MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 1 of 19

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

% Reserved on : 30

th

April 2026

Pronounced on : 29

th

May 2026

Uploaded on : 30

th

May 2026

+ MAC.APP. 20/2022 & CM APPL. 4585/2022

UTTAR PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT

CORPORATION

.....Appellant

Through: Mr. Shadab Khan, Advocate.

versus

AARTI KANDA & ORS.

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Advocate with

Mr. Ritik Singh, Advocate for R-1

to 3.

+ MAC.APP. 444/2023

POOJA & ORS. .....Appellants

Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Advocate with

Mr. Ritik Singh, Advocate

versus

MOHD GULZAR & ANR. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Shadab Khan, Advocate for

R-2.

CORAM:

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL

JUDGMENT

ANISH DAYAL, J.

1. These appeals arise out of the same accident, being, MAC. APP.

No. 20/2022, which has been filed by the Uttar Pradesh State Road

Transport Corporation (hereinafter, ‘Corporation’) assailing the

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 2 of 19

impugned judgment and award dated 12

th

November 2021 [hereinafter,

‘first award’], passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal

(‘MACT/Tribunal’), Rohini Courts in MACT No. 541/2017 awarding Rs.

29,28,600/- alongwith interest at the rate of 9% per annum to the legal

representatives (‘LRs’) of deceased/Jaspal Singh Kanda.

2. MAC. APP. No. 444/2023, has been filed by the legal

representatives (‘LRs’) of deceased/Vijay Kumar seeking setting aside

the impugned judgment and award dated 29

th

May 2023 [hereinafter,

‘second award’], passed by the MACT, South-West, Dwarka Courts in

MACT No. 750/2017, whereby the claim petition was dismissed.

The Incident

3. The accident in question occurred on 29

th

May 2017, when

deceased/Jaspal Singh Kanda was travelling from Ghaziabad to Delhi on

a scooter along with deceased/Vijay Kumar as a pillion rider. When they

reached near Raj Nagar Extension, Ghaziabad, U.P. a U.P. Roadways

bus bearing registration no. UP-81-BT-6607 (hereinafter, ‘offending

vehicle/bus’) allegedly driven in a rash and negligent manner by

driver/Mohd. Gulzar hit the scooter of the deceased, resulting in grievous

injuries to both occupants. They were removed to MMG Hospital where

deceased/Vijay Kumar died during treatment and deceased/Jaspal Singh

Kanda was shifted to GTB Hospital where he died during treatment.

4. Both the driver/Mohd. Gulzar and owner/Corporation appeared

and contested the claim petition. In the case of deceased/Jaspal Singh

Kanda, the claim was moved by his LRs, including, his wife, two sons

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 3 of 19

and mother. In the case of deceased/Vijay Kumar, the claim was moved

by his LRs, including, his wife, two children and mother.

Impugned awards

5. In the first award, MACT held the driver/Mohd. Gulzar liable for

negligence and awarded compensation of Rs. 29,28,600/- along with 9%

interest.

6. However, in the second award, the claim petition was dismissed

by the MACT on the ground that negligence was not made out against

the driver of offending vehicle.

7. Mr. Shadab Khan, counsel for Corporation, has challenged the

first award on the basis that the MACT was amiss in relying only on the

factum of filing of the FIR and charge-sheet, considering that there was

no eyewitness to the accident which would justify the factum of rashness

and negligence of driver/Mohd. Gulzar.

8. Moreover, there was no finding as regards contributory

negligence, despite the categorical stand taken by driver/Mohd. Gulzar

that the scooter was being driven on the wrong side of the road. Mr.

Shadab Khan, counsel for Corporation, placed reliance on the decision of

this Court in Usha Devi v. Mohan Lal & Anr. 2026:DHC:2694 whereby,

the Court had deducted 50% towards contributory negligence of

deceased.

9. Further, the compensation awarded was excessive and

disproportionate, including, the aspect of interest.

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 4 of 19

10. Mr. S.N. Parashar, counsel for claimants, has challenged the

dismissal of the second award on the ground that, there was enough

evidence on record proving negligence of the driver/Mohd. Gulzar.

Reference was made to the site plan marked as R1W1/DX2 in MAC.

APP. 444/2023, which shows that the scooter was being driven on the

right side of offending vehicle, i.e. on the driver’s side and the collision

took place when they were driving in parallel. However, in his testimony,

driver/Mohd. Gulzar had stated that the two-wheeler came from the

opposite direction in front of the bus and, therefore, he could not have

avoided a collision in any manner and there was no fault or negligence

on his part.

11. Mr. Parashar, counsel for claimants, pointed to the cross-

examination of driver/Mohd. Gulzar, R1W1, where he stated that the site

plan was correct and the scooter was coming from Raj Nagar and going

towards Delhi. He further stated that he could not tell the distance

between the scooter and the bus and that he ran away from the spot of

accident after the accident had occurred, leaving the bus at the spot due

to fear of public anger. He also stated that the department had suspended

him for one month as punishment and, thereafter, sent him for training.

12. Mr. Parashar, counsel for claimants, states that there are severe

contradictions in the testimony given as part of his affidavit by way of

examination in chief and as per the cross-examination and site plan, and

the same shows that testimony of the driver was not credible.

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 5 of 19

13. MACT, however, dismissed the claim petition on the basis that

there was a lack of proof of negligence, relying upon the decision of

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meena Variyal and Ors. (2007) 5

SCC 428.

14. Mr. Parashar, counsel for claimants, also pointed out that an FIR

was lodged against the driver/Mohd. Gulzar, which has now resulted in a

charge sheet for offences punishable under Sections 279/338/304A of the

Indian Penal Code,1860 (‘IPC’).

Analysis

Negligence

15. For the purposes of examining the issue of negligence, one must

deal with the second award first, which dismissed the claim petition on

the ground that negligence was not established on the basis of the

testimony of R1W1. There is no conflict on the issue that there was no

eyewitness to the accident. Therefore, what had to be gleaned from the

available evidence was, whether the testimony of driver/Mohd. Gulzar in

countering the claim of negligence, was consistent or not.

16. Lack of eyewitnesses does not mandate that there can never be any

finding of negligence, as observed by the Supreme Court in Anita

Sharma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171 wherein,

the Court stated that non-examination of best eyewitnesses, as may

happen in a criminal trial cannot be a reason for the Tribunal to not go

ahead and determine the issue of negligence based on material placed

before it. In such situations, nothing can be provided by the family of a

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 6 of 19

deceased in terms of evidence, except for the facts of the accident itself

which usually form a part of the investigation by the police.

17. In the case at hand, driver/Mohd Gulzar gave his testimony as

R1W1 stating that he was the driver of offending vehicle owned by the

Corporation. He stated that on 29

th

May 2017, he was driving from

Meerut and going towards Delhi at about 06.20 p.m., when the offending

vehicle/bus reached near Raj Nagar Extension, suddenly a two-wheeler

came in front of the bus from opposite direction in a rash and negligent

manner and dashed into the bus.

18. He stated that he was driving the bus in the correct lane at a

normal speed and was therefore, not negligent, while the two-wheeler

driver was driving at a high speed. He further stated that he took

measures to save the bus and avoid the accident, however, since the bus

was coming from the opposite direction it could not be controlled or

avoided.

19. In the cross-examination by counsel for claimant, he admitted that

he was arrested after the accident and a criminal case was pending

against him and he had not filed any complaint regarding alleged false

implication. Though, he was not suspended from his job, his route was

changed for some days.

20. He stated that the road on which the accident took place had a

divider in between and had two lanes. Left side was meant for buses and

that the motorcycle was coming towards the bus from the wrong side and

the motorcycle went under the left side tyre of the bus. He stated that he

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 7 of 19

was driving at about 50-55 kmph, but could not produce any document in

support, showing that a speed controller was installed in the bus and was

working properly. He later produced a document, R1W1/DX1 in support

of his contention.

21. Further in a subsequent cross-examination conducted on 1

st

August

2022, he admitted that as per the site plan, it was correct that the scooter

was coming from Raj Nagar towards Delhi and he could not tell the

distance between the scooter and the bus and, he ran away after the

accident and left the bus at the spot due to fear of public gathering.

22. He further stated that the department had suspended him for one

month as punishment and was thereafter sent for training for another

month.

23. In this context, it would be important to peruse the site plan which

is extracted as under for reference:

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 8 of 19

24. The site plan clearly notes the place of accident marked as point A

and the single arrow notes movement of the scooter, whereas, the double

arrow notes movement of the bus. It is evident from the site plan that

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 9 of 19

both vehicles were moving in the same direction and near the situs of

collision i.e. point A, the bus moved slightly to the right, resulting in a

collision with the scooter.

25. It is, therefore, clear that in these circumstances, testimony of

R1W1 collapses completely. Not only has he wrongly stated in his

examination-in-chief by way of affidavit, that the two-wheeler was

coming from opposite direction which is completely contrary to the site

plan, as also to his cross-examination, where he admitted that the scooter

was also coming from Raj Nagar to Delhi.

26. Further, in the cross-examination conducted on 30

th

January 2020,

driver/Mohd. Gulzar stated that only his route was changed and he had

not been suspended by the Corporation, whereas, in the subsequent

cross-examination conducted on 01

st

August 2022, he admitted that the

department had suspended him for one month and he was sent for

training.

27. Even if he might have been moving in his left lane and the scooter

might have been moving in parallel, the site plan shows that he moved

slightly to the right and, therefore, the scooter would have come under

the right wheel of the bus. However, he stated that the scooter came

under the left wheel of the bus, which could not have been possible

taking into account the site plan.

28. The issue of determination of negligence is based on application of

the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the persuasive value of criminal

proceedings and evidence on record, which has been discussed by this

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 10 of 19

Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Shehnaj Begum & Ors

2026:DHC:13169. Proceedings before the Tribunal are in the nature of

an inquiry, therefore, strict rules of procedure or evidence do not apply.

The assessment of negligence has to be conducted on the test of

preponderance of probabilities. Relevant observations of the Court are

extracted as under:

“Summarizing

38. From the above discussion relating to the nature of

inquiry before the Tribunal, the operation of the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the applicable

standard of proof, three aspects emerge clearly.

39. First, that the proceedings before the Motor

Accident Claims Tribunal are in nature of an inquiry

and are not hemmed in by rules of procedure or

evidence. The Supreme Court in Shila Datta (supra)

[passages extracted in paragraph 20 (a) above], has

elaborated on this aspect. Essentially, a claim under

Section 165 of the MV Act, is neither a suit nor an

adversarial lis.

40. Tribunal holds an inquiry and makes an award to

determine compensation, which ought to be just and

reasonable. The procedure to be followed is

summarised in the best discretion of the Tribunal. It

has the power under Section 169 of MV Act to summon

persons possessing special knowledge of the matters

relevant to the inquiry.

41. In Anita Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court

emphasised that fault may not be found merely because

Tribunals do not examine some of the best

eyewitnesses, as in a criminal trial, but should do their

best to analyse the material placed on record by the

parties.

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 11 of 19

42. Having clearly sketched the contours of the

procedure undertaken by a Tribunal, it brings us to the

second issue, which is determination of negligence.

The nature of the accident and the basic facts

surrounding the same are presented before the

Tribunal in the form of a DAR (Detailed Accident

Report), or through an FIR, or a recording in a police

diary, along with the claim for compensation. In order

to arrive at an assessment of negligence and, therefore,

consequential liability in tort law, the principle of res

ipsa loquitur, particularly in accident cases, is often

brought into play.

43. Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur constitutes an

exception to the general rule that the burden of proving

negligence lies upon the claimant. The facts, “tell its

own story” and “speak for itself”. The fact of the

accident itself sometimes constitutes evidence of

negligence. The principal function of the maxim is to

prevent injustice, that would be caused to a plaintiff

who would otherwise be compelled to prove the precise

cause of the accident and responsibility of the

defendant, when the facts are unknown to plaintiff but

lie only within the knowledge of defendant. The burden

then shifts to the defendant, who can, by leading

evidence, rebut the inference drawn by the Court based

on the doctrine.

…

45. Therefore, for application of the principle, it must

be shown that the offending vehicle was under the

management of the defendant and that the accident was

such that, in the ordinary course of things, it would not

have happened if those who were in management had

used proper care. Having reached a reasonable

inference based on the facts of the accident and being

presented with a defence raised by defendants that they

exercised care to avert foreseeable harm, the issue

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 12 of 19

before the Tribunal would be how to balance the two

aspects and what parameter is to be applied in

measuring this balance, or in assessing which side the

scales tilt.

46. This brings us to the third aspect, which is the test

to be applied. It is well settled that the test or the

burden of proof which applies is not that of beyond a

reasonable doubt (as in criminal cases), but on the test

of preponderance of probabilities.”

(emphasis added)

29. The Court has also dealt with the scope of the determination of

negligence as set out by the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co.

Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428. Observations made by this

Court in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Sunita Singh 2026:DHC:3190 may

be relied upon and are extracted as under:

“44. Respondents/claimants in Meena Variyal (supra)

had sought to submit that there was no obligation on

claimant to prove negligence, relying upon the decision

Gujarat SRTC (supra) where the Court had clarified

that observations in Minu B. Mehta (supra) were one

in the nature of obiter dicta. Supreme Court in Meena

Variyal (supra) clarified that the Court did not state

that in a claim based on negligence, there is no

obligation to establish negligence. In Minu B. Mehta

(supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with no fault

liability and a departure from Fatal Accidents Act,

1855 leading to a theory of strict liability. The Court

did not have an occasion to construe a provision like

163-A of MV Act, which provides for compensation

without proof of negligence in contradistinction to

Section 166 of the MV Act. Moreover, Minu B. Mehta

(supra) was decided by a three Judge Bench while

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 13 of 19

Gujarat SRTC (supra) was decided by a two Judge

Bench.

45. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Meena Variyal

(supra) stated that the obiter dicta in Minu B. Mehta

(supra), though, not binding, had clear persuasive

authority. Minu B. Mehta (supra) merely said that

proof of negligence was necessary, but the Supreme

Court in Meena Variyal (supra) clarified that these

obiter observations governed a claim under Section

166 of the MV Act and were inapplicable when claim

was made under Section 163-A of the Act.

46. This clarification by the Supreme Court merely

reiterates a fundamental position under law, that, in a

claim for liability based on negligence, claimant does

have to prove negligence. However, what is the nature

of that onus on the claimant needs to be understood.

The claimant, who may be injured or a legal

representative of the deceased, resulting from an

accident, can at best provide facts of the accident

which are available to them, by themselves or through

police records to a Tribunal. This would include

aspects of the nature of collision, vehicles involved,

location of the vehicles, situs of the accident and in

some cases involve an eyewitness testimony, as well.

Beyond that, from this conspectus of facts, can an

inference of negligence be drawn out. Onus on the

claimant cannot be more than this, considering that the

claimant would not have access to the information,

which is otherwise available to respondent/driver, as

to the conduct of respondent/driver while driving the

offending vehicle at the time when the collision took

place or the events leading to the collision.

47. At best, that can only be achieved by the claimant

in cross-examination of the driver of offending vehicle,

which as often seen in practice, do not appear before

Tribunals, the liability being borne by the Insurance

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 14 of 19

Company. Having discharged the onus to this extent,

the Supreme Court’s observation in Meena Variyal

(supra) having endorsed the obiter dicta of Minu B.

Mehta (supra), for a claim under section 166 of the MV

Act, does not mean that this onus is jettisoned. But it

also does not mean that there is something greater

than this onus on the claimants to discharge for

proving a claim.”

(emphasis added)

30. There is no doubt that criminal proceedings have been initiated

against the driver/Mohd. Gulzar and owner/Corporation, which have not

been controverted or any legal step taken by them.

31. The Supreme Court in various decisions has held that it is not

amiss for the MACT to rely on the FIR and charge-sheet to consider that

there was negligence on the part of the driver in case there are no

eyewitness, on preponderance of probabilities.

32. In this regard, decision of the Supreme Court in Ranjeet & Anr v.

Abdul Nayem Keb & Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 497 and Meera Bai &

Ors. v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. 2025 INSC

600, may be instructive.

33. The Supreme Court in Ranjeet (supra) reiterated its position on

the said issue, where it stated as under:

“4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has

been filed and the driver has been held negligent, no

further evidence is required to prove that the bus was

being negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the

eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to

prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of

the bus driver.

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 15 of 19

5. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the opinion

that the Tribunal and the High Court both manifestly

erred in law in refusing to grant any compensation to

the claimants.”

(emphasis added)

34. Relevant observations of the Supreme Court in Meera Bai (supra)

are extracted as under:

“2. The claimants before the Tribunal have filed an

appeal from the order of the High Court which allowed

the appeal of the insurance company and dismissed the

claim petition for reason of no eyewitness having been

examined to prove the rash and negligent driving.

3. On facts, it needs to be stated that the accident

occurred on 29.01.2015 when the deceased was

travelling pillion in a motorbike driven and owned by

the second respondent. The FIR was lodged against the

owner driver of the vehicle for the offence of rash and

negligent driving. A charge sheet was filed against the

owner driver. The owner driver filed a written

statement before the Tribunal denying the rash and

negligent driving on his part, however he did not

mount the box to depose that it was not due to his fault

that the accident occurred.

4. As far as examining the eyewitness, such a witness

will not be available in all cases. The FIR having been

lodged and the charge sheet filed against the owner

driver of the offending vehicle, we are of the opinion

that there could be no finding that negligence was not

established.”

(emphasis added)

35. In these circumstances, the finding of MACT, which ignored these

contradictions and held that the issue of negligence has not been proved,

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 16 of 19

cannot be sustained. Furthermore, such a finding is also inconsistent with

the first award.

36. For all these reasons, as discussed above, the appeal filed by

claimants assailing second award in MAC APP. 444/2023, against the

rejection of their claim is, therefore, allowed and the impugned award is

set aside.

37. Accordingly, the matter is remanded back to the MACT to decide

the issue of quantum of compensation, which shall be decided within 3

months on the basis of evidence already on record. Further evidence may

be requisitioned by MACT for any purpose, only if, it is considered

extremely necessary.

38. In MAC APP No. 20/2022, counsel for Corporation had raised a

plea that the deceased should have been held liable for contributory

negligence and reliance was placed on Usha Devi (supra). However, the

same shall not be sustainable, as the Court in Usha Devi (supra) had

arrived at that finding, on the basis that nothing had been put forth by the

claimants in the cross-examination of driver of offending vehicle to

suggest that he was solely negligent. Therefore, this decision shall not be

applicable to the facts of the case at hand.

39. Accordingly, the assertions of the Corporation stand dismissed, as

regards the issue of negligence and contributory negligence.

Compensation

40. Mr. Shadab Khan, counsel for Corporation, raised a plea that the

compensation awarded in the first award is excessive. It is noted that the

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 17 of 19

deceased was working as a private driver earning a sum of Rs. 15,000/-

per month, as stated in the testimony given by the widow of deceased.

However, there being no documentary evidence, the MACT considered

minimum wages of an unskilled worker at Rs. 13,584/-.

41. The deceased was aged about 34 years and, therefore, multiplier of

‘16’ and future prospects were awarded at 40% in light of principles

enunciated in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi

(2017) 16 SCC 680 and Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121.

42. Since, there were four dependants, deduction towards personal and

living expenses was at 1/4

th

and loss of dependency was, therefore,

correctly calculated at Rs. 27,38,600/-. Loss of love and affection, was

rightly not given, whereas, loss of consortium, was given at ₹1,60,000/-

for four family members and loss of estate and funeral expenses were

cumulatively given at Rs. 30,000/-

43. Therefore, compensation awarded by the MACT, was entirely in

line with the principles enunciated in Sarla Verma (supra) and Pranay

Sethi (supra). The Court does not find any reason to alter or reject the

same.

44. Mr. Shadab Khan, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company,

raised an additional ground that the interest rate awarded by the MACT

should be reduced.

45. The accident had taken place on 29

th

May 2017, and as per the

rates prescribed by Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) for fixed deposits

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 18 of 19

ranged between 6.5% and 6.75%, which were increased to 7.25% in the

subsequent year.

46. It would, therefore, be appropriate that an interest rate of about

7.25% be awarded on the compensation, which shall be computed from

the date of filing of petition i.e. 05

th

July 2017.

Directions

In MAC. APP. 20/2022

47. By order dated 03

rd

February 2022, Court had directed the

Corporation to deposit the entire awarded amount before the MACT, and

50% amount was directed to be released as per the scheme of disbursal,

with interest calculated at the rate of 6.25% per annum and the balance

amount was kept in an interest-bearing fixed deposit.

48. Considering that the compensation awarded by the MACT is

upheld, the balance 50% amount shall be released at an interest rate of

7.25% from the date of filing, to the claimants as lump sum within six

weeks. Balance amount, if any, shall be refunded to the Corporation.

49. Statutory deposit, if any, shall be refunded to Corporation, only if

the order of deposit has been complied with.

In MAC. APP. 444/2023

50. In view of the above discussion, the appeal stands allowed on the

issue of negligence of driver/Mohd. Gulzar.

51. The matter is remanded back to the MACT to be decided on the

issue of quantum of compensation within the next three months.

52. List before the MACT on 2

nd

July 2026.

MAC.APP. 20/2022 & MAC APP. 444/2023 Page 19 of 19

53. Accordingly, both appeals are disposed of.

54. Copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned MACT.

55. Copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned bank.

56. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.

(ANISH DAYAL)

JUDGE

MAY 29, 2026/RK/sp