2026:HHC:45

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision No. 574 of 2024

Reserved on: 25.11.2025

Date of Decision: 1.1.2026.

Pooja Aggarwal ...Petitioner

Versus

Central Bureau of Investigation ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Petitioner : Mr Y.P. Sood, Advocate.

For the respondent : Mr Janesh Mahajan, Advocate,

Special Public Prosecutor.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing of the order dated 06.7.2024, passed by learned Special

Judge (CBI), Shimla (learned Trial Court), vide which the

application filed by the petitioner (accused before the learned

Trial Court) seeking her discharge was dismissed. (Parties shall

hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed

before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the CBI filed a charge sheet before the learned

Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences

punishable under Sections 120B read with Sections 420, 467, 468,

and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 13 (1)(d) of

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). It was asserted that

the promoters of M/s Resource Food Private Ltd. availed a grant-

in-aid of ₹9,00,00,000/- (nine crores) from the Ministry of Food

Processing Industries (MoFPI) Government of India for setting up

an Integrated Cold Chain Project for the total cost of

₹21,00,00,000/- (twenty one crores) at village Rajgarh, Post

office Shambhu, Tehsil, Rajpura, District Patiala, Punjab, in the

year 2012; however, they misutilised the funds in connivance with

the promoters of M/s Hillcrest Foods and unknown Government

official. They assembled a dismantled plant and machinery of M/s

Hillcrest Foods set up in the year 2000- 2012 at village Bersan

Post Office Manjholi, Tehsil Nalagarh, District Solan, after

availing a grant-in-aid of ₹7,00,00,000 (seven crores) for setting

up an integrated cold chain project from MOFPI. An expression of

interest was floated by MoFPI on 7

th

May 2012. Shri Jaswinder

Singh (A5), an employee of Praveen Dewan (A2), at the instance

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of his employer, forged the signatures of Shri Lawrence Peris

(A3), purported Director of M/s Resource Food Pvt Ltd and

submitted a proposal and various documents to MoFPI to avail

the grant-in-aid. The petitioner is a Director of M/s Resource

Food Private Limited, and she was part of a conspiracy to avail the

grant-in-aid; hence, it was prayed that an action be taken against

her and the other accused.

3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused. When the accused appeared, she and the

other accused filed an application seeking their discharge,

asserting that there was insufficient ground to proceed against

them. The charge sheet did not disclose the commission of any

cognizable offence. The chargesheet was based on hearsay

evidence. The prosecution suppressed the original document

lying in the possession of MoFPI. Witnesses were shown the

photocopies, and they expressed their opinions based on the

photocopies alone. The report of the handwriting expert was also

based on the photocopies. The photocopies are inadmissible in

evidence. The specimen handwriting was taken without following

the procedure prescribed under Section 311-A of the Criminal

Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC). The Investigating officer was not

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competent to obtain the signatures of the accused. The officers of

MoFPI were not charged, and the charge of conspiracy failed.

Hence, it was prayed that the accused be discharged.

4. The application was opposed by the CBI by asserting

that the accused had applied for a grant-in-aid in favour of M/s

Resource Food Private Limited for setting up an integrated cold

chain project from the MoFPI based on the forged and fabricated

bills/invoices purportedly issued by different suppliers. The

photocopies bear the original signatures of the accused, clearly

showing that the photocopies were submitted to the Ministry.

There was sufficient material to frame charges against the

accused. Hence, it was prayed that the application be dismissed.

5. Learned Trial Court held that the Court has to prima

facie assess the material collected by the prosecution and

determine whether sufficient material existed for framing the

charges. The defence of the accused was not to be seen at the time

of framing of charges. It was permissible to look into the

photocopies at the time of framing the charges. The material on

record established that photocopies were produced before the

Ministry, and such photocopies fall within the definition of the

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primary evidence. The Investigating Officer stated that the

signatures were given voluntarily by the accused, and there is no

prohibition on taking the signatures by the Investigating Officer.

The accused and other persons had forged various documents and

produced them before the Ministry to avail the grant-in-aid.

Therefore, the application was dismissed.

6. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned

Trial Court, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting

that the learned Trial Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction

vested in it as per the law. The order was passed on mere

conjectures and surmises without going through the record.

There is no material to connect the petitioner with the

commission of the crime. The learned Trial Court did not refer to

the statement of any witness or the documents placed on record

by the prosecution showing that a strong suspicion existed

against the petitioner of committing the offence alleged against

her. The petitioner was never an employee of M/s Resource Foods

Pvt. Ltd. She was working in Himalayan Frozen Foods Ltd. She

had received a quotation in her e-mail, but that does not make

her a party to the commission of the offence. The petitioner never

forged or fabricated any bill or invoice for availing the grant-in -

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aid from MoFPI. The learned Trial Court also did not advert to this

aspect. The Investigating Agency also collected the bank details of

the petitioner, but did not find any suspicious activity. The CBI

has placed on record the photocopies, and in the absence of the

original, the prosecution cannot continue. Therefore, it was

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed

by the learned Trial Court be set-aside.

7. I have heard Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Mr Janesh Mahajan, Advocate, learned Special

Public Prosecutor, for the respondent/CBI.

8. Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in dismissing the

application for discharge. The CBI had failed to collect any

material to connect the petitioner to the commission of the crime.

The petitioner, in her capacity as an employee, had received the

invoices in her email, which is not sufficient to charge her for

forging the document or using the forged document as genuine.

She was acting as per the directions of her employer and cannot

be held liable for the commission of any offence. Therefore, he

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prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed

by the learned Trial Court be set-aside.

9. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate, learned Special Public

Prosecutor, for the respondent/CBI, submitted that the petitioner

was an active conspirator with the other co-accused. She had

received the invoices, which were altered and submitted to

MoFPI. Only the petitioner had access to her e-mail account, and

if the documents sent to the petitioner were subsequent forged,

the burden to explain this circumstance lies upon the petitioner.

Prima Facie, the alteration of the document sent to the petitioner

shows that she had forged the document, and since the forged

documents were submitted to MoFPI, an inference can be drawn

that forgery was in conspiracy with the other co-accused. The

learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while dismissing

the application filed by the petitioner, and this Court should not

interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while

exercising revisional jurisdiction.

10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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11. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502: 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 1582 that the Court framing the charges has to see a

prima facie case. It is impermissible to examine the material

threadbare to determine whether the accused is likely to be

convicted or not. It was observed: -

“12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of

charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and

at this stage, the probative value of materials on record

need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier

decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa,

(1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni,

(2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be

made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to

test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at

the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a

presumptive opinion on the existence of factual

ingredients constituting the offence alleged, and it is not

expected to go deep into the probative value of the material

on record and to check whether the material on record

would certainly lead to a conviction at the conclusion of the

trial.

12. It was held in Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P.,

(2024) 10 SCC 651: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 253: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1709

that the Court can sift and weigh the evidence to determine if a

prima facie case exists against the accused. It was observed at

page 661:

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“24. In the light of the decisions referred supra, it is thus

obvious that it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court

concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited

purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case

against the accused concerned has been made out. We are

of the considered view that a caution has to be sounded for

the reason that the chances of going beyond the

permissible jurisdiction under Section 227CrPC, and

entering into the scope of power under Section 232CrPC,

cannot be ruled out, as such instances are aplenty. In this

context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in

Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679: 2000 SCC (Cri)

1014. Taking note of the language of Section 227CrPC, is in

negative terminology and that the language in Section

232CrPC, is in the positive terminology and considering

this distinction between the two, this Court held that it

would not be open to the Court while considering an

application under Section 227CrPC, to weigh the pros and

cons of the evidence alleged improbability and then

proceed to discharge the accused holding that the

statements existing in the case therein are unreliable. It is

held that doing so would be practically acting under

Section 232 CrPC, even though the said stage has not

reached. In short, though it is permissible to sift and weigh

the materials for the limited purpose of finding out

whether or not a prima facie case is made out against the

accused, on appreciation of the admissibility and the

evidentiary value such materials brought on record by the

prosecution is impermissible as it would amount to denial

of opportunity to the prosecution to prove them

appropriately at the appropriate stage besides amounting

to exercise of the power coupled with obligation under

Section 232 CrPC, available only after taking the evidence

for the prosecution and examining the accused.

13. It was held in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of

Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, that the Court is not to

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undertake a threadbare analysis of the material but to see if there

is sufficient material to frame charges. It was observed:

“16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section

227 CrPC contemplates is that if, upon consideration of the

record of the case and the documents submitted therewith

and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the

prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there

are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the

accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his

reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of

discharge, the court is not required to undertake a

threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the

prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is

that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the

accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient

to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the

accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the

accused may still be acquitted. At the stage of discharge,

the court is only required to consider whether there are

sufficient materials which can justify the launch of a

criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a

discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal.

Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a

technicality or on the benefit of doubt, or the prosecution

could not prove the charge against the accused; but when

an accused is discharged, it means that there are no

materials to justify the launch of a criminal trial against

the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an

accused.”

14. The present petition has to be adjudicated as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

15. Kulbhushan and Om Prakash told the CBI that Pooja

Aggarwal is the Manager of M/s Hill Crest Foods and M/s

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Himalayan Frozen Foods Ltd. Dilawar Singh stated that Pooja

Aggarwal is a Personal Assistant in the Administrative Office of

M/s Hill Crest Foods and M/s Himalayan Frozen Foods Ltd. These

statements prima facie show that the petitioner is an employee of

the co-accused.

16. Ram Pal told the CBI that he had handed over the

purchase order, which was given by M/s Resources Foods Pvt. Ltd.

through authorized signatory Pooja Aggarwal, to him. The

invoices shown to him and used for obtaining grant-in-aid were

not issued by his firm, but these were forged by promoters of

Resource Foods Pvt. Ltd. Vikas Aggarwal stated that he had sent

the printed and self-attested copies of the quotation through e-

mail ID. The documents submitted by M/s Resource Foods Ltd.

were not the same which were sent by him. The price of the

quotation was increased from ₹7,80,000/- to ₹1,18,00,000/- by

the promoters of the company. This quotation was sent to Ravi

Bhushan Gupta, who sent it to the email ID of Pooja Aggarwal on

3.7.2012. The quotation was edited at the receiver’s end. Gautam

Jha stated that he had sent the printed self-attested copies of the

quotation of Fresh Food Technology in the name of Ms Pooja

Aggarwal/Mr. Diwan on the email ID of Pooja Aggarwal. The date

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of the quotation and the names of the person in whose name the

quotations were issued were edited. The amount was also altered

from ₹1,72,148.05 to ₹3,95,0000/-. Ravi Bhushan Gupta and

Ravish Gagla corroborated this version. These statements show

that the quotations sent to Pooja Aggarwal on her e-mail ID were

edited and submitted to MoFPI. Prima facie, the submission made

by the CBI has a force that the document could have only been

altered at the receiver’s end, and the petitioner has a role in the

alteration of the documents. This prima facie shows her

involvement in the forgery and submission of the forged

documents.

17. The CBI has also collected various documents written

by Pooja Aggarwal. She had signed a letter submitted to MoFPI

annexing the documents. She filed an application to MoFPI on

12.4.2013, submitting the copies of the temporary number, tax

invoices, and sale certificates in the name of M/s Hill Crest Foods.

She signed the agreement between Adani Agri Fresh Ltd. and M/s

Hill Crest Foods. These documents show the active involvement

of the petitioner in the affairs of M/s Hill Crest Foods. Therefore,

the submission that the petitioner was merely an employee and

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had nothing to do with the commission of the offence is not

acceptable.

18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ram

Prakash Chadha (supra) that the direct evidence of conspiracy

cannot be produced; however, it can be inferred from the

circumstances showing that the parties consented to do an illegal

act. It has been observed:-

32. There can be no doubt that a conspiracy is hatched in

privacy and not in secrecy, and such it would rarely be

possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. A few

bits here and a few bits there, on which the prosecution

may rely, are not sufficient to connect an accused with the

commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. To

constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first

and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of a

meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an

illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal

means.

33. In Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India, (1993) 3 SCC 609: 1993

SCC (Cri) 961, this Court characterised the offence of

criminal conspiracy as an agreement between two or more

persons to do an illegal act or a legal act through illegal

means. Furthermore, it was held that commission of the

offence would be complete as soon as there is consensus ad

idem, and it would be immaterial whether or not the

offence is actually committed. It is also held therein that

necessarily there must be agreement between the

conspirators on the design or object of the conspiracy. As

held in the R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 :

(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 164, the quintessential ingredient to

attract the offence of criminal conspiracy is agreement

between two or more persons. Therefore, the question is

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whether it was spelt in the final report dated 21-2-2000 or

in any of the records of the case and documents submitted

therewith, to find a prima facie case of commission of

criminal conspiracy against the appellant. True that an

agreement referred to in Section 120-AIPC may be

expressed or implied, or in part express and in part

implied. However, no record of the case or documents

submitted therewith carries such an allegation/accusation

against the appellant.”

19. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the

original documents were not produced with the charge sheet.

This submission will not help the petitioner. The CBI has

specifically asserted that the photocopies were submitted to the

MoFPI, and the production of the original documents was not

possible. It is a matter of trial whether the original documents

were submitted to the MoFPI or the photocopies were submitted.

However, the petitioner cannot be discharged because the

original documents were not submitted without allowing the CBI

to prove the plea taken by it.

20. It was submitted that the CBI was not competent to

take the specimen signatures. This submission cannot be

accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dara

Singh v. Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 706:

2011 SCC OnLine SC 219 that the procedure of taking the specimen

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handwriting adopted by the CBI cannot be faulted. It was

observed at page 525:

75. Another question which we have to consider is whether

the police (CBI) had the power under CrPC to take the spec-

imen signature and writing of A-3 for examination by the

expert. It was pointed out that during the investigation,

even the Magistrate cannot direct the accused to give his

specimen signature at the asking of the police, and only af-

ter the amendment of CrPC in 2005, power was given to the

Magistrate to direct any person, including the accused, to

give his specimen signature for the purpose of investiga-

tion. Hence, it was pointed out that, taking of his signa-

ture/writings being per se illegal, the report of the expert

cannot be used as evidence against him.

76. To meet the above claim, the learned Additional Solici-

tor General heavily relied on an eleven-Judge Bench deci-

sion of this Court in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad

[AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856 : (1962) 3 SCR 10]. This

larger Bench was constituted in order to re-examine some

of the propositions of law laid down by this Court in M.P.

Sharma v. Satish Chandra [AIR 1954 SC 300: 1954 Cri LJ

865: 1954 SCR 1077].

xxxxx

78. In view of the above principles, the procedure adopted

by the investigating agency, analysed and approved by the

trial court and confirmed by the High Court, cannot be

faulted with. In view of the oral report of Rolia Soren, PW 4

which was reduced into writing, the evidence of PW 23, two

letters dated 1-2-2002 and 2-2-2002 addressed by Ma -

hendra Hembram (A-3) to the trial Judge facing (sic con-

fessing) his guilt coupled with the other materials, we are

unable to accept the argument of Mr Ratnakar Dash,

learned Senior Counsel for Mahendra Hembram (A-3) and

we confirm the conclusion arrived at by the High Court.

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21. Madras High Court also held in Babitha Surendran v.

State, 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 14003, that the police have the power

to take specimen signatures during the investigation. It was

observed:

“8.  X”, an high ranking official, receives a handwritten

letter in the letter head of “Y”, containing serious insinua-

tions and also handing out death threat to him. “X” hands

over the letter with a complaint to the police, based on

which an FIR is registered against “Y” and an investigation

is taken up. During the course of the investigation, police

summon “Y”, who accepts that the letterhead belongs to

him, but denies the authorship of the contents. So, the next

step for the police should be to ask “Y” to give his speci-

men signatures and handwriting. When asked by the Po -

lice, “Y” voluntarily gives his specimen signatures and

handwriting. Police do not arrest “Y”, and they allow him

to leave. During the investigation, the police suspect one

“Z” and they examine him, and in the course of examina-

tion, they ask “Z” to give his specimen handwritings and

signatures, which he gives. Specimen handwritings and

signatures that were obtained from “Y” and “Z” are sent to

the Handwriting Expert along with the subject letter re-

ceived by “X”, for opinion. The Handwriting Expert opines

that the subject letter has been written by “Z” and not by

“Y”. Police consciously take a decision not to arrest “Z”,

but after completing the investigation, they file a Final Re-

port before the Court against “Z” for the offence of crimi-

nal intimidation, etc.

9. Can we say that the police have committed an illegality

by obtaining the specimen handwritings and signatures of

“Y” and “Z” and therefore, the prosecution should fail?

The answer is an emphatic “No”. The power of the police

to obtain handwriting and signatures during the course of

investigation from witnesses, suspects and accused has

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never been questioned, because it was considered a con-

comitant power of investigation that inheres in the police.

Xxxx

11. From the aforesaid texts themselves, it is

abundantly clear that it is an inclusive definition and

not an exhaustive definition. As long as there is no

constitutional or statutory prohibition inhibiting the

Police from obtaining specimen handwritings and

signatures from an accused, it cannot be stated that

the police are denuded of this power. The mere

obtaining of specimen signatures or handwriting

from the accused cannot, by itself fasten any

criminal liability on him, because the same has to be

compared by an Expert with the disputed one for

fastening criminal liability, unlike a statement to a

Police Officer which, proprio vigore may mulct the

suspect with criminal liability if it is in the nature of

a confession. The handwriting or signatures

obtained from an accused cannot, by itself, fasten

any criminal liability, unless it is sent to an expert to

be compared with the disputed one and an opinion is

obtained.

Xxxx

17. To say that Section 311-A is the only repository of the

power to obtain signatures and handwriting from the ac-

cused during investigation would amount to denuding a

power that always existed with the police. Section 311-A

was introduced in the Statute nearly 25 years after the

Supreme Court made a suggestion in  State of Uttar

Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra [(1980) 2 SCC 341] : (AIR 1980 SC

1522).

18. In my considered opinion, Section 311 A, Cr. PC. is an

enabling provision which comes to the aid of the Investi-

gating Agency, when a suspect or accused refuses to give

his specimen signatures or handwriting.

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22. Hence, it is difficult to agree with the submission that

the CBI had no jurisdiction to take the specimen signatures.

23. Therefore, the plea of the petitioner that the learned

Trial Court erred in dismissing her application for discharge

cannot be accepted. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that a

prima facie case exists for framing charges against her, and no

interference is required with the order passed by the learned Trial

Court.

24. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the

same is dismissed.

25. The observation made herein before shall remain

confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,

whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

1

st

January, 2026

(Chander)