CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 1 of 15

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRLA No.122 of 2004

(From the judgment and order dated 24.2.2004 passed by

learned Sessions Judge, Ganjam-Gajapati, Berhampur in S.C.

Case No.228/1999)

Laxman Kumar Sahoo

… Appellant

- versus-

State of Odisha … Respondent

Advocates appeared in the case through hybrid mode:

For Appellant : Ms.Diptirekha Nanda,

Advocate

-versus-

For Respondent

: Ms. Subhalaxmi Devi,

A.S.C.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CORAM:

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

Date of Hearing:05.03.2026 :: Date of Judgment:12.03.2026

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 2 of 15

Sashikanta Mishra,J. The appellant faced trial for committing

dowry death/murder of his wife in Sessions Case

No.228/1999 in the court of learned Sessions Judge,

Ganjam-Gajapati at Berhampur and being convicted for

the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C., he was

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life vide

judgment dated 24.2.2004, which is impugned in the

present appeal.

2. Prosecution case, briefly stated, is as follows;

The accused married one Gitanjali Palo, daughter of

Prabhasini Palo, as per Hindu rites on 17.1.1999 at

Jagannath Temple, Puri. It was agreed to pay

Rs.2,00,000/- as dowry as demanded by the bridegroom.

Prabhasini, paid Rs.50,000/-, gold ornaments, wearing

apparels and several household articles. The accused

used the said amount for purchasing articles for his

stationary shop. The balance amount was agreed to be

paid after marriage. The accused ill-treated his wife by

physically and mentally torturing her demanding the

balance amount. The couple was staying in a rented

accommodation. On 23.3.1999, Prabhasini heard that

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 3 of 15

the accused had set her daughter ablaze by pouring

kerosene on her body. Hearing this, she rushed to the

house of her daughter and found her with severe burn

injuries all over the body with kerosene smell. Her

daughter informed her that the accused had poured

kerosene on her and set fire to her using a match stick.

Prabhasini took her daughter on a rickshaw to the

hospital with the help of others where she was treated in

a critical condition. She reported the matter at Mahila

P.S., Berhampur on the next date. Basing on such

report, P.S. Case No.14 dated 24.3.1999 was registered

under Section 498-A/307 I.P.C. and Section 4 of the D.P.

Act followed by investigation. In course of investigation,

the victim having died, the case turned to Section 304-

B/302 of I.P.C. Charge sheet was accordingly submitted.

3. The plea of the accused is of complete denial.

4. To prove its case, prosecution examined 10

witnesses and proved 20 documents. Defence, on the

other hand, did not adduce any oral evidence but

exhibited two documents.

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 4 of 15

5. After analyzing the evidence on record, learned

Sessions Judge held that the prosecution had well

established its case against the accused. The dying

declaration of the deceased and the evidence of the other

witnesses including the informant were taken into

consideration by the learned Sessions Judge in arriving

at the above conclusion.

6. Heard Ms. Diptirekha Nanda, learned counsel for

the appellant and Ms. Subhalaxmi Devi, learned Addl.

Standing counsel for the State.

7. Ms. Nanda assails the impugned judgment of

conviction on the ground that the presence of the

appellant at the spot has not been proved nor his motive

to cause death of the deceased. Reliance on the dying

declaration is incorrect as there is no evidence to show

that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make such

a statement. Prosecution never proved that the dying

declaration was voluntary, truthful and free from

tutoring. Though it has been alleged that there was a

large gathering of people when the informant reached the

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 5 of 15

spot, no one has stated about the dying declaration

purportedly made by the deceased before her.

8. Per contra, Ms. Subhalaxmi Devi would contend

that it is well settled that only because a person

sustained 90% burn injuries does not automatically

imply that he/she is not in a fit mental state to make a

statement. There is no reason to disbelieve the doctor

who recorded the dying declaration as he is an

independent person having no interest in the case. Once

dying declaration is accepted, other considerations such

as motive etc. are not material. According to Ms.

Subhalaxmi, there is overwhelming evidence to show that

the accused had committed the crime.

9. Before delving into the merits of the rival

contentions, we feel it proper to examine the evidence on

record independently. The mother of the deceased, who is

the informant, was examined as P.W.2. Though she

mentioned in the F.I.R. that it was agreed to pay Rs.2

lakhs on the demand of the accused as dowry, she stated

before the Court that prior to the marriage there was no

demand either from the accused or from any of his

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 6 of 15

relations and that they had decided to give cash of Rs.2

lakhs to the accused. On the date of occurrence, her

daughter had come to her house for the tonsure

ceremony of her granddaughter. At about 7 to 8 P.M., the

accused came to their house and on his arrival the

deceased offered him some tiffin but he refused and left

their house. The deceased went to her house thereafter.

After some hours, the Sahi people came and informed

that the accused had set fire to Gitanjali hearing which,

they rushed to his house. P.W.2 further stated that she

found that her daughter was already brought out from

the room and kept on the verandah and that she had

severe burn injuries, but she was conscious and talking.

She told that the accused had burnt her by pouring

kerosene on her body. P.W.2 took her to the MKCG

Medical College and Hospital but she died two days after.

P.W.2 was cross-examined extensively. We find nothing

in the cross-examination so as to even remotely shake

her testimony.

10. Surprisingly, the brother of the deceased (son of

P.W.2) did not entirely support the prosecution case

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 7 of 15

against the accused though he corroborated the version

of P.W.2 regarding residence of the deceased in a rented

house at Sashtri Nagar and that on the date of the

occurrence the tonsure Ceremony was in progress in

their house and that the accused and the deceased had

come to their house and left after the feast. He did not

whisper a word about the oral dying declaration of the

deceased before P.W.2 for which he was declared hostile.

11. No other witness has stated anything to incriminate

the accused other than P.W.2.

12. P.W.8 is the doctor who recorded the dying

declaration of the deceased as her treating doctor. He

stated as follows:

“On 24.3.99, at 7-30 A.M. as the attending Doctor of

the patient, I recorded the dying declaration of the

patient, namely, Gitanjali Palo. The patient was then

conscious. I examined her condition and then I

recorded her dying declarations in my own hand in

presence of two P.G. Students, who have also signed

on the dying declaration statement. In the bed-head

ticket, I have clearly recorded about the condition of

the patient to the effect that the patient was conscious

and well oriented. This is my endorsement to that

effect marked as Ext.7/2. I could not take the L.T.I. or

R.T.I. of the patient as her both hands were severely

burnt. I have also recorded this fact in the dying

declaration statement. This is the dying declaration

recorded by me marked as Ext.7/3. This is my

endorsement with signature below it marked as

Ext.7/4. This is my signature at the foot of the dying

declaration marked as Ext.7/5. Both the P.G.

students in whose presence, I recorded the dying

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 8 of 15

declaration also signed on the dying declaration in

my presence. These are the signatures of the P.G.

Students, namely, Dr. Benu Panigrahi and Dr. Rajesh

Dora, marked as axts.7/6 and 7/7 respectively. I

have recorded the dying declaration in question and

answer form.

I did not requisition the services of any Magistrate for

recording the dying declaration of the patient.”

P.W.8 was also extensively cross-examined and he

admitted to not having endorsed any certificate that the

patient was conscious and that he examined her and

recorded her dying declaration.

13. P.W.9 is the autopsy surgeon, who found the

following injuries;

“Superficial burn injuries involving almost all the

parts of the body except (1) both sole, (2) an area of

44 c.m X 12 c.m involving outer lateral surface of right

upper lip staring just below the lateral end of clavicle

extending downwards. (3) an area of 42 c.m X 10 c.m

involing the outer lateral aspect of right thigh starting

10 c.m below the iliac crest ante-mortem showing line

of redness at the junction of burnt and unbrunt areas

looking black covered by medicaments and

amounting to 90 to 95 percent of body surface.”

He opined that the deceased died due to shock as a

result of the injuries.

The dying declaration was marked Ext.7/3. It is

recorded in question-answer form and is reproduced

below;

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 9 of 15

We think it proper to render an English

translation of the dying declaration as follows-

“ DYING DECLARATION

Dying declaration of Geetanjali Palo vide Regd. No.-C-

11571/23.03.99, Time 7.30 am on dt. 24.03.99

Q. What is your name?

A. Gitanjali Palo.

Q. Are your married – Yes

Q. What is the name of your husband? What is your

address?

A. Laxman Kumar Sahu, Sashtrinagar, Bijipur,

Berhampur, Ganjam.

Q. What caused your present situation?

A. Yesterday night at 11 P.M. my husband quarreled

with me and poured kerosene on me and then set fire

by lighting match stick.”

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 10 of 15

14. From the above narration, we find that there are no

eye witnesses to the occurrence. P.W.2 is the only witness

who has directly implicated the accused. That apart, the

oral dying declaration of the deceased made before P.W.2

and the recorded dying declaration marked Ext.7 also

directly implicate the accused. The trial Court, while not

accepting the prosecution case of dowry death, has held

it to be a case of murder basing on the above referred

evidence. Ex-facie, we find no infirmity much less

illegality in the judgment of the trial Court.

15. Having held as above, we shall now consider the

grounds raised by the accused-appellant to question the

correctness of the judgment.

16. It is urged that there is no evidence that the

accused was present at the spot. Admittedly, no evidence

is adduced in this regard. But in a question put to him

during his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the

accused admitted that the deceased was inside the

house. Since there is otherwise evidence on record to

show that the accused had visited his in-laws’ house for

the tonsure ceremony and had returned with his wife

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 11 of 15

following him shortly thereafter, there is no reason to

hold that the accused had gone somewhere else and not

to his house. In fact, in his examination under Section

313 Cr.P.C., the accused admitted that he had gone to

bring his wife from his in-laws’ house. Nothing has been

suggested to the prosecution witnesses, particularly

P.W.2 as to the presence of the accused elsewhere if not

at his home. Since the deceased clearly stated that her

husband poured kerosene on her body and set fire to her,

there can be no other conclusion that he was present at

home with the deceased. Prosecution cannot be expected

to lead evidence as to what had transpired inside the

house, but an inference can be drawn based on the

surrounding circumstances and the other evidence

adduced in this regard.

17. Coming to the dying declaration, prosecution relies

upon two such declarations- one made before P.W.2 at

the spot and the other recorded by the doctor at the

hospital. We may leave aside the oral dying declaration

for a moment and focus on the recorded declaration vide

Ext.7. Ms. Nanda has vehemently argued that in the

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 12 of 15

absence of any endorsement by the doctor that the

deceased was in a fit mental condition to give a

statement, Ext.7 cannot be accepted. She further argues

that the deceased having admittedly sustained 90% burn

injuries cannot be expected to be conscious or mentally

oriented enough to give a clear statement.

We have given our anxious consideration to the

above argument, but are unable to accept the same. We

say so for the reason that the doctor recording the dying

declaration is an entirely independent person having no

interest in the case. In fact, nothing was suggested to

him that he was actuated by malafides. The dying

declaration is in question-answer form. As can be seen

from its bare perusal, she clearly stated that on the

previous night her husband, after quarrelling with her,

poured kerosene and set fire using matchstick. The dying

declaration was recorded in presence of two P.G.

students but they were not examined. Law relating to use

of dying declaration is no longer res integra. In the case of

P.V. Radhakrishna v. State of Karnataka

1, it was held

that there is no hard and fast rule that percentage of

1

(2003) 6 SCC 443

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 13 of 15

burns is determinative factor to affect the credibility of

dying declaration and probability of its recording.

Percentage of burns alone will not determine the

probability or otherwise of making the dying declaration.

Even in a case of 100% burns, the Supreme Court has

held that merely for 100% burn injuries, it cannot be said

that the victim was incapable to make a statement.

Reference in this regard may be had to the judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of, Purshottam Chopra

v. State (NCT of Delhi)

2. Therefore, only because the

deceased sustained 90% burn does not, ipso facto, render

her incapable of giving a statement. As regards the

absence of a certificate showing her fit mental condition,

it has been held in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh

vs. Dal Singh and others

3, the Supreme Court held

that-

“20. The law on the issue can be summarised to the

effect that law does not provide who can record a

dying declaration, nor is there any prescribed form,

format, or procedure for the same. The person who

records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the

maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of

making such a statement. Moreover, the requirement

of a certificate provided by a doctor in respect of such

state of the deceased, is not essential in every case.”

2

(2020) 11 SCC 489

3

(2013) Supreme Court Cases 159

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 14 of 15

18. As already stated, P.W.8 stated that he had

recorded in the bed-head ticket at the time of admission

of the deceased that she was conscious and well oriented.

The dying declaration was recorded within two hours

thereafter. P.W.8 has categorically stated that the patient

was then conscious, he examined her condition and then

recorded her dying declaration. We find no reason to

disbelieve the version of the doctor who, as already

stated, is an independent person and a medical

professional having no personal interest in the case other

than treating the patient. So, leaving aside all other

evidence, the dying declaration is enough to show the

complicity of the accused.

19. As regards the question whether it can form the sole

basis of conviction, the Supreme Court in the case of

Kamla v. State of Punjab

4, referring to the oft quoted

judgment in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay

5, held

that if a dying declaration is found to be voluntary,

reliable and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied

upon even without any corroboration. The deceased made

4

(1993) 1 SCC 1

5

1957 SCC OnLine SC 20

CRLA No.122 of 2004 Page 15 of 15

an oral dying declaration before her mother P.W.2,

wherein she also stated the same thing as she stated

before the Doctor. There is no inconsistency whatsoever.

Moreover, there is no reason why a person facing

imminent death would falsely implicate her husband. The

grounds raised by the appellant are therefore untenable.

20. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of the

evidence, reasoning of the trial Court and its findings, the

contentions raised and the discussions made, we are left

with no doubt that the accused was rightly convicted for

the offence of murder. We, therefore, find no reason to

interfere with the impugned order.

21. In the result, the appeal fails and is therefore,

dismissed. The accused-appellant being on bail, his bail

bonds be cancelled and he be taken to custody forthwith

to serve the remaining part of the sentence.

..........................................

Sashikanta Mishra, J.

Manash Ranjan Pathak, J. I agree.

…........................................

Manash Ranjan Pathak, J.

Ashok Kumar Behera