Page No.# 1/31

GAHC030002442025

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : Crl.A./9/2025

Smt. Zonunmawii

Zuangtui, Aizawl

VERSUS

The State of Mizoram r/b the Secretary to Govt. of Mizoram, Home Dept. and Anr.

Aizawl2:Smt. K. Lalrinsiam

Advocate for the Petitioner : Mr Zoramchhana

Advocate for the Respondent : P.P./Addl.PP, Mizoram

:::BEFORE:::

HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MARLI VANKUNG

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA

Advocate for the appellants : Mr. Zoramchhana

Advocate for the respondents : 1.Mr. H. Zodinsanga,

Legal Aid Counsel for respondent No. 2.

2.Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte

Addl. P.P., Mizoram.

Date on which judgment is reserved : 04.02.2026.

Page No.# 2/31

Date of pronouncement of judgment : 11.02.2026

Whether the pronouncement is of the : Yes.

operative part of the judgment?

Whether the full judgment has been : No.

pronounced?

JUDGMENT & ORDER (CAV)

(Mridul Kumar Kalita, J)

1)Heard Mr. Zoramchhana, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard

Mrs. Mary L. Khiangte, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, as well as Mr. H.

Zodinsanga, learned Legal Aid Counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 2.

2)This appeal under Section 415 of BNSS, 2023, has been preferred by

the appellant Smt. Zonunmawii, impugning the Judgment dated 17.02.2025

as well as order of Sentence dated 27.02.2025 passed by the Court of

learned Special Judge, POCSO Act, Aizawl Judicial District, Aizawl, in Sessions

Case No. 82/2022, in connection with Criminal Trial No. 626/2020,

corresponding to All Women P.S. Case No. 14/2022, whereby the appellant

was convicted and sentenced under Section 4(1)/5(1)(a) of the Immoral

Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, read with Section 6/16 of the POCSO Act,

2012 and Section 376/109 of the Indian Penal Code.

3)The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief, are

that on 17.03.2022, one Smt. K. Lalrinsiami, Social Worker, District Child

Page No.# 3/31

Protection Unit, Aizawl, had lodged an FIR before the Officer-in-Charge of All

Women P.S., Aizawl, inter alia, alleging that, on 17.03.2022, at about 04:00

pm, she received an information over telephone from MHIP, Zuangtui,

wherein it was informed that one minor girl (hereinafter referred to as ‘X’ to

protect the identity of the victim), aged about 13 years, was induced into

prostitution by the present appellant and her husband namely Lalrinchhana.

It was also alleged in the FIR that the minor victim ‘X’ was sold to several

males from 13.01.2022 to the last part of February, 2022.

4)On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, the All-Women P.S. Case No. 14/2022

was registered under Section 4(1)/5(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention)

Act, 1956, read with Section 376 (3) of the Indian Penal Code as well as

Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and the investigation was initiated.

5)Upon completion of the investigation, the Charge Sheet was laid

against the present appellant (A2) and four other accused persons including

the husband of the appellant namely Sh. Lalrinchhana (A1). The other

accused persons against whom Charge Sheet was laid were Sh. Daniel

Lalhmachhuana (A3), Sh. Andrew Lalrintluanga (A4) and Sh. K. Lalbiakmawia

(A5). The accused,Sh. Andrew Lalrintluanga had absconded, during the

pendency of the trial court, therefore, the judgment could not the

pronounced against him, however, it proceeded against the other accused

persons including the present appellant.

6)After considering the materials available on record as well as after

hearing the learned counsel for both sides, the learned Judge, Special Court,

POCSO Act, Aizawl, on 18.08.2022, framed charges under Section 4(1)/5(1)

Page No.# 4/31

(a) of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, as well as under Section 376

and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, against the present appellant.

When the said charges were read over and explained to the appellant, she

pleaded not guilty to the same and claimed to be tried. Similarly, charges

were framed against other accused persons who were facing trial.

7)During trial, though, 20 prosecution witnesses were listed in the Charge

Sheet by the Investigating Officer, however, to bring home the charges

against the accused persons including the present appellant, the prosecution

side examined 17 of the listed charge sheeted witnesses including the victim

girl. The present appellant was examined by the Trial Court under Section

313 of the Court of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on 09.09.2024, during which

the appellant was asked 24 numbers of questions by the Trial Court.The

appellant denied the truthfulness of the testimony of the prosecution

witnesses and except a few questions, she answered most of the questions in

negative.

8)Ultimately, by judgment & order dated 17.02.2025 passed by the trial

court, which has been impugned in this appeal, the trial court had convicted

the present appellant under Section 4(1)/5(1) (a) of Immoral Traffic

(Prevention) Act, 1956, read with Section 6/16 of the POCSO Act, 2012

andSection 376/109 of the Indian Penal Code.The appellant was sentenced

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 20 years as well as to pay a

fine of Rs. 5000/- only and in default a payment of fine to undergo simple

imprisonment for 7 days under Section 6/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012. She

was also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years

under Section 5 (a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

Page No.# 5/31

9)The aforesaid judgment of the trial court convicting the appellant and

sentencing her in the matter stated herein above has been impugned in this

instant criminal appeal.

10)Before considering the respective submissions of the learned counsel

for both sides, let us go through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses

which is available on record.

11)The PW-1, namely Smt. K. Lalrinsiami, who is the first informant of the

case, has deposed before the trial court, that she is a social worker at District

Child Protection Office, Laipuitlang, Aizawl. She has deposed that on

17.03.2022 at around 04:00 p.m., she received a phone call from one Smt.

Lalramthari, the President of MHIP, Zuangtui, whereby, it was informed that

one minor girl was forced into prostitution by a couple who had engaged her

in their residence to do domestic chores.

12)The PW-1 has further deposed that on receipt of the said information,

she proceeded towards Zuangtui to enquire about the incident and met the

victim girl who had stated to her that she was forced into prostitution by the

present appellant and her husband Sh. Lalrinchhana. It was also told to her

by the victim girl that she followed whatever the appellant and her husband

asked her to do as she feared them of physically assaulting her. She further

deposed that during interaction with the present appellant and her husband,

she came to know that they used to take money for allowing the victim to

sleep with strangers for one night atthe rate of Rs. 4000/- and Rs. 1500/-.

She also deposed that the victim told her that she even did not remember as

to with how many numbers of persons she was asked to have forced sex.

Page No.# 6/31

She exhibited the FIR as exhibit P-2.

13)During cross-examination by the learned defence counsel for the

present appellant (A2), the PW-1 has deposed that she did not saw the

accused No. 2 actually posting advertisement about the victim girl and she

also does not know what gadgets were used by the present appellant to post

about the victim girl. The PW-1 was also cross-examined by the learned

defence counsel for the other accused persons, during which her testimony

given by her in her examination-in-chief remained, more or less, intact.

14)The PW-2 namely, the victim girl herself (‘X’) has deposed that she

used to stay in the residence of the present appellant and her husband, at

Edenthar Vengchhak, and used to help them in domestic chores. She has

deposed that initially the appellant and her husband treated her very well

and also celebrated her birthday on 12.01.2022, however, on the next day

i.e., 13.01.2022, the appellant and her husband sent her (the victim) with

one person who came in his white car. PW-2 further deposed that the present

appellant told her that the person who came in the white car was her uncle

and he has gone to have food with her in their house, however, the said

person took her to jungle and sexually assaulted her in the jungle inspite of

protest by her. She has further deposed that due to the such sexual assault,

she felt pain in her private parts and blood also came out of her private

parts. She has also deposed that after the said incident, the person who

sexually assaulted her dropped her in front of the house of the present

appellant where the she and her husband were waiting for her on the road

side next to their house. The PW-2 has further deposed that she did not

disclose the incident to the accused persons because she came to know that

Page No.# 7/31

it were they, who sent her with the said person for the said purpose.

15)The PW-2 has also deposed that from that day onwards, the appellant

and her husband sent her out with different persons after having

conversation on mobile phone with those persons. She also deposed that she

has herself seen the chat in mobile of the appellant. She has also deposed

that the appellant and her husband used to physically assault her whenever

she refused to go with whom they asked her to go. During her deposition,

the victim girl had also stated that she was sexually assaulted by the accused

Sh. Daniel Lalhmachhuana (A3) and Sh. Andrew Lalrintluanga (A4) on

different occasions. She also deposed that the accused Andrew Lalrintluanga

(A4) also had sexually assaulted her in the house of the appellant.

16)The PW-2 has also deposed that the accused Sh. K. Lalbiakmawia (A5)

was the last person who had sexually assaulted her in his vehicle (Bolero)

and on the way back home, the present appellant got into the vehicle of the

A5 and consume liquor together by stopping the vehicle on the road side.

She also deposed that taking this opportunity, she ran away from the vehicle

and took shelter in the house of one of her friends namely, Smt. Thutiami.

During her testimony, the victim girl has also stated that she does not

remember all the dates when she was sexually assaulted by the accused

persons.

17)The PW-2 has also deposed that when she was in the house of her

friend Smt. Thutiami, the present appellant came to know about it. On this,

her friend dropped her in the house of one of her relatives and from there,

the victim girl went to Leithum village and from there she went to Champhai.

Page No.# 8/31

She also stated that she stayed at Champhai for four nights and again went

back to Aizawl. She also stated that her statement was also recorded by

Court which is exhibited as exhibit P1.

18)During her cross-examination by the learned defence counsel for the

present appellant, she submitted that the present appellant did not advertise

her by her name. She also deposed that at first, she did not see the present

appellant actually posting the advertisement of her in Facebook or social

media. The PW-2 was also cross-examined by the learned defence counsel of

the other accused persons. During her cross-examination by the learned

Defence Counsel for accused No. 1, the victim girl stated that it is a fact that

the accused Smt. Zonunmawii (present appellant) received a sum of amount

paid by the client from the outcome of the prostitution. Her testimony which

she deposed in her examination-in-chief, more or less remained intact during

her cross-examination.

19)The PW-3, namely, Smt. Zonunsangi, has deposed that the victim is her

grand-daughter and she was born on 12.01.2009. She is the daughter of her

son namely, Sh. Lalchhandama. It is also deposed by PW-3 that her son, Sh.

Lalchhandama got divorced from his wife, Smt. Lalhriatchhungi and he

alongwith the victim were living at Edenthar. She deposed that towards the

end of the year 2021, when her grand-daughter refused to study properly,

she was scolded and slapped by her son.Her grand-daughter enraged out of

the said incident, ran out of the house. She further deposed that as she had

seen the victim girl with her mother in the market together, hence, she did

not worry about her. It is further deposed by PW-3 that in the month of

January, 2022, the appellant alongwith her husband came to her house and

Page No.# 9/31

informed that the victim will now live with them. They also promised her that

they would let her study and would look after her as their own child.

Thereafter, the victim started living with the appellant and her husband.

20)The PW-3 has further deposed that one day, the victim called her over

phone and informed her that on her birthday i.e., 12.01.2022, she would

come to their home, however, when she did not come, the PW-3 enquired

from the present appellant about her. However, the appellant replied that she

is very busy with work and therefore, the victim could not come back to their

home. PW-3 has further deposed that after a few months, she came to know

that her grand-daughter(victim) no longer lives with the appellant. She has

further submitted that once she got a call from the victim from the house of

their neighbor namely, Bawihtei, and when PW-3 scolded her as to why she

was not staying with the appellant and her husband, the victim told her that

they sold her body and she was sold to many people. After that, the PW-3

came to Bawihtei’s house where she met her grand-daughter. She has further

deposed that the said Bawihtei and her family members later on informed

NGO’s like MHIP, YMA. She exhibited the seizure memo as exhibit P-3.

21)During cross-examination by the learned counsel for the appellant (A2),

the PW-3 has deposed that the appellant and her husband were not her

relatives. She also stated that when she came to know that the appellant and

her husband used to sell the body of her grand-daughter, she immediately

went to meet her. She also deposed that after her grand-daughter ran away

from the present appellant and her husband, she went to Bawihtei and did

not came to her house or her father’s house. She was also cross-examined

by the learned counsel for the other respondents during which her testimony

Page No.# 10/31

remained more or less intact.

22)The PW-4, namely, Lalchhanhimi, has deposed that she came to know

from the friends of the victim that the appellant and her husband made her

sell her body and they would beat her up whenever she refused to do so.

She has also deposed that on 15.03.2022, she saw the victim at a shop and

she spoke to her and during conversation, the victim stated that the couple

with whom she was staying made her to sell her body for sex to different

persons through phone and they would beat her up if she refused to do so.

She also deposed that the victim told her that the couple use to take money

directly from the customers and they would give her little bit of the money to

the victim to meet her financial end. She has further deposed that to escape

from this ordeal, the victim ran away from the appellant and spent two nights

in her house. She has also deposed that on 17.03.2022, the appellant and

her husband came to her house to take back the victim, however, the victim

refused to go with them and held on the window frame as they tried to force

her. She also deposed that when all these things happen, she intervened and

did not allow the appellant to take victim back against her will. Later on, she

informed her grandmother. She has deposed that her tenant, Tenui, after

hearing about the incident, called MHIP leaders and informed them about the

incident to them and MHIP leaders thereafter informed Child Protection as

well as to the Police.

23)During her cross-examination by the learned counsel for the appellant

(A2), the PW-4 has deposed that she has not seen the appellant sell the

victim in person. She was also cross-examined by the learned counsel for the

other accused person, however, her testimony during her examination-in-

Page No.# 11/31

chief remained more or less intact.

24)The PW-5, namely, Ms. Lalbiakdiki, has deposed that in the 2022, she

was working as a home mother at Centre for Peace and Development (CPD),

Aizawl. In the said home, minor children who are abused and sexually

assaulted were usually kept and looked after. She has also deposed that on

19.03.2022, as requested by the Police, she accompanied the victim to the

police station and at the police station, the birth certificate of the victim was

seized and she put her signature on the seizure memo. The seizure memo

was exhibited as Exhibit P-3 and Exhibit M-1 as the birth certificate of the

victim. She was not cross-examined by the learned counsel for the appellant

(A2), however, she was cross-examined by other accused persons and during

cross-examination, her deposition more or less remained intact.

25)The PW-6, namely, R.C. Tlangtihlima, who has deposed that he was the

seizure witness of seizure of mobile handset from the possession of the

accused Sh. Daniel Lalhmachhuana (A3). No cross-examination was done of

the said witness on behalf of the present appellant, however, the cross-

examination done by the other accused persons were adopted by the

defence counsel for accused No. 2. During cross-examination of PW-6, his

testimony could not be shaken.

26)The PW-7, namely, Sh. C. Vanlalhuma, is also the seizure witness in

respect of seizure of the phone of A3 namely, Daniel Lalhmachhuana.

27)The PW-8, namely, Sh.Lalfakzuala, is also another seizure witness on

the vehicle bearing registration No. MZ 01R-0042, as well as the mobile

Page No.# 12/31

handset seized from the possession of the accused Sh. Daniel

Lalhmachhuana (A3).

28)The PW-9, namely, Sh. Lalthansanga, in his testimony showed his

ignorance about anything involved in this case.

29)The PW-10, namely, Sh. Lalengliana, is the seizure witness of the

mobile phone seized from the possession of the accused Sh. Andrew

Lalrintluanga. During his cross-examination by the learned counsel for the

appellant, the PW-10 deposed that he does not know anything about

involvement of the present appellant and Sh. K. Lalbiakmawia in the said

case.

30)The PW-11, namely, Ms. Lalrammawii, is also another seizure witness in

respect of seizure of a mobile handset from the possession of the accused

Sh. Andrew Lalrintluanga. Her cross-examination was declined by the learned

counsel for the present appellant.

31)The PW-12, namely, Dr. Zosangpuii, has deposed that on 17.03.2022,

she was posted as gynecologist at Civil Hospital, Aizawl. On that day, a

requisition was received from the All-Women Police Station, Aizawl, to

conduct medical examination of the victim girl (‘X’), of aged about 13 years

and in a case of alleged sexual assault. She deposed that the victim

consented for such medical examination and while the PW-12 was taking

history of the case, the victim told her that her guardians had trafficked her

multiple times for sex and she had a history of multiple sexual partners and

the last incident occurred about two weeks prior to the date of examination.

Page No.# 13/31

She has further deposed that during her examination, the victim was found

physically and mentally stable and was not under influence of any drugs or

alcohol at the time of examination. She did not find any seminal stains on her

clothes or any visible marks of violence on her body. She also deposed that

on genital examination, there were no bruises or laceration of the external

genitalia. However, there was an old rupture of the hymen. She exhibited

medical examination report as Exhibit P-37 and her signature thereon as

Exhibit P37 (a).

32)During cross-examination, the PW-12 has deposed that the victim

herself told to her that she had been trafficked multiple times for sex and had

multiple sex partners. She also deposed that the rupture of hymen could

have occurred due to sexual encounters with persons other than the

accused.

33)The PW-13, namely, Dr. Laldinpuii, has deposed regarding medical

examination of the accused Sh. Lalrinchhana as well as the present appellant

and no seminal stains or marks of violence were found over the body of the

accused person. She has exhibited the medical examination report of the

present appellant as Exhibit P-38. She also exhibited the medical examination

report of two other accused persons namely, Sh. Lalrinchhana (A1) and

accused Sh. Daniel Lalhmachhuana (A3).

34)The PW-14, namely, Dr. LalrinzualiChhangte, has deposed regarding the

medical examination report of accused Sh. Andrew Lalrintluanga.

35)The PW-15, namely, Dr. Thanmawii, has deposed that on 02.04.2022,

Page No.# 14/31

she was posted in the Emergency Department of Civil Hospital, Aizawl and on

that day, she received a requisition from All Women Police Station to conduct

medical examination of the accused, Sh. K. Lalbiakmawia, in case of alleged

sexual assault. The medical examination report has been exhibited as Exhibit

P-6.

36)The PW-19, namely, Ms. Sarah Lalrinkimi, Addl. SP, Aizawl Traffic P.S.

has deposed that she was posted on 17.03.2022 as DSP (headquarters) at

Aizawl and on that day, she took charge as the Officer-in-Charge of All

Women Police Station, Aizawl. She further deposed that on that day, she

received an FIR from one Smt. K. Lalrinsiami regarding trafficking of a young

girl (victim ‘X’) by the present appellant and her husband and accordingly an

All-Women Police Station case was registered and she initiated the

investigation. She further deposed that after initiating the investigation, she

arrested the present appellant after obtaining necessary permission from the

learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aizawl. She also took steps for

examination of the victim girl in Civil Hospital, Aizawl. She has further

deposed that during examination, it was found that there was an old rupture

in the hymen of the victim girl. She further deposed that she also recorded

the statement of the victim girl and also sent her to the District Court for

recording her statement by Judicial Magistrate. She further deposed that the

Birth Certificate of the victim girl was seized by her.

37)The PW-19 further deposed that she also seized one black colour Redmi

9 Active mobile phone from the possession of the present appellant.

Thereafter, she applied for permission from the Court to extract the Facebook

Messenger communication in the phone of the accused person which was

Page No.# 15/31

seized and accordingly, communications were extracted in the form of

screenshots. She further deposed that the present appellant and her husband

had created a number of fake Facebook Messenger accounts for their

communications and were mainly using an account in the name of Emily

Remsangpuii. She also deposed that they were searching for customers in

the Facebook Group called “Mipa leh Hmeichhia fair taka in pay-na”. She

further deposed that she obtained the call details of last five months of the

mobile phone which was seized from the possession of the present appellant

from the SP, CID Crime. She has deposed that she has examined the victim’s

paternal grandmother Pi. Zonunsangi. PW-19 has exhibited the birth

certificate of the victim as well as the arrest memo of the present appellant

and other accused persons. She has also exhibited the certificates under

Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act as Exhibit 35 and 36. Though, the

learned counsel for A5 had cross-examined the PW-19, she was not cross-

examined by other accused persons including the present appellant.

38)The PW-20, namely, Sh. LalrinpuiaChenkual, Deputy SP (Headquarters)

CID (SB), has deposed that he was posted as SDPO Aizawl South on

17.03.2022. On the said date, an FIR was lodged by K. Lalrinsiami, a social

worker, alleging that she received a telephone call from Zuangtui MHIP unit,

informing that a couple (husband and wife) were trafficking a minor girl, who

was living with them, for prostitution. He further deposed that accordingly,

AWPS Case No. 14/2022 was registered under Section 4 (1)/5(1)(a) of the

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, read with Section 376(3) of the

Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. He has further

deposed that Deputy SP, Sarah Lalrinkimi took up the investigation. He also

deposed that the accused persons, namely Lalrinchhana and Zonunmawii

Page No.# 16/31

(present appellant), were arrested during investigation and their statements

were recorded. He further deposed that the mobile phone of the present

appellant was also seized, and the victim, as well as both the arrested

accused persons were sent for medical examination. He further deposed that

the statement of the victim was recorded both by the Investigating Officer as

well as by the Magistrate, and the birth certificate of the victim girl was also

seized from the possession of her grandmother. He also deposed that

screenshot images of the Facebook Messenger communication from the

mobile phone of the present appellant were taken.

39)The PW-20 has further deposed that on 21.03.2022, he took over

charge as the Officer-in-Charge of the All-Women Police Station, and at the

same time, he also took over the charge of the investigation of this case. He

further deposed that, after taking over charge of the investigation, he studied

all the materials collected by the previous Investigating Officer, including the

screenshot images of the Facebook Messenger communication extracted from

the mobile phone of accused Zonunmawii (present appellant). He has

deposed that from the screenshot extracts, it came to light that another

accused person, namely Andrew Lalrintluanga (A5), was also involved in

procuring the victim ‘X’ for sex. He has further deposed that during the

interrogation of the accused Andrew Lalrintluanga (A4), he informed that he

had communicated with Lalrinchhana (A1) and Zonunmawii (present

appellant) through Facebook Messenger, and also spoken to Lalrinchhana

while two of them were in Edenthar. He was also informed by the accused

Andrew Lalrintluanga that accused Lalrinchhana took him to his residence at

Edenthar, where he had sex with victim ‘X’, and thereafter he paid Rs. 3000/-

to Lalrinchhanna for having sex with victim ‘X’.

Page No.# 17/31

40)The PW 20 has further deposed that he had also seized the mobile

phone of accused K. Lalbiakmawia (A5), and on examination of the said

phone, it was found that he was using Facebook Messenger with a different

name, i.e.,LbKhawlhring, to communicate with A1 and the present appellant.

He deposed that from the materials collected during investigation, it came to

light that the present appellant and her husband Lalrinchhana were using

fake Facebook Messenger profiles to traffic the victim ‘X’. He further deposed

that on conclusion of the investigation, he found the prima facie case under

Section 4 (1)/5 (1)(a) of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 against the

accused Lalrinchhana (A1) and the present appellant (A2) and accordingly

filed charge sheet against them. He has also deposed that he also found a

prima facie case under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, read with Section

376 (3) of the Indian Penal Code against other accused persons. He has

exhibited charge sheet as exhibit P8, and he also exhibited the extracted

screenshot copies of Facebook Messengers of accused Andrew Lalrintluanga

(A4) and the accused Lalbiakmawia (A5) as Exhibits P31 and P32

respectively. He also exhibited the arrest memo, medical examination reports,

seizure memo, sketch map of the place of occurrence at Edenthar, medical

examination reports of the accused persons, the certificates under Section

65B of the Indian Evidence Act, etc.

41)The PW 20 was not cross-examined by the defense counsel for the

accused No. 2, that is the present appellant. However, during cross-

examination by learned counsel for accused No. 4, he has deposed that the

screenshots of communication between Andrew Lalrintluanga (A4) and the

accused Larinchhana (A1) and the present appellant (A2) were obtained from

the phone of the present appellant.

Page No.# 18/31

42)After the examination of the prosecution witnesses, the accused

persons, including the present appellant, were examined under Section 313

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The present appellant was

examined by the trial court on 09.09.2024. During her examination, the

appellant admitted that the victim ‘X’ started to live with her from December,

2021, to help in household chores. However, she answered in negative when

she was confronted with the evidence that she sent the victim with one male

person who came in a white car, and who was introduced to the victim by her

as her uncle. When she was asked in question No. 8 by the Trial Court that,

in the evidence, it came to light that she openly used to chat with other

accused persons in her mobile phone, she answered in the negative, and

stated that the mobile phone was of her husband, Lalrinchhana, which she

used to keep. She also answered in negative that she, along with the other

accused, namely Lalbiakmawia (A5), consumed alcohol on the roadside after

the said accused had sex with the victim girl. She also denied that she used

to receive money paid by the clients for prostitution of the victim girl. She

also answered in negative when she was asked the question that it is she

who used to operate a Facebook account under different names. She was put

many other questions by the Trial Court. However, she denied her

involvement in the offense alleged in this case. Though, when the Trial Court

put her question as to whether she wanted to adduce any evidence, she

answered in affirmative,however, no defence evidence was led by the

appellant in support of her defence.

43)Mr. Zoramchhana, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted

that the Trial Court had erred in convicting and sentencing the appellant for

the offence of abetment under Section 376/109 of the IPC, as well as Section

Page No.# 19/31

16 of the POCSO Act, without framing any charge for abetment of such

offence against the appellant.

44)He submits that the trial court had framed charges, against the present

appellant,on 18.08.2022, under Section 4(1)/5(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic

(Prevention) Act, 1956, and Section 376 of the IPC, as well as Section 6 of

the POCSO Act, 2012. However, no charges were framed under Section 17 of

the POCSO Act, 2012 or under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code against

the present appellant.

45)The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the present

appellant (A2) was convicted and sentenced for the offencesof abatement of

offence under Section 376/109 of Indian Penal Code as well as under Section

17 of POCSO Act, 2012 without there being any charges framed in respect of

said offences. Hence, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

appellant was highly prejudiced, as she was unaware about the accusation of

abetment against her during the entire trial and was taken by surprise when

she was convicted for an offence for which no charges were framed against

her, and the same were never explained to her by the trial court.

46)The learned counsel for the appellant submits that Section 216 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1976, empowers the court to alter or add

charges at any time before the Judgment is pronounced. However, without

taking recourse to the said provision, the trial court convicted and sentenced

the appellant under the aforesaid provisions, by taking the appellant by

surprise. She submits that as the appellant was highly prejudiced for her

conviction by the trial court for offences for which she was never charged,

Page No.# 20/31

the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant by the impugned

Judgment are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant has

cited the following rulings of co-ordinate benches of this Court in support of

his submission:

1. “RengsibulaVs. State of Mizoram and Anr.” (Judgment dated

15.10.2025 in Crl.A. No. 11 of 2025).

2. “Malsawmdawngzela@Bastina Vs. State of Mizoram and Anr.”

(Judgment dated 14.02.2025in Crl.A. No. 33 of 2024).

47)The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the Trial

Court had erred in law in convicting the appellant under Section 4(1)/(5)(1)

(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, by relying heavily on the

statement of her husband, i.e., the accused, Lalrinchhana, which was

recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He

submits that it is a settled law that an explanation given by a co-accused

during his/her examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure cannot be used for convicting another co-accused for the obvious

reason that the accused who gives an incriminating explanation/statement

cannot be cross-examined by the co-accused against whom incriminating

statements were made. In support of his submission, the learned counsel for

the appellant has cited the case of “Maheshwar Tigga Vs. State of

Jharkhand”reported in (2020) 10 SCC 108.

48)The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that the trial

court had erred in convicting the appellant under Section 4 (1)/5 (1)(a) of

the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, without there being any evidence

against her in respect of said offences. He submits that there is no evidence

Page No.# 21/31

on record to show that the appellant knowingly lived on the running of

prostitution of the victim “X”. He submits that there is no evidence to show

that the appellant took any money from prostitution by victim “X”. He submits

that the money was taken by A1, i.e., the husband of the present appellant

and nothing is there to show that the appellant ever took such money.

Hence, he submits that there is no material to convict the appellant under

Section 4(1) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

49)The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that there is

also no evidence on record against the appellant for convicting her under

Section 5(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. He submits

that the victim “X” was given shelter by the appellant to do household chores

and there is nothing on record to show that she procured victim “X” for the

purpose of prostitution.

50)Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the trial

court also did not take into consideration the contradictions in the evidence

of prosecution witnesses. He submits that the victim girl in her statement

recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has

stated that the appellant and her husband charged Rs. 4000/-, Rs. 3000/-

and Rs. 2000/- for prostitution by victim, however, in the FIR different rates

were stated which was also deposed by the PW-1. However, he submits that

the difference in the rates stated by the prosecution witnesses makes their

testimony unreliable and the trial court has erred on relying on such evidence

for convicting the appellant. As such he submits that the impugned judgment

is liable to be set aside and the appellant is entitled to the acquitted of all the

charges and to be released immediately.

Page No.# 22/31

51)On the other hand, Ms. Mary L. Khiangte, the learned Addl. Public

Prosecutor has submitted that the trial court has rightly convicted and

sentenced the appellant after properly considering the evidence on record

and as such the impugned judgment does not warrants any interference by

this court in this appeal.

52)She submits that non-mentioning of charges at the initial stage under

Section 109/376 of Indian Penal Code as well as Section 17 of the POCSO

Act, 2012, against the present appellant, is notfatal to the prosecution case

as the appellant was well aware that she was tried for inducing the minor

victim to prostitution which also constitutes offence of abatement under

Section 109/376 of Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 17 of the

POCSO Act, 2012. She submits that the appellant has failed to show any

prejudice caused to her due to non-mentioning of Section 17 of the POCSO

Act, 2012 and Section 109/376 of Indian Penal Code in the memorandum of

charges.

53)She submits that under Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

the Court is empowered to alter or add any charge at any time before

judgment is pronounced.She submits that such alteration or adding of

charges may be done even after completion of evidence, arguments and

reserving of the judgment.She submits that in the instant case the appellant

has failed to demonstrate any prejudice caused to her due to alteration of

charges from Section 376 of Indian Penal Code to Section 376/109 of Indian

Penal Code as well as from Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 to Section 17

of the POCSO Act, 2012. She submits that the evidence on record clearly

established that the appellant conspired and intentionally aided the

Page No.# 23/31

commission of rape on the minor victim “X” and she was confronted with all

incriminating evidence against her during her examination under Section 313

of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and was given opportunity to rebut such

incriminating evidence. Hence, she submits that the appellant has not

suffered any prejudice due to alteration of charges by the trial court. In

support of her submission learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has cited following

rulings: -

a) “Nallapareddy Sridhar Reddy v. State of A.P.”, reported in(2020) 12

SCC 467.

b) “KammariBrahmaiah v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P.”,

reported in(1999) 2 SCC 522.

c) “Anna Reddy Sambasiva Reddy &Ors. Vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh”,reported in (2009)12 SCC 546.

54)The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has also submitted that the

appellant was not convicted only on the basis of statement of her husband

which was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 but on the basis of clear and uncontroverted incriminating evidence

against her on record. She submits that the evidence of prosecution

witnesses including that of the victim girlclearly shows that the victim was

induced to go with several adult male persons for sex in return for payment

of money by those persons. She also submits that in the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses clearly shows that the present appellant also took

money paid by clients for prostitution by victim “X”. She submits that the

electronic evidence, i.e., screenshot of WhatsApp chats and Facebook

Page No.# 24/31

Messenger also clearly showsthat the appellant along with her husband

caused the victim “X” to be taken away by different men for the purpose of

paid sex and the money paid against the same was received by the appellant

along with her husband. She submits that the trial court hasrightly

considered the incriminating evidence against the appellant and convicted

her under Section 4(1)/5(1)(a) of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 as

well as under Section 6/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 376/109 of

the Indian Penal Code and rightly imposed appropriate punishment under the

aforesaid provisions. Hence, she submits that the conviction as well as

sentence imposed on the appellant is liable to be upheld and this appeal is

liable to be dismissed.

55)Mr. H. Zodingsanga, the learned Legal Aid Counsel, appearing for the

respondent No. 2 has adopted the submissions made by learned Additional

Public Prosecutor and has submitted that this appeal is liable to be dismissed.

56)We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for both

sides. We have also gone through the materials available on record. We have

also gone through the rulings cited by learned counsel for both sides in

support of their respective submissions.

57)On perusal of the materials available on record, it appears that the

present appellant (A2) as well as her husband (A1) were tried jointly along

with three other accused persons. Out of whom one accused (A4) absconded

and another (A5) was acquitted on getting benefit of doubt. One of the

accused, namely,Daniel Lalhmachhuana (A3) was convicted by the trial court

under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with Section 376 of the Indian

Page No.# 25/31

Penal Code. The present appellant (A2) along with her husband (A1) were

convicted under Section 4(1)/5(1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,

1956 as well as under Section 6/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 read with

Section 376/109 of Indian Penal Code. It is pertinent to mention herein that

at page No. 30 in paragraph No. 6 of the impugned judgment the trial court

has mentioned the penal provisions of POCSO Act, 2012 as Section 6/16 of

the said Act, whereas, in page No. 32 in paragraph No. D of the impugned

judgment the penal provision of the POCSO Act, 2012 is stated to be under

Section 6/17 of the said Act.For the sake of clarity, we make it clear that the

later i.e., Section 6/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is the correct penal provision.

58)The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the

no charges were framed under Section 6/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 as well

as under Section 376/109 of Indian Penal Code against the appellant,

however, she was convicted and sentenced for the said offences which is

illegal and has caused immense prejudice to the appellant. For deciding this

contention, let us look at the relevant provision in the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973, which deals with such a circumstance, i.e., Section 464 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is reproduced as follows: -

“464. Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in,

charge. — (1) No finding, sentence or order by a court of competent

jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no

charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or

irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless in

the opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of

justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(2) If the court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of opinion that a

failure of justice has in fact been occasioned, it may—

(a) In the case of an omission to frame a charge, order that a charge

be framed and that the trial be recommended from the point

Page No.# 26/31

immediately after the framing of the charge;

(b) In the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge, direct

a new trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it

thinks fit:

Provided that if the court is of opinion that the facts of the case are

such that no valid charge could be preferred against the accused in

respect of the facts proved, it shall quash the conviction.”

59)A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that no finding,

sentence or order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed to be

invalid merely on the ground of any error omission or irregularity in framing

of charge or that no charge was framed unless the court of appeal,

confirmation or revision is of the opinion that if failure of justice has been in

fact occasioned thereby. It also provides that if such a court is of considered

opinion that a failure of justice has occasioned thereby, it may take recourse

to the options provided for by in Section 464 (2) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973.

60)In the instant case, if we carefully examine the memorandum of charge

prepared by the trial court while framing charges against the present

appellant, on 18.08.2022, it appears that following particulars of offences are

mentioned therein which was also read over and explained to the appellant

on that day: -

“That, you during 13

th

January 2022 to last part of February 2022

induced the victim aged about 13 yrs for prostitution who stays with

you to several adult men for paid sexual intercourse and received Rs.

4000 per night for a whole night or Rs. 1500 if not for a whole night.

The places of these offences include hotel, public place and inside

your rented house at Zuangtui and you are therefore liable for

charge u/s 4(1) 5(1) (a) ITPA 1956, 376 Indian Penal Code, 6 of

Page No.# 27/31

POCSO Act.”

61)On a bare perusal of the aforementioned particulars of the offence

stated in the memorandum of charge, which were explained to the appellant

on 18.08.2022, it appears that though there is omission on the part of the

trial court to specifically mention therein the Section 109 of the Indian Penal

Code as well as Section 17 of the POCSO Act, 2012, however, in very clear

terms the accusation against the appellant were described therein. The

accusation was very categorical in as much as it was for inducing the minor

victim to have sexual intercourse with serval adult male, at various places,

against payment of money by them. The particulars of offence with which

the appellant was charged and which were read over and explained to her by

the trial court, clearly makes out the offence of abetment of rape under

Section 376/109 of the Indian Penal Code as well as it also makes out

offence of abetting aggravated penetrative sexual assault against the victim

girl under Section 17/6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.Thus, it appears that the

particulars of the offence with which the appellant was charged with were

read over and explained to her by the trial court and it gives sufficient notice

to her that she is being tried for offence of abetment of offence under

Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

Hence, we are of the considered opinion that mere omission to mention

Section 109 of Indian Penal Code and Section 17 of the POCSO Act, 2012, in

the memorandum of charges, under the facts and circumstances of this case,

at the best, may be considered as an irregularity without affecting the merit

of the case. More so, when the appellant has failed to demonstrate any

palpable prejudice caused to her.

Page No.# 28/31

62)The minority of the victim “X” has not been challenged by the appellant

in this appeal. While deciding the point No. 1 formulated by the trial court, in

the impugned judgment, the trial court after considering the birth certificate

of the victim “X” which was exhibited as Exhibit “M” as well as the

uncontroverted testimony of PW-2 & PW-3, in that regard, came to the

finding that the date of birth of the victim “X” is 12.01.2009 and at the time

of the alleged incidents, she was “minor” within the meaning of Section 2(cb)

of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 as well as a “child” within the

meaning of Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act, 2012. As the said finding has not

been challenged and since we are also of the opinion that the finding arrived

at by the trial court regarding minority of the victim girl is based on the

evidence available on record, no further discussion is required on the said

issue.

63)As regards conviction of the appellant under Section 4(1) of the

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 is concerned, it appears that the trial

court, apart from considering the testimony of PW-1 & PW-2 in this regard,

also took into consideration the answer given by the husband of the

appellant, namely, A1, to question No. 16 put to him during his examination

under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein he

admitted that they use to share the money with the victim also. Though, the

learned counsel for the appellant has objected to such a use of statement of

co-accused by the trial court for arriving at the finding of guilt of the present

appellant, however, even if we do not take thesaid statement into

consideration, there are sufficient materials on record to justify the conviction

of the appellant under Section 4(1) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,

1956. For example,the victim girl (PW2) while deposing during her cross-

Page No.# 29/31

examination by the learned counsel for A1, at paragraph No. 11, has

categorically stated that the appellant received money paid by the client from

the out come of prostitution. Said evidence remained unrebutted throughout

her examination and same is sufficient to come to the finding of guilt of the

appellant under Section 4(1) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.

64)As regards conviction of the appellant under Section 5(1)(a) of the

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 is concerned, there are sufficient

evidence on record to justify the same. The said provision penalizes any

person who procures or attempt to procure a person, whether with or

without his consent, for the purpose of prostitution. The Black’s Law

Dictionary describe the word “procure” as“(1) to obtain(something),

especially by special effort or means; (2) To achieve or bring about (a

result); and (3) To obtain a sexual partner for another such as minor or a

prostitute.”In the instant case, the uncontroverted evidence of the

prosecution witnesses (mainly of PW-2 & PW-3),discussed in the foregoing

paragraphs of this judgment, clearly shows that the victim girl was procured

by the appellant and her husband in the name of looking after her as their

own child and thereafter, they induced her into prostitution. The evidence of

victim girl, to the effect that she was knowingly sent, on 13.01.2022, by the

appellant and her husband, with an unknown person by telling her that he is

her uncle, who had committed forcible sex with her,has remained intact.

Similarly, the evidence regarding the fact that the victim was subjected to sex

by A3 & A4 on various occasioned and that the appellant and her husband

(A1) use to physically assault the victim whenever, she refused to with the

person whom they asked her to go with, also remained intact.The electronic

evidence, i.e., screenshot of WhatsApp chats and Facebook Messenger also

Page No.# 30/31

clearly shows that the appellant along with her husband caused the victim

“X” to be taken away by different men for the purpose of paid sex. The said

evidence also remained uncontroverted as the defense side failed to demolish

the same during cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses.The fact

that the mobile phone of the appellant was used for such soliciting purpose

also remained uncontroverted. These uncontroverted evidences, in our

considered opinion, are sufficient for arriving at the finding of the guilt of the

appellant under Section 5 (1)(a) of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,

1956.

65)As regards the offence ofabetment under Section 376/109 of the Indian

Penal Code as well as Section 17 read with Section 6 of the POCSO, 2012 is

concerned, the fact that the victim is a minor and she was subjected to

penetrative sexual assault on 13.01.2022 by a person with whom the victim

was sent by the appellant and her husband has remained intact. The fact

that she was subjected to penetrative sexual assault by A3 & A4 has also

remained intact. The evidence of PW2 that she was asked the go with such

persons by the appellant and her husband also remained intact. Further the

evidence that in event of refusal by the PW2 to accompany the men with

whom she was asked to go by the appellant and her husband, she used to be

assaulted by them also remained intact. Under such circumstances the

offence of abetment by the appellant and her husband of the commission of

the offence of penetrative sexual assault upon the victim girl by the men with

whom she was sent by them stands proved.

66)In view of the discussions made and reasons stated in the foregoing

paragraphs, we are of the view that the finding of guilt of the appellant, by

Page No.# 31/31

the trial court, under Section 4(1)/5(1) (a) of Immoral Traffic (Prevention)

Act, 1956, read with Section 6/17 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and Section

376/109 of the Indian Penal Code as well as the sentence imposed on the

appellant for the aforesaid offences does not require any interference by us

in this appeal. We find this appeal devoid of any merit.

67)This appeal is accordingly, dismissed.

68)Send back the records of the trial court along with a copy of this

judgment to the trial court.

JUDGE JUDGE

Comparing Assistant