2026 INSC 740

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 1 of 16

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 127 OF 2026

RUTVIJ BHAGAT SINGH WAKHARE …PETITIONER(S)

Versus

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL J.

1. The present writ petition has been instituted by the petitioner under Article

32 of the Constitution of India seeking, principally, quashing of multiple First

Information Reports

1

registered in different States of the country. In the

alternative, the petitioner seeks clubbing and consolidation of the subject FIRs,

along with a direction to conduct one composite investigation by a single

1

‘FIRs’ for short.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 2 of 16

investigating agency, to avoid multiplicity of proceedings; conflicting

investigations and possibly judicial opinions. For ready reference, the reliefs

sought in the writ petition are extracted hereunder:

“(a) Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the following Complaints/FIRs

filed against the Petitioner as mentioned.

(b) Quash and set aside all the FIRs lodged in Maharashtra Pune Cyber

Police Station Pune City with FIR No.0499 of 2024 Bengaluru with

Crime No. 412 of 2024, and Crime No.275/2024 and in Odisha with

Crime No. 32 of 2024, under section 120B,170, 389, 417, 419, 420,

465, 467, 468, 471, 506 R/w 35, 36, 37 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and

section 43, 66(c) and 66(d) of I.T. Act.

(c) In the alternative, direct that all the above-mentioned FIRs be

clubbed and consolidated, and further direct that only one composite

investigation be carried out, preferably by a single investigating agency,

to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting investigations.

(d) Pass any other just and equitable order in the interest of Justice,

Equity and Good Conscience.”

2. The subject FIRs have been registered in the States of Maharashtra,

Karnataka and Odisha under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

2

and the Information Technology Act, 2000

3

. At this juncture, it would be apposite

to set out the details of the FIRs which form the subject matter of the present

proceedings:

S. No. FIR No. Date Offences Police Station/

District

KARNATAKA

1. 0275 of 2024 10.05.2024 Sections 419, 420, 384

and 506 of IPC; and

Section 66(C) and 66(D)

of IT Act

Central CEN Crime

PS; District:

Bengaluru City

2

‘IPC’ for short.

3

‘IT Act’ for short.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 3 of 16

2. 0412 of 2024 13.05.2024 Section 420 IPC; and

Sections 43, 66(C) and

66(D) of IT Act

East CEN Crime PS;

District: Bengaluru

City

MAHARASHTRA

3. 0499 of 2024 04.06.2024 Sections 419, 420 and

34 of IPC; and Section

66(D) of IT Act

Pune City Cyber

Police Station;

District: Pune City

ODISHA

4. 0032 of 2024 06.12.2024 Sections 419, 420, 465,

467 and 120-B IPC; and

Sections 66(C) and

66(D) of the IT Act

Cyber PS Rourkela;

District: Rourkela

3. The allegations, as emerging from these FIRs, pertain to incidents of cyber

fraud, wherein the complainants were contacted by unknown persons posing as

police officials and were falsely informed that several money laundering

activities had been carried out in their names. On this pretext, the complainants

were induced to transfer large sums of money to various bank accounts for

verification and investigation. It is alleged that a part of the money, so transferred,

was credited to Account No.50200085120507 maintained in the name of ‘M/s Al

Zeba Marinen Overseas’, a proprietary concern of the petitioner. Though the

petitioner is not named as an accused in the subject FIRs, the aforesaid bank

account belonging to his proprietary concern finds a mention therein.

4. The petitioner, however, denies the aforesaid allegations and contends that

he has no role in the commission of these alleged offences. According to him, he

had permitted his friend, Mr. Ganesh Khaire, to use the aforesaid bank account

on a commission basis to run an online gaming business. It is contended that the

said bank account was, thereafter, operated by Mr. Ganesh Khaire, and one Mr.

Krishnakant Sharma. The petitioner further states that upon becoming aware of

the misuse of the bank account, he lodged a Cyber Crime Complaint dated

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 4 of 16

09.05.2024 against the said persons, alleging that they had fraudulently used the

bank account of his proprietary concern for unlawful money transfers.

5. It is in this background that the petitioner has filed the present writ petition

seeking, inter alia, quashing of the subject FIRs or, in the alternative, their

clubbing and consolidation. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and

perused the material placed on record.

Whether the subject FIRs should be quashed?

6. The principal relief sought by the petitioner is the quashing of the subject

FIRs. Before examining whether such relief deserves to be granted, it would be

apposite to consider whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution

is maintainable for seeking quashing of an FIR.

7. Article 32 of the Constitution is the constitutional conduit through which

this Court may issue ‘appropriate’ writs for the enforcement of Fundamental

Rights guaranteed under Part III. The right to approach this Court under Article

32 is itself a fundamental right and has been aptly described by Dr. B.R.

Ambedkar as the ‘heart and soul’ of the Constitution. The jurisdiction conferred

under Article 32 is undoubtedly wide. At the same time, it is an extraordinary

remedy which must be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances,

particularly when it is necessary to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the

infringement of fundamental rights.

8. It is well settled that the power of this Court under Article 32 is broad

enough to quash criminal proceedings in an appropriate case, so as to prevent

abuse of the process of law. The existence of an alternative statutory remedy does

not, by itself, bar the exercise of jurisdiction. However, as a matter of judicial

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 5 of 16

principle and orderly procedure, an aggrieved party is expected, in the ordinary

course, to firstly approach the High Court. It is only where the facts disclose a

violation of fundamental right(s) or other compelling circumstances that this

Court would directly exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32. [See:

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras

4

; Union of India v. Paul Manickam

5

;

Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P.

6

; and Sunil Kumar Rai v. State of Bihar

7

]

9. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to refer to a few judicial

pronouncements of this Court wherein the principles governing the exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 32 for quashing criminal proceedings have been

considered:

9.1. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Arnab Ranjan Goswami v.

Union of India

8

, held that although a petition under Article 32 to quash the

FIR is maintainable, the petitioner should ordinarily be relegated to the

High Court under Section 482 CrPC unless exceptional circumstances

exist. It observed as under. The ratio reads as under:

“57. … Whether the allegations contained in the FIR do or do not

make out any offence as alleged will not be decided in pursuance of

the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, to quash the FIR. The

petitioner must be relegated to the pursuit of the remedies available

under the CrPC, which we hereby do. The petitioner has an equally

efficacious remedy available before the High Court. We should not

be construed as holding that a petition under Article 32 is not

maintainable. But when the High Court has the power under Section

482, there is no reason to by-pass the procedure under the CrPC, we

see no exceptional grounds or reasons to entertain this petition under

Article 32. There is a clear distinction between the maintainability

of a petition and whether it should be entertained. …”

(emphasis supplied)

4

1950 SCC 436.

5

(2003) 8 SCC 342.

6

(2019) 6 SCC 619.

7

(2024) 17 SCC 592.

8

(2020) 14 SCC 12.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 6 of 16

[See also: Amish Devgan v. Union of India

9

]

9.2. This Court, in Vinod Dua v. Union of India

10

, in exercise of its

power under Article 32, quashed the FIR registered against the petitioner

therein, having found that the allegations levelled against him directly

impinged upon his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a). While doing

so, this Court reiterated that the practice of relegating the petitioner to

approach the High Court before approaching this Court is a matter of self-

discipline and that there is no bar on this Court to exercise its jurisdiction

under Article 32 of the Constitution to quash the criminal proceedings.

“30. In Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P. [Jagisha Arora v. State of

U.P., (2019) 6 SCC 619 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 881] , this Court

entertained a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against an

order of remand passed by the jurisdictional Magistrate despite the

objection that the order must be challenged in accordance with the

provisions of the Code. The discussion was : (SCC pp. 619-20, paras

2-7)

“... … …

5. As a matter of self-imposed discipline and considering the

pressure of mounting cases on this Court, it has become the

practice of this Court to ordinarily direct that the High Court

first be approached even in cases of violation of fundamental

rights. However, Article 32 which is itself a fundamental right

cannot be rendered nugatory in a glaring case of deprivation of

liberty as in the instant case, where the jurisdictional

Magistrate has passed an order of remand till 22-6-2019 which

means that the petitioner's husband Prashant Kanojia would be

in custody for about 13/14 days for putting up posts/tweets on

the social media. …

… … …

31. Thus, the practice of directing that the High Court be

approached first even in cases of violation of fundamental rights,

is more of a self-imposed discipline by this Court; but in glaring

cases of deprivation of liberty, this Court has entertained petitions

under Article 32 of the Constitution. We may, at this stage, also

9

(2021) 1 SCC 1.

10

(2023) 14 SCC 286.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 7 of 16

notice the following observations made in Union of India v. Paul

Manickam [Union of India v. Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 :

2004 SCC (Cri) 239] : (SCC p. 356, para 22)

“22. Another aspect which has been highlighted is that many

unscrupulous petitioners are approaching this Court under

Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the order of

detention directly without first approaching the High Courts

concerned. It is appropriate that the High Court concerned

under whose jurisdiction the order of detention has been

passed by the State Government or Union Territory should be

approached first. In order to invoke the jurisdiction under

Article 32 of the Constitution to approach this Court directly,

it has to be shown by the petitioner as to why the High Court

has not been approached, could not be approached or it is futile

to approach the High Court. Unless satisfactory reasons are

indicated in this regard, filing of petition in such matters

directly under Article 32 of the Constitution is to be

discouraged.”

(emphasis supplied)

9.3. More recently, in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P.

11

, this Court

reaffirmed that a writ petition under Article 32 seeking quashing of an FIR

is maintainable where grievance discloses a violation of a fundamental

right. It was held that:

“89. We shall now proceed to address the question as to whether a

writ petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 32 of the Constitution would be maintainable for seeking

quashing of an FIR and the consequential proceedings arising

therefrom.

90. This Court, as the highest constitutional court, has been

conferred with the powers as enshrined under Part III of

the Constitution to provide remedies against the violation of

fundamental rights. The very fact that the right to constitutional

remedies has itself been enshrined as a fundamental right is a clear

affirmation that this Court is the ultimate guarantor of their

enforcement. Once the Constitution has cast such a responsibility

upon it, this Court need not direct a petitioner to pursue an

alternative remedy, when the grievance stems from the alleged

violation of a fundamental right.

91. At the same time, although, as a matter of orderly procedure

and judicial discipline, an aggrieved party is expected, in the

11

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 8 of 16

ordinary course, to first approach the High Court, yet where facts

disclose a palpable violation of the fundamental rights

necessitating urgent intervention, it is incumbent upon this Court,

in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to step in and secure justice. In

such circumstances, the existence of an alternative remedy cannot

dilute the constitutional mandate entrusted to this Court. That is

why it is said that “Let justice be done, though the Heavens may

fall”.”

(emphasis supplied)

10. In the present case, the petitioner has only contended that, (i) he was

serving abroad on a merchant ship; (ii) had no knowledge of the alleged

transactions; and (iii) that the aforesaid bank account was operated and misused

by Mr. Ganesh Khaire and Mr. Krishnakant Sharma. In our considered opinion,

the petitioner has failed to establish infringement of any fundamental right

warranting the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32. He has also

not been able to show the existence of any exceptional or exigent circumstances

so as to justify bypassing the procedure available under CrPC.

11. In these circumstances, before this Court can embark upon an enquiry as

to whether the subject FIRs should be quashed, it would be appropriate for him

to pursue the remedies available under Article 226 of the Constitution and/or

Section 482 CrPC. We are, therefore, not inclined to grant reliefs sought in prayer

(a) and (b) of the writ petition.

Alternative relief – Clubbing of the FIRs

12. In the alternative, the petitioner has prayed for the clubbing and

consolidation of the subject FIRs and for a direction that one composite

investigation be carried out by a single investigating agency. According to the

petitioner, all the FIRs arise out of the same set of allegations and disclose

commission of similar offences. It is contended that permitting multiple FIRs and

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 9 of 16

investigations in different jurisdictions viz., Maharashtra, Karnataka and Odisha,

would result in multiplicity of proceedings, conflicting findings and serious

prejudice to the petitioner.

13. Per contra, the respondent States contend that the prayer for clubbing

deserves to be rejected. According to them, each of the subject FIRs is filed by a

distinct complainant in relation to an independent transaction and separate acts

constituting cognizable offences. Therefore, the investigating agencies in

respective States are competent to investigate offences committed within their

jurisdiction in accordance with law.

14. The law governing registration of multiple FIRs is fairly well settled. This

Court has consistently held that there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the

same incident or occurrence or in respect of the incidents which form a part of

the same transaction. At the same time, where the subsequent FIR, inter alia,

relates to a distinct occurrence or offence; is a counter-complaint; or reveals a

larger conspiracy, the registration of the same is permissible.

14.1. In T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala

12

, this Court held that no

successive FIRs could be filed in connection with the same or connected

cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the

same transaction. It was observed as under:

“18. … All other informations made orally or in writing after the

commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence

disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and

entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other

cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the

investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC. No

such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and

entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a

second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme

of CrPC. Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence

12

(2001) 6 SCC 181.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 10 of 16

under Section 307 or 326 IPC and the investigating agency learns

during the investigation or receives fresh information that the victim

died, no fresh FIR under Section 302 IPC need be registered which

will be irregular; in such a case alteration of the provision of law in

the first FIR is the proper course to adopt.

… … …

20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of

the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173

CrPC only the earliest or the first information in regard to the

commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of

Section 154 CrPC. Thus there can be no second FIR and

consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every

subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or

the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more

cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable

offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences

and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in

charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable

offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found

to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the

same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section

173 CrPC.

… … …

27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens

under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power

of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by

the court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of

Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to make further

investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary)

and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang

case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however,

observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further

investigation with the permission of the court. However, the

sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a

citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the

same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,

consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after

filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be

beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of

abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our

view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive

FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or

connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the

course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to

the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under

Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit

case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles

226/227 of the Constitution.”

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 11 of 16

(emphasis supplied)

[See also: Amit Katyal v. State of Haryana

13

]

14.2. Significantly, in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat

14

this Court held

that the ‘test of sameness’ has to be applied to determine whether two

FIRs relate to the same incident or form different parts of the same

transaction. It held that if the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR

ought to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, where the

version in the second FIR is different or is in respect of a different

incident/crime, then a subsequent FIR is permissible. [See also: Arnab

Ranjan Goswami (supra)]

14.3. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P.

15

this Court held that

registration of a second FIR is permissible where the incident is separate;

offences are similar or different; or relate to an incident of such magnitude

that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the first FIR. It was

observed as under:

“14. … It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle

that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence.

However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or

different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude

that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded

first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important

aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the

legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These

safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double

jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of

power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore,

second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. …

15. It has to be examined on the merits of each case whether a

subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR about the same

incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and

whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not

be appropriate for the court to lay down one straitjacket formula

uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed

13

2026 SCC OnLine SC 890.

14

(2010) 12 SCC 254.

15

(2013) 6 SCC 384.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 12 of 16

question of law and facts depending upon the merits of a given

case.

… … …

25. … The court in order to examine the impact of one or more

FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case

and then apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both

FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence, are

in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same

transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences. If the

answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be liable to

be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, whether the

version of the second FIR is different and they are in respect of

two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible, …”

(emphasis supplied)

14.4. More recently, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Surendra

Singh Rathore

16

, through one of us (Sanjay Karol, J.), referring to the

earlier decisions of this Court, summarised the principles regarding the

permissibility of the registration of a second FIR, in the following terms:

“9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the

following principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the

registration of a second FIR:

9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival

version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR

already stands registered.

9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they

may arise from the same set of circumstance es.

9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier

FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.

9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident

bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.

9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or

different.”

(emphasis supplied)

16

2025 SCC OnLine SC 358.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 13 of 16

15. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above makes it clear, inter alia,

that registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible if they relate to the same

incident or form part of the same transaction. However, where the subsequent

FIR relates to a distinct offence/incident or a separate transaction, its registration

cannot be faulted. The meaning of what constitutes ‘same transaction’ or ‘distinct

offence’ has been succinctly explained by this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v.

Khimji Bhai Jadeja

17

, wherein the Court laid down triple tests, though not to be

applied cumulatively, to decide whether separate actions can be treated as part of

the ‘same transaction’ – (i) unity of purpose and design; (ii) proximity of time

and place; and (iii) continuity of action. The relevant part thereof is reproduced

hereunder:

“10. In Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala v. Union of India

6

, this Court dealt

with the question as to what is meant by ‘every distinct offence’. It was

held that ‘distinct’ meant ‘not identical’ and two offences would be

distinct if they are not, in any way, inter-related. It was further held that

if there is some inter-relation, there would be no distinctness and it

would depend upon the circumstances of the case in which the offences

were committed whether there be separate charges for those offences or

not.

11. In Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this

Court observed that, what is to be ascertained under Section 235(1) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (equivalent to

Section 218(1) CrPC), was whether the offences arise out of acts so

connected together as to form the same transaction. It was noted that

‘same transaction’ is not defined anywhere in the 1898 Code and it was

held that whether transactions can be regarded as the same transaction

would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case. The

Bench noted that the general thought is that, where there is proximity

of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action

in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form

part of the same transaction. The Bench, however, cautioned that it is

not necessary that every one of these elements should co-exist for

transactions to be regarded as the same transaction … Noting that a

transaction may consist of an isolated act or a series of acts, the Bench

held that such series of acts must, of necessity, be connected with one

another and if some of them stand out independently, they would not

form part of the same transaction but would constitute a different

transaction. It was concluded that the ‘same transaction’ means a

17

2026 SCC OnLine SC 19.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 14 of 16

transaction consisting either of a single act or of a series of connected

acts.

12. In State of Jharkhand through SP, Central Bureau of

Investigation v. Lalu Prasad Yadav alias Lalu Prasad

7

, this Court

observed that even if the modus operandi is the same, it would not make

it a single offence when the offences are separate. This Court held that,

if a conspiracy is furthered into several distinct offences, there have to

be separate trials. …

… … …

20. As already noted hereinabove, precedential law has laid down triple

tests, though not to be applied cumulatively, to decide when separate

actions can be treated as part of the ‘same transaction’ - 1) unity of

purpose and design; 2) proximity of time and place; and 3) continuity

of action. These tests may be applied to ascertain whether a series of

acts form part of the same transaction or not. … If, however, it is

concluded that there are several transactions and distinct offences in

relation to different victims, there have to be separate trials for each

offence, subject to Section 219 CrPC/Section 242 BNSS, which allows

the Trial Court to try three/five offences of the same kind committed

within a year. Once all the incidents are taken to be part of the same

transaction and amalgamated into one FIR, the punishment would

follow accordingly as per law.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. Keeping in view the above exposition of law, we are unable to grant the

relief of clubbing and consolidation of the subject FIRs, as sought in prayer (c)

of the writ petition. In the present case, each of the subject FIRs has been lodged

by a different complainant who was allegedly induced to part with money on

different occasions but with no live link or connectivity of transactions inter se

different set of persons. The mere fact that a part of the defrauded amounts is

alleged to have been transferred in the bank account of petitioner’s proprietary

concern does not, by itself, establish that all the incidents form part of the same

transaction. Though the alleged modus operandi appears to be similar, the

victims, the amounts involved, the transactions complained of and the

consequences suffered are distinct. Prima facie, therefore, the subject FIRs relate

to separate transactions disclosing distinct offences and cannot be said to arise

out of the same transaction.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 15 of 16

17. The petitioner has also urged that, owing to his serious cardiac ailments

and diabetic condition, it would be difficult for him to face proceedings in

different States. While we are not oblivious to this fact, however, such difficulty

cannot be a ground to direct clubbing of FIRs which otherwise disclose

commission of distinct offences. On the other hand, clubbing the subject FIRs

may cause hardship to the complainants as they would be forced to run from pillar

to post to pursue their criminal complaints.

18. We are also mindful of the fact that the investigation is still in its nascent

stage. Cyber frauds of the present nature are often executed through complex

technological means involving multiple bank accounts, fictitious identities and

digital networks operating across different jurisdictions. Investigation into such

offences, as rightly contended by the learned counsel(s) for the respondent States,

necessarily requires detailed forensic examination of electronic evidence,

analysis of banking transactions and tracing of money trails so as to identify the

people involved. Given that the investigating agencies are yet to ascertain the

complete flow of funds and unravel the entire chain of events, a direction for a

composite investigation may impede a fair and effective investigation. Several

cyber frauds are now on the rise and the offence, considering its gravity and

implications cannot be taken lightly. More so, when the victims of crime largely

hailing from the rural areas, unaware and ignorant of the process and the

mechanism adopted by the criminals are allured to overcome their poverty.

19. In light of the above, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed. We

expressly clarify that liberty is reserved to the petitioner to approach the

appropriate forum to seek appropriate relief(s) as he may be entitled to in law

and/or avail any other remedy as may be available in law, if so advised. All

contentions of the parties are left open, which shall be considered by the

competent Court on their own merits and in accordance with law.

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 127 of 2026 Page 16 of 16

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………………….J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 24, 2026