2026:JHHC:30913-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 455 of 2018

(Against the judgement of conviction and the order of sentence both dated

26.02.2018 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Pakur, in

Sessions Trial No. 74 of 2014)

Satrughan Lohar, aged about 30 years, son of Ramchandra Lohar, Resident

of Mouza-Durgapur, P.O and P.S-Pakuria, District-Pakur

..... … Appellant

Versus

The State of Jharkhand … … Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

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For the Appellant : Md. Zaid Ahmad, Advocate

Mr. Aman Ali, Advocate

For the State : Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, APP

C.A.V On 11.09.2026 Pronounced on 14/10/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant criminal appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against the judgment of conviction and

the order of sentence both dated 26.02.2018 passed by the learned Principal

Sessions Judge, Pakur in S.T. No. 74 of 2014, whereby and whereunder the

appellant, above-named, has been convicted under section 376(1) of the Indian

Penal Code and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years with a fine amount of

Rs.25,000/- for the said offence and in default of payment of fine amount,

further R.I. for two years was imposed.

Factual Matrix

2. The prosecution story, in brief, on the basis of the complaint case

being PCR Case No.303/2014, in which the complainant/victim (PW-4) had

stated that she is a minor Paharia girl and accused/appellant Satrughan Lohar is

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by caste a Lohar who lives at Durgapur adjacent to the village of the

complainant. She has further stated that she used to go to hatia market and

returned home. For the last about 2 to 3 years, the accused kept on watching the

complainant and talked with her whenever she visited hatia. In this way giving

false enticement he used to meet her and on 05.03.2013, it was Tuesday, when

she had gone to Patpahari hatia, then, giving assurance of marriage, he took her

to his house and established physical relation with her for one year. She

repeatedly pressurized the accused to perform marriage with her and then on

01.06.2014 with the help of kith and kin, he took the thumb impression of the

complainant on a plane paper and driven her away from his house.

3. Complainant/victim, further stated in her complaint that the accused

taking benefit of simplicity of the victim and giving false enticement of

marriage deliberately kept ravishing her and committed the offence u/s 376 of

the IPC. Before filing of the complaint petition, she had gone to the police

station with her father but the officer-in-charge did not pay heed the complaint's

grievance and told her to file a case in the court.

4. The complaint petition was sent by the J.M. 1

st

class, Pakur to the police

station for filing an F.I.R. and investigation U/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C.

5. On the basis of complaint petition an F.I.R. being Pakuria P.S. Case No.

32/2014 dated 15.06.2014, was registered under section 376 of the IPC against

the accused Satrughan Lohar and after investigation, the police submitted

charge-sheet against the accused under sections 493, 376 of the I.P.C.

Cognizance of the offence was taken and the case was committed to the court

of sessions for trial and disposal.

6. Charges were framed against the accused/appellant person under

Sections 493 and 376 of the IPC to which the pleaded not guilty and claimed to

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be tried. Trial commenced and the statements of the accused was recorded

under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.

7. At the conclusion of trial, the accused/appellant, namely, Satrughan

Lohar was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid by the learned trial Court.

8. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence is under challenge in

this appeal.

Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant:

9. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken the following

grounds for interfering with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in

the impugned judgment:

(i) The prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charge said to

be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

(ii) It has been contended that the conduct of the complainant/victim is

highly unnatural and improbable and there is no justified reason as to

why the victim/complainant did not raise any objection while living

with the accused person in his house and later on she has lodged a

complaint case against the appellant with ulterior motive which makes

the entire case of prosecution suspicious.

(iii) It has been contended that the complainant herself has admitted that

she was living with the appellant in his house for one year and three

months but concealed the fact that the appellant and the victim was

living together as husband and wife and after getting divorce as per

Santhali custom she with an ulterior motive has falsely implicated the

appellant in false case of rape which is not justified at all.

(iv) It has been contended that in the Aadhar Card and Voter Card of

the victim/complainant the name of the appellant, i.e,, Satrughan Lohar

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is mentioned as the husband of the victim and, as such, it is not a case

under sections 493/376 of the I.P.C. rather it is a matrimonial dispute

and on that basis the conviction and sentence of the appellant cannot be

said to be legal and justified.

(v) The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that it is a case of

love affair and thereafter the appellant and the complainant/victim had

agreed to reside together as husband and wife and established physical

relationship. This fact has also been supported by the witnesses before

the Investigating Officer and it has come in the case-diary also, but the

said fact has not been taken into consideration by the learned trial Court

and, hence, conviction and sentence of the appellant is bad in law.

(vi) It has been contended that the complainant/victim herself did not

want to live with the appellant due to dispute arose between them and

the divorce was done as per custom of Santhali customs in presence of

Panches, but the learned trial Court has failed to take into consideration

the aforesaid fact.

(vii) It has been contended that the doctor (PW6) has opined that

spermatozoa not seen, however, it was opined that the hymen was torn

(old tear), so it may be case of sexual intercourse., but the learned trial

Court has erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant under

sections 493/376 of the I.P.C. as it has come on record that the appellant

and the victim/complainant were residing together as husband and wife

for a long time.

10. The learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid

grounds, has submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction passed by

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the learned trial Court convicting the appellant under section 376(1) of the

I.P.C., therefore, is not sustainable in eyes of law and fit to be set aside.

Submission of the learned counsel for the State:

11. On the contrary, the learned APP appearing for the State has defended

the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by taking the

following grounds:

(i) The conviction under section 376(1) of the I.P.C. against

the present appellant does not suffer from an error, since, ample

evidence has been produced by the prosecution.

(ii) It has been contended that the informant P.W.-4 has

supported the prosecution story as she is the victim herself and her

statement has been supported by medical evidence as well as by

other prosecution witnesses and, therefore, appellant has been

rightly convicted under sections 376(1) of the I.P.C. and, as such,

the impugned judgment does not require any interference.

12. The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid premise, has

submitted that the impugned judgment passed against the present appellant

does not suffer from any error and same does not require any interference under

sections 376(1) of the I.P.C, hence, the present criminal appeal is fit to be

dismissed.

Analysis

13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents

available on record as also the finding recorded by the trial Court in the

impugned judgment.

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14. We have also gone through the testimonies of the witnesses as available

in the Trial Court records as also the exhibits appended therewith.

15. Learned trial Court, based upon the testimonies of witnesses, has passed

the impugned judgment of conviction under Section 376(1) of the I.P.C and

sentenced the appellant as referred hereinabove.

16. This Court, before considering the argument advanced on behalf of the

parties, is now proceeding to consider the testimonies of witnesses which have

been recorded by the learned trial Court.

17. It is evident from the record that in order to substantiate the case, the

prosecution has altogether examined 7 witnesses out of whom P.W.-4 is the

victim herself, P.W.-1 Sheela Kumari, P.W.-2 Sarsij Kunwar, P.W.-3 Ramjatan

Kuwar @ Ramjatan Kuber, PW5-Budhani Maharani, PW6-Dr. Navin Barla

and P.W.-7 Mahendra Paswan is the Investigating Officer of the case.

18. P.W.-1 Sheela Kumari, is the cousin of the victim. She has deposed

that the occurrence took place two years three months ago. Victim is the

daughter of her uncle. Satrughan Lohar (the appellant) and victim used to talk

in Hatia (Market). She has further stated that after two years Satrughan Lohar

took the victim to his house giving the allurement of the marriage but did not

solemnize marriage and after one year her sister returned from there. They both

lived there as husband and wife. The witness identifies the accused in the court.

During her cross-examination, PW1 has deposed that after performing

love marriage Satrughan did not take Lalita from hatia. She does not know that

in a Santhal custom a boy forcibly takes away a girl and perform marriage with

her. She had not gone to the house of Satrughan. She had visited the village of

Satrughan but she had not seen the Adhar card of victim. She has denied the

suggestion that the marriage between Lalita and Satrughan was performed

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according to social custom and in the identity card the name of Satrughan has

been written as husband of Lalita. She has not seen that in the voter list the

name of Satrughan has mentioned as husband of Lalita. She has denied the

suggestion that Lalita herself after breaking the marital relation with the

appellant returned back and being her sister, she has given false statement.

19. P.W.-2 Sarsij Kunwar has deposed that victim is his cousin sister and

on allurement of marriage, Satrughan Lohar (the appellant) took her to his

house on 05.03.2013 and kept her there as his wife. Victim told Satrughan

Lohar to perform legal marriage with her then with the help of his relatives

Satrughan Lohar took her signature on a plain paper and on 01.06.2014, he

drove her out of his house.

During cross- examination P.W.-2 deposed that the informant and

Satrughan Lohar are of different castes. They both had love affair. He has not

seen the Adhar card of the informant. He does not know that in the Adhar card

the name of her husband is Satrughan Lohar. The informant lived with

Satrughan for one year, therefore, his name may have been mentioned as her

husband in voter card. They are by caste Paharia while the accused is by caste

Lohar. They did not tell the accused to perform marriage according to Paharia

custom. No panchayat was called for marriage. He has denied the suggestion

that the informant herself left the house leaving the accused and they have filed

the case for extorting money.

20. P.W.-3 Ramjatan Kuwar @ Ramjatan Kuber has deposed that the

occurrence took place three years ago. Satrughan Lohar took away the victim

from Pathpahari hatia to his house on the assurance to perform marriage with

her and kept her for about one year there and then took her signature on a plain

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paper and told her to go away. He did not perform marriage with her and drove

the victim out of his house. He also established physical relation with her.

During cross-examination P.W.-3 has stated that he did not see taking

away Lalita from hatia, but, victim told him about the said occurrence. He has

further stated that he did not tell the police that he is cousin of the victim. He

denied that victim had written the name of her husband as Satrughan Lohar in

Adhar card and Voter Identity Card.

21. P.W.-4 is the complainant/victim, has deposed that the occurrence took

place three to three and half years ago. She went to Pathpahari Hatia where

Satrughan Lohar was chasing her. He caught her and took her towards the field

and ravished her. The incident occurred at 7.00 PM. She started crying then he

consoled and told to perform marriage with her. Thereafter, he took her to his

home and kept her one year telling his wife. She asked him when he would

marry her, then he called a few people from his neighborhood and the village

and obtained her thumb impression on a plain sheet of paper. Thereafter, she

returned to the house of her father and told him about the occurrence. Satrughan

Lohar did not perform marriage with her. Thereafter she went to the court and

filed the case against him.

During cross-examination, P.W.-4 deposed that when she had gone to

the court to file case, at that time she had informed about the occurrence to her

Advocate. She had told to the Daroga jee or the Advocate, that when she went

to Pathpahari Hatia, Satrughan Lohar was chasing her, he caught her and took

towards the field and ravished her and this incident, occurred at 7.00 PM. When

she started crying, then the accused/appellant told him not to weep and that he

would perform marriage with her. She did not weep at hatia and she wept in the

field and there was no one. She has stated that before this occurrence, she did

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not go to Burdman with Satrughan Lohar to work there. After that occurrence,

she lived at the house of Satrughan Lohar for one year three months and in the

meanwhile, she went to Burdman with Satrughan Lohar three to four times.

During that period, someone came to take photograph for the Aadhaar card and

she allowed him to take photograph and in the Aadhar Card she had recorded

the name of Satrughan Lohar as her husband. When her thumb impression was

being taken on the plain paper several persons of Durgapur were present but

she did not identify them. She has denied the suggestion that on 01.06.2014,

she voluntarily took divorce from Satrughan Lohar. She has further denied the

suggestion that no occurrence took place and she has filed a false case to extort

money.

22. P.W.-5 Budhani Maharani has deposed that the occurrence took place

two years ago. Satrughan Lohar performed bad work with victim and on

assurance of performing marriage with victim, he took her to his house from

Pathpahari hatia and kept her for two years there, thereafter he refused to

perform marriage and then she filed the case. The witness has claimed to

identify the accused.

During cross-examination P.W.-5 has deposed that victim is her nanad

and victim had told her about all the facts. She does not know that in the Adhar

card and Voter card the name of Satrughan Lohar had been written as her

husband. She does not know that according to Santhali custom for love marriage

a boy takes away a girl catching her hand from hatia to his house.

23. P.W.-6 Dr. Navina Barla has deposed that on 17.06.2014, she was

posted as Medical Officer at Sadar Hospital, Pakur. On the same day at about

11.00 A.M., she examined the victim. And found the followings:-

(i) Mark of identification:- Black more on right arm.

(ii) Black mole on left side neck.

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(iii) Auxiliary hair and pubic hair were present.

(iv) Mark of violence over body-Nil.

(v) Mark of violence over external genital-Nil.

(vi) Hymen was torn (old tear). Vagina allowed two fingers

easily.

2. On Pathological examination:- Vaginal swab taken and sent for

examination for spermatozoa-not seen.

(3). Age is decided by medical board.

(4). Opinion- As the hymen was torn, so it may be case of sexual

intercourse.

The examination report has been marked as Ext.-1. The doctor

has further deposed that the victim’s age was determined by Medical

Board an she was one of the members of Medical Board along with

Dr. S.R. Soren and Dr. R.K. Singh who examined the victim. After,

examination the Medical Board found the age of the victim between 18

to 19 years. The Medical Board report was marked as Ext.-2.

24. P.W.-7 Mahendra Paswan, is the Investigating Officer of the case.

Investigating Officer has deposed that on 15.06.2014, he was posted at Pakuria

P.S. as A.S.I. On that day he received the charge of investigation of the case of

Pakuria P.S. Case No. 32/2014. He has proved the registration on the complaint

petition which has been marked as Ext.-3. He further proved the formal F.I.R.

which has been marked as Ext.-4. During investigation he recorded restatement

of the complainant/informant and thereafter recorded the statements of the

witnesses Sarsij Kunwar, Shila Kumari. Thereafter, he went to the place of

occurrence and according to the informant/complainant, the place of occurrence

is village-Dem, Durgapur, where the house of accused Satrughan Lohar is

situated which is built of clay and trolley facing north. There is one room in the

house of 12’’x 8’’. PW-7 has further stated that there were house hold articles

kept in the room and it is stated that in that room victim lived with Satrughan

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Lohar continuously for one year where Satrughan Lohar had committed sexual

exploitation upon victim. PW-7 has further deposed that on 16.06.2016 the

medical examination of the accused Satrughan Lohar was done and thereafter,

he sent the victim to the hospital with a lady constable, namely, Jasmin Kisku

for her medical examination. Thereafter, he received the medical report. After

completion of investigation, he submitted charge sheet against the accused

Satrughan Lohar under sections 493 and 376 IPC. He identified the accused

Satrughan Lohar who is present in the Court.

25. During cross-examination PW-7 has deposed that the Medical Board,

assessed the age of the victim between 18 to 19 years. The victim has not stated

in her re-statement that Satrughan Lohar was chasing her. PW-7 further stated

that the victim had also not stated that the accused caught her and took towards

the field and ravished her. She has also not stated that the occurrence took place

at 7.00 PM and she started crying then he told not to weep and gave assurance

that he will perform marriage with her. He has stated that at para-46 of the case

diary it was written that the complainant Lalita Dehri went to East Bengal to

work at kiln and in course of that her love started with accused Satrughan Lohar

and they started living as husband and wife and established physical relation.

He has further stated that the accused Satrughan Lohar some time took the

informant to his house and the fact was known to the family members of the

informant and in the year 2014 they both went together to work at Kiln at

Bengal and returned in the month of May and when some differences arose

between them due to that the informant refused to live with the accused

Satrughan Lohar. Thereafter, on 01.06.2014 a panchayati took place in the

village in which the members of both the families appeared and in presence of

society Lalita Dehri refused to live with accused Satrughan Lohar, then in the

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presence of members of panchayati the village Pradhan prepared a divorce

paper and obtained the signatures and thumb impressions of the villagers. PW7

has further stated that in the Adhar card and the Voter Identity card of Lalita

Dehri the name of Santrughan Lohar has been shown as her husband.

26. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid factual aspect vis-à-vis argument

advanced on behalf of parties, is now proceeding to examine the legality and

propriety of impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by

formulating following questions to be answered by this Court:

I. Whether the evidence of complainant/victim is reliable and

trustworthy?

II. Whether the consent given by the complainant/victim, for

establishing physical relationship was voluntary or it was given

under misconception of fact?

III. Whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the

accused/appellant for the offence under section 376 of IPC?

IV. Whether the trial Court committed any error in convicting the

accused/appellant and sentencing him as above?

27. Since the issues are inter-linked with each other and, as such, they are

being taken together by taking into consideration the facts of the given case

including the testimony of witnesses.

28. This Court, has to decide the legality and propriety of the impugned

judgment of conviction and order of sentence particularly whether the

informant/victim P.W.-4, is trustworthy and reliable and based on her testimony

accused/appellant can be convicted under Section 376 of IPC.

29. This Court finds from the impugned judgment that learned trial Court

has convicted the appellant under section 376(1) of IPC relying on the

testimony of the informant/victim P.W.-4 which were supported by P.W.-1,

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P.W.-2, PW-3 and P.W.-5, and further by taking aid of the medical examination

report Ext.-1. Learned trial Court, in the impugned judgment had noted that

accused/appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim by giving false

assurance to the victim that he would marry her and consent was obtained under

misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 of IPC.

30. It is evident from record that in the present case FIR was registered

under Section 376 of IPC against Satrughan Lohar (appellant herein), on the

basis of the complaint case being PCR Case No. 303/2014, filed by the

complainant/victim.

31. Before we analyse and appreciate the circumstances that have weighed

with the trial Court, this Court think it apposite to refer to certain authorities

pertaining to evidentiary value of the evidence of the prosecutrix in offence of

rape.

32. It is settled proposition of law that once the statement of the prosecutrix

inspires confidence and is accepted by the Court as such, conviction can be

based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix.

33. The law is well settled that if evidence of the prosecutrix inspires

confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her

statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult

to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may

lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of

an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the

background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its

responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual

molestations as per the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case

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of State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, paragraph-21 of the

said judgment is being referred hereunder as :-

“21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is

on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating woman's

rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is

a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the

violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must

remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and

personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well

as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault

— it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A

murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the

very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great

responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must

deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine

the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor

contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the

prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise

reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires

confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her

statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it

difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for

evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of

corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of

the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case

and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive

while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.”

34. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vishnu v. State of

Maharashtra, (2006) 1 SCC 283, has held as under: -

“25. The statement of the prosecutrix, in our view, is quite natural, inspires

confidence and merits acceptance. In the traditional non-permissive bounds

of society of India, no girl or woman of self-respect and dignity would depose

falsely, implicating somebody of ravishing her chastity by sacrificing and

jeopardising her future prospect of getting married with a suitable match. Not

only would she be sacrificing her future prospect of getting married and

having family life, but also would invite the wrath of being ostracised and cast

out from the society she belongs to and also from her family circle. From the

statement of the prosecutrix, it is revealed that the accused induced her to a

hotel by creating an impression that his wife was admitted in the hospital and

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that he would see her first and then drop the prosecutrix at her residence

whereas, in fact, she was not admitted in the hospital. On the pretext of going

to Nanawati Hospital, he took her to a hotel, took her inside a room, closed

the door of the room, threatened to finish her if she shouted and then forcibly

ravished her sexually. In our view, a clear case of rape, as defined under

Section 375 clause thirdly IPC has been established against the accused. It is

now a well-settled principle of law that conviction can be sustained on the sole

testimony of the prosecutrix, if it inspires confidence.”

35. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raju v. State of M.P.,

(2008) 15 SCC 133, held that evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected

and should be believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par

with that of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration

is necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the greatest

weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same time they cannot

be universally and mechanically applied to the facts of every case of sexual

assault which comes before the court. Paragraph-8,9 and 10 of the aforesaid

judgment are quoted hereinbelow-

“ 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through

the record. It is true that rape is one of the most heinous and

reprehensible of crimes that can be committed on a woman and it is for

this reason that courts have leaned heavily in favour of such a victim.

(See State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh [(1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC

(Cri) 316] .) In this matter, this Court allowed the State appeal against

acquittal and while convicting the accused under Section 376 IPC,

observed thus: (Gurmit Singh case [(1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri)

316] , SCC p. 403, para 21)

“21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is

on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's

rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a

sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the

violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must

remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and

personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well

as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault—

it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer

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destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul

of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great

responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must

deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine

the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor

contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the

prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise

reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires

confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her

statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it

difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for

evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of

corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of

the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case

and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive

while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.”

(emphasis in original)

The Court also observed that the alarming frequency of crimes against

women had led Parliament to make some special laws in the

background that rape was a very serious offence and that this was

another factor which was to be kept in mind while appreciating the

evidence in such matters.

9. The observations in Gurmit Singh case [(1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996

SCC (Cri) 316] were reiterated in Ranjit Hazarika v. State of

Assam [(1998) 8 SCC 635 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1725] in the following

terms: (Gurmit Singh case [(1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] ,

SCC pp. 395-96, para 8)

“8. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the

fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come

forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her

honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases

involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no

material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even

discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the

discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw

out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of

the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression

are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the

victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons

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17

which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts

should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual

assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires

confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her

statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts

to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman

who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt,

disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a

prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its

judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the

outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of

law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of

an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on

a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even

more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the

occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a

good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit,

the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight,

absence of corroboration notwithstanding. (emphasis supplied)

Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial

credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial

reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law

but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be

overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an

accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and it is

improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of

suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to

be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic

diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape

of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny

making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and

insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of

by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable.”

(emphasis in original)

10. The aforesaid judgments lay down the basic principle that ordinarily

the evidence of a prosecutrix should not be suspected and should be

believed, more so as her statement has to be evaluated on a par with that

of an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is

necessary. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid observations must carry the

greatest weight and we respectfully agree with them, but at the same

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

18

time they cannot be universally and mechanically applied to the facts

of every case of sexual assault which comes before the court.”

36. Again, Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Narender Kumar v. State (NCT

of Delhi), (2012) 7 SCC 171, reiterated the earlier view laid down in the earlier

judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. For ready reference, paragraphs -20, 21

and 22 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted herein below -

“20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of the

prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such,

conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix

and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling

reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement.

Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial

reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under

the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or

insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an

otherwise reliable prosecution case.

21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of

rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be

appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any

other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist

in view of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. However, if the

court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face

value, it may search for evidence, direct or substantial

(sic circumstantial), which may lend assurance to her testimony.

(Vide Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. [(2003) 3

SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 596 : AIR 2003 SC 818] and Vishnu v. State

of Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217 : AIR

2006 SC 508].)

22. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious

infirmities and inconsistencies with other material, the prosecutrix

making deliberate improvement on material point with a view to rule

out consent on her part and there being no injury on her person even

though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon

her evidence. (Vide Suresh N. Bhusare v. State of Maharashtra [(1999)

1 SCC 220: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1595] .)”

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19

37. Hence, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid cases of rape has laid

down that, conviction can be based solely on the solitary evidence of the

prosecutrix, if evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence and it must be

relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material

particulars. Evidence of a prosecutrix should be evaluated on a par with that of

an injured witness and if the evidence is reliable, no corroboration is necessary.

38. Re-adverting to the fact of the present case, ongoing through the

complaint petition of the complainant/victim, this Court finds that in her

complaint petition complainant/victim, had stated that on 05.03.2013, it was

Tuesday, when she had gone to Patpahari Hatia, then, giving assurance of

marriage, the accused/appellant, took her to his house and established physical

relation with her for one year. The relevant paragraph of the complaint petition

is quoted herein below-

“4. यह कि अकियुक्त ने इस प्रिार झुठे प्रलोिन देिर पररवाकदनी

िे साथ बीच बीच में कमलता था और उसिा शारीररि शोषण िरता

था। अंत में कदनांि 05.03.2013 कदन मंगलवार िो जब पररवाकदनी

पातपहाडी हकिया गयी थी तो अकियुक्त ने शादी िरने िे झुठा वादा

देिर अपने घर ले गया और पररवाकदनी िे साथ एि साल ति

शारीररि संबंध स्थाकपत िरते रहा। पररवाकदनी बार बार अकियुक्त

से कवकधवत शादी िा दबाव देते रही तब अकियुक्त ने कदनांि

01.06.2014 िो अपना सगे संबंकधयों िे मद्द से एि सादा िागज

पर पररवाकदनी िा िी०/कनशान लेिर घर से िगा कदया।“

39. Hence, in the complaint petition, the specific case of the

complainant/victim is that lastly on 05.03.2013, the accused/appellant took her

from Patpahari hatia to his house on the false assurance of marriage had

established physical relations with her, which continued for about one year.

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20

40. But, during the trial, complainant/victim (PW-4) had stated in her

examination-in-chief that when she had gone to Pathpahari hatia, accused

Satrughan Lohar had chased her. Thereafter, Satrughan Lohar caught her and

took her towards the field and ravished her. The incident occurred at 7.00 PM.

The relevant paragraph of the examination-in-chief of the complainant/victim

(PW-4) is quoted as under-

“1 ये घिना तीन-साढे तीन साल पहले िी है। मैं पाथपहाडी हकिया गयी थी।

शत्रुघन लोहार मेरे पीछे-पीछे आ रहा था। मुझे पिडिर, खेत िी तरफ ले गया

और मेरी इज्जत लूि कलया। समय सात बजे शाम िी घिना है। मैं वहााँ जोर-जोर

से रोने लगी तो वह बोला कि मत रोओ, मैं तुमसे शादी िरं गा। उसिे बाद घर

पहंचाया और एि साल ति अपनी पत्नी िहिर, मुझे रखा। उसिे बाद, मैं

उससे बोली कि िब मुझ से शादी िरोगे तो वह अपने घर िे और गांव िे दो-

चार आदमी िो बुलािर, सादा िागज में िीप कनशान कलया। उसिे बाद मैं

अपने कपता िे घर वापस चली गयी और घिना िे बारे में बताई। शत्रुघन लोहार

मेरे साथ शादी नहीं किया। उसिे बाद, मैं िोिट में आिर, िे स िी, और

िम्पलेन पर अंगूठे िा िीप दी। शत्रुघन लोहार िोिट में नहीं है। होता तो उसे

पहचानती। शत्रुघन लोहार िी हाजरी उनिे अकधवक्ता िे माध्यम से कदया गया

है।“

41. Hence, during the trial, the victim (PW-4) for the first time, had alleged

that when she had gone to Pathpahari Hatia, there the appellant chased her,

took her to a nearby field, and committed rape upon her at about 7:00 pm, but

the said fact has not been disclosed by the victim (PW-4) in her complaint

petition in PCR Case No. 303/2014, on the basis of which FIR was registered.

42. Here, the factual narration reveals a clear inconsistency in the

prosecution’s case. In the written complaint, the victim alleged that on

05.03.2013 the accused/appellant took her from Patpahari Hatia to his house

under the false assurance of marriage and thereafter maintained physical

relations with her for about one year. However, in her examination before the

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

21

Court, she shifted her version and stated that she was taken towards the field

and was ravished and raped there.

43. Such divergence amounts to a material improvement and departure

from the original case set up in the complaint. Courts have consistently held

that when the prosecutrix introduces substantial variations in her testimony,

particularly on the core aspect of the occurrence, it casts doubt on the reliability

of her evidence.

44. Further, the Investigating Officer had also stated in his cross-

examination that the victim had not stated in her re-statement that Satrughan

Lohar (appellant herein) had caught her and took her towards the field and

ravished her at 7.00 PM.

45. Thus, the improvement of the vital fact about the alleged incident of

rape committed by the accused/appellant upon her, in her complaint petition,

which is the foundation of the prosecution case, raises a serious doubt about the

truthfulness and credibility of the complainant/victim (PW-4).

46. Again, the victim (PW-4) has alleged that the accused/appellant

established physical relations with her on the promise of marriage but

subsequently did not marry her.

47. Learned trial Court, in the impugned judgment had given its finding

that accused/appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim by giving false

assurance of marriage to the victim that he would marry her and consent was

obtained under misconception of fact as defined under Section 90 of IPC.

48. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to refer herein the judgment of

the Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Uday v. State of Karnataka,

(2003) 4 SCC 46. In this case appellant was convicted under Section 376 of

IPC and the learned the trial Court as well as the High Court had concurrently

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

22

held that though the prosecutrix had consented to sexual intercourse with the

appellant, the consent was obtained by fraud and deception inasmuch as the

appellant induced her to consent on the promise that he shall marry her.

49. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Uday v. State of Karnataka(supra), laid

down that that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with

a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her

on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false

promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. There is no straitjacket

formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual

intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact.

In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best

guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the

court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding

circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own

peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent

was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. Paragraph-21 of

this judgment is quoted herein below-

“21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in

favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual

intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise

that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given

under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the

meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we

must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether

consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or

whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate

analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to

the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court

must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding

circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its

own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

23

the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact.

It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden

is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence,

absence of consent being one of them.”

50. Re-adverting to the fact of the present case, this Court finds that Sarsij

Kunwar (PW-2), who is the cousin brother of the victim, in his cross-

examination, had categorically deposed that the victim (PW-4) and the

accused/appellant were having love affair. This admission assumes significance,

as it indicates that the parties were in a consensual romantic relationship prior to

the alleged physical relationship between them.

51. Further, this Court finds that investigating Officer had also deposed

about love affair between the complainant/victim and the accused/appellant.

The Investigating Officer (PW-7), had further deposed in his cross-examination

that at para-46 of the case diary it was written that the complainant went to East

Bengal to work at kiln and in course of that her love started with accused

Satrughan Lohar (appellant herein).

52. Further, it is evident from cross-examination of victim/prosecutrix that

she had admitted that in the Aadhar Card she had recorded the name of accused/

appellant Satrughan Lohar as her husband.

53. The Doctor (P.W.6), who had examined the victim, deposed that the

Medical Board assessed her age to be between 18 to 19 years. The report of the

Medical Board, marked as Exhibit-2, is on record. In view of the said report, it

stands established that the victim was a major at the relevant time.

54. Hence, from the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered

view that the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-4) does not inspire confidence

to form the sole basis of conviction. The materials on record suggest that she

was a major and was admittedly in a love relationship with the

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24

accused/appellant Satrughan Lohar and the facts and circumstances of the

present case suggests that consent given by the complainant/victim cannot be

said to be given under misconception of fact. Moreover, in her cross-

examination, she admitted that the name of the accused/appellant had been

recorded as her husband in her Aadhaar Card. These circumstances create doubt

regarding the prosecution version and render the testimony of the prosecutrix

insufficiently reliable to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

55. So, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court that the consent of

the prosecutrix was obtained under a misconception of fact within the meaning

of Section 90 of the IPC is not supported by the evidence available on record.

Rather, the said finding appears to be founded on surmises and conjectures,

without there being cogent and reliable evidence to establish that the accused

had induced the prosecutrix to consent on a false promise of marriage from the

very inception.

56. Accordingly, all the issues have been answered.

57. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decision

has propounded the proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any

conviction if the charge is not being proved beyond all reasonable doubts, as

has been held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors. Vrs. State of U.P.,

reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it has been held as

under:-

"22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the

complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of

reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this

nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we

remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person should

be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the prosecution

establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction

cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford to deprive

liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least a reasonable

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

25

level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We really entertain

doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime."

58. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors.

Vrs. State of Karnataka, 2017 (13) SCC 98, has held at paragraph-26 as under:

"26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the

findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed to

understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of

the trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the

evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for

conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused

is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt."

59. Further, it needs to refer herein the principle of 'benefit of doubt'

belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of 'benefit

of doubt' can be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of

the accused, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors.,

reported in (1999) 5 SCC 96, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7 as under:

"7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of

the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the

High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to

Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution". Unfortunately, the High Court

did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way

of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of

doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity.

But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal

jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when

there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the

reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a

conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed

the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal

trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment

of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at the final

end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and

reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused."

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

26

60. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of

Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57 has

laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through the web of

administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the

evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the

other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be

adopted, for ready reference, paragraph 6 thereof requires to be referred herein

which reads hereunder as :-

“6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of

justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced

in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his

innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. —"

61. It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid view, the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has already laid down the same

view at paragraph 163 which is required to be referred which read hereunder

as-

“163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been

completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the

evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour of the

prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly

entitled to the benefit of doubt.---"

62. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and legal position

as discussed hereinabove, is of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove

the charges under Section 376(1) of IPC against the appellant Satrughan Lohar,

beyond all reasonable doubt, as such, the impugned judgment of conviction and

order of sentence requires interference by this Court.

63. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction and the order of

sentence both dated 26.02.2018 passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge,

2026:JHHC:30913-DB

27

Pakur in S.T. No. 74 of 2014, against the appellant Satrughan Lohar cannot

sustain and is hereby, set aside.

64. Consequently, the appeal is hereby allowed.

65. The appellant Satrughan Lohar, be released forthwith if not wanted in

any other case.

66. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

67. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned

forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

I Agree.

(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

Sudhir

Jharkhand High Court,

Dated:14/10/2026

AFR

Uploaded on 14/10/2026.