even before Hon’ble the Apex Court since long.

II.Re: basis of making assertions made by the petitioner:-

7. Learned Amicus also pointed out that in support of the

assertions made against the learned Magistrate named above, in the

present proceedings, petitioner has relied upon the following:-

Sr.

No.

Description Remarks

1.Dismissal of Civil Suit No. 730

of 2017 on 06.08.2024, on the

ground of being barred by

limitation.

Civil Appeal No. CA-221-2024

is pending.

2.Conducting of proceedings in

Execution Petition No. 65 of

2022 in a casual and irregular

manner; and not taking any

action qua loss of record such as

Judgement and Decree and other

material documents from

judicial file.

Vide order dated 13.08.2024

(Annexure P-4), Judgement

Debtor in this case was issued

show cause notice as to why he

be not committed to civil

imprisonment for enforcement

of judgement and decree.

Petitioner also filed an

application for initiation of

contempt proceedings against

JD (Annexure P-5)

3.Passing the order of acquittal of

accused Sandeep Mehra in a

complaint case, under Section

138 of NI Act, bearing case No.

NACT-694-2024, and falsely

labelling the petitioner as a

money-lender.

Judgement of acquittal was

challenged by the petitioner

before High Court in CRM-A-

97-2025, and now the matter is

sub-judice in the Court of

Additional Sessions Judge,

Jind, after remand by the High

Court.

4.Issuance of show cause notice to

the petitioner in case No.

COMI/91/2024, titled as Rajesh

Jain v. Rambir Khatkar and

another, for intentionally

Reply to the show cause notice

has been filed by the petitioner

(Annexure P-3)

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 9 -

sending false e-mail to seek an

adjournment

5.Non supply of list of

documents/documents by

copying agency in case No.

NACT-545-2017, with a wrong

report that no such list of

documents is available on file.

6.Wrong allegation that the

petitioner has removed the reply

to the show cause notice from

the file/record of

COMI/91/2024

7.Tampering of judicial files

concerning the petitioner by

court-staff but not taking of any

action against them.

8.Passing of impugned order

dated 15.05.2025 with pre-

determined mind.

9.Material documents from

judicial file of case No. NACT-

545-2017 were removed,

facilitating acquittal of the

accused.

SLP is stated to be pending in

Hon’ble Apex Court.

III.Re: any absolute right to appear in person:-

8. As regards the absolute right of the petitioner to appear in

person, learned Amicus firstly referred to the provisions of Sections 29

and 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961, which entail as under:-

“29.Advocates to be the only recognized class of persons

entitled to practice law – Subject to the provisions of this

Act and any rules made thereunder, there shall, as from the

appointed day, be only one class of persons entitled to

practice the profession of law, namely, advocates.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

32.Power of court to permit appearances in particular

cases - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter,

any court, authority, or person may permit any person, not

enrolled as an advocate under this Act, to appear before it

or him in any particular case.”

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 10 -

In the next limb of his submissions, learned Amicus cited the

judgement of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Satish

Kumar Saini and another v. State of Punjab and others (CRM-M-

19799-2024, decided on 17.12.2024), reported as Law Finder Doc Id #

2674985 : 2025(1) RCR (Criminal) 436. In the said case, one of the

issue for consideration was: as to whether a litigant/party to a lis has a

right to appear in person and plead his/her own case, and after noticing

the provisions of Sections 29 and 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and

various judgements of Hon’ble the Apex Court, it has been concluded

that there is no right nay indefeasible right vested in litigant to appear on

his/her own before a Court and it is within the discretion of such Court to

grant or not to grant permission to such litigant to appear on his own.

Learned Amicus, thus, submitted that in terms of Section 32

of the Advocates Act, 1961, a discretionary power is vested with the

Court/authority etc. to allow a party/person to appear on his/her own, by

use of the word “may”. This word signifies a conferment of power where

the power is wide enough to cover both an acceptance and a refusal of a

plea, depending upon the facts of such plea. Ordinarily, the word “may”

is not a word of compulsion. It is an enabling word and it only confers

capacity, power or authority and essentially implies discretion.

Further submitted that the language as also phraseology

employed in the Advocates Act, 1961, is precise, plain, unambiguous and

unequivocal and the power reserved in the Court/authority etc. is

discretionary in nature. In other words, it is left entirely upon the

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 11 -

discretion of the concerned Court/authority etc. to examine the feasibility

of granting permission to any person to assist the Court on his/her own.

IV.Re: power of Trial Court to direct litigant to seek legal

assistance:-

9. Learned Amicus has also submitted that in the present case,

the petitioner has questioned the power of learned Magistrate to direct

him to engage a trained advocate and to make any future appearance in

the matter only through an advocate. Thus, it has to be analysed whether

the Trial Court has power to direct him to seek legal assistance.

In this regard, learned Amicus has pressed into the provision

of Section 339(2) of BNSS, 2023 (corresponding Section 302(2) of

Cr.P.C.), whereunder the Magistrate is competent to allow any person to

conduct the prosecution personally. However, the word used in Section

339 again is “may”, which clearly means that the discretion is vested

with the Magistrate to grant or refuse permission. Section 339 of BNSS,

2023 is reproduced as under:-

“339. Permission to conduct prosecution. -

(1)Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case

may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person

other than a police officer below the rank of inspector; but

no person, other than the Advocate-General or Government

Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public

Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such

permission:

Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to

conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the

investigation into the offence with respect to which the

accused is being prosecuted.

(2)Any person conducting the prosecution may do

so personally or by an advocate.”

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 12 -

10. Learned Amicus also referred to the ‘Canons of Judicial

Ethics’, as contained in Volume-IV of the High Court Rules and Orders,

which have been regarded as “canons for professional conduct of

judicial officers”; required to be used as a reminder for judges and as

indicating what the people have a right to expect from them; have been

issued as a general guide, but the enumeration of particular duties should

not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative

though not specifically mentioned; and that the public should have

absolute confidence in the integrity and impartiality of judicial officers.

At Sr. Nos. 11 and 15 of the ‘Canons of Judicial Ethics’, it

has been provided as under:-

“11.Unprofessional Conduct of Counsel. - He should

utilize his opportunities to criticise and correct

unprofessional conduct of Counsel, brought to his

attention ; and, if adverse comment is not a sufficient

corrective, should report the matter at once to the High

Court.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

15.Interference in conduct of trial. - He may properly

intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and

prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some

obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue

interference, impatience, or participation in the examination

of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward

witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by

the unusual circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the

proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the

truth in respect thereto.

Conversation between the judge and counsel in court

is often necessary but the judge should be studious to avoid

controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the

dispute between litigants and lead to its unjust disposition.

In addressing counsel, litigants, or witnesses, he should

avoid a controversial manner or tone.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 13 -

He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their

arguments except to clarify his mind as their positions, and

he should not be tempted to the unnecessary display of

learning or a premature judgment.”

11. Learned Amicus also submitted that though there are no

specific provisions contained under the scheme of the Cr.P.C. or BNSS,

however, the Trial Court while exercising powers of criminal court has

powers to regulate its functioning in a manner which is best suited for

administration of justice.

In a given case, even if a litigant insists on self-

representation or refuses legal help, the Court is duty bound to impart

justice and the Court may override that refusal, especially if the case risks

being mishandled or prejudiced. Hence, in criminal complaints, the

Court can appoint a counsel for its own assistance, even if the

complainant/litigant refuses legal representation. This is done to ensure

that the proceedings are fair, legally sound, and not hindered by lack of

expertise or cooperation.

V.Re: whether averments made in the petition amounts to

criminal contempt:-

12. Learned Amicus also raised serious concern about the words

and phraseography used by the petitioner in his petition and subsequent

additional affidavit dated 06.10.2025. In paragraph Nos. 1 to 4 as also in

the grounds of present petition, allegations have been levelled against the

Trial Judge by name, by using the words “pre-set mind”, “actuated with

malice”, “framing of false records”, “manipulating judicial records”,

“levelling of false, preposterous and absurd allegations”, “prejudicial

conduct”, “systematic and planned targeting of the petitioner”.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 14 -

However, perusal of the petition filed by the petitioner and the record in

the form of annexures, appended alongwith the petition including the

affidavit in support of the averments made in the petition, do not

substantiate any of the allegations levelled by the petitioner against the

learned Trial Court judge.

According to the learned Amicus, the said allegations have

been made without evidence or due diligence and the language used is

derogatory and is scandalous. Hence, such conduct not only undermines

the dignity of the court but also constitutes criminal contempt under

Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

ANALYSIS AND FINDING:-

13. I have gone through the pleadings of the present case

minutely and considered the submissions addressed by learned Amicus

Curiae.

14. From reading of the factual backdrop recorded in the earlier

part of this judgement, this Court finds that the instant petition has been

actuated by the petitioner, just to satisfy his “whims and fancies”, by

levelling direct allegations/imputations against learned Judicial

Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, such as judicial misconduct, systematic

targeting of the petitioner, malice, biased attitude, pre-set mind, illegal

acts, and tampering/manipulation of judicial record etc.

15. The petitioner may be very good in his own profession, i.e.

being a doctor and specialist Orthopaedic Surgeon, and might have been

appearing before different Courts or authorities in person by filing and

defending his cases, but it does not mean that he is having an absolute or

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 15 -

indefeasible right and permanent entitlement that cannot be annulled,

revoked, or voided by any Court of law. The position of law as regard

the power of Court to permit appearances in particular cases is well

defined.

16. Our Constitutional framework extends ‘freedom of

expression’ and ‘freedom of speech’, enabling citizens to express freely.

This freedom in turn helps in revelation of mistakes or bias or at times

even corruption. Freedom of expression in arguments plays a pivotal role

in the development of judicial dignity, equality, justice, and to secure the

protection of other fundamental human rights. It is essential to the rule of

law and liberty of the citizens. The advocate or the party appearing in

person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. At the same time, they

equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order

in the court proceedings or judicial process. The liberty of free expression

is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded

allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary.

17. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court (Sumeet Goel, J.), while

dealing with the question: whether a litigant/party to a lis has a right to

appear in person and plead his/her own case, has made the following

pertinent observations, in para Nos. 11 to 16 of the judgement, in the case

of Satish Kumar Saini and another (supra):-

“11. The right of an aggrieved individual to

approach a judicial forum is a cornerstone of the rule of law

and forms a fundamental pillar of our democratic legal

system. However, the exercise of this right is not unqualified

and is subject to procedural and adjectival laws established

by the legal framework of the land. These procedural norms

are designed to ensure not only the effective redressal of

grievances but also the orderly functioning of courts. In

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 16 -

furtherance of these objectives, the Advocates Act, 1961,

places a general restriction on non-advocates appearing

and practicing before Courts as a matter of right. This

statutory framework is aimed at safeguarding the quality of

judicial proceedings by ensuring that those appearing

before the Courts possess the requisite legal expertise and

understanding of the law. The Indian Judicial System,

operating primarily on an adversarial framework,

inherently relies on the advocates of rival parties to

facilitate the effective conducting of judicial proceedings.

This system entrusts; the responsibility of presenting facts,

evidence and legal arguments; upon the advocates, who act

as intermediaries between their clients and the Court. The

role of the judiciary is not confined to determining which

party has presented its case more effectively or

persuasively; rather, it is committed to the higher objective

of dispensing justice in accordance with law, equity and the

principles of fairness. This justice-oriented approach

necessitates that the Court receives adequate assistance

from rival sides, enabling it to reach decision that aligns

with the ends of justice. Advocates play a pivotal role in this

process, acting as essential instruments in the

administration of justice. A judge, often likened to the

charioteer of justice, requires the support of well-informed

and legally skilled advocates who function as the wheels of

the chariot, ensuring its smooth and effective movement.

Without such assistance, the judicial process risks being

impaired, leaving the Court ill-equipped to address the

complexities of disputes brought before it. The adversarial

judicial system in our country is fundamentally dependent

on the competence, integrity and ethical conduct of

advocates. By conferring the nearly exclusive right to

represent parties in Court upon qualified professionals, the

Advocates Act, 1961 ensures that the judiciary is supported

by individuals who possess the requisite legal knowledge

and professional commitment. Advocates, as officers of the

Court, bridge the gap between the parties and the judiciary,

providing the Court with the assistance it needs to fulfill its

constitutional mandate of delivering justice. This

partnership between the bench and the bar forms the

backbone of the judicial process, fostering a system where

justice prevails, not through the rhetorical prowess of one

party over another, but through a fair and informed

adjudication of disputes. The role of advocates in this

system, therefore, transcends mere representation; it is

integral to the preservation of the rule of law and the

realization of justice. Advocates are the Officers of the

Court and they will not necessarily tell the Courts only

those things which go in favour of their clients but will also

let the Court know about the factors, especially the ones in

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 17 -

law, which would go against their clients. Advocates do not

plead only for their clients but they, infact, plead to assist

the Court in reaching the correct conclusions. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Dr. D.C. Saxena (supra) [Dr.

D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, (1996) 5

SCC 216] has elucidated the salutary nay indispensable role

of Advocates in our justice dispensation system. Therefore, a

near exclusive right has been vested in 'Advocates' to cause

representation before a Court/authority etc. in Section 29 of

the Advocates Act, 1961.

12. The statutory provision, for enabling a party-

in-person to appear on his/her own, is essentially

encapsulated in Section 32 of the Advocates Act, 1961. A

bare perusal of this provision would reflect that, a

discretionary power has been vested in the Court/authority

etc. to allow a party-person to appear on his/her own, by

use of the word "may". This word signifies a conferment of

power where the power is wide enough to cover both an

acceptance and a refusal of a plea, depending upon the facts

of such plea. Ordinarily, the word "may" is not a word of

compulsion. It is an enabling word and it only confers

capacity, power or authority and essentially implies

discretion. Still further; the Golden Rule of Interpretation

(Literal Rule of Interpretation), as relied upon by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments of Dikshitulu's

case (supra) [Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu,

(1979) 2 SCC 34] and Laxmi Narain Dhut's case (supra)

[National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007)

3 SCC 700], when applied in the present scenario to Section

32 of the Advocates Act of 1961, shows that the language as

also phraseology employed in this legislation is precise,

plain, unambiguous and unequivocal and the power

reserved in the Court/authority etc. is discretionary in

nature. In other words, it is left entirely upon the discretion

of the concerned Court/authority etc. to examine the

feasibility of granting permission to any person to assist the

Court on her/his own.

There is no gainsaying that, such discretion

ought to be exercised by a Court/authority, in accordance

with the well settled principles of justice, equity and good

conscience. ......

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

13. In our judicial adjudicatory system, there are

two prime aspects, firstly, the Judge needs the assistance of

trained advocates in order to decide the controversy

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 18 -

correctly, secondly, the dignity of the judicial process and

Courts ought to be preserved. If a party-in-person fails in

both or even in any one of them, it would be a tragedy for

the Court as well as for the litigant. May be a litigant loses

his/her case only because he/she was not able to project the

case correctly before the Court or may be because he/she is

not well aware as to what conduct is expected of him/her in

a Court room. Sometimes such a conduct can be voluntary

or sometimes it can be innocent but the danger of

dilapidation of the justice system is always imminent. A

litigant may have a cogent cause to seek for appearing in

propria persona in the Court, to defend his/her interest/right

and may try to demonstrate sufficient as well as imperative

reasons for the intervention of the Court in the matter, but

may be actually a naive person who is unable to put forth

his/her case properly. It is the province of the Judge to

recognize the lack of formal legal training of such litigants,

ergo be lenient towards procedural errors committed by

them; sometimes, judges may provide guidance or

explanation to such litigants regarding the court procedures

and rules, aiming to ensure that such litigants have a fair

opportunity to present their cases. Hence, to promote access

to justice some flexibility in the otherwise straight jacketed

procedures may be allowed. Nonetheless, it has been

observed that despite the resoluteness, intelligence and best

intentions on the part of such litigants, in most of the

scenarios, there is an acute deficiency of even basic

information in laws and legal processes. Such exiguous

legal know-how becomes detrimental to the case/petition

itself, rather it exacerbates the hardships of disputations,

and may also cause such a litigant to suffer serious

consequences. Where a litigant, though not formally trained

in law, demonstrates a reasonably sound understanding of

legal principles, the procedural framework, and the facts of

the case, the Court may consider allowing such a person to

appear and address it. This ensures that access to justice

remains meaningful and inclusive, particularly for informed

and capable citizens seeking to represent themselves.

However, the courts must exercise great caution in

permitting uninformed or inadequately prepared individuals

to plead their cases personally. Incompetent representation

by ill-equipped litigants may result in incomplete

presentation of facts, misinterpretation of legal principles,

and a failure to address critical issues, thereby hindering

the Court's ability to arrive at a just decision.

14. There is yet another aspect of the matter viz. if

the litigant who seeks to represent himself/herself has poor

antecedents or irresponsible behaviour or dubious

character, the Court may receive counter-productive

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 19 -

assistance from him/her. The Court, as also the entire justice

system, would suffer if quarrelsome, ill-informed or block

headed party-in-person is permitted to appear. There are

other situations where, if permission is granted to a party-

in-person to appear for himself/herself, it may be

obstructive nay destructive of justice. Such situations are, by

nature thereof itself, are not capable of being exhaustively

enumerated.

15. Especially, in the marital disputes, lack of the

emotional distance and objectivity waylays the entire

matter-in-hand. Disintegration of marriage is an affecting

and stirring situation for both spouses, as well as for the

extended family and close associates. Even the most

rational, well grounded and sagacious of a person is likely

to be disconcerted and unnerved in such a disheveled

personal scenario; and this gets exacerbated, especially in a

public forum like open Court proceedings. When emotions

are running high or the parties are wrapped up in their

emotional turmoil, no one is inclined towards constructive

problem solving or dispute resolution. Indubitably, the

parties also surmise that only they can present their case;

only they can be privy to their injury, sufferings and

troubles; that their circumstances are unique, peculiar and

specific to an extent that no one else can commentate upon

them. There is also an urge to vent out the overawed

emotions, since no other forum, especially public forum is

available to justify their stance. Often enough, the Court

proceedings are overlaid with emotional turmoil and extend

the suffering of the parties due to protracted and drawn out

matches of words. In such cases, self-representation

becomes a stumbling block.

The skepticism of a litigant(s) towards having

an Advocate representing them stems out of a general

wariness, understandably, due to unfamiliarity with the

legal system, technical and procedural. Often, this

translates into a distrust towards representation by an

Advocate as such no litigant believes that no standard legal

framework can satisfy their unique circumstances. However,

Advocates are bulwark of the well-wrought justice system,

adept at legal procedures, proficient and well-versed with

knowledge of laws, rules and regulations. And, a large

workforce of advocates, specializing in various aspects of

legal acumen, means that a large pool of expertise is in

existence. If a litigant is stepping out to a public forum/open

Court proceedings to covet justice, fairness and

impartiality; he/she ought also attempt to rise above any

prejudice or predilection towards distrust as regards the

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 20 -

Justice system and those who all are committed towards

upkeeping it, especially Advocates.

15.1. In case a litigant is wanting to appear in

person for the reason, that he/she is unable to engage the

assistance of a lawyer on account of financial constraint,

the same can well be remedied by providing for a legal aid

counsel. There is a robust mechanism provided for grant of

free legal assistance under the aegis of the Legal Services

Mechanism in this regard.

“16.As a result of above-said rumination, the following

postulates emerge:

I.(i)There is no right nay indefeasible right vested

in litigant to appear on his/her own before a Court and it is

within the discretion of such Court to grant or not to grant

permission to such litigant to appear on his own.

(ii)It is neither axiomatic nor fathomable to lay

down any exhaustive set of guidelines for exercise of such

direction by a Court as every case has its own peculiar

factual matrix.

II.No written/specific application is required to be

moved by a litigant to appear on his/her own.

III.In case a litigant wishes to appear on his/her own but

it is not permitted by the Court and such litigant expresses

financial constraint(s) for availing assistance/services of an

Advocate; he/she ought to be provided the assistance of a

free Legal Aid Counsel in case he/her is unable to engage a

Counsel”

18. After reading the provision of Section 32 of the Advocates

Act, 1961, and the judgement of Satish Kumar Saini’s case (supra),

there is no possibility for this Court to take a different view than what has

already been taken by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Thus, it is

held and reiterated that a litigant/party has no indefeasible right to appear

on his/her own before a Court and it is within the discretion of such Court

to grant or not to grant permission to such litigant to appear on his own.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 21 -

19. In addition, this Court also found force and is in agreement

to the submissions addressed by learned Amicus qua power of learned

Magistrate to direct the petitioner to engage a trained advocate and to

make any future appearance in the matter only through an advocate.

Thus, it is held that: even if a litigant insists on self-

representation or refuses legal help, the Court is duty bound to impart

justice and the Court may override that refusal, especially if the case risks

being mishandled or prejudiced. Hence, in criminal cases, the Court can

appoint a counsel for its own assistance, even if the complainant/litigant

refuses legal representation. This is done to ensure that the proceedings

are fair, legally sound, and not hindered by lack of expertise or

cooperation.

20. After reading the pleadings and the grounds set forth by the

present petitioner to lay challenge to the impugned order dated

15.05.2025 (Annexure P-1), this Court is astonished that without there

being any substance or cogent evidence/material, the petitioner has raised

serious allegations/imputations against the concerned Magistrate (named

above), by using the words and phraseography, such as “pre-set mind”,

“actuated with malice”, “framing of false records”, “manipulating

judicial records”, “levelling of false, preposterous and absurd

allegations”, “prejudicial conduct”, “systematic and planned targeting

of the petitioner”.

As per own showing, there are about 38 cases of the

petitioner, out of which 09 have been dealt with by Mr. Vivek Singh,

Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jind. Further, as per the list of 09 cases,

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 22 -

attached with the additional affidavit of the petitioner, dated 06.10.2025,

05 cases were still pending in the said Court.

Merely because the learned Magistrate has dismissed one

complaint, under Section 138 of the NI Act, filed by the petitioner against

Sandeep Mehra; dismissed his one civil suit; sought reply of the

petitioner by issuing a show cause notice to him regarding sending an e-

mail dated 21.11.2024, thereby seeking exemption from appearing before

the Court; and passing the impugned order dated 15.05.2025, does not

prove or substantiate the aforementioned allegations/imputations, which

are certainly very serious in nature. Moreso, this Court also feels that

where ever any order or direction passed by any Court nay the Court of

Mr. Vivek Singh, Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, which has an

adverse impact or not of the liking of the petitioner, he feel agitated and

avail his remedy, may be as per law.

21. This Court finds no substance in the averments and truth in

the allegations made by the petitioner against the Magistrate. Learned

Magistrate after relying upon the judgement of the Co-ordinate Bench of

this Court, in the case of Satish Kumar Saini (supra), has rightly

exercised his discretion. There is no ambiguity in the impugned order

dated 15.05.2025 (Annexure P-1), warranting any interference by this

Court.

Accordingly, the impugned order dated 15.05.2025

(Annexure P-1) is upheld and the instant main petition as well as

miscellaneous application(s) are dismissed, being bereft of any merit.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 23 -

RE:WHETHER CONDUCT OF THE PETITIONER WARRANTS

INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HIM FOR

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT?

22. Before parting with this judgement, there is another facet of

matter which requires deeper consideration.

23. This Court found it profitable to quote former Chief Justice

of India, Hon’ble Mr. Justice M. Hidayatullah:

“The good faith of judges is the firm bed-rock on which

any system of administration securely rests and an

attempt to shake the people’s confidence in the courts is

to strike at the very root of our system of democracy.”

[see: E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T.

Narayanan Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325]

It is also well propounded principle of law that “when the

authority of the judiciary is questioned or undermined, it becomes the

duty of judges to act, not for their personal protection, but to uphold

the dignity and credibility of the institution, for upon that dignity rests

the confidence of the public in the administration of justice”.

Thus, it is paramount and pious duty of this Court to

preserve the magnanimity of the Courts and no one can be permitted to

desecrate their sanctity.

24. In the case of Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of

U.P., Law Finder Doc Id # 262525 : (2011) 7 SCC 776, Hon’ble the

Apex Court has observed that -

“15.......The superior courts have a duty to protect the

reputation of judicial officers of subordinate courts, taking

note of the growing tendency of maligning the reputation of

judicial officers by unscrupulous practising advocates who

either fail to secure desired orders or do not succeed in

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 24 -

browbeating for achieving ulterior purpose. Such an issue

touches upon the independence of not only the judicial

officers but brings the question of protecting the reputation

of the Institution as a whole.

16.The dangerous trend of making false allegations

against judicial officers and humiliating them requires to be

curbed with heavy hands, otherwise the judicial system itself

would collapse. The Bench and the Bar have to avoid

unwarranted situations on trivial issues that hamper the

cause of justice and are in the interest of one. “Liberty of

free expression is not to be confounded or confused with

license to make unfounded allegations against any

institution, much less the Judiciary”. A lawyer cannot be a

mere mouthpiece of his client and cannot associate himself

with his client maligning the reputation of judicial officers

merely because his client failed to secure the desired order

from the said officer. A deliberate attempt to scandalise the

court which would shake the confidence of the litigating

public in the system, would cause a very serious damage to

the Institution of judiciary. An Advocate in a profession

should be diligent and his conduct should also be diligent

and conform to the requirements of the law by which an

Advocate plays a vital role in the preservation of society and

justice system. Any violation of the principles of professional

ethics by an Advocate is unfortunate and unacceptable.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

28.......A Judge has to discharge his duty and passes

order in the manner as he thinks fit to the best of his

capability under the facts and circumstances of the case

before him. No litigant, far less an advocate, has any right

to take the law in his own hands. The contemnor abused the

Judge in most filthy words unworthy of mouthing by an

ordinary person and that is true without any justification for

him ascending the dais during the course of the proceedings

and then abusing the judicial officer in the words

"Maaderchod, Bahanchod, High Court Ko Contempt Refer

Kar". The courts certainly cannot be intimidated to seek the

favourable orders. The appellant intimidated the presiding

officer of the court hurling filthiest abuses and lowered the

authority of the Court, which is tantamount to interfere with

the due course of judicial proceedings. The charge which

stood proved against the appellant could not be taken lightly

and in such a fact-situation the apology tendered by him,

being not bonafide, was not acceptable.”

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 25 -

25. In the case of M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and

Haryana and others, 1991 (3) RCR (Criminal) 310 : (1991) 3 SCC

600, Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under:

“The foundation of our system which is based on the

independence and impartiality of those who man it will be

shaken if disparaging and derogatory remarks are made

against the presiding judicial officer with impunity....It is

high time that we realise that much cherished judicial

independence has to be protected not only from the

executive or the legislature but also from those who are an

integral part of the system. An independent judiciary is of

vital importance to any free society.”

26. In the case of Dr. D.C. Saxena v. Hon’ble the Chief

Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216, in the opening para of the

judgement, Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus:-

“ In a clash of competing interest in constitutional

contours, this case calls to strike a balance between the

freedom of speech and expression, a salutary right in a

liberal democratic society and paramount countervailing

duty to maintain public confidence in the administration of

justice. …...”

Dr. D.C. Saxena, who was a Professor, had initiated public

interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution, with a prayer to

direct Sri P. V. Narsinma Rao, the President of Indian National Congress

and the former Prime Minister of the country to pay a sum of Rs. 8.29

lakhs and odd said to be due to the Union of India for use of India. Air

Force aircraft or helicopters from October 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993.

After perusing the record and hearing the petitioner-in-person, the

Hon’ble Apex Court summarily “dismissed” the writ petition.

Thereafter, Dr. D.C. Saxena filed yet another writ petition,

this time against the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India. The Registry

raised objections for its maintainability but, at the insistence of the

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 26 -

petitioner, it was posted, with office objections, for hearing, as

unregistered Writ Petition (C) No. D-17209/95, before a three Judge

Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court. Dr. D.C. Saxena, again appearing in

person, persisted to justify the averments made by him in the writ

petition, against the then Hon’ble Chief Justice of India. In spite of the

Court having pointed out that the averments were scandalous, the

petitioner reiterated that he “stood by the averments made therein” and

sought for the declaration -

(1)that the then Hon’ble CJI (name omitted herein) was

unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India;

(2)that he should be stripped off his citizenship;

(3)to direct registration of an FIR against him under

various provisions of Indian Penal Code for

committing forgery and fraud and under the

Prevention of Corruption Act;

(4)to direct prosecution of him under the Prevention of

Corruption Act;

(5)to direct him to defray from his personal pocket the

expenses incurred by the petitioner in filing the two

writ petitions i.e. W.P. No. 432/95 and the second writ

petition;

(6)to direct the then Hon’ble CJI to reimburse from his

pocket to the public exchequer the entire loss caused

to the State, as a consequence of non-payment of the

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 27 -

dues by Sri P. V. Narasimha Rao with interest at 18%

per annum; and

(7)other consequential directions.

After hearing Dr. D.C. Saxena, Hon’ble Apex Court

dismissed his second writ petition as well, and observed thus:-

“The several averments in the writ petition are

scandalous and it is surprising that the petitioner,

who is, said to be Professor in a University, has

chosen to draft and file such a writ petition. His

understanding of the meaning of Article 32 of the

Constitution, is to say the least, preposterous. The

allegations made are reckless and disclose

irresponsibility on the part of the petitioner. This writ

petition is wholly misconceived and is an abuse of the

process of the Court. The writ petition has no merit.

The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.

In view of the attitude of the petitioner even at

the hearing, when he persisted in this stand and, on

our asking him, reiterated that he stood by the

scandalous averments made therein, we consider it

our duty to issue to the petitioner a notice to show

cause why proceedings to punish him for contempt of

this Court should not be initiated against him. The

Registry to take the necessary steps for registering the

matters as a contempt petition. The petitioner who is

present-in-person is given notice of the contempt

petition. He is required to file his reply within four

weeks to show cause why proceedings for contempt

should not be initiated against him. We request the

learned Solicitor General to assist the Court in this

contempt matter.

List the matter after notice of the date fixed by

Registry is given to Dr. D.C. Saxena and the Solicitor

General.”

In the contempt proceedings initiated against Dr. D.C.

Saxena, after exhaustively noticing the factual matrix and arguments etc.,

their Lordships’ of the Hon’ble Apex Court, passed a detailed and

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 28 -

landmark judgement in Dr. D.C. Saxena’s case (supra), and the relevant

excrept of the same are reproduced as under:-

“ 28.The question, therefore, arises: whether the

afore-enumerated imputations constitute contempt of this

Court? Though the petitioner contended that the provisions

of the Act are ultra vires Article 19(1) (a) of the

Constitution, it is not necessary for the purpose of this case

to dwelve upon that contention. This Court has taken suo

motu cognizance of contempt of this Court under Article 129

of the Constitution of India which reiterates as a Court of

record, its power to punish for contempt of itself. As pointed

out in the proceedings of this Court dated January 13, 1996,

in spite of the fact that this Court brought to his attention

the gravity of the imputations, the petitioner insisted and

reiterated that he stood by the scandalous averments made

therein. This court being duty bound, was, therefore,

constrained to issue notice of contempt. The question,

therefore, is whether the aforesaid imputations are

scurrilous attack intended to scandalise the Court and do

they not impede due administration of Justice ? Words are

the skin of the language. Language in which the words are

couched is media to convey the thoughts of the author. Its

effect would be discernible from the language couched

proprio vigore. The petitioner, a professor of English

language in clear and unequivocal language emphasised

and reaffirmed that the averments were "truthfully and

carefully" worded. The question is to what extent the

petitioner is entitled to the freedom of those expressions

guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution? If

they are found scandalous, whether he would get absolved

by operation of Article 19(1)(a) ? As this Court has taken

suo motu action under Article 129 of the Constitution and

the word 'contempt' has not been defined by making rules, it

would be enough to fall back upon the definition of

"criminal contempt" defined under Section 2(c) of the Act

which reads thus:

“ ‘criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether

by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible

representations, or otherwise) of any matter of the

doing of any other act whatsoever which -

(i)scandalises or tends to scandalise, or

lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or

(ii)prejudices, or interferes or tends to

interfere with, the due course of any judicial

proceedings; or

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 29 -

(iii)interferes or tends to interfere with, or

obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of

justice in any other manner.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

33.A citizen is entitled to bring to the notice of the

public at large the infirmities from which any institution

including judiciary suffer from. Indeed, the right to offer

healthy and constructive criticism which is fair in spirit

must be left unimpaired in the interest of the institution

itself. Critics are instruments of reforms but not those

actuated by malice but those who are inspired by public

weal. Bonafide criticism of any system or institution

including judiciary is aimed at inducing the administration

of the system or institution to look inward and improve its

public image. Courts, the instrumentalities of the State are

subject to the Constitution and the laws and are not above

criticism. Healthy and constructive criticism are tools to

augment its forensic tools for improving its functions. A

harmonious blend and balanced existence of free speech

and fearless justice counsel that law ought to be astute to

criticism. Constructive public criticism even if it slightly

oversteps its limits thus has fruitful play in preserving

democratic health of public institutions. Section 5 of the Act

accords protection to such fair criticism and saves from

contempt of court. The best way to sustain the dignity and

respect for the office of judge is to deserve respect from the

public at large by fearlessness and objectivity of the

approach to the issues arising for decision, quality of the

judgment, restraint, dignity and decorum a judge observes

in judicial conduct off and on the bench and rectitude.

34.......Any criticism about judicial system or the

Judges which hampers the administration of justice or

which erodes the faith in the objective approach of the

Judges and brings administration of justice to ridicule must

be prevented. The contempt of court proceedings arise out of

that attempt. Judgments can be criticised. Motives to the

Judges need not be attributed. It brings the administration

of justice into disrepute. Faith in the administration of

justice is one of the pillars on which democratic institution

functions and sustains. In the free market place of ideas

criticism about the judicial system or judges should be

welcome so long as such criticism does not impair or

hamper the administration of justice. This is how the courts

should exercise the powers vested in them and Judges to

punish a person for an alleged contempt by taking notice of

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 30 -

the contempt suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a

lawyer. .......

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

37.Scandalising the Judges or courts tends to

bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect

and disregard and tantamounts to contempt. All acts which

bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend

its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority,

constitute contempt committee in respect of single Judge or

single court or in certain circumstances committed in

respect of the whole of the judiciary or judicial system. ......

38.The contempt of court evolved in common law

jurisprudence was codified in the form of the Act. Section

2(c) defines "criminal contempt" which has been extracted

earlier. In A.M. Bhattacharjee's case (1995 AIR SCW 3768)

(supra) relied on by the petitioner himself, a Bench of two

Judges considered the said definition and held that

scandalising the court would mean any act done or writing

published which is calculated to bring the court or Judges

into contempt or to lower its authority or to interfere with

the due course of justice or the legal process of the court. In

para 30, it was stated that scandalising the court is a

convenient way of describing a publication which, although

it does not relate to any specific case either past or pending

or any specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary

as a whole, which is calculated to undermine the authority

of the courts and public confidence in the administration of

justice. Contempt of court is to keep the blaze of glory

around the judiciary and to deter people from attempting to

render justice contemptible in the eyes of the public. A libel

upon a court is a reflection upon the sovereign people

themselves. The contemnor conveys to the people that the

administration of justice is weak or in corrupt hands. The

fountain of justice is tainted. Secondly, the judgments that

stream out of that foul fountain is impure and contaminated.

In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 9 para 27 at

page 21 on the topic "Scandalising the Court" it is stated

that scurrilous abuse of a Judge or court, or attack on the

personal character of a Judge, are punishable contempts.

The punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting

either the court as a whole or the individual Judges of the

court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the

public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by

compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, from

the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is

undermined or impaired. In consequence, the court has

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 31 -

regarded with particular seriousness allegations of

partiality or bias on the part of a Judge or a court. On the

other hand, criticism of a Judge's conduct or of the conduct

of a court, even if strongly worded, is not a contempt

provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in

good faith, and is not directed to the personal character of a

Judge or to the impartiality of a Judge or court.

39.Thereafter, it is of necessity to regulate the

judicial process free from fouling the fountain of justice to

ward off the people from undermining the confidence of the

public in the purity of fountain of justice and due

administration. Justice thereby remains pure, untained and

unimpeded. The punishment for contempt, therefore, is not

for the purpose of protecting or vindicating either the

dignity of the court as a whole or an individual Judge of the

court from attack on his personal reputation but it was

intended to protect the public who are subject to the

jurisdiction of the court and to prevent undue interference

with the administration of justice. If the authority of the

court remains undermined or impeded the fountain of justice

gets sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the mind of the

litigant public or the right thinking public at large for the

benefit of the people. Independence of the judiciary for due

course of administration of justice must be protected and

remain unimpaired. Scandalising the court, therefore is a

convenient expression of scurrilous attack on the majesty of

justice calculated to undermine its authority and public

confidence in the administration of justice. The malicious or

slanderous publication inculcates in the mind of the people

a general disaffection and dissatisfaction on the judicial

determination and indisposes in their mind to obey them. If

the people's allegiance to the law is so fundamentally

shaken it is the most vital and most dangerous obstruction of

justice calling for urgent action. Action for contempt is not

for the protection of the Judge as private individual but

because they are the channels by which justice is

administered to the people without fear or favour. As per the

Third Schedule to the Constitution oath or affirmation is

taken by the Judge that he will duly and faithfully perform

the duties of the office to the best of his ability, knowledge

and judgment without fear or favour, affection or ill-will and

will so uphold the Constitution and the laws. In accordance

therewith Judges must always remain impartial and should

be known by all people to be impartial. Should they be

imputed with improper motives, bias, corruption or

partiality, people will lose faith in them. The Judge requires

a degree of detachment and objectivity which cannot be

obtained, if Judges constantly are required to look over their

shoulders for fear of harassment and abuse and

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 32 -

irresponsible demands for prosecution or resignation. The

whole administration of justice would suffer due to its

rippling effect. It is for this reason that scandalising the

Judges was considered by the Parliament to be contempt of

a court punishable with imprisonment or fine.

40.Scandalising the court, therefore, would mean hostile

criticism of Judges as Judges or judiciary. Any personal

attack upon a Judge in connection with office he holds is

dealt with under law of libel or slander. Yet defamatory

publication concerning the Judge as a Judge brings the

court or judges into contempt, a serious impediment to

justice and an inroad on majesty of justice. Any caricature

of a judge calculated to lower the dignity of the court would

destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence

in the administration of justice or majesty of justice. It

would, therefore, be scandalising the Judge as a Judge, in

other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper

motives to a Judge is scandalisation of the court and would

be contempt of the court. Even imputation of lack of

impartiality or fairness to a Judge in the discharge of his

official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the

offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an

affront to majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges

the authority of the Court, he interferes with the

performance of duties of Judge's office or judicial process

or administration of justice or generation or production of

tendency bringing the Judge or judiciary into contempt.

Section 2(c) of the Act, therefore, defines criminal contempt

in wider articulation that any publication, whether by

words, spoken or written, or by signs or by visible

representation or otherwise of any matter or the doing of

any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to

scandalise or lower or tends to lower the authority of any

court or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with

the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interferes or

tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the

administration of justice in any other manner is a criminal

contempt. Therefore, a tendency to scandalise the Court or

tendency to lower the authority of the court or tendency to

interfere with or tendency to obstruct the administration of

justice in any manner or tendency to challenge the authority

or majesty or justice, would be a criminal contempt. The

offending act apart, any tendency if it may lead to or tends

to lower the authority of the court is a criminal contempt.

Any conduct of the contemnor which has the tendency or

produces a tendency to bring the Judge or court the

contempt or tends to lower the authority of the court would

also be contempt of the court.

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 33 -

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

41.......As stated earlier, imputation of corrupt or

improper motives in judicial conduct would impair the

efficacy of judicial dispensation and due protection of the

liberties of the citizen or due administration of justice. This

paramount public interest is protected by the definition in

Section 2(c) of the Act. It is therefore, not necessary to

establish actual intention on the part of the contemnor to

interfere with the administration of justice. Making reckless

allegations or vilification of the conduct of the court or the

Judge would be contempt.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx

46.......If the forum of the judicial process is

allowed to mount scurrilous attack on a Judge, the question

arises whether the forum of the judicial process of

vilification of the Judges or imputations to the Judges in the

pleadings presented to the court would give liberty of

freedom of expression to an advocate or a litigant. In the

light of the above discussion, we have little doubt to

conclude that when an advocate or a party appearing before

the court requires to conduct himself in a manner befitting

to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a

free licence to the indulge in writing in the pleadings the

scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the Judge

or the court. If a reputation and dignity of the Judge, who

decides the case are allowed to be prescribed in the

pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear

and independence of the judiciary would be a thing of the

past.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx xxx”

27. In the recent past, when a Transfer Petition (Criminal) No.

613 of 2025, titled as “N. Peeddi Raju v. Anumula Revanth Reddy”,

came up for consideration, it was noticed by their Lordship’s of the

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 34 -

Hon’ble Apex Court that in the said petition, ‘scurrilous and scandalous

allegations had been made against a sitting Judge of the High Court of

Telangana’. Though the transfer petition was dismissed, vide order

dated 29.07.2025, yet the Hon’ble Apex Court felt that the petitioner and

the lawyers, connected with the transfer petition, cannot be permitted to

go scot-free. Accordingly, they were issued show cause notice(s) as to

why an action for committing Contempt of the Court should not be

initiated against them.

The said suo moto contempt proceedings were then

considered in case titled as “In Re: N. Peddi Raju and others” [Suo

Moto Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2025, decided on 10.11.2025,

and reported as 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2457].

During course of proceedings of the said case, the alleged

contemnors tendered apology before the Hon’ble Apex Court. However,

considering that since the scandalous allegations were made against the

learned Judge of the High Court, the case before the High Court was

ordered to be reopened for the limited purpose of tendering an

unconditional apology by the alleged contemnors before the learned

Judge of the High Court, who had passed the final order in the petition,

i.e. Criminal Petition No. 4162 of 2020. Thereupon, while accepting the

apology tendered by the three alleged Contemnors, the learned Single

Judge of the High Court of Telangana, in her order dated 22.08.2025,

observed as under:

“11.A trend of vilifying Judges has emerged in recent

times. Disgruntled lawyers and litigants often demand

release, recusal and transfer of matters on the pretext of

oblique motives attributed to the Judge. Such reckless

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 35 -

allegations derail the course of justice by creating an

environment of intimidation which is not conducive to the

effective administration of justice. Personal attacks on

Judges breach the safety-net of impartial decision-making

and is antithetical to independent Judges. Targetting of

Judges makes for Skeptical and unsure Judges.

12.The attackers also forget that while - casting and

circulating - aspersions in print or on social media can be

done by the flick of a key, the concerned Judge does not

have a platform to present his/her side of the story. One-

sided mud-slinging, more often than not, swings right back

to besmirch the attacker. The ‘Majesty’ of a Court is an

inalienable part of the respect associated with upholding

of the Rule of Law. Attacks on Judges irrevocably dent the

dignity of Courts as impartial arbiters of justice and affects

public trust and confidence in the judiciary. Advocates, as

equal participants in the quest for justice, have a greater

responsibility in ensuring that the Court is not brought to

disrepute.

13.As an end-note, Judgeship is never about the power

of the Chair but is always about the responsibility of

disseminating justice with conscience, commitment and

compassion. The common man should repose full faith

and confidence on the Courts. Fortunately,

notwithstanding the occasional stresses and strains, Courts

continue to be the proud flag-bearers of justice.”

(Emphasis added)

Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of In Re: N. Peddi Raju

and others (supra) also observed that in the recent past there is a

growing trend of making scurrilous and scandalous allegations against

the Judge(s), in the pleadings, when they do not get favourable orders,

and such a practice has to be strongly deprecated. In regard to the role of

the lawyers, their Lordship’s referred to the Constitution Bench

judgement in the case of M.Y. Shareef v. Hon’ble Judges of the High

Court of Nagpur, (1954) 2 SWCC 444; judgement in the case of T.V.

Choudhary, A Member of the Indian Administrative Service (Under

Suspension), (1987) 3 SCC 258; and also quoted: Lord Reld in Rondel

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 36 -

v. Worsley [[1967) 3 All ER 993, 998], & Lord Denning, M.R. in

Rondel v. W [[1966] 3 All ER 657, 665].

28. Reverting to the present petition, it is noticed that the choice

of words and the language used by the petitioner in the main petition as

well as in the subsequent additional affidavit dated 06.10.2025, are

defamatory. The imputations levelled by the petitioner against the learned

Magistrate (named above) seem to be intended at scandalizing the Court

in such a way so as to create distrust in the people’s mind and impair the

confidence of the people in the Court and the Judge. This is not mere

writing of scandalous, scurrilous and contemptuous expressions in this

petition which constitutes criminal contempt but the act, conduct and

endeavour of the petitioner to create a general dissatisfaction in the minds

of people about the judicial determination also, prima facie, seems to

obstruct the administration of justice. The scurrilous attack on the

integrity and honesty of learned Magistrate is calculated to cause

irreparable harm to the reputation and character of the Judicial Officer

who is seized with the case of the petitioner on judicial side. The attempt

by a person to target a Judge is one of the ways to hinder or obstruct the

due administration of justice in the Courts. It seems to this Court that by

filing the instant petition, the petitioner intended to cause embarrassment

to the learned Magistrate and to deter him from discharging his judicial

functions. The expressions used by the petitioner in the main petition as

well as in the additional affidavit, which have already been noticed in the

earlier part of this judgement, are disparaging in character and derogatory

to the dignity of the learned Magistrate. The use of such expressions,

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 37 -

prima facie, tends to scandalise the authority of the Court. Further, the

personal attack on the impartiality and fairness of the learned Magistrate

while discharging judicial functions are a direct attack on his character,

causes prejudices and intends to interfere with the judicial processes.

29. At this juncture, it is also apposite to mention that it is not

for the first time that such type of petition has been filed by the petitioner.

This Court has come across the order dated 29.01.2025, passed by the

Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRM-M-4077-2025, titled as “Rajesh

Jain v. Sandeep Mehra and another”.

The said petition was filed by the petitioner herein for

setting aside the order dated 04.12.2019, passed by the learned Judicial

Magistrate Ist Class, Jind, in case No. NACT-436-2018, Police Station

Civil Lines, and further stern directions to learned District Judge Jind qua

non-disposal of application dated 24.10.2024, seeking recall of impugned

nullity order, inspite of extreme urgency compelling into extended

litigation.

In the said case, the petitioner appeared in person and filed

the petition by impleading the learned District Judge, Jind, as respondent

No. 2. At the time of listing of the said petition, a note was put up by the

Registry, bring to the notice of the Court that an objection was raised by

the registry as to why learned District Judge, Jind, was arrayed as

respondent No. 2. However, the petitioner did not delete the same and

requested to put up his case as it is before the Bench.

Thereupon, the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in par Nos.

3 to 6 of its order dated 29.01.2025, made the following observations:-

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 38 -

“3. The petitioner though tried to made an attempt

to justify impleading the District Judge, Jind as respondent

No.2, however after arguing for some time, he apologized

for his conduct. He prays for withdrawal of the present

petition with liberty to file a fresh one by not impleading

District Judge, Jind as respondent in the petition.

4. On hearing, the Court finds that the petitioner

is appearing in person, however even if the petitioner is

appearing in person, he cannot be allowed to desecrate the

sanctity of the Court. As he has apologized, this Court

keeping in view the magnanimity of the Court allows him to

withdraw this petition with liberty to file a fresh one after

rectifying the mistake.

5.The Court cautions the petitioner to maintain

dignity of the Court in future.

6. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed to

be withdrawn in above mentioned terms.”

30. Despite the caution having already been given by the Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court, in its order dated 29.01.2025 (supra), the

petitioner did not stop and filed the instant petition on 04.07.2025,

imputing scandalous allegations against the learned Magistrate, which

have already been discarded by this Court in the earlier part of this

judgement, because such allegations have been made without evidence or

due diligence and the language used is derogatory and is scandalous.

31. As a sequel of above discussion, this Court is of the

considered opinion that such conduct of the petitioner not only

undermines the dignity of the court but also constitutes criminal contempt

under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

32. Accordingly, the registry is directed to place the present

petition alongwith today’s judgement before Hon’ble the Chief Justice

for listing the matter before an appropriate Bench for the limited purpose

CRM-M-35246-2025 (O&M) - 39 -

and consideration whether further proceedings under Section 2(c) of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against the petitioner be initiated or not.

33. This Court also places on record its gratitude to Mr. Vivek

Salathia, learned Amicus Curiae, who graciously assisted in the present

proceedings, in bringing to fore the factual and legal position of law.

(SANJAY VASHISTH)

JUDGE

February 11, 2026

Pkapoor