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CRL.P No. 100213 of 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,AT DHARWAD

DATED THIS THE 2

ND

DAY OF APRIL, 2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR

CRIMINAL PETITION NO.100213 OF 2025

(482 OF Cr.PC/528 OF BNSS)

BETWEEN:

1. SHYAM MEHTA

SON OF BIMAL MEHTA,

AGED 33 YEARS,

RESIDING AT NO.12, ROAD NO.4,

KESHWAPUR, HUBLI, DHARWAD,

KARNATAKA-580023.

2. BIMAL MEHTA

SON OF KANTILAL MEHTA,

AGED 60 YEARS,

RESIDING AT NO.12, ROAD NO.4,

KESHWAPUR, HUBLI,

DHARWAD-580023.

3. NEEPA MEHTA

WIFE OF BIMAL MEHTA,

AGED 57 YEARS,

RESIDING AT NO.12, ROAD NO.4,

KESHWAPUR, HUBLI,

DHARWAD-580023.

…PETITIONERS

(BY SRI SHRIDHAR PRABHU, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,

BY GOKUL ROAD,

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POLICE STATION, HUBLI,

NORTH SUB-DIVISION,

(REPRESENTED BY

STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,

HCK, DHARWAD.

2. YALLAPPA KARIGAPPA HARIJAN,

AGE: 45 YEARS,

OCCUPATION: LABOURER,

GOKUL VILLAGE, HUBBALLI.

…RESPONDENTS

(SRI ABHISHEK MALIPATIL, HCGP FOR R1;

SRI RAJNEET M. PAWAR, ADV. FOR R2)

THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528

OF BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, PRAYIN G

TO QUASH THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT IN CRIME

NO.0146/2024 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT, ON 29

TH

OCTOBER 2024 FOR ALLEGED OFFENCES, UNDER SECTION 50 4

AND 584 OF IPC AND SECTION 3(1)(R), 3(1)(S) OF SC A ND ST

ACT, 1989, AS THE SAME IS ARBITRARY, BASELESS, AND DOES

NOT DISCLOSE ANY PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE

PETITIONER/ACCUSED NOS.1 TO 3 ON THE FILE OF II

ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DHARWAD,

SITTING AT: HUBBALLI REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIO NER

BY THE 1

ST

RESPONDENT PROCEDUED AT ANNEXURE-A AND

ETC.

THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR

ORDERS AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS

THIS DAY, THIS COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

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CRL.P No. 100213 of 2025

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR

CAV ORDER

This criminal petition is filed by the

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 under Section 482 of Code of

Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C)/528 of Bharatiya Nagarik a

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) praying to quash the e ntire

proceedings initiated against the petitioners/accused Nos.1

to 3 with the following prayer:

“PRAYER

A. Quash the First Information Report in Crime No.

0146/2024 registered by the Respondent, on 29

th

October 2024 for alleged offenses, under Section

504 and 584 of IPC, and Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) of

SC and ST Act, as the same is arbitrary, baseless,

and does not disclose any prima facie case against

the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 registered on

the file of II Additional District and Sessions Judge,

Dharwad sitting at Hubballi, registered against the

Petitioner by the 1

st

Respondent produced at

ANNEXURE-A.

B. direction, restraining the Respondent Police from

conducting any further investigation in Crime

No.146/2024.

C. Grant the cost of this Petition.

D. Pass any other appropriate order/direction as the

Hon’ble Court may deem fit to grant under the

present facts and circumstances of the case, in the

interest of justice and equity.”

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2. It is the brief case of prosecution as per the FIR

and complaint averments that the complainant and an other

person, namely Hanumanth Gurugunti, belong to the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Community and

were working for 20 years in the “SWIMS TECHNOLOGY

PRIVATE LIMITED FACTORY” (‘the factory’ for short). On

06.02.2024, at about 3.30 p.m. to 4.45 p.m., the owners of

the factory, who are accused Nos.1 to 3 arrived at the main

gate of the dispatch section of the factory.

3. During this interaction, the petitioners/accused

Nos.1 to 3 attempted to put pressure on the complai nant

and one Hanumanth Gurugunti to file a complaint aga inst

one Mahadev Khandekar, but they refused to comply w ith

the request of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3.

Therefore, they abused the complainant and Hanumant h

Gurugunti in filthy language, specifically using derogatory

terms with reference to caste, by saying that even if we

directed to lodge a complaint before the Police Sta tion,

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nothing had happened; hence, they abused, insulted and

humiliated the complainant and Hanumanth Gurugunti in

public view and threatened to dismiss them from

employment. Hence, with these allegations, the complaint is

lodged and the crime is registered for the offences as above

stated.

4. Heard the arguments of learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3,

learned HCGP appearing on behalf of respondent No.1 /State

and learned counsel appearing on behalf of responde nt

No.2.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners/accused

Nos.1 to 3 submitted that filing of the complaint by invoking

the provisions of offences under the Scheduled Cast e and

the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

(‘the SC and ST Act, 1989’) is nothing but abuse of process

of the Court. It is submitted that even as per the complaint

averments, the alleged incident took place on 06.04.2024,

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but the complaint was lodged on 29.10.2024; therefo re,

there is enormous delay in lodging the complaint, w hich

itself goes to show that the entire complaint averments are

false.

6. Furthermore, the complainant and Hanumanth

Gurugunti are working in the factory as workmen and there

is a trade union dispute between the management and the

workmen of the factory; thus, lodging of the compla int is

only to threaten the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, who are

the owners of the factory. Therefore, there is a la bour

dispute pending and in order to achieve their obliq ue

motive, such false complaint has been filed. Further, it is

submitted that the alleged incident as per the comp laint

averments occurred inside the factory premises and there is

no access to the public nor is there any possibility of it

being viewed by the public. Therefore, the entire complaint

averments are false.

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7. Further submitted that on 16.10.2024, the WEIR

BDK VALVES WORKERS UNION had given notice to

accused No.2 (who is the president of the factory) for strike

and the contents of the strike show that the compla int

lodged is in the background of a trade union dispute with

the management of the factory; hence, a false compl aint

has been lodged. Therefore, it is prayed to allow the petition

and quash the entire proceedings initiated against the

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3.

8. In support of the arguments, the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3

places reliance on the following judgments:

i. LAKSHMI DEVI AND ORS. VS. STATE OF

KARNATAKA AND ORS.

1

(LAKSHMI DEVI AND

ORS. CASE)

ii. AROKIA SWAMY AND ORS. VS. THE STATE OF

KARNATAKA

2

(AROKIA SWAMY AND ORS.

CASE)

iii. SHAJAN SKARIA VS. THE STATE OF KERALA

AND ORS.

3

(SHAJAN SKARIA CASE)

1

Criminal Petition No.3824 of 2021 dated 28.03.2022

2

MANU/KA/0459/2018

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iv. CHANCHALPATI DAS VS. THE STATE OF WEST

BENGAL & ANR.

4

(CHANCHALPATI DAS CASE)

v. SUJOY GHOSH VS. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND

& ANR.

5

(SUJOY GHOSH CASE)

vi. HITESH VERMA VS. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

AND ANOTHER

6

(HITESH VERMA CASE)

vii. B. VENKATESWARAN AND ORS. VS. P.

BAKTHAVATCHALAM

7

(B. VENKATESWARAN

AND ORS. CASE)

viii. RAJU VS. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

8

(RAJU’s CASE)

ix. KHUMAN SINGH VS. STATE OF MADHYA

PRADESH

9

(KHUMAN SINGH CASE)

x. VILAS BHORMALJI OSWAL VS. STATE OF

KARNATAKA AND ORS.

10

(VILAS BHORMALJI

OSWAL CASE)

9. With reference to the above cited cases, the

learned counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 t o 3

submitted that the complaint is suffering from inor dinate

delay in lodging the complaint making baseless and vague

allegations and criminal offences are not made out. The

3

MANU/SC/0936/2024

4

(2023) 20 SCC 120

5

SLP (Crl.) No.9452 of 2025 dated 20.06.2026

6

(2020) 10 SCC 710

7

MANU/SC/0009/2023

8

MANU/SC/0619/2025

9

MANU/SC/1161/2019

10

MANU/KA/1745/2025

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lodging of the complaint is motivated by union strike and

there is no evidence of caste-based discrimination;

therefore, only with an oblique motive to threaten the

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, who are the owners of the

factory, such a baseless complaint is filed and submitted

that this is nothing but abuse of process of Court.

10. On the other hand, learned HCGP appearing on

behalf of respondent No.1/State and learned counsel

appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 submitted th at the

complaint averments prima facie disclose that offences

under the provisions of SC and ST Act, 1989, are made out

and when such prima facie case is made out, the

truthfulness of the complaint averments are to be decided

during the course of trial, but not at this stage w hile

exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS.

Hence, pray to dismiss the petition.

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down

principle of law in various judgments upon exercising the

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inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and on e

among them is extracted in the judgment of GULAM

MUSTAFA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER

11

at Paragraph Nos.26 and 30, it is held as follows:

“26. Although we are not for verbosity in our

judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial

precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v Bhajan

Lal

12

, this Court held: (SCC pp. 378-79, paras 102-

103)

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the

various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of

the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which

we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the

following categories of cases by way of illustration

wherein such power could be exercised either to

prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise

to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and

sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or

rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad

kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence

or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first

information report and other materials, if any,

11

(2023) 18 SCC 265

12

1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

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accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code

except under an order of a Magistrate within the

purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations

made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence

collected in support of the same do not disclose

the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only

a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is

permitted by a police officer without an order of a

Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)

of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that there

is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code

or the Act concerned (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where

there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act

concerned, providing efficacious redress for the

grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect

that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding

should be exercised very sparingly and with

circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare

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cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking

upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or

otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the

complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent

powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the

court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

(emphasis supplied)

30. The law on the subject was also examined in Parbat bhai

Aahir v. State of Gujarat

13

. In Habib Abdullah Jeelani

14

, it was

opined: (Habib Abdullah Jeelani Case, SCC p. 788, para 13)

“13. ……inherent power in a matter of quashment of F IR

has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and when

and only when such exercise is justified by the tes t

specifically laid down in the provision itself. There is no

denial of the fact that the power under Section 482 CrPC is

very wide but it needs no special emphasis to state that

conferment of wide power requires the Court to be m ore

cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the

Court.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Upon considering the FIR and complaint

averments, no doubt that there is a delay about six months

in lodging the complaint. As per the FIR material, the

occurrence of the offence is on 06.04.2024 and the First

Information Statement (FIS) was lodged on 29.10.202 4.

Though there is a mention regarding the delay in lo dging

the complaint, the circumstances surrounding the ev ents

are to be considered. Just because there is delay in lodging

13

(2017) 9SCC 641

14

(2017) 2 SCC 779

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the complaint that always cannot be made a ground t o

suspect the prosecution case and complaint averment s are

false; the delay can always be considered during the trial to

decide whether the complaint was lodged is with a mala fide

intention or not. The delay is not a ground that fits the

ingredients mentioned in Section 482 of Cr.P.C. so as to say

that there is abuse of process of the Court. If the

complainant desired to lodge a false complaint, he could

have mentioned the occurrence of the incident as ha ving

taken place just one or two days prior to the date of lodging

the FIS; there would have been no necessity for the

complainant to mention the date of events as 06.04. 2024.

If the complainant had mala fide intention to lodge the

complaint, the date of occurrence of the incident could have

been mentioned just one or two days prior to 29.10.2024 so

as to cover the delay, but the very fact that the d ate of

occurrence is mentioned in the complaint as 06.04.2 024

and lodging of complaint on 29.10.2024 is to be considered

in the surrounding circumstances.

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13. The circumstances, prima facie, are that the

complainant was working as a workman in the factory under

the employment of the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 and

there was a trade union dispute prevailing at that point of

time. One of the grievances in the trade union disp ute is

that 41 workmen have been transferred to the State of

Gujarat; this is one of the grounds mentioned in the notice

intimating the management about going on strike. Und er

these circumstances, the complainant being a poor

workman might not have been in a position to face t he

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, who are the owners of the

factory and if a complaint had been lodged at that moment,

there would have been chances of termination from t he

employment. Under these circumstances, the complain ant

would have been deprived of his livelihood.

14. Considering these circumstances, the delay

cannot be a ground to suspect the prosecution case, much

less to label the complaint averments are false. Hence, the

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delay is to be considered during the course of the trial, in

light of the circumstances under which the delay in lodging

the complaint occurred. If the complainant had intended to

manipulate the things, he could have mentioned dates prior

one or two days prior to the date of lodging the complaint

dated 29.10.2024, but that is not found. Hence, prima facie

the date of occurrence of the incident appears to have been

mentioned promptly. Thus, the delay in lodging the

complaint considering the facts and circumstances

surrounding the incidents cannot be made a ground t o

quash the proceedings.

15. The learned counsel for the petitioners/accused

Nos.1 to 3 places reliance on the judgment of Hon’b le

Supreme Court in the case of SUJOY GHOSH (Supra),

wherein it is held at Paragraph No.14, as follows:

“14. When an accused seeks quashing of either

the FIR or criminal proceedings on the

ground that such proceedings are

manifestly frivolous, vexatious or malicious,

the Court is duty bound to examine the

matter with greater care. It will not be just

enough for the Court to look into the

averments made in the FIR/complaint alone

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for the purpose of ascertaining whether the

necessary ingredients to constitute the

alleged offence are disclosed or not. In

frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the

Court owes a duty to look into many other

attending circumstances emerging from the

record of the case, over and above the

averments and, if need be, with due care

and circumspection, and try to read in

between the lines. The Court while

exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482

of the Code or Article 226 of the

Constitution need not restrict itself only to

the stage of a case but is empowered to

take into account the overall circumstances

leading to the initiation/registration of the

case as well as the materials collected in

the course of investigation.”

16. It is discussed in the paragraph that when the

accused seeks quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings,

the surrounding circumstances are also to be consid ered

and are equally applicable to the complaint. When a case

for quashing is initiated by the accused, the surrounding

circumstances are to be taken into account. In the same

way, the surrounding circumstances are also to be gathered

for the complainant; therefore, the surrounding

circumstances are to be considered equally on both the

accused and complainant to find out whether a prima facie

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case exists and whether there are materials to proceed with

the trial. Once it is found that prima facie materials exist in

the prosecution case, the matter would be adjudicated only

during the trial.

17. It is another submission made by the learned

counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 that

admittedly, as per the averments in the complaint, the

alleged incident took place at the door of the disp atch

section of the factory and is not a public place; therefore,

there could not have been any occasion for the publ ic to

view the incident. Hence, the offences under the provisions

of the SC and ST Act, 1989, are not attracted.

18. There is difference between Public Place and

Public View. Section 3 of the SC and ST Act, 1989, defines

that offences occurring in public view are attracted. Public

view does not necessarily mean a public place. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court has interpreted the difference betwee n

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public view and public place in the context of Section 3 of

the SC and ST Act, in the following decisions.

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

KARUPPUDAYAR VS. STATE REP. BY THE DEPUTY

SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, LALGUDI TRICHY AND

OTHERS

15

, at Paragraph Nos.9, 10 and 11, it is held as

under:

“9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act

would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder,

it has to be established that the accused intention ally

insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of

a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place

within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence

under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be

necessary that the accused abuses any member of a

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in

any place within public view.

10. The term “any place within public view” initially

came up for consideration before this Court in the case of

Swaran Singh V. State through Standing Counsel. Thi s

Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand

referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal

position as under:

“

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or

intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to

be regarded as “place in public view” had come up f or

consideration before this Court in the judgment reported

as Swaran Singh V. State (Swaran Singh V. State, (2008)

8 CC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (cri) 527). The Court had drawn

15

2025 SCC OnLine SC 215

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distinction between the expression “public place” and “in

any place within public view”. It was held that if an

offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn

outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someon e

from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the

lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On

the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but

some members of the public are there (not merely

relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since

it is not in the public view (sic) (ED. : This sentence

appears to be contrary to what is stated below in t he

extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p.

736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15,

below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building,

but some members of the public are there (not merel y

relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since

it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC

pp. 443-44, para 28)

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar,

the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3

(by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car

which was parked at the gate of the premises. In ou r

opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,

since the gate of a house is certainly a place with in

public view. It could have been a different matter had

the alleged offence been committed inside a buildin g,

and also was not in the public view. However, if th e

offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn

outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someon e

from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, th e

lawn would certainly be a place within the public view.

Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but

some members of the public are there (not merely

relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence

since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not

confuse the expression “place within public view” w ith

the expression “public place”. A place can be a private

place but yet within the public view. On the other hand,

a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is

owned or leased by the Government or the municipali ty

(or other local body) or gaon sabha or an

instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons

or private bodies.”

(emphasis in original)

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11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place

‘within public view’, the place should be open where the

members of the public can witness or hear the utterance

made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence

takes place within the four corners of the wall whe re

members of the public are not present, then it cannot be

said that it has taken place at a place within public view.”

20. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

HITESH VERMA VS. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND

ANOTHER

16

at Paragraph Nos.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14,

has observed as follows:

“8. Against the backdrop of these facts, it is pertinent

to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of

enactment of the Act. It is provided as under:

“Statement of Objects and Reasons.- Despite various

measures to improve the socio-economic conditions o f

the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they

remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil

rights. They are subjected to various offences,

indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have, in

several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and

property. Serious crimes are committed against them for

various historical, social and economic reasons.

2. Because of the awareness created amongst the

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through

spread of education, etc., they are trying to assert their

rights and this is not being taken very kindly by t he

others. When they assert their rights and resist practices

of untouchability against them or demand statutory

minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced

labour, the vested interests try to cow them down a nd

terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the

Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self-respect or

honour of their women, they become irritants for th e

16

(2020) 10 SCC 710

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dominant and the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of

even the Government allotted land by the Scheduled

Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented and mor e

often these people become victims of attacks by the

vested interests. Of late, there has been an increase in

the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities

like making the Scheduled Castes persons eat inedib le

substances like human excreta and attacks on and ma ss

killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled

Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled

Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the

circumstances, the existing laws like the Protection of

Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of

the Penal Code, 1860 have been found to be inadequa te

to check these crimes. A special Legislation to check and

deter crimes against them committed by non-Schedule d

Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore,

become necessary.”

9. The long title of the Act is to prevent the

commission of offences of atrocities against the members

of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, t o

provide for Special Courts and Exclusive Special Courts

for the trial of such offences and for the relief a nd

rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for

matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

10. The Act was enacted to improve the social

economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of t he

society as they have been subjected to various offences

such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. T hey

have been deprived of life and property as well. Th e

object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict

indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the

offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is

thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste

against the vulnerable section of the society for t he

reason that they belong to a particular community.

11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for

an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The sa id

section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f.

26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision

is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under:

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“3. (1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with

intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste o r

a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;”

12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section

3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1) intentionally

insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of

a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in a ny

place within public view”.

13. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would

indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and

intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member o f a

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. All insults or

intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the

Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of

victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tr ibe.

The object of the Act is to improve the socio-econo mic

conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Schedule d

Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an

offence under the Act would be made out when a memb er

of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to

indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of

title over the land by either of the parties is not due to

either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every

citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance

with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family

members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or

that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the

civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in

accordance with the procedure established by law. S uch

action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 i s

member of Scheduled Caste.

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or

intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to

be regarded as “place in public view” had come up f or

consideration before this Court in the judgment reported

as Swaran Singh V. State

17

. The Court had drawn

distinction between the expression “public place” and “in

any place within public view”. It was held that if an

offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn

outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someo ne

17

(2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527

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from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the

lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On

the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but

some members of the public are there (not merely

relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since

it is not in the public view (sic). The Court held as under:

(SCC pp. 443-44, para 28).

“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar,

the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3

(by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car

which was parked at the gate of the premises. In ou r

opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,

since the gate of a house is certainly a place with in

public view. It could have been a different matter had

the alleged offence been committed inside a buildin g,

and also was not in the public view. However, if th e

offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn

outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someon e

from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, th e

lawn would certainly be a place within the public view.

Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but

some members of the public are there (not merely

relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence

since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not

confuse the expression “place within public view” w ith

the expression “public place”. A place can be a private

place but yet within the public view. On the other hand,

a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is

owned or leased by the Government or the municipali ty

(or other local body) or gaon sabha or an

instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons

or private bodies.”

(emphasis in original)

21. This Court, by considering the above stated

judgments, extracted the principle of law laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the above cited cases, the facts

substantiated are that in the back ground of a civil dispute

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regarding immovable property, offences under the

provisions of SC and ST Act, 1989, were foisted. Therefore,

since there was a civil dispute between the parties over the

property, it was held that the criminal proceedings were

found to be abuse of process of the Court. Thus, th e

proceedings were quashed and the present case is

considered on the facts and circumstances involved in the

case. Hence, the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the above cited cases are to be applied.

22. Upon a dispute arising between the

complainant/respondent No.2 and the owners, who are the

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3, the complainant/respondent

No.2 has lodged a complainant, which reads as under:

“EzÀgÀ°è ¦üAiÀiÁ𢠲æà AiÀÄ®è¥Àà vÀAzÉ PÀjAiÀÄ¥Àà ºÀjd£À gÀªÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄä zÀÆgÀÄ

¤ÃrzÀÄÝ, CzÀgÀ°è vÁªÀÅ ºÁUÀÆ ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄAvÀ UÀÄgÀÄUÀÄAmÉ E§âgÀÄ PÀ¼ÉzÀ 20 ªÀµÀð¢AzÀ

ºÀħâ½î UÉÆÃPÀÄ® gÀ¸ÉÛAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ ¹éªÀiïì mÉPÁß®f ¥ÉæöÊ.°. PÁSÁð£ÉAiÀÄ°è PÉ®¸À ªÀiÁqÀÄvÁÛ

§A¢gÀÄvÉÛêÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ: 06/04/2024 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀÄzÁåºÀß 3-30 jAzÀ 4-45 gÀ ¸ÀĪÀiÁjUÉ

PÁSÁð£ÉAiÀÄ r¸ï ¥ÁåZï «¨sÁUÀzÀ zÁégÀzÀ §½ PÁSÁð£ÉAiÀÄ ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÁzÀ ±ÁåªÀÄ

ªÉÄúÁÛ ©ÃªÀÄ¯ï ªÉÄúÁÛ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¤Ã¥Á ªÉÄúÁÛ gÀªÀgÀÄ DUÀ«Ä¹ ¦üAiÀiÁð¢zÁgÀjUÉ

ºÁUÀÆ ºÀ£ÀĪÀÄAvÀ UÀÄgÀÄUÀÄAmÉ gÀªÀjUÉ PÀgÉzÀÄ ªÀiÁ°ÃPÀgÁzÀ ±ÁåªÀÄ ªÉÄúÁÛ gÀªÀgÀÄ

E§âjUÀÆ ªÀÄÄAzÉ ¤°è¹PÉÆAqÀÄ ªÀĺÀzÉêÀ RAqÉÃPÀgÀ gÀªÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É PÀA¥ÉèÃl §gÉzÀÄPÉÆr

JAzÀÄ MvÁ۬Ĺ §gÉzÀÄPÉÆqÀ®Ä ¤gÁPÀj¹zÀÝjAzÀ CªÀj§âjUÀÆ “¯Éà ªÉÆ£Éß £À£Àß ªÉÄïÉ

ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £À£Àß vÀAzÉAiÀĪÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¥ÉÆðøÀ oÁuÉAiÀÄ°è PÀA¥ÉèÃl PÉÆnÖ¢Ýj ¤ÃªÉãÀÄ

ºÀgÀPÉÆAræ, CªÀgÉãÀ ºÀgÀPÉÆÃqÀÄæ ¯Éà ¤ÃªÀÅ £Á ºÁQzÀ C£Áß wAwj¯ÉÃ, £À£Àß PÉÊAiÀÄ°è£À

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D¼ÀÄUÀ¼ÀÄ ¤ÃªÀÅ. £À£Àß ªÉÄïɣÀ PÀA¥ÉèÃl PÉÆqÀÄwÛj ¤ªÉÃ°è ºÉÆQÌj ¤ªÀÄä ªÀÄ£É J¯Éè Lw,

¤ÃªÀÅ JµÀÄÖ UÀAmÉÃPÀ ªÀÄ£ÉUÉ ºÉÆQÌÃj ¤ÃªÀÅ AiÀiÁªï eÁwAiÀĪÀgÀÄ ¤ÃªÀÅ PÀA¥À¤UÉ

§gÀĪÁUÀ J£ÀAvÀ §A¢Ãj FUÉãÀ PÉ®¸Á ªÀiÁqÀPÀwÛÃj £ÀªÀÄUɯÁè UÉÆÃvÉÛöÊw JAzÀÄ £ÀªÀÄUÉ

£ÀªÀÄä PÉ®¸ÀPÉÌ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ £ÀªÀÄä eÁwUÉ ¤A¢¹gÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¤ÃªÀÅ PÀ¼ÀªÀÅ ªÀiÁr¢Ýj JAzÀÄ PÀÆqÀ¯ÉÃ

¤ªÀÄä£ÀÄß PÉ®¸À¢AzÀ vÉUÉzÀĺÁPÀÄvÉÛÃ£É JAzÀÄ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQzÁÝgÉ CAvÁ PÉÆlÖ zÀÆj£À §UÉÎ

¥ÀæPÀgÀt zÁR°¸ÀPÉÆAqÀÄ vÀ¤SÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß PÉÊPÉÆArzÉ.”

23. Considering this, admittedly the alleged offences

occurred at a place inside the factory premises. Mo re

particularly, the place is at the door of the dispatch section

of the factory. The dispatch section is not a remote place in

the factory. The dispatch section and its door are accessible

to employees working in the factory and are not iso lated

places; therefore, the said place is easily accessible and

amenable for employees for ingress and egress. Henc e,

when the alleged incident took place at the said place, it

was easily amenable to public view. Public view doe s not

necessity mean public view by any passer by public but if

employees are at that place such employees are also to be

considered as members of public. Therefore, this prima

facie case is made out for prosecution that the alleged

incident is amenable to public view; hence, the ingredients

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of Section 3 of the SC and ST Act, 1989, regarding public

view are attracted. Thus, for this reason, when thi s is a

matter for trial at this stage, the proceedings cannot be

quashed.

24. Another argument canvassed by the learned

counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 that the

present complaint is offshoot of the strike called for by the

trade union and the learned counsel for the

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 has tried to make a

connection between the strike and the complaint wit h the

alleged incident. Learned counsel for the

petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 has produced a notice issued

by the Weir BDK Valves Workers Union addressed to

accused No.2, who is the president of the factory, which is

dated 16.10.2024 and the complaint is lodged on

29.10.2024.

25. It is argued that the trade union had issued a

notice calling for strike if the demands stated therein are

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not honoured by giving 15 days’ notice and after completion

of the 15 days of the notice, the complaint is lodged; hence,

the learned counsel for the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3

tried to make a connection between the complaint an d the

strike. Calling for strike by the trade union is different

aspect. The complainant belongs to a member of the

scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.

26. Just because a notice for strike is issued and a

complaint is lodged, linking these two events is nothing but

appears to be coincidence. Whether trade union has

instigated the complainant to lodge complaint again st the

petitioners is a question of disputed fact is triable issue in

the trial, but cannot be decided at this stage. The complaint

lodged by the complainant is his private affair wit h the

accused. There is nothing in the notice dated 16.10 .2024

that the accused have abused the complainant or any

members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribe s with

reference to the caste. The notice for strike is given making

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some demands by the trade union on the dispute betw een

management and union and because the date of notice is

issued on 16.10.2024 and the complaint is lodged on

29.10.2024, it cannot be said that the lodging of complaint

is linked with the strike. The complaint allegations are to be

considered on their prima facie value, apparently on the

face of the complaint. The complainant being one of the

workmen might have also inevitably joined with the trade

union, but the issue of strike cannot be linked wit h the

allegations made in the complaint, which can be tried in the

trial. Since the complainant is also an employee of the

factory and his grievance cannot be washed away whe n the

notice for strike is issued by the trade union. The issue of

strike and the complaint are to be considered

independently.

27. It is quite natural that everyone has

apprehension if any workman/employee goes against t he

wish of the owner of the factory, then there is apprehension

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in the mind of employee/workman that he would be

terminated; therefore, this is a question of liveli hood.

Hence, there might be delay, though it is not explained in

the complaint. Therefore, in this context, the delay is a

question of fact for trial to verify whether the complaint

averments are genuine or not. Under these circumstan ces,

the proceedings cannot be quashed as lodging of the

complaint does not amount to abuse of the process of Court

as prima facie case is made out to proceed with the trial.

28. The averments in the complaint are to be taken

at their face value considering the surrounding

circumstances. The abusive words used by the accuse d are

that even though a complaint has been lodged before the

Police against the complainant himself and his father “what

did you do and what did you achieve ” and abused with

reference to caste in filthy language and also threatened by

lodging a false complaint of theft and terminating him from

the employment. These prima facie averments in the

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complaint constitute offences to be triable during the trial.

The genuineness and veracity of the averments of th e

complaint cannot be decided at this stage.

29. It is argued that the present complaint is lodged

in the backdrop of an industrial dispute between th e

management and the employees. Here, the petitioners are

part of the management and have filed a list of cas es of

industrial dispute, but upon considering this fact of pending

industrial disputes, how far it has any connection to the

present case, considering the face value of the com plaint

averments, is to be looked into is not made out. There may

be industrial dispute, but upon perusal of the comp laint

averments extracted above, there is not even a whis per

that the complaint has been lodged in the backgroun d of

pending industrial dispute. Raising an industrial dispute is

different; it is done collectively by all the employees in the

factory. Therefore, merely because an employee, bei ng a

member of trade union, who incidentally happens to belong

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to the SC/ST community, lodges a complaint as in th e

present case alleging that an offence has been comm itted

by abusing him with reference to caste, is not a ground to

connect this case with industrial dispute cases.

30. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for

the petitioners/accused Nos.1 to 3 are found to be

distinguishable on the facts and circumstances involved in

the cited cases and in the present case on hand.

31. In the case of B. VENKATESWARAN AND ORS.

(supra), the facts are that there was a conspiracy and

unlawfully encroached the pathway adjacent to the house of

the accused and started to construct temple. It was alleged

that the said temple was built on the complainant’s water

pipeline, sewage pipeline and EB cable thereby caus ing

obstruction to the complainant to enjoy his property. In this

background of a civil dispute between the parties, FIR was

registered for offences under the provisions of the SC and

ST Act, 1989. Hence, there was a property dispute a nd it

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was of the opinion that the civil dispute is given the color of

criminal proceedings; thus, it was quashed.

32. Considering the difference in facts and

circumstances involved in the above cited case, it is not

applicable to the present case on hand.

33. Further, in the case of RAJU (supra), the facts

are that there was a judgment of conviction and it is upheld

by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh

and the accused is sentenced and one of the offence s

alleged is under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)

and Section 3 (2) (V) of the SC and ST Act, 1989. T he

Hon’ble Apex Court upheld the conviction under Sect ions

366, 342, 376(2)(g) of IPC and set aside the convic tion

made under Section 3(2)(V) of the SC and ST Act, 1989, on

the reason that offence was made with reference to caste.

Therefore, in this background of the factual matrix , the

offences under the SC and ST Act, 1989, was set asi de.

Hence, due to the difference in the factual matrix between

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the present case and the above cited case, the above cited

judgment is not applicable.

34. Further, in the case of SHAJAN SKARIA

(supra), the facts are that the accused in his capacity as the

Editor of an online news channel named “Marunandan

Malayali” published a video on YouTube and an online video

sharing platform, leveling certain allegations against the

complainant. Therefore, considering the difference between

the present case and the above cited case, the said

judgment is not applicable to the present case. Moreover, it

was considering the scope of ground of the anticipatory bail

in the context of Section 18 and 18A of the SC and ST Act,

1989. Hence, the above cited case is not applicable to the

present case on hand.

35. Further, in the case of KHUMAN SINGH (supra),

the facts are that the complainant-Rajaram along wi th his

brother Raghuveer, the deceased Veer Singh and rela tive

Badam Singh had gone to cultivate the fields and gra ze

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their cattle. When the deceased Veer Singh was cultivating

the field and the others were grazing the cattle, t he

deceased objected and drove the buffaloes of the ac cused

out of his field, on which the accused became furious and

started abusing and scolding the deceased, saying how the

deceased belonging to Khangar caste could drive awa y the

buffaloes of Thakurs out of his field. When the dec eased

objected to it, it is alleged that the accused with an

intention to kill the deceased, attacked him with an axe,

due to which the deceased Veer Singh fell down. Thereafter,

the accused allegedly gave two-three blows on the head of

the deceased with the axe and the deceased died. In this

background, the complaint was filed and in criminal

proceedings, conviction was recorded and went up to the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, which held that the convicti on of

the accused under Section 3(2)(V) of the SC and ST Act,

1989, is set aside, but the conviction of the accused was

modified under Section 302 of IPC as a conviction u nder

Section 304 Part II of IPC and the accused sentence d to

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undergo. Therefore, due to difference in factual ma trix

between the above cited case and in the present cas e, the

above cited case is not helpful to the petitioners herein.

36. Further, in the case of VILAS BHORMALJI

OSWAL (supra), the facts are that the petitioner, the

complainant and two others are partners in the business of

real estate and there is an agreement between the

partners. It is stated that in the agreement there is a clause

that the complainant will be appointed as Managing Director

and the petitioner is nominated as Joint Signatory Authority.

After passing a decade of the said partnership firm , a

dispute arose between the partners, particularly be tween

the petitioner and the complainant on the score tha t the

petitioner did not sign some documents pertaining t o the

firm, due to which the development of business was stalled.

In this background, the matter culminated into the filing of

a complaint. Hence, there is a difference in factual matrix

between the above said case and the present case on hand,

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as the facts in the cited case are regarding the business.

Therefore, the above cited judgment is not applicable to the

present case on hand.

37. Further, the case of CHANCHALPATI DAS

(supra) deals with laying down the principle of law

regarding use of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

38. Further, in the case of LAKSHMI DEVI AND

ORS. (supra), the facts are that the complainant is the

owner of the land, who sold the land for a consideration of

Rs.50,000/- per acre. Even after the sale of the land, the

complainant was still interfering with the said land, which by

then had belonged to the petitioners by virtue of the sale

deed dated 24.04.2002. This drove the petitioners t o

institute a suit in O.S.No.105/2011, seeking an injunction

against the complainant. The complainant was defend ant

No.1 in the said suit and the said suit was decreed. In this

backdrop of a civil dispute with some allegations, the

complainant lodged a complaint under the provisions of SC

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and ST Act, 1989. Hence, having found a difference in the

factual matrix in the above cited case, the said judgment is

not applicable to the present case on hand.

39. The observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court and High Courts of different States in the cases relied

upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners/acc used

Nos.1 to 3 are on the basis of the facts, circumstances and

evidence in each case; therefore, they are found to be

distinguishable from the facts and circumstances involved in

this case. Hence, they are not applicable in the pr esent

case.

40. Upon reading the complaint averments,

apparently on the face of the record as discussed a bove,

when it is clearly revealed the offences alleged an d

considering the surrounding circumstances, the prosecution

has made out prima facie case for trial and not found to be

abuse of process of Court. Also, the petition fail s to

demonstrate what is to give effect to code (BNSS) and also

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fails to what is in the petition to secure ends of justice.

Hence, the proceedings cannot be quashed at this st age.

Therefore, the criminal petition is liable to be dismissed.

41. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.

Sd/-

(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR)

JUDGE

SRA /CT-AN

List No.: 2 Sl No.: 64