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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

CRLMC No.3847 of 2025

An application under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023.

Sri Golak Prasad Mohapatra . Petitioner

Mr. Subir Palit, Senior Advocate

-versus-

State of Orissa (Vigilance) . Opposite Party

Mr. Niranjan Maharana, Addl.

Standing Counsel for Vigilance

CORAM:

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. MOHAPATRA

Date of hearing : 16.12.2025 | Date of Judgment : 25.02.2026

A.K. Mohapatra, J. :

1. The present CRLMC application has been filed by the Petitioner,

who happens to be the president of Orissa Consumer‟s Cooperative

Federation Ltd., with a prayer to quash the FIR bearing Vigilance Case

No.30 dated 02.06.2010, under Annexure-1, the Charge-sheet No.05

dated 30.03.2013 under Annexure-2 and the entire criminal proceeding

arising out of T.R. No.42 of 2013 which corresponds to Bhubaneswar

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Vigilance P.S. Case No.30, involving commission of offences under

sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1998 (“PC Act”) and sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B of the IPC, pending

in the court of the learned 3

rd

Additional Sessions Judges, Bhubaneswar.

FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE

2. The factual matrix of the present case, as gathered from the FIR

and Final Form, at Annexures-1 and 2 respectively, and bereft of

unnecessary details, is that earlier on 02.06.2010 Bhubaneswar Vigilance

FIR No.30 was lodged pursuant to a report filed by the Superintendent of

Police, Vigilance Cell Unit Office, Bhubaneswar, alleging irregularities

in distribution of coal by the „Orissa Consumer‟s Cooperative Federation

Ltd‟ (hereinafter „OCCF‟) during the effective period of 2008-2009 and

2009-2010. It was alleged that during the aforementioned period OCCF

has sold coal earmarked for deserving MSMEs, i.e. small consumers in

non-core sectors whose annual consumption is less than 4200MT, as per

the Ministry of Coal, Government of India, Resolution No.23011/4/2007

dated 18.10.2007, at a higher rate in the open market, while failing to

distribute the profits amongst deserving MSMEs.

3. Upon inquiry, it was further revealed that Shri Akhil Kumar Jena,

the MD of OCCF, vide letter dated 10.07.2008, had requested the

Director of Industries, Odisha, to appoint the OCCF as the „State

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Nominated Agency‟ (hereinafter „SNA‟) for distribution of coal to

MSMEs in the state. Consequently, OCCF was appointed as the SNA for

receiving 60,000MT coal from M/s Mahanadi Coal Fields Ltd.

(hereinafter „MCL‟) and a Fuel Supply Agreement („FSA‟) was executed

with MCL by the BM, OCCF on 05.09.2009. It was alleged that prior to

the issuance of the Government order and execution of the FSA, a

decision was taken by the President of OCCF on 12.08.2008 to engage a

Marketing Agent for receipt and distribution of coal. A notice inviting

willingness was issued on 14.08.2008, and three applications were

purportedly received, whereafter, one Debendra Kumar Panda of M/s

Vinayak Minerals was appointed as Marketing Agent vide order dated

22.08.2008 bearing Order No.979 issued by the MD, OCCF and an

agreement was executed with him by the GM, OCCF on 09.09.2008 and

08.05.2009 for the period 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 respectively to

manage the daily affairs of the OCCF and receive 3% margin out of the

5% margin due to OCCF.

4. The FIR further reveals that quotations from two out of the three

applicants desirous of being appointed as Marketing Agent, were found to

be fake. Also, during 2008-09, OCCF reportedly received 40,900 MT of

coal from MCL and claimed distribution of the same to 16 MSME units.

During 2009-10, OCCF reportedly received 52,664 MT of coal and

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claimed distribution to 32 MSME units. On this basis, OCCF was entitled

to margin profits of Rs.16,26,751/- for 2008-09 and Rs. 39,64,258/- for

2009-10. However, payments of Rs.8,04,009/- for 2008-09 and

Rs.17,20,572/- up to February 2010 were made to the Marketing Agent

out of the margin profit due to OCCF. Additionally, it was also

discovered by the Vigilance Department that 5 out of 16 MSMEs, for the

period 2008-09, and 7 out of 32 MSMEs, for the period 2009-10, to

whom linkage coal was distributed, were found to be fake or non-

existent.

5. The FIR also alleges that given the e-auction rate of coal was

Rs.1400/- per MT and the average market price was Rs.2500/- MT during

the relevant period, and linkage coal at a base price of Rs.850/- was

supplied to OCCF by MCL, the Marketing Agent, in connivance with the

OCCF and DIC officials, has indulged in selling linkage coal at an higher

rate in the open market and derived illegal pecuniary benefit therefrom

which has also resulted in a loss to the Government Exchequer to the tune

of around Rs.25,24,581/-. Lastly, the FIR also reveals that Debendra

Kumar Panda of M/s. Vinayak Minerals was fraudulently appointed as

Marketing Agent in contravention of Government guidelines and by

fabricating relevant records. Resultantly, an FIR was lodged, a Final

Form filed alleging commission of the above-mentioned offences,

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cognizance taken of the said offences and, at present, the trial in the case

is underway. Being aggrieved by the prolonged continuation of the trial,

and on several other grounds, the Petitioner has approached this court by

filing the present CRLMC application, invoking its inherent powers and

praying for the relief as prayed for herein.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER

6. Heard Mr. Subir Palit, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the

Petitioner. At the very outset, the learned senior counsel for the

Petitioner, assailing the allegations in the FIR and the Final Form as

vexatious, contended that even if the allegations in the FIR and the charge

sheet are taken at their face value, they do not disclose the commission of

any offence by the Petitioner and do not establish any direct role, act, or

omission attributable to the Petitioner which would attract the offences

alleged under the PC Act and the IPC. He further contended that despite

there being no prima facie case against the Petitioner, he has been made

to suffer the agony of ever-looming prosecution for the last decade and

half.

7. The learned senior counsel for the Petitioner at this point submitted

that the initial FIR was lodged in the year 2010 but the final form was

filed in 2013 only and no explanation has been provided for such delay.

Thereafter, the trial in the matter commenced and is still continuing even

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after 15 years of registration of the FIR. Additionally, referring to the

copies of the order dated 10.09.2024 to 20.06.2025, under Annexure-3

series and the depositions of witnesses, under Annexure-4 series, learned

senior counsel for the Petitioner contended that out of the total 38

prosecution witnesses only 13 witness have been examined so far.

Moreover, as is evident from the aforesaid order sheets, the prosecution

witnesses have repeatedly failed to appear before the trial court on dates

fixed for recording of evidence. Assailing such conduct of the

prosecution witnesses and the conduct of the prosecution at large, the

learned senior counsel for the Petitioner contended that such inordinate

delay in conclusion of the trial is solely attributable to the Prosecution

and has resulted in undue harassment of the Petitioner since the last

decade and half. It was further submitted that such long delay in

conclusion of trial also clearly violates the fundamental right of personal

liberty and speed trial granted to the Petitioner under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. The learned senior counsel has also condemned

such deliberate attempt of the prosecution to prolong the trial, so as to

harass the Petitioner, and submitted that such delay in conclusion of the

trial amounts to a gross abuse of the process of law. While making such

submissions, the learned senior counsel has clarified that the Petitioner

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has, at all times, fully cooperated with the prosecution and the trial

proceedings and no default can be attributed to the Petitioner.

8. Next, assailing the conduct of the Investigating Officer in the

present case, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner contended that the

Investigating Officer has submitted the charge sheet by deliberately

suppressing material facts. According to the learned senior counsel for

the Petitioner, the Committee of Management of OCCF comprises of

twenty-one members, and the Petitioner, as the elected President, could

not have taken any unilateral decision. It was submitted that all decisions

of the Committee of Management are required to be taken by majority

resolution and are thereafter implemented by the executive functionaries.

Therefore, the question of attributing culpability to the Petitioner alone

does not arise in the present case. It was also urged that the learned

Special Judge has also failed to apply judicial mind while taking

cognizance and framing charge against the Petitioner.

9. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel for the Petitioner has

stated that the investigation and the consequent criminal proceedings

initiated against the Petitioner are vitiated by mala fides and political

vendetta. It was submitted that the Vigilance raids conducted at the Head

Office of OCCF, at Bhubaneswar, on 19.05.2010 and 20.05.2010 were

politically motivated, as the Petitioner was, at the relevant time, the State

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Secretary-cum-Spokesperson of a national political party and had

publicly raised serious concerns and protests against the State

Government with regard to displacement of people in connection with the

POSCO project. It was argued that, on account of such political stance,

the Petitioner was targeted and the Vigilance machinery was utilised to

harass him. In view of the above, it was submitted that the initiation and

continuation of the criminal proceedings are manifestly actuated by

personal and political vendetta and have been undertaken without any

credible or cogent evidence to substantiate the allegations which would

warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

10. Once again, referring to the governance structure of the OCCF, the

learned senior counsel for the Petitioner contended that the OCCF is

governed by its registered Bye-laws as well as the provisions of the

Odisha Co-operative Societies Act, 1962 („Societies Act, 1962‟). It was

submitted that under Sections 27 and 28 of the said Act, the final

authority of the Society vests in the Annual General Body, while the

Committee of Management is entrusted with the administration and

management of the Society. Therefore, policy decisions relating to the

functioning of the Society are required to be taken collectively by the said

Committee. As such, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner urged that

the Petitioner, as the elected President, could not have taken any

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unilateral decision, and that all decisions were taken by majority

resolution of the Committee of Management and thereafter implemented

by the executive functionaries. In such circumstances, it was contended

that the Petitioner cannot be individually held liable for the acts allegedly

undertaken by the Society.

11. It was further submitted that there is no credible evidence to

suggest that the Petitioner, in his individual capacity, extended any undue

favour or acted with bias, as is evident from the statutory audit reports.

The learned senior counsel for the Petitioner further contended that

OCCF does not directly engage in coal business operations and that the

responsibility for handling coal distribution lies with the Managing

Director and the respective Branch Managers, who act in accordance with

the decisions of the Committee of Management. It was submitted that,

under the bye-laws of OCCF, the Managing Director is vested with

authority to oversee office administration and business operations. It was

also pointed out that the Director of Industries, Odisha, has not, at any

stage made, any allegation against the Petitioner. The learned senior

counsel for the Petitioner further contended that the Vigilance enquiry

itself revealed that the management of OCCF had no direct involvement

in the coal business or in the maintenance of records relating thereto, and

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that the Petitioner did not act individually or directly in any manner in

relation to the coal business of OCCF.

12. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, drawing attention of this

Court to the copy of the Audit Report, under Annexure-5 to the present

CRLMC application, submitted that the statutory Audit Reports prepared

by the Auditor-General of Co-operative Societies, Odisha, who is the

competent authority under the Societies Act to determine profit or loss of

co-operative bodies, clearly indicates that OCCF earned profits of

approximately Rs.3 crores during the relevant period. As per the learned

senior counsel for the Petitioner, the above fact fundamentally contradicts

the Vigilance allegation of financial loss, of around Rs.30 lakhs, and

reinforces the fact that no pecuniary loss or misconduct can be

attributable to the Petitioner. As such, the learned senior counsel for the

Petitioner submitted that the findings of the Vigilance authorities is

clearly misleading and erroneous, and, appears to have been made with

the sole intent to falsely implicate the Petitioner in the present criminal

proceeding. To further corroborate his stance, the learned senior counsel

for the Petitioner placed reliance on the principles laid down by the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in its decision in Bhajanlal’s case.

13. In such view of the matter, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner

contended that there are no clear and cogent evidence on the record to

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show that a criminal case of whatsoever nature is made out against the

Petitioner. Additionally, since the case has been pending for more than a

decade, continuation of the proceedings would result in unnecessary

wastage of valuable judicial time and would further the prejudice already

caused to the Petitioner. Accordingly, learned senior counsel for the

Petitioner submitted that the present case falls squarely within the

parameters for exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court under

Section 528 BNSS, and as such, warrants interference by this Court.

CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY -VIGILANCE

14. Heard Mr. Niranjan Moharana, learned counsel for the Vigilance

Department. Perused the Counter Affidavit filed by the Opposite Party-

Vigilance Department. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the

Opposite Party-Vigilance Department that in the present case, the

Petitioner, being the President of OCCF, has abused his official position

and, in connivance with other co-accused persons, has shown undue

official favour to one Debendra Kumar Panda, a private person and

Power of Attorney holder of M/s Vinayak Minerals, by appointing him as

Marketing Agent for handling the coal business of OCCF during the

relevant period of 2008-2010. He further submitted that such an

appointment was made in clear violation of policy guidelines and

circulars issued by the Directorate of Industries and by fabricating false

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records, thereby facilitating the said Marketing Agent to obtain illegal

pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs.25,24,581/- as commission,

causing corresponding loss to the OCCF Ltd. As such, upon thorough

investigation by the Vigilance Department, a charge sheet has been

submitted against the Petitioner and other accused persons for offences

punishable under Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act read

with Sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC.

15. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department has

further stated that, as of now, cognizance has already been taken by the

learned trial court, charges have been framed, and the trial is in progress.

Learned counsel also submitted that the materials collected during

investigation, as reflected in the charge sheet, clearly makes out a prima

facie case against the accused persons. It was stated that the pleas raised

by the Petitioner, including reliance on statutory audit reports and alleged

absence of personal involvement, strictly constitute defence pleas which

can only be adjudicated fairly during the trial after appreciation of

evidence submitted from both sides. Learned counsel further submitted

that it is a settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing, the Court

should not undertake an exercise of appreciation of evidence or examine

disputed questions of fact. Therefore, the judgments relied upon by the

Petitioner are inapplicable to the facts of the present case and, the present

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criminal proceedings involving the Petitioner and other co-accused

persons ought not to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its

inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, particularly when the trial has

already commenced and is underway.

16. Further, with regard to the Petitioner‟s reliance on the audit reports

of OCCF, learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department

submitted that the contention of the Petitioner that OCCF earned profit of

about Rs.3 crores during the relevant period, as reflected in statutory

audit reports of OCCF, is wholly irrelevant and cannot absolve the

Petitioner of criminal liability arising out of the Petitioner‟s conduct in

abusing his official position to give away undue favour and facilitation of

illegal pecuniary gain. It was stated that the illegalities committed by the

Petitioner are in no way mitigated by the overall financial performance of

OCCF. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department

thereafter contended that the investigation by the Vigilance department

has disclosed that after the engagement of the Marketing Agent, he has

adopted fraudulent practices and used forged documents in the names of

fake and non-existent firms, thereby obtaining illegal pecuniary

advantages to the tune of Rs.36,15,068/- resulting in corresponding loss

to OCCF Ltd.

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17. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department,

further referring to the appointment of the Marketing Agent, contended

that the investigation revealed serious procedural violations in the

appointment of the Marketing Agent. It was submitted that the

willingness of intending persons was not invited as required under the

Odisha General Financial Rules (OGFR), and no paper publication was

issued. Moreover, the policy guidelines issued vide Government Circular

No. 175 dated 09.09.2009, communicated to the Managing Director,

OCCF vide Letter No. 22415 dated 14.09.2009 under the Odisha Co-

operative Societies Act, 1962, were also violated. It is the learned

counsel‟s contention that despite such mandatory requirements, the

accused Debendra Kumar Panda was engaged as Marketing Agent in

violation of government policy and by fabricating records, in conspiracy

with co-accused persons including the present Petitioner.

18. So far as the matter of delay in conclusion of the trial is concerned,

learned counsel for the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department contended

that the same can be attributed to the accused persons including the

Petitioner, since they failed to appear before the Court below despite

repeated summons, necessitating issuance of non-bailable warrants.

Subsequently, their appearance was secured, charges were framed, and

trial is presently proceeding. Therefore, the learned counsel for the

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Opposite Party-Vigilance Department submitted that the Petitioner cannot

take advantage of such delay to seek quashing of the proceedings. In view

of the above contentions, the learned counsel for the Opposite Party-

Vigilance Department asserted that the FIR and charge sheet clearly

disclose a prima facie commission of cognizable offences, and that there

is no illegality, irregularity, or infirmity necessitating interference by this

Court. As such, the present CRLMC petition, which is an attempt to

derail the criminal trial, should be dismissed forthwith in the interest of

justice.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT

19. Heard learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner and the

learned counsel for the Vigilance Department. Perused the F.I.R, the

Final Form and other materials available on record along with the counter

affidavit on behalf of the Opposite Party-Vigilance Department.

20. The Petitioner, who was the president of OCCF at the relevant

point in time, has filed the present CRLMC petition, invoking the

inherent powers of this Court under section 528 BNSS (erstwhile section

482 Cr.P.C) with a prayer to quash the F.I.R and criminal proceeding

initiated against him. The main plank of the Petitioner‟s argument is that

hypothetically even if all the allegations in the F.I.R are taken to be true,

no offence under the alleged section can be said to be made out against

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the Petitioner. It is the Petitioner‟s stance that even though he is the

president of the society, all the decisions of OCCF are taken by a

committee of management and not by the Petitioner alone. Also, given

the fact that after nearly 15 years from the date of registration of the F.I.R

the trial has not yet concluded, Petitioner‟s right to speedy trial has been

violated. The Opposite Party-Vigilance Department, have naturally

opposed the Petitioner‟s prayer, mainly on the ground that a clear case

against him is made out as per the allegations in the F.I.R and Final Form,

and that the Petitioner in connivance with other accused persons has

abused his official position in engaging the Marketing Agent thereby

causing a loss of more than Rs.30 lakhs to the Government Exchequer.

The learned counsel has also stated that since the trial has already

commenced, and some of the witnesses from the Prosecution side have

already been examined, it would not be apt to interfere with the criminal

proceeding at this stage.

21. In view of the aforesaid basic premise, this Court is required to

adjudicate the veracity of the prayer of the Petitioner against the scope of

exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under section 528 of BNSS.

Before proceeding further, it would only be most apt to re-enunciate the

basic guiding principles that govern the quashing of an F.I.R or criminal

proceeding. In this context, reference may first be had to the landmark

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pronouncement of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bhajanlal’s case,

reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, wherein the Hon‟ble Court while

clarifying that it is not practical to lay down any precise, clearly defined

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae or to give an exhaustive list of

cases where such power should be exercised, observed that the power of

quashing a criminal proceeding is to be exercised very sparingly and with

circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. While issuing such

clarification, the Hon‟ble Court laid down certain illustrative scenarios

where a High Court may quash the impugned F.I.R or criminal

proceeding;

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose

a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police

officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an

order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of

the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

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offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no

prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a

specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on

the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.”

22. The aforesaid pronouncement of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of

India is tune with the consistent line of judicial precedent flowing from

R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21. In

R.P. Kapur (supra), while examining the scope of the inherent powers of

the High Court under Section 561-A of the erstwhile Code of Criminal

Procedure (which is pari materia with Section 482 of the present Code

and Section 528 of the BNSS), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that such

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inherent powers cannot be exercised in respect of matters specifically

governed by other provisions of the Code. It was further clarified that the

inherent jurisdiction may be invoked to quash criminal proceedings only

in appropriate cases, either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or

to secure the ends of justice. The Court also cautioned that, as a rule,

criminal proceedings ought to proceed in accordance with the statutory

framework, and interference at an interlocutory stage is to be exercised

with circumspection.

23. Similarly in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, reported in

(1977) 4 SCC 551, the Hon‟ble Apex Court, highlighting the power of the

High Courts to do real and substantial justice in exercise of its inherent

powers, interpreted the inherent powers under section 482 of Cr.P.C

against the old 1898 code, and observed that;

“8. Under Section 435 of the 1898 Code the High Court had

the power to “call for and examine the record of any

proceeding before any inferior criminal court situate within

the local limits of its.… jurisdiction for the purpose of

satisfying itself ... as to the correctness, legality or propriety

of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and as

to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court”,

and then to pass the necessary orders in accordance with the

law engrafted in any of the sections following Section 435.

Apart from the revisional power, the High Court possessed

and possesses the inherent powers to be exercised ex debito

justitiae to do the real and the substantial justice for the

administration of which alone Courts exist. In express

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language this power was recognized and saved in Section

561-A of the old Code…

At the outset the following principles may be noticed in

relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High

Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally,

almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:

“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a

specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance

of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent

abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice;

(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar

of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

24. So far as the scope of consideration of materials on record is

considered, in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy,

reported in (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble

Supreme Court elaborated on the limited scope of material that may be

examined by the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction to quash an

FIR. The Court drew a clear distinction between the consideration of

materials placed on record and the appreciation of evidence, holding that

while the former is permissible, the latter falls beyond the permissible

contours of such jurisdiction. It was clarified that only such material

which, on its face, fails to disclose the commission of any offence, even if

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the allegations in the FIR are accepted in their entirety, may be looked

into for the purpose of quashing. The Court observed as under:

“5. …Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice

and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to

produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It

would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action

which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.

In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any

proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts

to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings

would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is

disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of

fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible

to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has

alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the

allegations are accepted in toto…”

25. In addition to the aforesaid principles, it is also fairly well settled

that the power to quash an FIR should be exercised sparingly with

circumspection and while exercising this power, the Court must believe

the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It

has been repeatedly held that except in exceptional cases where non-

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interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Courts should

ordinarily refrain from interfering at the stage of investigation of offences

(see Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, reported

in (2021) 19 SCC 401, and Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi),

reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983). This Court is also aware that

while exercising jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, it is not intended

to conduct a mini-trial. Instead, the High Court is required to restrict its

inquiry to whether the allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if

accepted as true on their face, constitute a prima facie offence (reference,

in this regard, may be had to CBI vs Aryan Singh, reported in 2023 SCC

Online SC 379). That said, it must also be borne in mind that that primary

object of the F.I.R is to set the criminal investigation into motion. It may

not set out the case in every minute detail with unmistakable precision. It

is not the encyclopedia of all the facts and circumstances of the case on

which prosecution relies, and, as such, the FIR is not considered a

substantive evidence and its evidentiary value is limited to corroboration

and contradiction of the evidences (see Nisar

Ali v. State of U.P., reported in 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42, Kirender

Sarkar v. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 342, and Bable

Alias Gurdeep Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2012) 11

SCC 181). Therefore, the primary focus, while considering an application

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for quashing of an F.I.R/ criminal Proceeding, must always be to prevent

abuse of the process of the Court or to otherwise secure the ends of

justice.

26. So far the present matter is concerned, the alleged occurrence

pertains to the period 2008-2010 and the F.I.R was initially lodged in the

year 2010. The sanction to initiate prosecution against the Petitioner was

obtained from the RCS, Bhubaneswar in 2011. The chargesheet was

submitted in 2013, three years after registration of the F.I.R, and the

charge was framed 9 years later in 2022, which is also when the first

witness on behalf of the prosecution was examined. As of August, 2025

only 13 out of the 38 charge-sheeted witnesses have been examined. This

implies that the case has been lingering on for one and half decades at this

point and is no close to being concluded.

27. In the aforesaid context, it would be apt to refer to Maneka Gandhi

Vs. Union of India & Anr reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 and Hussainara

Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, reported in (1980)

1 SCC 81, wherein it was observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court that

Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived

of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law,

that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the

procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just and therefrom flows,

Page 24 of 36

without doubt, the right to speedy trial. It was also observed that no

procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded

as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. The

aforesaid position was again considered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in

Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225,

wherein the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, after surveying a catena of

decisions, formulated eleven non-exhaustive propositions recognising

that fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 creates a

right in an accused to be tried speedily. The Court held that where such

right is found to have been infringed, quashing of charges or conviction

may be an appropriate relief. However, this is not the only course open,

and having regard to the nature of the offence and other attending

circumstances, the Court may pass such other appropriate orders as the

interests of justice demand. Subsequently, in P. Ramachandra Rao v.

State of Karnataka, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578, the Constitution

Bench reaffirmed the law laid down in A.R. Antulay (supra).

28. Consequently, in Pankaj Kumar vs. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.,

reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117, the Hon‟ble Apex Court, again taking

note of a catena of judicial decisions governing the field, including the

ones cited above, observed that it is well settled that the right to speedy

trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of

Page 25 of 36

the Constitution and such a right is applicable not only to the actual

proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding

police investigations as well. The Hon‟ble Apex Court has further

observed that the right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal

persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In

every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been

infringed, the court has to perform the balancing test having regard to all

attendant circumstances, and determine in each case as to whether the

right to speedy trial has been denied. In the event the court arrives at the

conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed,

the charges or the conviction, may be quashed unless the court feels that

having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances,

quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a

scenario, it is open to the High Court to pass any appropriate order as it

may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of

trial [see paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of Pankaj Kumar’s case

(supra)].

29. Moreover, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Vakil Prasad v. State of

Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, emphasized that the right to a speedy trial is a

fundamental right and that excessive delay in investigation or trial would

compromise the fairness of the trial itself. It was further clarified that

Page 26 of 36

speedy trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and

essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in

Article 21. Similarly, in Mahendra Lal Das vrs. State of Bihar and Ors,

reported in 2002 (1) SCC 149 it was held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

that prosecution delay beyond a reasonable period is not only detrimental

to the accused but also undermines public confidence in the criminal

justice system. The Court stated that inordinate delay causes not only

personal hardship to the accused but also societal harm by rendering the

process of justice ineffective. It was further observed that;

“7. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not

material but speedy justice is the mandate of the

Constitution being in the interests of the accused as well as

that of the society. Cases relating to corruption are to be

dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when

delay is found to have been caused during the investigation,

inquiry or trial, the concerned appropriate authorities are

under an obligation to find out and deal with the persons

responsible for such delay. The delay can be attributed

either to the connivance of the authorities with the accused

or used as a lever to pressurise and harass the accused as is

alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case…

9. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances

of the case, we are inclined to quash the proceedings against

the appellant as permitting further prosecution would be the

travesty of justice and a mere ritual or formality so for as the

Page 27 of 36

prosecution agency is concerned, and unnecessary burden as

regards the courts.”

(Emphasis supplied)

30. So far as inordinate delay in conclusion of the trial is concerned,

the Hon‟ble Supreme court, in Santosh De Vs. Archana Guha & Ors.,

reported in (1994) 1 SCC 421, while entertaining an appeal against the

decision of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding, declined to

interfere with the impugned order of the High Court and observed that

unexplained delay, of eight years in the said case, in commencing the trial

by itself infringes the right of the accused to speedy trial. In the absence

of any material to the contrary, the Court accepted the findings of the

High Court that the delay of eight years was entirely and exclusively on

account of the default of the prosecution, and, as such, dismissed the

appeal. Similarly, in Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia,

reported in (2008) 2 SCC 370, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that

one of the mandates of Article 21 is that a person should not be disturbed

except on sufficient grounds (para 18). The Court emphasised the need to

balance the law enforcement powers of the State with the protection of

citizens from injustice and harassment, observing that while the State has

a duty to ensure that no crime goes unpunished, it also owes a duty to

ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed (paras 19–20).

Page 28 of 36

31. Next, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar v. State of

Maharashtra reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117 quashed the criminal

proceedings on account of “unwarranted prolonged investigations” that

caused inordinate delay. It was held that;

“24. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles,

enumerated above, we are of the opinion that in the instant

case, the appellant's constitutional right recognised under

Article 21 of the Constitution stands violated. It is common

ground that the first information report was recorded on 12-

5- 1987 for the offences allegedly committed in the year

1981, and after unwarranted prolonged investigations,

involving aforestated three financial irregularities; the

charge-sheet was submitted in court on 22-2-1991. Nothing

happened till April 1999, when the appellant and his

deceased mother filed criminal writ petition seeking quashing

of proceedings before the trial court.

25. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to

inordinate delay in investigations and trial has been raised

before us for the first time but we feel that at this distant

point of time, it would be unfair to the appellant to remit the

matter back to the High Court for examining the said plea

of the appellant. Apart from the fact that it would further

protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful purpose would

be served as learned counsel for the State very fairly stated

before us that he had no explanation to offer for the delay

in investigations and the reason why the trial did not

commence for eight long years. Nothing, whatsoever, could

be pointed out, far from being established, to show that the

delay was in any way attributable to the appellant.

***

Page 29 of 36

27. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show

any exceptional circumstance, which could possibly be

taken into consideration for condoning the prolongation of

investigation and the trial. The lackadaisical manner of

investigation spread over a period of four years in a case of

this type and inordinate delay of over eight years (excluding

the period when the record of the trial court was in the High

Court), is manifestly clear.

28. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the

appellant has been denied his valuable constitutional right

to a speedy investigation and trial and, therefore, criminal

proceedings initiated against him in the year 1987 and

pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Latur, deserve to

be quashed on this short ground alone.”

(Emphasis supplied)

32. In addition to the above, reference may also be had to the recent

judgement of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Anr.

Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2023 SC 102, wherein the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court

and quashed the impugned criminal proceeding, and held that:

“24. In the present case, the Respondent has

provided no explanation for the extraordinary delay of

more than four years between the initial site inspection, the

show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the absence

of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer

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some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal

proceedings.

25. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground

for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases,

unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken

into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for

quashing a criminal complaint.

26. While this court does not expect a full-blown

investigation at the stage of a criminal complaint, however,

in such cases where the accused has been subjected to the

anxiety of a potential initiation of criminal proceedings for

such a length of time, it is only reasonable for the court to

expect bare-minimum evidence from the Investigating

Authorities.

27. At the cost of repetition, we again state that the

purpose of filing a complaint and initiating criminal

proceedings must exist solely to meet the ends of justice, and

the law must not be used as a tool to harass the accused.

The law, is meant to exist as a shield to protect the innocent,

rather than it being used as a sword to threaten them.

CONCLUSION

28. It must be noted that the High Court while passing the

impugned judgment, has failed to take into consideration to

the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that

the quashing of a criminal complaint must be done only in

the rarest of rare cases, it is still the duty of the High Court

to look into each and every case with great detail to prevent

miscarriage of justice. The law is a sacrosanct entity that

exists to serve the ends of justice, and the courts, as

protectors of the law and servants of the law, must always

ensure that frivolous cases do not pervert the sacrosanct

nature of the law.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Page 31 of 36

33. Finally, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, very recently in Robert

Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, reported 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 2511, was concerned with a criminal prosecution that had

remained pending for an inordinately long period without meaningful

progress in trial, largely attributable to prosecutorial and systemic delays.

The appellant‟s primary contention was that the prolonged pendency of

the proceedings violated his fundamental right to a speedy trial under

Article 21 of the Constitution. The Hon‟ble Court, taking into

consideration the pronouncement in Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of

U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351, wherein it was held that the

process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude,

and CBI v. Mir Usman, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2066, along

with its other earlier decisions, surveyed the constitutional jurisprudence

on speedy trial and held that inordinate and unexplained delay in

conclusion of criminal proceedings, particularly where attributable to the

State, renders the prosecution oppressive and violative of Article 21, and

may warrant quashing of the proceedings notwithstanding the seriousness

of the allegations. The Court further emphasised that constitutional courts

are duty-bound to intervene where the criminal process itself becomes

punitive by the passage of time. Relevant portion thereof is quoted

hereinbelow:

Page 32 of 36

“19. ...When only the actions of the appellant were subject

matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as

above - 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by

delay. No reason is forthcoming for this extended period

either in the chargesheet or at the instance of the Court

having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other

words, the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal

investigation hanging over him for all these years. The

judgments above referred to supra hold unequivocally that

investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial and it

is also held therein, that violation of this right can strike at

the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed.

At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot be set

in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer

limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation

must be drawn to a close. …Where though, Article 21 would

be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present

matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood

from record for the investigation having taken a large

amount of time. The accused cannot be made to suffer

endlessly with this threat of continuing investigation and

eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday

existence.

***

21…(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning

of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of

fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice

system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously

with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that

there is a large gap between the first information report and

the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an

explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself

to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.

Page 33 of 36

The direction above does not come based on this case

alone. This Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions

that there is massive delay in filing chargesheet/taking

cognizance etc. This Court has time and again, in its

pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy

investigation and trial as being important for the accused,

victim and the society. However, for a variety of reasons there

is still a lag in the translation of this recognition into a

reality.”

(Emphasis supplied)

34. Reverting to the matter at hand, the Prosecution-Vigilance

Department contends that the prolonged pendency of the trial is

attributable to the non-appearance of the Petitioner. However, a perusal of

the order sheets of the learned trial court, placed at Annexure-6 series,

reveals that the Petitioner was present on all material dates, except when

his appearance was legitimately dispensed with under Section 317 of the

Cr.P.C. Likewise, from the depositions of the witnesses examined so far,

at Annexure-4 series, it is evident that the cross-examination of one

witness was deferred on only one occasion, for a single day, pursuant to a

time petition filed on behalf of the Petitioner. Except the aforesaid

instance, on a prima facie perusal of the record, no other delay is

discernible as being attributable directly and solely to the Petitioner. The

Prosecution-Vigilance Department has further alleged that the delay was

also occasioned due to non-appearance of the accused persons,

Page 34 of 36

necessitating issuance of non-bailable warrants to secure their presence

for framing of charge. However, no material has been placed before this

Court to substantiate the issuance of any such warrant against the present

Petitioner, as claimed in the counter affidavit. In such circumstances, this

Court is constrained to hold that the delay in the trial cannot be attributed

to the Petitioner and that the same is, in fact, largely attributable to the

prosecution.

35. Furthermore, even on merits, the Prosecution‟s case suffers from

certain inconsistencies. The FIR alleges that the Petitioner and other co-

accused caused a loss of Rs.25,24,581/- to the Government Exchequer,

whereas the charge sheet quantifies the alleged loss at Rs.36,15,068/-.

Similar discrepancies are also discernible in the counter affidavit filed by

the Vigilance Department. Also, the prosecution has not provided the

manner in which they have calculated the loss amount. A perusal of the

charge sheet further reveals that Shri Choudhury Barada Prasana Das, the

then Managing Director of OCCF, had requested the Principal Secretary

to the Government to recommend OCCF for engagement as a State

Nominated Agency (SNA) for procurement of coal from MCL. Likewise,

Shri Hemant Kumar Sarma, the then Director of Industries, had

recommended OCCF for such engagement. It was Shri Chakradhar Das,

the General Manager of OCCF, who informed the Managing Director

Page 35 of 36

regarding OCCF‟s nomination as SNA and invited willingness from

interested persons for engagement as Marketing Agent. It was also Shri

Akhil Kumar Jena, the Managing Director, who had initially proposed

that, due to insufficiency of funds with OCCF, a Marketing Agent may be

appointed to handle the coal business on behalf of OCCF. So far as the

Petitioner is concerned, the record indicates that he merely directed that

the notice inviting willingness for appointment of Marketing Agent be

circulated to all branches of OCCF and the offices of the RCS, that the

noting regarding appointment of the Marketing Agent be communicated

to the next bidder, and that the matter be placed before the next Board

meeting. It further appears that the Business Sub-Committee had taken

the decision to engage a Marketing Agent. Thus, prima facie, it does not

appear that the Petitioner recommended the appointment of the Marketing

Agent. Therefore, on the face of the material on record, there is no

indication that the Petitioner recommended the appointment of the

Marketing Agent or that any direct or exclusive responsibility can be

attributed to him for the said appointment or the purported loss allegedly

flowing therefrom.

CONCLUSION

36. Having considered the submissions advanced by the learned

counsel for the respective parties, upon a perusal of the factual matrix and

Page 36 of 36

the materials available on record, and in the light of the foregoing

analysis, this Court has no hesitation in holding that, both on the ground

of inordinate delay in the framing of charge and conclusion of

investigation, and by extension, the trial, as well as on merits, the present

case is a fit one for exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court

under Section 528 of the BNSS to prevent abuse of the process of law and

to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly, the impugned FIR bearing

Bhubaneswar Vigilance P.S. Case No. 30 dated 02.06.2010, and the

consequential criminal proceeding bearing T.R. No. 42 of 2013 pending

before the learned 3

rd

Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar, are

hereby quashed insofar as the present Petitioner is concerned.

37. The CRLMC application is allowed accordingly. However, there

shall be no order as to costs.

(Aditya Kumar Mohapatra)

Judge

Orissa High Court, Cuttack

The 25

th

February, 2026/ S.K. Rout, Jr. Stenographer