2026 INSC 7 Page 1 of 34

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 24570 OF 2024)

NIRBHAY SINGH SULIYA …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

& ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

K.V. Viswanathan, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This case highlights the unfortunate plight of a judicial

officer (appellant herein) who, after 27 years of unblemished

service, was removed from service. The sole and exclusive

basis on which the appellant has been removed are four

judicial orders by which he enlarged certain parties thereon

on bail. Those four orders were contrasted with fourteen other

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orders of bail and after finding that in the four orders Section

59-A of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915 (for short the

“Excise Act”) was not referred to, action has been taken.

According to the High Court, in the fourteen other orders the

appellant referred to the said Section implying thereby that he

was conscious of the existence of the said Section on the

statute. Section 59-A prescribes what has now famously come

to be known as “twin conditions” for grant of bail.

3. The question before us is whether on facts, based on the

four judicial orders of grant of bail per se and without anything

more, the authorities were justified in removing the appellant

from service?

4. The facts lie in a very narrow compass. The appellant

joined service on 31.10.1987 as Civil Judge (Junior Division) in

the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service. The appellant scaled

the ladder up and in 2003 was promoted as Additional District

Judge and in September, 2008 was confirmed in the said post.

On 16.05.2011, he was transferred to Khargone, District

Mandaleshwar (MP), where he joined as First Additional

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District & Sessions Judge. In the course of discharge of his

duties, he dealt with several matters, including bail

applications under the Excise Act.

5. One Jaipal Mehta, a resident of Jaitapur, Khargone,

lodged a complaint with the Chief Justice of the Madhya

Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur. The complaint which did not

set out any details of the bail orders and which was in very

general terms reads as under:-

“Subject: Regarding disposal of cases under Section 34(2)

of IPC.

Sir,

In reference to above subject matter, it is requested that

First ADJ Sh. Suliya posted in Khargone, District-West

Nimar, Mandleshwar by taking bribe through his Steno

namely Anil Joshi, Clerk, is granting bails in the cases of

Section 34/2 of Excise Act i.e. of 50 Bulk Ltrs. of liquor,

whereas, ADJ/Sessions Judge has no power to allow said

bail applications. Said Bails are allowed by the High Court.

Anil Joshi, Steno challenges in each and every case that

either you bring case of 302, 307, Claim or Civil Case, I

have good setting with sir, I will get it resolved, rest you

have to pay money as per my wishes. Due to such corrupt

employee, the judiciary is getting defamed. Injustice is

being done with the aggrieved parties in place of giving

them justice. Who will be responsible for it? Previously in

the year 1995-196, the serious complaints of bribe were

also made against the said corrupt employee, on which, no

action was taken. Aforesaid employee is posted in

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Khargone since last 25 years and is earning money by

doing setting with Advocates openly. If the enquiry of his

account be conducted, then, the truth will be exposed. If,

the trust of public loses confidence in judiciary then, will

be possible of military rule jungle raj.”

6. It will be seen that according to the complaint, the

allegation was that the appellant was taking bribe through his

steno, namely, Anil Joshi for grant of bail in cases under the

Excise Act in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50 Bulk

liters or more; that the said Anil Joshi was claiming that he will

get the work done through the appellant for extraneous

consideration; that due to such corrupt employee, the

judiciary was getting defamed; that even in 1995-96, serious

complaints of bribery were made against the said employee

on which no action was taken; that the said employee has been

posted in Khargone for more than 25 years and is earning

money through illegal means and that an inquiry is essential.

7. It appears from the counter affidavit filed before this

Court by R-2 - the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, that a

preliminary inquiry was conducted by the District Judge (I &

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V), Indore Zone, Indore, against the appellant and on

06.10.2012, the Principal Registrar (I & V) put up a note based

on which it was decided to initiate departmental proceedings

against the appellant.

8. What emerges is that in the preliminary inquiry certain

orders passed by the appellant in bail proceedings seem to

have been examined and few orders pulled out. Two charges

were framed against the appellant of which the second charge

admittedly was held not proved by the inquiry officer. The

charges read as under:-

“Whereas, you Shri Nirbhay Singh Suliya while functioning

as Additional Sessions Judge, Khargone, distt.

Mandleshwar, have committed following acts which if

proved would amount to grave misconduct:-

ARTICLE OF CHARGE - I

That, you, with corrupt of oblique motive or for some

extraneous considerations, while functioning as Additional

& Sessions Judge, allowed Bail Application No. 129/11

Lokesh Vs. State of MP vide order dated 1.8.11, Bail

Application No. 136/11 Babulal & Ors. Vs. State vide order

dated 4.8.11, Bail Application No.200/11 Mohan Vs. State of

MP vide order dated 7.12.11, Bail Application No. 123/12

Jitendra & Nantiya Vs. State & No. 122/12 Gulab & Ors. Vs.

State of MP, vide order dated 31-08-12, against the

provisions of Section 59-A of the M.P. Excise Act wherein

all the cases, quantity of seized liquor was 50 and more

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bulk litres. On the contrary, you rejected Bail Application

No.89/11 vide order dated 16.06.2011, Bail Application No.

92/11, vide order dated 23.06.11, Bail Application

No.104/11, vide order dated 1.7.2011, Bail Application

No.103/11, vide order dated 4.7.11, Bail Application no.

111/11, vide order dated 11.7.11, Bail Application No.

121/11, vide order dated 21.07.11, Bail Application

No.140/11, vide order dated 12.08.11, Bail Application No.

160/11 vide order dated 22.09.11 and six other bail

applications in which the quantity of seized liquor was 50

bulk litres or more. In this manner you have applied double

standard, malafidely, in allowing the aforesaid bail

applications.

ARTICLE OF CHARGE - II

That, you, with corrupt or oblique motive or for some

extraneous consideration allowed the first bail application

No. 101/2012 Pappu Vs. State of MP in Crime No. 101/2012

under section 439 of CrPC for offense punishable under

363, 366, 376(2)(g) of the IPC in a serious offence of gang

rape without assigning any sufficient reason, whereas the

accused was already facing trial in another similar crime

no. 103/2012 PS Oon for offence punishable under sections

363, 366, 376(2)(g) 3 of the IPC.

Your aforesaid acts being unbecoming of Judicial Officer

amount to grave misconduct under Rule 3 of M.P. Civil

Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 and are punishable under

Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control &

Appeal) Rules, 1966.”

9. A perusal of “Charge-I” reveals that the orders in the

following bail applications where Bail was granted to the

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applicants therein were the basis of the gravamen of the

charge:-

Bail Application Nos. Date of Order

129/2011 01.08.2011

136/2011 04.08.2011

200/2011 07.12.2011

123/2012 & 122/2012 31.08.2012

10. The charge was that for corrupt motive or that for some

extraneous consideration, bail applications were allowed

contrary to Section 59-A of the Excise Act. A contrast was

made with 14 other bail orders, where the appellant had

rejected bail. It is significant to note that among the five bail

orders, Bail Application No.200/2011 that was disposed of on

07.12.2011 was actually a case where the appellant had

rejected bail. Somehow that order also made its way into

“Charge-I”, as an order of grant of bail. Be that as it may. In

the list of witnesses, Jaipal Mehta was named apart from a

general statement – “any other witnesses that may be felt

necessary”.

11. The appellant gave his reply and dealt with each bail

order that was subject matter of the charge.

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12. We have perused the actual bail orders. In the bail order

in Bail Application No.129/2011 (60 liters of liquor) the

reasoning given was as under:-

“After hearing arguments of both the parties, Criminal

Case No.1685/11 Filed before Chief Judicial Magistrate

was perused. On perusal, it is clear that on 25.07.2011,

challan has been filed against both the Applicants/Accused

in violation of Section 34(2) of M.P. Excise Act, and

possibility of consuming time in it's trial cannot be

overruled. In view of the nature of crime, allegations, and

without commenting on the merits of evidences collected

in the present case i.e. Crime No. 232/11, and by placing

reliance on the said case laws, where trial is likely to take

time, and Applicant/Accused are theirselves [sic] being

permanent resident, there is no flight risk or tempering

evidences on their part, thereupon, it appears justifiable to

grant benefit of bail to these Applicants/ Accused Persons.

Due to this reason, the present Bail Application u/s 439

Cr.P.C. is hereby allowed.”

13. Similarly, in other orders, reasons like filing of challan,

the applicants being rural farmers with no flight risk were

mentioned. There was no express reference to the twin

conditions under Section 59-A(2) of the Excise Act.

14. At the inquiry, the complainant Jaipal Mehta was not

examined. Instead the executive clerk of ADJ, Khargone

Court, Gendalal Chauhan was examined as witness No.1, in

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support of the charge. The witness marked all the exhibits and

categorically deposed as under which actually was in favour

of the appellant :-

“It is correct to say that while passing orders, Anil Joshi was

posted as Steno in the Court of First Additional Sessions

Judge. He is posted in Khargone since last 7-8 years, whom

I know due to being my colleague. I never seen Anil (sic)

asking anyone that he has good relations with Suliya Sahab

and I will get done the work by doing setting. None of the

Advocates has told me that Anil Joshi has setting with Suliya

Sahab.”

15. The appellant in defense examined the prosecutor K.P.

Tripathi who appeared in all the 18 bail applications which

were subject matter of the charge. He deposed as under:-

“I did not feel that the double standard has been adopted

by the Court. If it would happen, then, I would give my

opinion to the State for taking action in Hon'ble High

Court. In Exh. P-19, only one Crime i.e. Crime No.102/12

is registered against Accused Pappu in P.S. Oon.

Moreover, as per my knowledge, no other crime is

registered against this accused. Because in Police Report,

there is no mention of registration of any other crime

against him. I find the functioning of Court to be

completely impartial.”

……

Page 10 of 34

“That, three Bail Applications of Excise Act have been

allowed, and out of the said Applications, 15 Applications

have been rejected. In my opinion, in the cases of Bail

marked as Exh. P-1, P-2 and P-4, those orders of allowing

bail application which have been passed in view of the

facts and circumstances of respective cases, nature of

crime, and in pursuance of the case laws of Hon'ble High

Court and Supreme Court, those orders are completely

based on merits and are relevant and true as per law.

Those 15 Bail Applications which have been rejected by

the Ld. Trial Court, out of those cases, in the orders

marked as Exh. P-9, Exh. P-12, Exh. P-13, Exh. P-17 and

Exh. P-18, the case was at the initial stage of

investigation.”

……

“Note: Question by Enquiry Officer:-

Question: The bail orders, in which bail applications have

been allowed, whether those orders according to your

goodself or in the opinion of Public Prosecutor, are proper

or improper? What you say in this regard.

Answer: In my opinion i.e. in the capacity of Public

Prosecutor, the orders of granting bail were absolutely

proper and on proper grounds.”

16. Notwithstanding the above evidence the inquiry officer

held “Charge-I”, proved by recording the following findings:-

“Therefore, on the basis of aforesaid analysis, as a final

conclusion, it is proved in favour of the Department that

Delinquent Officer Sh. N.S. Suliya in the capacity of

Additional Sessions Judge, not being impartial in the

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disposal of Bail Applications for the offences of Section

34(2), 49-A of the Excise Act, and with oblique motive and

by deliberately violating the mandatory provisions of

Section 59-A of the aforesaid Act, has committed

misconduct by allowing some Bail Application Nos.

129/11, 136/11, 123/12, 122/12 and by rejecting some bail

Applications by applying double standards in malafide

and arbitrary manner, who has violated Rule 3 of the M.P.

Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 196, which is punishable

under Rule 10 of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification,

Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966.”

17. On 21.03.2014, a copy of the inquiry report was furnished

to the appellant and he was asked to show cause on the

punishment. The appellant filed a detailed reply by his letter

dated 10.04.2014.

18. On 02.09.2014, on the recommendation of the High Court

of Madhya Pradesh, order was passed by the Principal

Secretary, Government of M.P., Law & Legislative Affairs

Department, removing the appellant from service. A

representation/appeal filed against the said order was

rejected on 17.03.2016.

19. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court

of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur (Writ Petition No.8623/2016)

challenging the order of removal and the order of the

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appellate authority and prayed for reinstatement with

consequential benefits.

20. By the impugned order dated 25.07.2024, the High Court

has dismissed the Writ Petition by recording the following

finding:-

“If the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the

case referred to herein above, are taken note of, then a

reasonable finding arrived at by the Inquiring Authority in

the present case based on material available on record can

neither be interfered with by this Court nor can it termed

as perverse or unreasonable to such an extent that

interference can be made by this Court.

Considering the material available in the present case, it is

apparent that the petitioner was holding the post of

Additional Sessions Judge with which comes a great

responsibility and he was under obligation to conduct

himself in a manner befitting the post held by him. He was

under duty to conduct the proceedings of bail applications

in conformity with the provisions of law. He extended the

benefit of bail to some applicants relying on the

pronouncement of High Court and refused to grant bail to

others without considering those pronouncements. No

violation of principles of natural justice or error is found in

the procedure followed in the enquiry in the present case.

In the absence of any procedural illegality, irregularity in

the conduct of departmental enquiry, in the considered

opinion of this Court, no interference is warranted and after

considering the over all material available in the record

and in view of the settled position of law, we do not find any

reason to interfere in the order of punishment/removal

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dated 02.09.2014 and the order of rejection of appeal on

17.03.2016 and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.”

21. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us.

22. We have heard Mr. Dama Seshadri Naidu, learned senior

counsel assisted by Mr. Kanu Agarwal, learned counsel for the

appellant and Mr. Arjun Garg, learned counsel for the

respondent no. 2, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, who

ably presented the case of the said respondent. We have

perused the records, including the written submissions and

the compilation of case law filed by the parties.

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT: -

23. Learned senior counsel for the appellant contends that

the allegations were directly against Anil Joshi – the

Stenographer; that neither the complainant – Jaipal Mehta nor

the Stenographer was produced as witnesses during the

Departmental Inquiry and that the bail orders which were

subject matter of the inquiry were passed on valid grounds.

Even in the case of special statute “bail is the rule and jail is the

exception”; that the Inquiry Officer has examined the legality

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and propriety of the orders of bail acting as an Appellate

Authority. That the departmental witness Gendalal Chauhan

and the public prosecutor in their deposition did not support

the charge and finally it was contended that merely because

on a given set of facts, a different conclusion is possible, is no

ground to indict a Judicial Officer. It was further submitted that

wrong exercise of jurisdiction or mistake of law or wrong

interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating

disciplinary proceedings.

CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2 – THE HIGH

COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH :-

24. The learned Counsel for the respondent no. 2 - the High

Court of Madhya Pradesh submitted that the procedure for

Inquiry has been duly followed; that the consistent view of this

Court has been that the Court will not function as an Appellate

Court over the Inquiry report and the only consideration was

whether the Inquiry had been fairly conducted after giving

due opportunity to the delinquent. It was further submitted

that Section 59-A (2) of the Excise Act was not even referred to

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in the bail orders in question, while in the other bail orders it

was mentioned while rejecting bail. The learned counsel

submitted that the Inquiry Officer has come to the conclusion

that the conduct of the appellant was not impartial and the

appellant violated the mandate of Section 59-A and applied

double standards in a mala fide and arbitrary manner. It was

submitted that a judicial officer is required to maintain a very

high standard of devotion to duty. So contending, it was

pleaded that the impugned order did not call for any

interference.

QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION : -

25. The questions for consideration are whether the order

removing the appellant from service based on the inquiry

report is justified in law and whether any good ground has

been made out for interference?

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION: -

26. The present is the case of a Disciplinary Inquiry against

the senior Judicial Officer. Before we set out the parameters

laid down by this Court as to in what circumstances a Judicial

Page 16 of 34

Officer can be subjected to penalty in the discharge of his

duties, it is apposite to make certain preliminary

observations.

27. A fearless judge is the bedrock of an independent

judiciary, as much as an independent judiciary itself is the

foundation on which rule of law rests. A judicial Officer is

tasked with the onerous duty of deciding cases. Invariably

one party to the case would lose and go back unhappy.

Disgruntled elements amongst them, wanting to settle scores

may raise frivolous allegations. The Trial Judiciary also has

tremendous work pressure and works under trying working

conditions. Large number of cases are listed in a day and most

of the Judicial Officers give their very best while discharging

their duties.

28. Instances have also emerged from different parts of the

country, where not just disgruntled parties but some

mischievous elements in the Bar have also resorted to

intimidatory tactics against the members of the Trial Judiciary

by engineering false and anonymous complaints. Strict and

Page 17 of 34

strong action in accordance with law should be taken against

such individuals filing a false and frivolous complaint against

a judicial officer and/or if found to be engineering the false

and frivolous complaints. Such proceedings would include in

appropriate cases, proceedings for contempt of court. In case

the person filing or engineering false and frivolous complaints

is a recalcitrant member of the Bar, apart from proceedings

for contempt of court, reference to the bar council should be

made for disciplinary action. Bar councils, on receipt of such

references, have to dispose of the matter expeditiously.

29. Equally, if the complaint of misconduct against the

judicial officer is prima facie found to be true, prompt action

to initiate disciplinary proceeding should be taken and no

leniency should be shown if the charges are established. Not

only this, in appropriate cases where criminal prosecution is

warranted against a judicial officer, the High Court should not

hesitate to have the same initiated. That is the only way to

weed out black-sheeps sullying the fair name of the judiciary.

Due care and caution must be exercised by the High Court in

Page 18 of 34

initiating such proceedings. It should be ensured that only

because an order is wrong or there is an error of judgment,

without anything more, a judicial officer is not put through the

ordeal of a disciplinary proceeding or a prosecution.

30. It is trite to recall the observations of this Court in Sadhna

Chaudhary v. State of U.P and Another.

1:-

“20. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion

cannot constitute “misconduct”. Any “probability” of

misconduct needs to be supported with oral or documentary

material, even though, the standard of proof would

obviously not be on a par with that in a criminal trial. While

applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to

consider the existence of differing standards and

approaches amongst different Judges. There are

innumerable instances of judicial officers who are liberal in

granting bail, awarding compensation under MACT or for

acquired land, back wages to workmen or mandatory

compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such

relief-oriented judicial approaches cannot by

themselves be grounds to cast aspersions on the honesty

and integrity of an officer.

21. Furthermore, one cannot overlook the reality of ours

being a country, wherein countless complainants are

readily available without hesitation to tarnish the image

of the judiciary, often for mere pennies or even cheap

momentary popularity. Sometimes, a few disgruntled

members of the Bar also join hands with them, and the

officers of the subordinate judiciary are usually the

easiest target. It is, therefore, the duty of the High Courts

1

(2020) 11 SCC 760

Page 19 of 34

to extend their protective umbrella and ensure that the

upright and straightforward judicial officers are not

subjected to unmerited onslaught.

26. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end

result of adjudication does not matter, and only whether

the delinquent officer had taken illegal gratification

(monetary or otherwise) or had been swayed by

extraneous considerations while conducting the process

is of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is possible that

a judicial officer can indulge in conduct unbecoming of

his office whilst at the same time giving an order, the

result of which is legally sound. Such unbecoming

conduct can either be in the form of a Judge taking a case

out of turn, delaying hearings through adjournments,

seeking bribes to give parties their legal dues, etc. None

of these necessarily need to affect the outcome.

However, importantly in the present case, a perusal of the

charge-sheet shows that no such allegation of the process

having been vitiated has been made against the appellant.”

(Emphasis supplied)

31. In Abhay Jain vs. High Court of Rajasthan

2, this Court

quoted with approval the observations in Sadhna Chaudhary

(supra).

32. When false allegations fly thick and fast, the judicial

officers cannot react. Here is where the High Court which is

vested with the supervisory control has to exercise great

2

(2022) 13 SCC 1

Page 20 of 34

caution and circumspection. As to what the parameters are,

when the High Court on the Administrative side is faced with

such a scenario, has been felicitously set out by Chief Justice

D.Y. Chandrachud J. speaking for the Court in R.R. Parekh v.

High Court of Gujarat and Another

3 as under: -

“16. The issue of whether a judicial officer has been

actuated by an oblique motive or corrupt practice has to be

determined upon a careful appraisal of the material on the

record. Direct evidence of corruption may not always be

forthcoming in every case involving a misconduct of this

nature. A wanton breach of the governing principles of law

or procedure may well be indicative in a given case of a

motivated, if not reckless disregard of legal principle. In the

absence of a cogent explanation to the contrary, it is for the

disciplinary authority to determine whether a pattern has

emerged on the basis of which an inference that the judicial

officer was actuated by extraneous considerations can be

drawn. Cases involving misdemeanours of a judicial officer

have to be dealt with sensitivity and care. A robust common

sense must guide the disciplinary authority. At one end of

the spectrum are those cases where direct evidence of a

misdemeanour is available. Evidence in regard to the

existence of an incriminating trail must be carefully

scrutinised to determine whether an act of misconduct is

established on the basis of legally acceptable evidence. Yet

in other cases, direct evidence of a decision being actuated

by a corrupt motive may not be available. The issue which

arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances from

which an inference that extraneous considerations have

actuated a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn. Such

3

(2016) 14 SCC 1

Page 21 of 34

an inference cannot obviously be drawn merely from a

hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. A wrong decision

can yet be a bona fide error of judgment. Inadvertence

is consistent with an honest error of judgment. A charge

of misconduct against a judicial officer must be

distinguished from a purely erroneous decision whether

on law or on fact. The legality of a judicial determination

is subject to such remedies as are provided in law for

testing the correctness of the determination. It is not the

correctness of the verdict but the conduct of the officer

which is in question. The disciplinary authority has to

determine whether there has emerged from the record

one or more circumstances that indicate that the

decision which forms the basis of the charge of

misconduct was not an honest exercise of judicial

power. The circumstances let into evidence to establish

misconduct have to be sifted and evaluated with caution.

The threat of disciplinary proceedings must not demotivate

the honest and independent officer. Yet on the other hand,

there is a vital element of accountability to society involved

in dealing with cases of misconduct. There is on the one

hand a genuine public interest in protecting fearless and

honest officers of the District Judiciary from motivated

criticism and attack. Equally there is a genuine public

interest in holding a person who is guilty of wrongdoing,

responsible for his or her actions. Neither aspect of public

interest can be ignored. Both are vital to the preservation of

the integrity of the administration of justice.”

(Emphasis supplied)

33. As held in R.R. Parekh (supra), it should be borne-in-

mind that inference of misconduct or about extraneous

considerations having actuated, the decision cannot be drawn

Page 22 of 34

merely from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous. It has

been held that a wrong decision can yet be a bona fide error

of judgment and inadvertence is consistent with an honest

error of judgment. Ultimately, it is not the correctness of the

verdict but the conduct of the Officer in question which is

determinative.

34. It is apposite to recall the observations of this Court in

Union of India and Others vs. K.K. Dhawan

4, which has been

followed in P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. and Others

5. This Court

in K.K. Dhawan (supra), while illustrating certain cases for

which disciplinary action can be initiated, took care to

administer a note of caution also. In K.K. Dhawan (supra), this

Court held:-

“28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial

or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or

in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as

a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has

to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the

present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or

legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of

the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The

4

(1993) 2 SCC 56

5

(2001) 6 SCC 491

Page 23 of 34

legality of the orders with reference to the nine

assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision

under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the

Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary

action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude

that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following

cases:

(i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would

reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or

devotion to duty;

(ii) if there is prima facie material to show

recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his

duty;

(iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming

of a Government servant;

(iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the

prescribed conditions which are essential for the

exercise of the statutory powers;

(v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;

(vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive,

however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke

said long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the

fault is great”.

29. The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive.

However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or

merely because the order is wrong and the action not

falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary

action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of

caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no

absolute rule can be postulated.”

35. This Court held that merely because the order is wrong,

disciplinary action is not warranted and that each case will

Page 24 of 34

depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated.

What is significant to notice is that even though in the

illustrated case [para 28 (iv)] K.K. Dhawan (supra), cases of

omission of prescribed conditions which are essential for the

exercise of statutory powers may in a given case furnish a

ground for disciplinary enquiry, it is not an absolute rule and

each case will depend upon the facts. As observed in R.R.

Parekh (supra), the Disciplinary Authority has to examine

whether there has emerged from the record, one or more

circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms the

basis of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise

of judicial power.

36. In Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and

Haryana and Another

6, this Court highlighted how the

functioning of the Trial Judiciary would be seriously impacted

and fearless discharge of duties would become a casualty, if

inquiries are launched on ill-conceived or motivated

6

(1988) 3 SCC 370

Page 25 of 34

complaints. This Court in Ishwar Chand Jain (supra) held as

under:-

“14. Under the Constitution the High Court has control

over the subordinate judiciary. While exercising that

control it is under a constitutional obligation to guide

and protect judicial officers. An honest strict judicial

officer is likely to have adversaries in the mofussil

courts. If complaints are entertained on trifling matters

relating to judicial orders which may have been upheld

by the High Court on the judicial side no judicial officer

would feel protected and it would be difficult for him to

discharge his duties in an honest and independent

manner. An independent and honest judiciary is a sine

qua non for rule of law. If judicial officers are under

constant threat of complaint and enquiry on trifling

matters and if High Court encourages anonymous

complaints to hold the field the subordinate judiciary

will not be able to administer justice in an independent

and honest manner. It is therefore imperative that the

High Court should also take steps to protect its honest

officers by ignoring ill-conceived or motivated

complaints made by the unscrupulous lawyers and

litigants. Having regard to facts and circumstances of the

instant case we have no doubt in our mind that the resolution

passed by the Bar Association against the appellant was

wholly unjustified and the complaints made by Shri

Mehlawat and others were motivated which did not deserve

any credit. Even the vigilance Judge after holding enquiry

did not record any finding that the appellant was guilty of

any corrupt motive or that he had not acted judicially. All

that was said against him was that he had acted improperly

in granting adjournments.”

[Emphasis supplied]

Page 26 of 34

37. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ramesh Chander

Singh v. High Court of Allahabad and Another

7, wherein this

Court held as under:-

“12. This Court on several occasions has disapproved the

practice of initiation of disciplinary proceedings against

officers of the subordinate judiciary merely because the

judgments/orders passed by them are wrong. The

appellate and revisional courts have been established

and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher

courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside

erroneous judgments of the lower courts. While taking

disciplinary action based on judicial orders, the High

Court must take extra care and caution.

17. In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India [(1999)

7 SCC 409 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1299 : AIR 1999 SC 2881] this

Court held that wrong exercise of jurisdiction by a quasi-

judicial authority or mistake of law or wrong

interpretation of law cannot be the basis for initiating

disciplinary proceeding. Of course, if the judicial officer

conducted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation

or integrity or good faith or there is a prima facie material

to show recklessness or misconduct in discharge of his

duties or he had acted in a manner to unduly favour a

party or had passed an order actuated by corrupt motive,

the High Court by virtue of its power under Article 235 of

the Constitution may exercise its supervisory

jurisdiction. Nevertheless, under such circumstances it

should be kept in mind that the Judges at all levels have

to administer justice without fear or favour. Fearlessness

and maintenance of judicial independence are very

essential for an efficacious judicial system. Making

7

(2007) 4 SCC 247

Page 27 of 34

adverse comments against subordinate judicial officers

and subjecting them to severe disciplinary proceedings

would ultimately harm the judicial system at the

grassroot level.”

38. Highlighting various options available before the High

Court to deal with judicial officers and the need for clearly

establishing misconduct and extraneous influences or illegal

gratification before resorting to disciplinary measures, this

Court in Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar and Others

8,

had the following to say:-

“16. We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in

no manner indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong

order, then no action is to be taken. In case a judicial officer

passes orders which are against settled legal norms but there

is no allegation of any extraneous influences leading to the

passing of such orders then the appropriate action which the

High Court should take is to record such material on the

administrative side and place it on the service record of the

judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into

consideration while considering career progression of the

judicial officer concerned. Once note of the wrong order is

taken and they form part of the service record these can be

taken into consideration to deny selection grade, promotion,

etc., and in case there is a continuous flow of wrong or illegal

orders then the proper action would be to compulsorily retire

the judicial officer, in accordance with the Rules. We again

reiterate that unless there are clear-cut allegations of

misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any

8

(2019) 10 SCC 640

Page 28 of 34

kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be

initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been

passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground

that the judicial order is incorrect.”

[Emphasis supplied]

39. That merely because a different conclusion was possible

is not an indicium for misconduct was highlighted in P.C. Joshi

(supra).

“7. In the present case, though elaborate enquiry has been

conducted by the enquiry officer, there is hardly any

material worth the name forthcoming except to scrutinize

each one of the orders made by the appellant on the judicial

side to arrive at a different conclusion. That there was

possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a different

conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking

one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason

alone. The enquiry officer has not found any other

material, which would reflect on his reputation or

integrity or good faith or devotion to duty or that he has

been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may

say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or

correct and not attribute any motive to him which is for

extraneous consideration that he had acted in that

manner. If in every case where an order of a subordinate

court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to

be initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary

will be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of

writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary

enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act

independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution

are given in K.K. Dhawan case [(1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993

SCC (L&S) 325 : (1993) 24 ATC 1] and A.N. Saxena

case [(1992) 3 SCC 124 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 861 : (1992) 21

ATC 670] that merely because the order is wrong or the

Page 29 of 34

action taken could have been different does not warrant

initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the

judicial officer. In spite of such caution, it is unfortunate

that the High Court has chosen to initiate disciplinary

proceedings against the appellant in this case.”

40. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present

case, we find that the appellant has been held guilty of

misconduct only based on certain judicial orders granting bail

without anything more. We say so for the following reasons:-

(i) The complaint, as originally filed by Jaipal Mehta,

was primarily against Anil Joshi, the stenographer who

has been working in Khargone for a long time even

before the appellant assumed office in Khargone.

(ii) The complaint neither set out any particulars nor set

out any judicial order. It was general in nature.

(iii) The complainant was not examined in the inquiry.

The witnesses examined in support of the charge

Gendalal Chauhan did not support the charge.

(iv) The prosecutor who appeared in each of the 18 bail

orders was examined on behalf of the defence and even

Page 30 of 34

he deposed that the State accepted the orders granting

bail without mounting any challenge in the higher court.

He categorically deposed that the orders were

absolutely proper and were passed on proper grounds.

(v) A perusal of the four orders show that reasons have

been given, though there is no express mention Section

59-A (2) of the Excise Act. In one bail order, the appellant

mentions about the filing of the challan and the possibility

of the trial consuming lot of time. In fact, in the said order,

the appellant has relied on Article 21 though he has not

expressly mentioned the same. In the other bail orders,

he mentions about the applicants being rural farmers and

not being a flight risk and so on.

(vi) There is absolutely no material placed on record to

show that there are circumstances from which inference

could be drawn that extraneous considerations actuated

the passing of those orders of bail. The hypothesis was

drawn only on the basis that the order did not make

reference to the statutory provision expressly.

Page 31 of 34

(vii) The finding that in 14 other orders he referred to

Section 59-A (2) of the Excise Act is by itself not enough

to infer misconduct in the passing of the four bail orders

in question.

(viii) It will be a dangerous proposition to hold that

judgments and orders which do not refer expressly to

statutory provisions are per se dis-honest judgments.

41. The High Court has erred in not interfering with the

order. A valiant attempt was made by Mr. Arjun Garg to

sustain the impugned order by contending that a writ court or

this Court cannot act as an appellate court over the inquiry

report and the only consideration was whether the inquiry had

been fairly conducted. We are unable to accept the said

contention. In our opinion, for the reasons stated above, the

findings in the inquiry report are perverse and are not

supported by findings on record. We make bold to record a

finding that on the available material, no reasonable person

would have reached the conclusion that enquiry officer

reached.

Page 32 of 34

42. In Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra and

Another

9, Saghir Ahmad, J. lucidly explained the principle

thus:-

“51. It was lastly contended by Mr Harish N. Salve that this

Court cannot reappraise the evidence which has already

been scrutinised by the enquiry officer as also by the

Disciplinary Committee. It is contended that the High Court

or this Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, act as the

appellate authority in the domestic enquiry or trial and it is

not open to this Court to reappraise the evidence. The

proposition as put forward by Mr Salve is in very broad

terms and cannot be accepted. The law is well settled that

if the findings are perverse and are not supported by

evidence on record or the findings recorded at the

domestic trial are such to which no reasonable person

would have reached, it would be open to the High Court

as also to this Court to interfere in the matter. In Kuldeep

Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC

(L&S) 429 : JT (1998) 8 SC 603] this Court, relying upon

the earlier decisions in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of

Bihar [(1978) 3 SCC 366 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 458 : AIR 1978

SC 1277 : (1978) 3 SCR 708] , State of Andhra

Pradesh v. Rama Rao [AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25]

, Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain [AIR

1969 SC 983 : (1969) 2 LLJ 377] , Bharat Iron

Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel [(1976) 1 SCC 518 :

1976 SCC (L&S) 92 : AIR 1976 SC 98 : (1976) 2 SCR 280] as

also Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC

635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 : (1985) 1 SCR

866] laid down that although the court cannot sit in

appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary

9

(1999) 7 SCC 739

Page 33 of 34

authority or the enquiry officer in a departmental

enquiry, it does not mean that in no circumstance can

the court interfere. It was observed that the power of

judicial review available to a High Court as also to this

Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the

domestic enquiry as well and the courts can interfere

with the conclusions reached therein if there was no

evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded

were such as could not have been reached by an

ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse.”

(Emphasis supplied)

43. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order

of removal dated 02.09.2015, the order of Appellate Authority

dated 17.03.2016 and the impugned order of the High Court

are all set aside. The appellant shall be deemed to have

continued in service till he attained the normal age of

superannuation. Since the appellant has been kept out of

service for no fault of his, we are of the opinion that full back

wages with all consequential benefits should be given to the

appellant. Let the monetary benefits be released within a

period of eight weeks from today with interest @ 6 per cent.

No order as to costs.

Page 34 of 34

44. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to all the

Registrar Generals of the respective High Courts in the

country, so as to enable them to draw the attention of the Chief

Justices of the High Courts to the same.

……….........................J.

[J . B. PARDIWALA]

……….........................J.

[K. V. VISWANATHAN]

New Delhi;

5

th

January, 2026

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 24570 OF 2024)

NIRBHAY SINGH SULIYA …..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ANR. …..RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

J.B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. My esteemed brother Justice K.V. Viswanathan has

penned an ineffable judgment. This judgment will go a

long way in protecting judicial officers of the district

judiciary from being subjected to departmental action for

alleged wrong or incorrect exercise of discretion in passing

orders of bail without anything mo re. Brother

Viswanathan has put it very pithily, saying that if the

complaint of misconduct against the judicial officer is

2

prima facie found to be true then, in such circumstances,

disciplinary proceedings must be taken, and no leniency

should be shown if the charges are established. In an

appropriate case, even criminal prosecution may be

instituted against a judicial officer. Such action is

necessary to weed out tainted judges from the judiciary. It

goes without saying that corruption in the judiciary at any

level is intolerable, as corruption severely undermines the

core of the administration of justice and erodes public

trust in the rule of law. However, the High Court, which is

vested with the supervisory control must keep in mind

that a judicial officer of the district judiciary works mostly

in a charged atmosphere. A mere wrong order or wrong

exercise of discretion in grant of bail by itself without

anything more, cannot be a ground to initiate

departmental proceedings.

2. Initiation of departmental proceedings on mere suspicion

is one of the primary causes why trial court judges are

reluctant when it comes to exercising discretion for the

purpose of grant of bail. It should not happen that because

3

of the lurking fear in the mind of a trial court judge, of

some administrative action being taken that even in a

deserving case, well within the principles of law, bail is

declined. This is one reason why the High Courts are

flooded with bail applications. The same is the scenario

even so far as the Supreme Court is concerned. Over a

period of time, the trial court judges have exhibited

tendency to shirk from their solemn judicial function and

responsibility when it comes to exercising discretion in

matters relating to bail. Courts of the district judiciary

wield powers necessary for the functioning of the justice

delivery system in India and when their autonomy is

compromised by higher courts and fear takes precedence

over judicial duties, democracy and the rule of law suffer.

3. For functioning of democracy, an independent judiciary to

dispense justice without fear and favour is paramount. As

held by this Court in M.S. Bindra versus Union reported

in (1998) 7 SCC 310 while evaluating the materials the

authority should not altogether ignore the reputation in

which the officer was held till recently. The maxim "Nemo

4

Firut Repente Turpissimus" (no one becomes dishonest all

of a sudden) is not unexceptional but still is a salutary

guideline to judge human conduct, particularly in the field

of Administrative Law. The authorities should not keep the

eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which

the delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those

who were supervising him earlier. To dunk an officer into

the puddle of "doubtful integrity" it is not enough that the

doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of

such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be

entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material.

Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it

would have happened. There must be preponderance of

probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt

regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification

to ram an officer with the label ‘doubtful integrity’.

…………………………….J.

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

NEW DELHI:

5

TH

JANUARY 2026.