2026:HHC:45

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Rev. No. 532 of 2024

Reserved on: 25.11.2025

Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.

Pali Diwan ...Petitioner

Versus

Central Bureau of Investigations ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

For the Petitioner : Mr N.K. Bhalla, Advocate.

For Respondent No.1 : Mr Janesh Mahajan, Advocate,

Special Public Prosecutor.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of the order dated 06.7.2024, passed by learned Special

Judge (CBI), Shimla (learned Trial Court), vide which the

application filed by the petitioner (accused before the learned

Trial Court) seeking her discharge was dismissed. (Parties shall

hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed

before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the CBI filed a charge sheet stating that the

petitioner, Mrs Pali Diwan, Partner of M/s Resource Foods,

submitted an application dated 29.9.2010 in the prescribed

format along with the relevant documents to avail a non-

recurring grant-in-aid for setting up the Integrated Food Chain

Project at village Bersa, P.O. Manjohali, Tehsil Nalagarh. The

petitioner is a director of M/s Resource Food Private Limited, and

she was part of a conspiracy to avail the grant-in-aid; hence, it

was prayed that an action be taken against her and the other

accused.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, she and the

other accused filed an application seeking their discharge,

asserting that there was insufficient material to proceed against

them. The charge sheet did not disclose the commission of any

cognizable offence. The chargesheet was based on hearsay

evidence. The prosecution suppressed the original document

lying in the possession of the Ministry of Food Processing

Industry (MoFPI). Witnesses were shown the photocopies, and

they expressed their opinions based on the photocopies alone.

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The report of the handwriting expert was also based on the

photocopies. The photocopies are inadmissible in evidence. The

specimen handwriting was taken without following the procedure

prescribed under section 311A of the Criminal Procedure Code,

1973 (CrPC). The Investigating Officer was not competent to

obtain the signatures of the accused. The officers of MoFPI were

not charged, and the charge of conspiracy failed. Hence, it was

prayed that the accused be discharged.

4. The application was opposed by the CBI by asserting

that the accused had applied for a grant-in-aid in favour of M/s

Resource Food Private Limited for setting up an integrated cold

chain project from the MoFPI based on the forged and fabricated

bills/invoices purportedly issued by different suppliers. The

photocopies bear the original signatures of the accused, clearly

showing that the photocopies were submitted to the Ministry.

There was sufficient material to frame charges against the

accused. Hence, it was prayed that the application be dismissed.

5. Learned Trial Court held that the Court has to

prima facie assess the material collected by the prosecution and

determine whether sufficient material existed for framing the

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charges. The defence of the accused was not to be seen at the time

of framing of charges. The material on record established that

photocopies were produced before the Ministry, and such

photocopies fall within the definition of the primary evidence.

The Investigating Officer stated that the signatures were given

voluntarily by the accused, and there is no prohibition on taking

the signatures by the Investigating Officer. The accused and other

persons had forged various documents and produced them before

the Ministry to avail the grant-in-aid. Therefore, the application

was dismissed.

6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned

Trial Court, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting

that she has nothing to do with the commission of an offence. The

petitioner had not submitted any forged documents. The

submission of an application for approval of a project to MoFPI

cannot be considered a criminal act. The petitioner submitted the

application on the prescribed format for sanction of the project

on 29.9.2010, along with the required documents. This

application was accepted as per the settled guidelines. The charge

sheet does not disclose that the petitioner had signed, executed or

presented any document in the office of MoFPI. The status of the

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petitioner is at par with Smt. Kanan Diwan. She had also signed

the loan agreement with the bank as a partner. The charge sheet

does not mention that the petitioner had submitted the

photocopies of invoices/bills to any Department including MoFPI,

at any point in time. The photocopies are not primary evidence

and are inadmissible in evidence. The opinion of the handwriting

expert based on the photocopies and the report is admissible. No

case for framing of charge was made out. Therefore, it was prayed

that the present petition be allowed.

7. CBI filed a reply asserting that the petitioner, Smt. Pali

Diwan (A3) submitted forged/fake invoices/bills of different

vendors, CA and CE Certificates and stamps in connivance with

other Directors/Partners. The petitioner Smt. Pali Diwan (A3), her

family members and relatives conspired with each other and

shifted the plant and machinery from M/s Hillcrest Foods Ltd. to

Resource Foods Pvt. Ltd. The staff of the Government of India

aided this forgery and caused loss while sanctioning grand-in-

aid. The original invoices/bills could not be produced despite the

best efforts. Even the MoFPI and the Bank of India, which had

sanctioned the loan in favour of the firm, failed to collect the

original record and violated the norms and rules to sanction the

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grant-in-aid and term loan. The companies that are stated to

have issued the invoices and supplied the machines stated that

they had not issued any invoices or sold any machinery to M/s

Resource Foods Private Limited. Therefore, it was prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

8. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and

affirming those of the petition was filed.

9. I have heard Mr N.K. Bhalla, learned counsel for the

petitioner, and Mr Janesh Mahajan, Advocate, learned Special

Public Prosecutor, for the respondent/CBI.

10. Mr. N.K. Bhalla, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that, as per CBI, the petitioner had applied for a grant-

in-aid. There is no allegation that the petitioner had submitted

forged certificates/documents after the loan was sanctioned. The

criminal law does not recognize vicarious liability. Hence, he

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be

quashed qua the petitioner. He relied upon the judgment titled

Vunna Visali Vs. State of A.P. and others MANU/AP/00979/2001,

Proddaturi Shobha Rani and others Vs. State of A.P. and others

MANU/AP/0133/2020, State of HP Vs. Pirthi Chand and others

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MANU/SC/0259/1996, Monaben Ketanbhai Shah and another Vs.

State of Gujarat and others (2004) 7 SCC 15, Sham Sunder and others

Vs. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0494/1989, Ashok Kumar Tyagi Vs.

State of HP and others MANU/HP/0283/2015 and Jyoti Peris Vs. CBI

2025:HHC:36358 in support of his submission.

11. Mr Janesh Mahajan, Advocate, learned Special Public

Prosecutor, for the respondent/CBI, submitted that the petitioner

was a Director/Partner of M/s Resource Foods Limited. She had

forged and submitted various documents to MoFPI to avail a

grant-in-aid. Her application for discharge was rightly dismissed

by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present

petition be dismissed.

12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502: 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 1582 that the Court framing the charges has to see a

prima facie case. It is impermissible to examine the material

threadbare to determine whether the accused is likely to be

convicted or not. It was observed: -

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“12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of

charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and

at this stage, the probative value of materials on record

need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier

decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa,

(1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni,

(2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be

made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to

test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at

the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a

presumptive opinion on the existence of factual

ingredients constituting the offence alleged, and it is not

expected to go deep into the probative value of the material

on record and to check whether the material on record

would certainly lead to a conviction at the conclusion of the

trial.

14. It was held in Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P.,

(2024) 10 SCC 651: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 253: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1709

that the Court can sift and weigh the evidence to determine if a

prima facie case exists against the accused. It was observed at

page 661:

“24. In the light of the decisions referred supra, it is thus

obvious that it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court

concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited

purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case

against the accused concerned has been made out. We are

of the considered view that a caution has to be sounded for

the reason that the chances of going beyond the

permissible jurisdiction under Section 227CrPC, and

entering into the scope of power under Section 232CrPC,

cannot be ruled out, as such instances are aplenty. In this

context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in

Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679: 2000 SCC (Cri)

1014. Taking note of the language of Section 227CrPC, is in

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negative terminology and that the language in Section

232CrPC, is in the positive terminology and considering

this distinction between the two, this Court held that it

would not be open to the Court while considering an

application under Section 227CrPC, to weigh the pros and

cons of the evidence alleged improbability and then

proceed to discharge the accused holding that the

statements existing in the case therein are unreliable. It is

held that doing so would be practically acting under

Section 232 CrPC, even though the said stage has not

reached. In short, though it is permissible to sift and weigh

the materials for the limited purpose of finding out

whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the

accused, on appreciation of the admissibility and the

evidentiary value such materials brought on record by the

prosecution is impermissible as it would amount to denial

of opportunity to the prosecution to prove them

appropriately at the appropriate stage besides amounting

to exercise of the power coupled with obligation under

Section 232 CrPC, available only after taking the evidence

for the prosecution and examining the accused.

15. It was held in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of

Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, that the Court is not to

undertake a threadbare analysis of the material but to see if there

is sufficient material to frame charges. It was observed:

“16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section

227 CrPC contemplates is that if, upon consideration of the

record of the case and the documents submitted therewith

and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the

prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there

are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the

accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his

reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of

discharge, the court is not required to undertake a

threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the

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prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is

that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the

accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient

to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the

accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the

accused may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge,

the court is only required to consider whether there are

sufficient materials that can justify the launch of a criminal

trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is

at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the

end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on the

benefit of doubt, or the prosecution could not prove the

charge against the accused; but when an accused is

discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify

the launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he

is discharged, he is no longer an accused.”

16. The present petition has to be adjudicated as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

17. It is undisputed that the petitioner had submitted the

proposal to the MoFPI containing various invoices. Ram Pal told

the CBI that the invoices shown to him and used for obtaining

grant-in-aid were not issued by his firm, but these were forged

by promoters of Resource Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vikas Aggarwal stated

that he had sent the printed and self-attested copies of the

quotation through e-mail ID. The documents submitted by M/s

Resource Foods Ltd. were not the same which were sent by him.

The price of the quotation was increased from ₹7,80,000/- to

₹1,18,00,000/- by the promoters of the company. This quotation

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was sent to Ravi Bhushan Gupta, who sent it to the email ID of

Pooja Aggarwal on 3.7.2012. The quotation was edited at the

receiver’s end. Gautam Jha stated that he had sent the printed

self-attested copies of the quotation of Fresh Food Technology in

the name of Ms Pooja Aggarwal/Mr. Diwan on the email ID of

Pooja Aggarwal. The date of the quotation and the names of the

person in whose name the quotations were issued were edited.

The amount was also altered from ₹1,72,148.05 to ₹3,95,0000/-.

Ravi Bhushan Gupta and Ravish Gagla corroborated this version.

These statements show that the quotations sent to Pooja

Aggarwal on her e-mail ID were edited and submitted to MoFPI.

Prima facie, these statements show that the petitioner had

submitted a proposal annexing forged documents.

18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram

Prakash Chadha (supra) that the direct evidence of conspiracy

cannot be produced; however, it can be inferred from the

circumstances showing that the parties consented to do an illegal

act. It has been observed:-

32. There can be no doubt that a conspiracy is hatched in

privacy and not in secrecy, and such it would rarely be

possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. A few

bits here and a few bits there, on which the prosecution

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may rely, are not sufficient to connect an accused with the

commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. To

constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first

and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of a

meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an

illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal

means.

33. In Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1993) 3 SCC 609: 1993

SCC (Cri) 961, this Court characterised the offence of

criminal conspiracy as an agreement between two or more

persons to do an illegal act or a legal act through illegal

means. Furthermore, it was held that commission of the

offence would be complete as soon as there is consensus ad

idem, and it would be immaterial whether or not the

offence is actually committed. It is also held therein that

necessarily there must be agreement between the

conspirators on the design or object of the conspiracy. As

held in the R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 :

(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 164, the quintessential ingredient to

attract the offence of criminal conspiracy is agreement

between two or more persons. Therefore, the question is

whether it was spelt in the final report dated 21-2-2000 or

in any of the records of the case and documents submitted

therewith, to find a prima facie case of commission of

criminal conspiracy against the appellant. True that an

agreement referred to in Section 120-AIPC may be

expressed or implied, or in part express and in part

implied. However, no record of the case or documents

submitted therewith carries such an allegation/accusation

against the appellant.”

19. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the

original documents were not produced with the charge sheet.

This submission will not help the petitioner. The CBI has

specifically asserted that the photocopies were submitted to the

MoFPI, and the production of the original documents was not

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possible. It is a matter of trial whether the original documents

were submitted to the MoFPI or the photocopies were submitted.

However, the petitioner cannot be discharged because the

original documents were not submitted without allowing the CBI

to prove the plea taken by it.

20. It was submitted that the CBI was not competent to

take the specimen signatures. This submission cannot be

accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dara

Singh v. Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 706:

2011 SCC OnLine SC 219 that the procedure of taking the specimen

handwriting adopted by the CBI cannot be faulted. It was

observed at page 525:

75. Another question which we have to consider is whether

the police (CBI) had the power under CrPC to take the spec-

imen signature and writing of A-3 for examination by the

expert. It was pointed out that during the investigation,

even the Magistrate cannot direct the accused to give his

specimen signature at the asking of the police, and only af-

ter the amendment of CrPC in 2005, power was given to the

Magistrate to direct any person, including the accused, to

give his specimen signature for the purpose of investiga-

tion. Hence, it was pointed out that, taking of his signa-

ture/writings being per se illegal, the report of the expert

cannot be used as evidence against him.

76. To meet the above claim, the learned Additional Solici-

tor General heavily relied on an eleven-Judge Bench deci-

sion of this Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad

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[AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856 : (1962) 3 SCR 10]. This

larger Bench was constituted in order to re-examine some

of the propositions of law laid down by this Court in M.P.

Sharma v. Satish Chandra [AIR 1954 SC 300: 1954 Cri LJ

865: 1954 SCR 1077].

xxxxx

78. In view of the above principles, the procedure adopted

by the investigating agency, analysed and approved by the

trial court and confirmed by the High Court, cannot be

faulted with. In view of the oral report of Rolia Soren, PW 4

which was reduced into writing, the evidence of PW 23, two

letters dated 1-2-2002 and 2-2-2002 addressed by Ma -

hendra Hembram (A-3) to the trial Judge facing (sic con-

fessing) his guilt coupled with the other materials, we are

unable to accept the argument of Mr Ratnakar Dash,

learned Senior Counsel for Mahendra Hembram (A-3) and

we confirm the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.

21. Madras High Court also held in Babitha Surendran v.

State, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14003, that the police have the power

to take specimen signatures during the investigation. It was

observed:

“8.  X”, an high ranking official, receives a handwritten

letter in the letter head of “Y”, containing serious insinua-

tions and also handing out death threat to him. “X” hands

over the letter with a complaint to the police, based on

which an FIR is registered against “Y” and an investigation

is taken up. During the course of the investigation, police

summon “Y”, who accepts that the letterhead belongs to

him, but denies the authorship of the contents. So, the next

step for the police should be to ask “Y” to give his speci-

men signatures and handwriting. When asked by the Po -

lice, “Y” voluntarily gives his specimen signatures and

handwriting. Police do not arrest “Y”, and they allow him

to leave. During the investigation, the police suspect one

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“Z” and they examine him, and in the course of examina-

tion, they ask “Z” to give his specimen handwritings and

signatures, which he gives. Specimen handwritings and

signatures that were obtained from “Y” and “Z” are sent to

the Handwriting Expert along with the subject letter re-

ceived by “X”, for opinion. The Handwriting Expert opines

that the subject letter has been written by “Z” and not by

“Y”. Police consciously take a decision not to arrest “Z”,

but after completing the investigation, they file a Final Re-

port before the Court against “Z” for the offence of crimi-

nal intimidation, etc.

9. Can we say that the police have committed an illegality

by obtaining the specimen handwritings and signatures of

“Y” and “Z” and therefore, the prosecution should fail?

The answer is an emphatic “No”. The power of the police

to obtain handwriting and signatures during the course of

investigation from witnesses, suspects and accused has

never been questioned, because it was considered a con-

comitant power of investigation that inheres in the police.

Xxxx

11. From the aforesaid texts themselves, it is

abundantly clear that it is an inclusive definition and

not an exhaustive definition. As long as there is no

constitutional or statutory prohibition inhibiting the

Police from obtaining specimen handwritings and

signatures from an accused, it cannot be stated that

the police are denuded of this power. The mere

obtaining of specimen signatures or handwriting

from the accused cannot, by itself fasten any

criminal liability on him, because the same has to be

compared by an Expert with the disputed one for

fastening criminal liability, unlike a statement to a

Police Officer which, proprio vigore may mulct the

suspect with criminal liability if it is in the nature of

a confession. The handwriting or signatures

obtained from an accused cannot, by itself, fasten

any criminal liability, unless it is sent to an expert to

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be compared with the disputed one and an opinion is

obtained.

Xxxx

17. To say that Section 311-A is the only repository of the

power to obtain signatures and handwriting from the ac-

cused during investigation would amount to denuding a

power that always existed with the police. Section 311-A

was introduced in the Statute nearly 25 years after the

Supreme Court made a suggestion in  State of Uttar

Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra [(1980) 2 SCC 341] : (AIR 1980 SC

1522).

18. In my considered opinion, Section 311 A, Cr. PC. is an

enabling provision which comes to the aid of the Investi-

gating Agency, when a suspect or accused refuses to give

his specimen signatures or handwriting.

22. Hence, it is difficult to agree with the submission that

the CBI had no jurisdiction to take the specimen signatures.

23. The judgments cited on behalf of the petitioner deal

with the vicarious liability of the Director/Partner, and they do

not apply to the present case because the petitioner is not being

implicated because of her position, but because of the submission

of an application annexing forged documents.

24. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the learned

Trial Court erred in dismissing her application for discharge

cannot be accepted. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that a

prima facie case exists for framing charges against her, and no

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interference is required with the order passed by the learned Trial

Court.

25. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the

same is dismissed.

26. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Chander)