2026 INSC 764 Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 1 of 21

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No (s). 553 OF 2023

RAMASREY @ FAKKAD ... PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH ... RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No (s). 42 OF 2024

WITH

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No (s). 69 OF 2025

AND

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No (s). 198 OF 2025

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 2 of 21

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL J.,

1. These four writ petitions present same or similar questions

of law but they arise in different facts and circumstances.

1.1 Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 553 of 2023 has been filed

by Ramasrey @ Fakkad challenging the sentence imposed

on him by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in

connection with Sections 364A, 302 and 201 Indian Penal

Code, 1860

1

, modifying the judgment of the learned

Special Judge (Dacoity Affected Area), Agra in Sessions

Trial No. 647 of 2006 in which he was sentenced to death

to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life. His

Special Leave Petition to this Court was dismissed as

withdrawn 03

rd

August 2015.

2

His bone of contention is

that the IPC envisages only two punishments under

Section 302 IPC i.e., death or imprisonment for life and it

does not provide for imprisonment for remainder of natural

life and as such the imposition of such a sentence is

unconstitutional.

1

IPC

2

SLP(Crl.)__2015 @ Crl.M.P. No.2705-06/2015

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 3 of 21

1.2 Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 42 of 2024 has been filed by

one Chander Kant Jha, agitating similar grounds as Writ

Petition (Crl.) 69 of 2025. He had been convicted under

Sections 302 and 201 of IPC and sentenced to death by the

concerned Trial Court which sentence was modified by the

High Court of Delhi, to remainder of natural life without

remission. The State’s appeal thereagainst

3

was dismissed

vide order dated 11

th

February 2019.

1.3 Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 69 of 2025 has been

preferred by one Atbir Singh, who had been convicted by

the Additional Session Judge, Delhi and sentenced to death

in connection with FIR No.24 of 1996 under Section

302/34 IPC. The High Court of Delhi confirmed the

sentence. After the dismissal of the Criminal Appeal by

this Court

4

and subsequent review and curative petitions,

his mercy petition under Article 72 of the Constitution of

India

5

before Hon’ble the President of India was accepted

in terms of order dated 15

th

November 2012. Accordingly,

his sentence was modified to imprisonment for remainder

of natural life without parole. His contention in this writ

petition is similar to Ramasrey@Fakkad. He submits that

the remainder of natural life clause has been specifically

3

SLP(Crl.) No. 6351/2016

4

Criminal Appeal 870 of 2006 by judgment dated 9

th

August 2010

5

Constitution

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 4 of 21

added by the Legislature via subsequent amendments

limited only to sexual offences. He further submits that

such a sentence defeats the statutory rights of an individual

under Section 432 of Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

6

.

1.4 Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 198 of 2025 is at the

instance of three convicts namely Sarabjit Singh, Gurdev

Singh @ Baldev Singh, and Satnam Singh, all of whom

have been convicted under Sections 302/307/148/149 of

IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959. among others,

in connection with FIR No.226 of 1991 and sentenced to

death under Section 302 read with 149 IPC which was

confirmed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh and appeals thereagainst were dismissed by

this Court

7

. Mercy petitions before Hon’ble the President

were accepted in as much as their sentences were modified

to imprisonment for remainder of natural life with no

remission. Their challenge to the same is on similar

grounds as raised by the other writ petitioners.

2. We have heard Mr. Rishi Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel

for the petitioners and Mr. S.V. Raju, Mr. Raja S. Thakare,

learned Additional Solicitors General for the respondents. We

6

CrPC

7

Criminal Appeal 392 of 2002 and Criminal Appeal 394 of 2002 by judgment dated 1

st

August 2003

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 5 of 21

have also heard Mr. R. Venkataramani, the learned Attorney

General for India, whose assistance we requested vide order

dated 16

th

October 2025.

3. The following questions arise for consideration before this

Court:

(a) The constitutionality of the sentence as awarded to

the writ petitioners;

(b) Whether judicial review of exercise of clemency

powers by the Hon’ble President of India is

permissible, it be under Article 32 or Article 136 of

the Constitution of India;

(c) Connected with the latter, would be the question

whether it is open for this Court to modify the

sentence as modified by the powers under Article 72

of the Constitution.

4. The learned Attorney General, raises an objection to the

maintainability to these petitions. We may as such address the

same. Article 32 reads as follows:

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this

Part

(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by

appropriate proceedings for the

enforcement of the rights conferred by

this Part is guaranteed.

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 6 of 21

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to

issue directions or orders or writs,

including writs in the nature of habeas

corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo

warrant and certiorari, whichever may be

appropriate, for the enforcement of any of

the rights conferred by this Part.

(3) Without prejudice to the powers

conferred on the Supreme Court by

clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by

law empower any other court to exercise

within the local limits of its jurisdiction ill

or any of the powers exercisable by the

Supreme Court under clause (2).

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall

not be suspended except as otherwise

provided for by this Constitution.”

It is trite law that a petition to this Court is maintainable in a case

where there is a violation of fundamental rights or there is grave

injustice. The sanctity of this power is evidenced by the fact that

an opportunity to approach the highest Court of the country is

itself being made a fundamental right in the Constitution and

that is perhaps the reason why Dr. Ambedkar had termed this as

the “most important Article” in the Constitution. Accordingly, it

has been recognised in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India

8

as part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is well

established though that this Court does not entertain such

petitions in all circumstances, and only does so, generally, when

8

(1997) 3 SCC 261

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 7 of 21

it is shown that why coming directly to this Court was essential

and the writ petition before the jurisdictional High Court for

instance, may not be more appropriate. Expressing the scope of

this important jurisdiction and recognising the limitations,

provided for in the Constitution, as also those placed by the

judicial restraint, this Court has said in many cases, as follows:

4.1 P.B. Gajendragadkar J. (as he then was) writing

for a Constitution Bench in Daryao v. State of U.P.

9

discussed Article 32 in the following terms:

“8. There can be no doubt that the fundamental

right guaranteed by Article 32(1) is a very

important safeguard for the protection of the

fundamental rights of the citizens, and as a result

of the said guarantee this Court has been entrusted

with the solemn task of upholding the fundamental

rights of the citizens of this country. The

fundamental rights are intended not only to protect

individual's rights but they are based on high public

policy. Liberty of the individual and the protection

of his fundamental rights are the very essence of

the democratic way of life adopted by the

Constitution, and it is the privilege and the duty of

this Court to uphold those rights. This Court would

naturally refuse to circumscribe them or to curtail

them except as provided by the Constitution itself.

It is because of this aspect of the matter that

in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [(1950)

SCR 594] in the very first year after the

Constitution came into force, this Court rejected a

preliminary objection raised against the

competence of a petition filed under Article 32 on

the ground that as a matter of orderly procedure the

petitioner should first have resorted to the High

9

1961 SCC OnLine SC 21

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 8 of 21

Court under Article 226, and observed that “this

Court is thus constituted the protector and

guarantor of the fundamental rights, and it cannot,

consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it,

refuse to entertain applications seeking protection

against infringements of such rights”. Thus the

right given to the citizen to move this Court by a

petition under Article 32 and claim an appropriate

writ against the unconstitutional infringement of

his fundamental rights itself is a matter of

fundamental right, and in dealing with the

objection based on the application of the rule of res

judicata this aspect of the matter has no doubt to be

borne in mind.”

4.2 In Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India

10

it

was held that a petition preferred under Article 32 petition

by a convict seeking the benefit of a judgment which

cause a shift in jurisprudence subsequent to the conviction

and sentence awarded to him, would be maintainable. In

doing so, Article 32 was spoken of in the following terms

by Vikram Nath J., and one of us Sanjay Karol J.,

respectively:

“11. Article 32 of the Constitution of India is the

constitutional conduit through which this Court

may issue “appropriate” writs to secure the

enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Described in

the Constituent Assembly as the “heart and soul”

of the Constitution, it furnishes a direct route for

citizen to this Court whenever a protected

Fundament Right is said to be under threat.

…

52. Article 32 of the Constitution of India provides

that this Court has the power to issue prerogative

10

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1823

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 9 of 21

writs in favour of the applicant before it, should

they succeed in establishing a violation of a right

under Part III of the Constitution. The natural

corollary that the petitioner would have to show

that some or the other right available to him, which

is enshrined under Part III stands violated…”

4.3 Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India

11

, B.V.

Nagarathna J., reiterated in para 142 what was held in

Para 34 of K.D. Sharma v. SAIL

12

which reads as under:

“34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under

Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226

of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and

discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein

are issued for doing substantial justice. It is,

therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner

approaching the writ court must come with clean

hands, put forward all the facts before the court

without concealing or suppressing anything and

seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid

disclosure of relevant and material facts or the

petitioner is guilty of misleading the court, his

petition may be dismissed at the threshold without

considering the merits of the claim.”

5. As is demonstrated from the above judgments, the scope

of Article 32 although wide in some sense, is restricted in

another sense. The right of a prisoner to approach this Court

obviously cannot be outrightly restricted but this right cannot be

used to circumvent other procedures, using it as a shortcut to

ventilate their grievances before a Court of law. An additional

aspect that determines the maintainability of these petitions

11

(2024) 5 SCC 481

12

(2008) 12 SCC 481

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 10 of 21

(particularly the ones filed by Sarabjit and Atbir) is the question

whether this Court can sit over the decision of the Governor or

President, as the case may be, for what has been pleaded before

us, is not the incorrect exercise of power by these constitutional

authorities but instead, for this Court to exercise this power

independently and reduce their sentences after the exercise of

power of remission already stood exercised by the constitutional

authority under Article 72/161. The powers given to the

President or the Governor are unaffected and unencumbered by

any other provision of the Constitution. If the argument

advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is

accepted, we would be sitting in appeal, (not judicial review)

over the exercise of an executive power, which is not

permissible.

6. On a perusal of various judgments, where the scope of the

President’s or the Governor’s power has arisen, the following

principles, inter alia, can be noticed:

6.1 The powers under these two articles are construed

in the widest possible terms since there are no words

limiting the scope thereof used in the Articles; (Epuru

Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P.

13

).

13

(2006) 8 SCC 161 – Two Judge Bench

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 11 of 21

6.2 Both the President and the Governor, in exercise of

these powers must act with the aid and advice of Council

of Ministers; (Maru Ram v. Union of India

14

)

6.3 Governor’s power cannot be exercised to suspend

a sentence while a particular case is subjudice before this

Court; (K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay

15

)

6.4 The President under Article 72 can examine the

merits of the matter. The exercise of this power is

executive in character. (Kehar Singh v. Union of India

16

)

6.5 The powers under Articles 72/161 are separate and

distinct from statutory power of remission under CrPC.

(Union of India v. V. Sriharan

17

)

6.6 The scope of judicial review is limited to following

grounds:

(a) that the order has been passed without

application of mind;

(b) that the order is mala fide;

(c) that the order has been passed on extraneous or

wholly irrelevant considerations;

14

(1981) 1 SCC 107 – Five Judge Bench

15

1960 SCC OnLine SC 31 – Five Judge Bench

16

(1989) 1 SCC 204 – Five Judge Bench

17

(2016) 7 SCC 1– Five Judge Bench

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 12 of 21

(d) that relevant materials have been kept out of

consideration;

(e) that the order suffers from arbitrariness. (Epuru

Sudhakar (supra); Pyare Lal v. State of

Haryana

18

)

7. It is fairly obvious from the perusal of the above

judgments that none of the grounds on which judicial review of

the President’s/Governor’s action is permissible are met in this

case.

8. Let us next appreciate the argument that the sentence of

imprisonment for remainder of natural life is unconstitutional.

9. The two provisions relevant for the present discussion are:

IPC:

“45. “Life”.—The word “life” denotes the life of a

human being, unless the contrary appears from the

context.

53. Punishments.—The punishments to which

offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code

are—

First,—Death;

Secondly.—Imprisonment for life;

Fourthly.—Imprisonment, which is of two

descriptions, namely:—

(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;

(2) Simple;

Fifthly.—Forfeiture of property;

18

(2020) 8 SCC 680 Three Judge Bench

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 13 of 21

Sixthly.—Fine.

BNS:

2. Definitions. –– In this Sanhita, unless the

context otherwise requires,––

(17) “life” means the life of a human being, unless

the contrary appears from the context

4. Punishments. —The punishments to which

offenders are liable under the provisions of this

Sanhita are—

(a) Death;

(b) Imprisonment for life;

(c) Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions,

namely:—

(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;

(2) Simple;

(d) Forfeiture of property;

(e) Fine;

(f) Community Service”

10. In Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka

19

, a

Bench of three judges while dealing with the question of

sentence made elaborate discussions and concluded that there is

a subset of cases where life imprisonment which actually

amounts to only 14 years of imprisonment may be

disproportionately light and also that it may not meet the

standard of rarest of rare cases as enunciated in Bachan Singh

v. State of Punjab

20

, for these cases it was observed as follows:

“91. The legal position as enunciated in Pandit

Kishori Lal [(1944-45) 72 IA 1 : AIR 1945 PC 64]

, Gopal Vinayak Godse [AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961) 3

SCR 440] , Maru Ram [(1981) 1 SCC 107 : 1981 SCC

(Cri) 112] , Ratan Singh [(1976) 3 SCC 470 : 1976

SCC (Cri) 428] and Shri Bhagwan [(2001) 6 SCC 296

19

(2008) 13 SCC 767 – Three Judge Bench

20

(1980) 2 SCC 684 -- Five Judge Bench

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 14 of 21

: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1095] and the unsound way in which

remission is actually allowed in cases of life

imprisonment make out a very strong case to make a

special category for the very few cases where the

death penalty might be substituted by the punishment

of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in

excess of fourteen years and to put that category

beyond the application of remission.

92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly

different angle. The issue of sentencing has two

aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly

harsh or it may be highly disproportionately

inadequate. When an appellant comes to this Court

carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial court

and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find,

as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of

the rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat

reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But at the

same time, having regard to the nature of the crime,

the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life

imprisonment subject to remission normally works

out to a term of 14 years would be grossly

disproportionate and inadequate. What then should

the Court do? If the Court's option is limited only to

two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for

all intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years and

the other death, the Court may feel tempted and find

itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a

course would indeed be disastrous. A far more just,

reasonable and proper course would be to expand the

options and to take over what, as a matter of fact,

lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus

between 14 years' imprisonment and death. It needs to

be emphasised that the Court would take recourse to

the expanded option primarily because in the facts of

the case, the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment

would amount to no punishment at all.

93. Further, the formalisation of a special category of

sentence, though for an extremely few number of

cases, shall have the great advantage of having the

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 15 of 21

death penalty on the statute book but to actually use it

as little as possible, really in the rarest of rare cases.

This would only be a reassertion of the Constitution

Bench decision in Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 :

1980 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR 1980 SC 898] besides being

in accord with the modern trends in penology.”

(emphasis supplied)

(See: Shahjad Ali v. State of Uttarakhand,

21

; Ramesh A. Naika

v. Registrar General

22

)

11. Subsequently, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan

23

, a

Constitution Bench was dealing inter-alia with this special

category of sentence i.e., imprisonment for remainder of natural

life without remission. A majority of three judges found the

special category of sentence to be justified and well founded.

The minority held that placing sentences that are for the

remainder of natural life, beyond the scope of remission to be

unconstitutional. On the question of meaning of the term ‘life

imprisonment’ however, all five judges were ad idem. The

relevant discussion on this aspect is as follows:

On the meaning of life imprisonment, it was held:

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla J. speaking for Dattu, C.J.,

himself and Ghose, J

“177. Imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53

read with Section 45 of the Penal Code only means

imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict.

The right to claim remission, commutation, reprieve,

etc. as provided under Article 72 or Article 161 of the

21

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1024 Three Judge Bench

22

2025 SCC OnLine SC 575 Three Judge Bench

23

(2016) 7 SCC 1 – Five Judge Bench

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 16 of 21

Constitution will always be available being

constitutional remedies untouchable by the Court.”

…

Uday U.Lalit J. (as he then was) speaking for

himself and Sapre J.

“257. Section 53 IPC envisages different kinds of

punishments while Section 45 IPC defines the word

“life” as the life of a human being unless the contrary

appears from the context. The life of a human being is

till he is alive that is to say till his last breath, which

by very nature is one of indefinite duration. In the light

of the law laid down in Godse [Gopal Vinayak

Godse v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600 :

(1961) 1 Cri LJ 736 : (1961) 3 SCR 440] and Maru

Ram [Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107

: 1981 SCC (Cri) 112 : (1981) 1 SCR 1196] , which

law has consistently been followed the sentence of life

imprisonment as contemplated under Section 53 read

with Section 45 IPC means imprisonment for rest of

the life or the remainder of life of the convict. The

terminal point of the sentence is the last breath of the

convict and unless the appropriate Government

commutes the punishment or remits the sentence such

terminal point would not change at all. The life

imprisonment thus means imprisonment for rest of the

life of the prisoner.

…

260. The sentence of life imprisonment means

imprisonment for the rest of the life or the remainder

of the life of the convict. Such convict can always

apply for obtaining remission either under Articles

72 or 161 of the Constitution or under Section 432

CrPC and the authority would be obliged to consider

the same reasonably.”

On the special category of sentence, it was observed by F.M.

Ibrahim Kalifulla J. for the majority in para 178 as under:

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 17 of 21

“Question 52.1 : Whether imprisonment for life in

terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the Penal

Code meant imprisonment for rest of the life of the

prisoner or a convict undergoing life imprisonment

has a right to claim remission and whether as per the

principles enunciated in paras 91 to 93 ofSwamy

Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda

(2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009)

3 SCC (Cri) 113] , a special category of sentence may

be made for the very few cases where the death

penalty might be substituted by the punishment of

imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in

excess of fourteen years and to put that category

beyond application of remission?

Answer

…

178. We hold that the ratio laid down in Swamy

Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State

of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC

(Cri) 113] that a special category of sentence; instead

of death can be substituted by the punishment of

imprisonment for life or for a term exceeding 14 years

and put that category beyond application of remission

is well founded and we answer the said question in the

affirmative.”

Uday U.Lalit J. (as he then was) for the minority, answers the

reference in para 287:

…

“Sub-question (b). Whether as per the principles

enunciated in paras 91 to 93 ofSwamy

Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda

(2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 :

(2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] , a special category of

sentence may be made for the very few cases where

the death penalty might be substituted by the

punishment for imprisonment for life or

imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years

and to put that category beyond application of

remission?

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 18 of 21

Answer

287. In our view, it would not be open to the Court to

make any special category of sentence in substitution

of death penalty and put that category beyond

application of remission, nor would it be permissible

to stipulate any mandatory period of actual

imprisonment inconsistent with the one prescribed

under Section 433-A CrPC.”

12. Given the conclusion of the majority as extracted above,

we only wonder how the petitioners have raised this contention.

A five-judge Bench has said that sentences for the remainder of

natural life are valid. Where does the scope arise for it to be

contended that such sentences are invalid/unconstitutional or

trample upon statutorily granted rights in the form of Section 432

CrPC, that too before a Bench of two judges? We can only say

that such an endeavour is a misuse, if not the abuse of process of

law. This is even more so in view of the fact that the ground under

CrPC that is raised has also been answered by the Constitution

Bench. The paragraphs reproduced by us above clearly stipulate

that when a sentence awarded is for imprisonment for life without

the categorical addition of ‘without remission’, the power of the

State under Section 432 Cr.PC is unaffected and such an

application would be maintainable. In those select few cases

where the ‘without remission’ condition is utilised, which is

obviously done so, in the attending facts of that case keeping in

view the gravity of crime, nature of offence and the fact that

reduction of the sentence therein to an ‘ordinary sentence’ would

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 19 of 21

be unjust, the statutory right being denuded, cannot be termed to

be offensive to the Constitution.

13. Petitioners have placed reliance upon Joseph v. State of

Kerala

24

and in particular para 28 and 33 thereof. There can be no

qualms with the observations made by the co-ordinate Bench

therein speaking through Ravindra Bhat, J. What is said is that

courts may impose sentences that go beyond 14 or 20 years in

view of Sriharan supra, but it is not open for the State

Government by executive instruction to take such role. In that

context, it was observed that taking away premature release

altogether would have the effect of defeating the prisoner

internally. This is the exact reason because of which in our view

the court in Swamy Shraddananda (2) supra, acknowledged the

special category which has to be used with due regards to the facts

of the case and not ordinarily. In conclusion, this case does not

support the petitioners.

CONCLUSION

14. Having considered the arguments raised by the petitioners

as above, following are the conclusions in the respective writ

petitions by the convicts:

24

Writ Petition (Crl.)520 of 2022/ Manu/SC/1049/2023

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 20 of 21

Writ Petition (Crl.) 553 of 2023

15. Ramasrey@ Fakkad, the record reveals, has not taken

recourse to statutory or constitutional remedies that are available

to him. He has not preferred petitions for remission either to the

State Government or to the constitutional authorities as may be

applicable. In view of the principles enumerated, as discussed

earlier, we see no reason to entertain this petition under

Article 32.

Writ Petition (Crl.) 42 of 2024

16. Chandrakant Jha has not preferred petitions for remission

either to the State Government or to the constitutional authorities

as may be applicable . In that view of the matter, we see no reason

to entertain this petition under Article 32. It may be specifically

noted that V. Sriharan supra answers the question as raised in the

writ petition that life sentence ordinarily means remainder of

natural life (ref: Sections 45 & 53 IPC). That apart, the judgment

of conviction by the Delhi High Court, SLP against which is

dismissed by this Court, categorically directs that he would not

be released on remission for the remainder of his life then such a

question does not even arise. It has also been stated that the

powers under Articles 72/161 shall remain unaffected. Nothing

further needs to be said.

Writ Petition (Crl.) No(s). 553 of 2023 Page 21 of 21

Writ Petition (Crl.) 69 of 2025 & Writ Petition (Crl.) 198 of 2025

17. In both these writ petitions which have been tagged with

the lead matter, orders have already been passed by Hon’ble the

President of India. We have, in Para 6 of this judgment culled out

the principles regarding exercise of power by such constitutional

authority as also the grounds of judicial review thereof. Neither

contraventions of any of the principles could be pointed out, nor

could it be stated that any of the grounds of judicial review were

met in the present facts.

18. These petitions under Article 32 are misdirected and are

accordingly dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

……………………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………………………………………J.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

New Delhi;

July 29, 2026