In the High Court at Calcutta

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Appellate Side

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya

And

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

FAT No. 266 of 2020

Subhadip Bose

Vs.

LA Collector, Hooghly, Chinsurah

With

COT 178 of 2025

Madhusri Roy @ Ray

Vs.

State of West Bengal

With

COT 177 of 2025

Aniruddha Bandyopadhyay and another

Vs.

State of West Bengal

With

FA No. 228 of 2022

Aniruddha Banerjee

Vs.

LA Collector, Hooghly, Chinsurah

With

FA No. 377 of 2025

Sheela Mukherjee

Vs.

LA Collector, Hooghly, Chinsurah

With

2

FA No. 41 of 2021

+

CAN 5 of 2022

State of West Bengal represented by LA

Collector, Hooghly

Vs.

Aniruddha Banerjee

With

FA No. 70 of 2022

State of West Bengal

Vs.

Mahua Mitra

With

FA No. 72 of 2022

State of West Bengal

Vs.

Sangramjit Singha Roy

With

FAT No. 267 of 2020

Subarna Singha Roy

Vs.

LA Collector, Hooghly, Chinsurah

With

FAT No. 268 of 2020

Sangramjit Singha Roy

Vs.

LA Collector, Hooghly, Chinsurah

With

FAT No. 272 of 2020

State of West Bengal represented by LA

Collector, Hooghly

Vs.

Subhadip Bose

With

3

FAT No. 273 of 2020

+

CAN 3 of 2024

State of West Bengal represented by LA

Collector, Hooghly

Vs.

Madhusri Roy @ Ray

With

FAT No. 277 of 2020

+

CAN 5 of 2023

State of West Bengal represented by LA

Collector, Hooghly

Vs.

Bikramjit Singha Roy

With

FA No. 200 of 2025

State of West Bengal represented by LA

Collector, Hooghly

Vs.

Aniruddha Bandhyopadhyay and another

With

FAT No. 275 of 2020

+

CAN 4 of 2024

The State of West Bengal

Vs.

Smt. Sheela Mukherjee

For the land losers: Mr. Ayan Banerjee,

Ms. Debjani Sengupta,

Ms. Paulomi Ghosh

For the State : Mr. Amal Kumar Sen, AAG,

Mr. Soumitra Bandyopadhyay, Sr. Gvt. Adv.,

Mr. Aniruddha Sen,

Mr. Priyabrata Batabyal

4

Heard

& reserved on : 22.12.2025

and 23.12.2025 (FAT No. 275 of 2020)

Judgment on : 14.01.2026

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-

1. By a judgment dated May 8, 2025, a co-ordinate Bench of this

Court, inter alia comprised of one of us (Sabyasachi

Bhattacharyya, J.), had disposed of two appeals bearing FAT No.

516 of 2019 and FAT No. 3 of 2019, which, we are apprised, have

not been interfered with in any further challenge till date and

operates as res judicata between the parties thereto.

2. All the present appeals and cross-objections arise from the self-

same land acquisition proceeding from which the said previous

appeals arose. The arguments advanced by the land losers as well

as the State in the previous appeals are adopted in their entirety

by both sides in the present appeals. It has been prayed that the

instant appeals be also disposed of in terms of the judgment

passed in the said earlier appeals. However, for the sake of

completion, we narrate the salient features of the said judgment

dated May 8, 2025, while passing a similar judgment in the

present appeals as well.

3. The matter arises out of a Notification issued under Section 4 of

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the

5

LA Act”) in respect of lands located at Mouza- Bhadrakali in

Uttarpara, West Bengal in respect of acquisition of such lands for

the public purpose of rehabilitation of squatters/ refugees of the

Bhadrakali Women’s Home. The Notification was followed by a

hearing given under Section 5A of the LA Act by the District

Collector. However, in an order passed in connection with a writ

petition, a fresh hearing under Section 5A was directed to be held

and all previous steps taken from the initial hearing under the said

provision till then were annulled.

4. In the meantime, the right to Fair Compensation and Transparency

in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act, 2013

(for short, “the 2013 Act”) came into force with effect from April 1,

2024, pursuant to which the calculation of compensation was

required to be made under Section 26 of the 2013 Act by dint of

Section 24 thereof.

5. A re-hearing was held under Section 5A and awards were duly

passed, in respect of which references were initiated at the behest

of the land losers, including the present land losers, under Section

18 of the LA Act. Since the Rules under the 2013 Act had not been

framed till then, by another order of a learned Single Judge of this

Court, the reference was directed to continue under Section 18 of

the LA Act.

6. By the impugned common judgment and awards dated September

20, 2018, the reference cases was disposed of. Being aggrieved by

6

the same, the land losers as well as the State have preferred the

present appeals and cross-objections.

7. The cardinal grounds of challenge by the State are as follows:

a. The impugned award was passed on the basis of five sale

deeds produced by the land losers before the Referral Court,

out of which at least two were executed post-notification. The

date of Notification under Section 4 of the LA Act, as

published in the Extraordinary Gazette, was September 20,

2011, which is agreed on by both parties to be the relevant

date for the purpose of calculation of compensation.

Whereas the sale deeds produced by the land losers were in

respect of lands with structures, the lands acquired in the

present cases were without any structures, although recorded

in the records-of-rights to be “Bastu” in nature. Thus, the

deeds in respect of lands with structure s could not a

reasonable basis for assessment of compensation in respect of

vacant lands.

b. The plots covered by the sale deeds produced by the land

losers are situated far away from the subject-plots in the

present matters and were adjacent to a 25 -feet wide road.

Thus, those sale deeds would depict a higher valuation and,

thus, could not be a reasonable basis for valuation of the

acquired lands which are the subject of the present

acquisition. The sale data produced by the State in respect of

7

lands adjoining the self-same cluster of lands as acquired in

the present acquisition proceeding should have formed the

basis of assessment of compensation in the present cases.

c. The Referral Court relied on one of the deeds produced by the

claimant which allegedly contained absurdly high market

value, as opposed to the other deeds. However, in terms of

settled law, if there is a marked difference between the sale

price/market value shown in one of the deeds and the others,

such deed ought to be discarded for the purpose of assessing

compensation.

d. In its applications filed for production of additional documents

under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the

State relies upon e-assessment slips of March 26, 2012

which, according to the State, reflect the correct market price

of adjacent lands in respect of sale deeds of the

contemporaneous period of the acquisition. Those, it is

submitted, were required to be considered for assessing the

market value of the present acquired plots. It is reiterated in

such context that the learned Referral Judge overlooked the

sale data provided by the State and relied solely on the sale

deeds produced by the land losers.

8. On the other hand, the land losers, in support of their

appeals/cross objections and while controverting the arguments of

the State, put forth the following grounds of challenge:

8

a. The impugned referral awards are perverse, since the learned

Referral Judge found that the average value of the sale deeds

produced was Rs. 4,50,000/- per Cottah, by placing reliance

on the statements made in the pleadings of the land losers.

However, the actual average value of the sale deeds comes to

around Rs. 5,49,694/- per Cottah.

b. It is settled law that the highest among the various exemplars

is to be taken for calculation of compensation. In support of

the proposition, the land losers cite Sri Ram M.

Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur Ranee of Vuyyur v. Collector

of Madras, reported at (1969) 1 MLJ (SC) 45, Meherawal

Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot and Others v. State of

Punjab and Others, reported at (2012) 5 SCC 432, Himmat

Singh and Others v. State of M.P. and Another, reported at

(2013) 16 SCC 392 and Anjani Molu Dessai v. State of Goa and

Another, reported at (2010) 13 SCC 710. As held in Ashok

Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana, reported at (2016) 4

SCC 544 and Bhimasha v. Speical Land Acquisition Officer and

Another, reported at (2008) 10 SCC 797, the court has to

assess just and fair compensation in respect of land

acquisition irrespective of the amount actually claimed by the

land losers. The highest market value among the deeds

produced was found in Deed No. 0782 dated September 29,

2011, which was to the tune of Rs. 6,36,666/- per Cottah.

9

Thus, the learned Referral Judge, it is argued, applied

erroneous yardsticks in restricting the claim to the initial

pleadings of the land losers without taking into account the

highest exemplar.

c. Under Section 26(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, different alternative

parameters for assessing the market value have been

provided, with the rider that the higher value among those

has to be taken as the basis of such valuation. Although in

Clause (b) of Sub-section (1), average sale price has been

mentioned as one of the parameters, since sub-clause (a)

provides for the market value for registered sale deeds in the

area to be another determinant, which is the higher valuation

in the present case, the same was to be taken as the basis for

calculation of compensation.

d. The sale data provided by the State before the Referral Court

did not reflect the market value but the set-forth value of such

sales, which could not, thus, be looked into for the purpose of

assessing compensation.

e. As per Section 2(13) of West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973,

“mouza” is defined as the smallest unit of area of land. Since

the sale deeds produced by the land losers pertained to the

Bhadrakali Mouza, where the lands acquired under the

present proceeding were also situated, such deeds provided

an accurate measure of market value, as determined by the

10

registration office, which was mentioned in the deeds. Hence,

the valuation mentioned in the said deeds ought to have been

the basis of calculation of market value for the purpose of

calculating compensation.

f. Interest has been calculated by the Referral Court till the date

when the award was passed, that is July 30, 2015; however,

in the reply to a query made by the claimant under the Right

to Information Act, the Special Land Acquisition Officer,

Hooghly enclosed a Memo which revealed that the Governor

was pleased to approve the awards in connection with the

subject acquisition on February 23, 2016. Such document is

sought to be brought on record by the land losers by way of

additional evidence by filing applications under Order XLI

Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the land

losers, the interest on the market value as per Section 64 of

the 2013 Act should have been calculated till February 23,

2016, that is, the date of approval of the awards.

g. Additional compensation in terms of the Section 72 of the

2013 Act as well as interest in terms of Section 80 thereof

ought to have been awarded as well.

h. The State did not file any written objection to the referral

application under Section 18 of the LA Act ; as such, the

evidence adduced by the State cannot be looked into at all,

being not supported by pleadings. In support of such

11

proposition, the land losers cite Ratanlal Alias Babulal

Chunilal Samsuka v. Sundarabai Govardhandas Samsuka

(Dead) Through Legal Representatives and Others, reported at

(2018) 11 SCC 119 and Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and

Another, reported at (2008) 17 SCC 491.

9. Upon the above arguments being advanced, the following issues

were framed for deciding the earlier appeals:

(i) Basis of valuation;

(ii) Whether compensation should have been granted ti ll the

date of the Governor’s approval of the award;

(iii) Whether the claimant is entitled to get interest on

excess compensation in terms of Section 72 of the 2013

Act;

(iv) Whether the claimant is entitled to interest under

Section 80 of the 2013 Act.

10. The judgment rendered by the co-ordinate Bench in the previous

appeals in respect of the above issues is set out verbatim

hereinbelow:

“(i) Basis of valuation

21. Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act provides that notwithstanding

anything contained in the said Act, in case of land acquisition

proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act where no award under

Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, all provisions of the

2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall

apply.

12

22. It is an admitted position that in the present case, only a

notification was issued under Section 4 of the 1894 Act and no

award under Section 11 was passed, since the introduction of the

2013 Act intervened, and the compensation was awarded on the

basis of the parameters laid down in the 2013 Act. Thus, the

premise of calculation has to be in respect of the 2013 Act in terms

of Section 24(1)(a) of the said Act, more so since on the date of the

award, the 1894 Act stood repealed under Section 114(1) of the

2013 Act.

23. The mode of determination of market value of land by Collector

has been provided in Section 26 of the 2013 Act. As per sub -

section (1) of Section 26, three objective criteria have been laid

down in assessing and determining the market value of land.

24. The first, contained in Clause (a), is the market value, if any,

specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for the registration of sale

deeds or agreements to sell, as the case may be, in the area where

the land is situated.

25. The second yardstick is the average sale price for similar type of

land situated in the nearest village or nearest vicinity area, as per

Clause (b).

26. Clause (c) provides as a third yardstick the consented amount of

compensation as agreed upon under Section 2(2) in case of

acquisition of lands for private companies or for public-private

partnership projects.

27. Clause (c) does not apply in the present case at all and the conflict

sought to be raised is between Clauses (a) and (b). Whereas the

State seeks to rely on the average sale price as provided for in

Clause (b), the claimant argues that the market value under

Clause (a) is applicable.

28. A perusal of Section 26(1) clearly shows that the above three

criteria have been disjuncted by the conjunction “or” and, in no

uncertain terms, sub-section (1) provides that out of the three

criteria, whichever is higher is to be adopted.

13

29. We find from the sale deeds and other documents produced in

connection with the matter that the market value is admittedly

higher than the sale prices as reflected in the deeds of nearby

lands. Thus, it is the market value which is to be considered in

terms of Section 26(1) for the purpose of assessment of

compensation.

30. The State admits that the sale data produced in the court below

was not restricted to sale deeds but also contained gift deeds and

other nature of documents. Thus, the said documents could not

have been a reasonable yardstick for calculation of compensation.

The e-assessment slips sought to be produced before this Court

were obtained in March, 2012, that is after the date of the

notification. We cannot also overlook the fact that the State did not

file any written objection/statement in the court below and hence,

is precluded from producing evidence in the absence of any

pleadings to support the same. The ratio laid down in Ratanlal

Alias Babulal Chunilal Samsuka (supra) and Bachhaj Nahar

(supra) is germane in such context.

31. It is found from the impugned judgment that although initially the

sale deeds produced by the claimant were not exhibited, the

Referral Court observed that since the certified copies of such

deeds were not objected to by the State, those be exhibited and

marked as Exhibits. Thus, the technical objection taken to the

marking of the said sale deeds as exhibits on such count must

give way to substantive justice, particularly keeping in view the

nature of the adjudication. Unlike an ordinary civil suit, where it

is for the respective parties to prove their respective cases, in a

compensation matter, it is for the Referral Court to assess, on the

basis of available documents, fair compensation.

32. Going by such yardstick, the market value as mentioned in the

sale deeds produced by the claimant could be validly looked into

by the Referral Court.

33. However, the State has raised a valid objection as to two out of the

said deeds pertaining to a period after the notification and, as

14

such, we keep those deeds beyond our consideration. Going by

the three remaining pre -notification sale deeds of the

contemporaneous period, we find that the highest market value

among the same is Rs.6,02,500/- per Cottah, as enumerated in

Deed No.05821. It has been consistently held by the Supreme

Court and different High Courts that while calculating

compensation in respect of land acquisition, the comparable deed

showing highest valuation should be taken into consideration. The

said proposition is reflected in the judgments of Sri Ram M.

Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur Ranee of Vuyyur (supra),

Meherawal Khewaji Trust (Registered), Faridkot (supra), Himmat

Singh and Others (supra) as well as Anjani Molu Dessai (supra)

cited by the claimant. It is a well-settled position of law that the

highest exemplar is to be taken as the basis for calculation of

compensation.

34. The only other question left to be decided is whether the market

value shown in the highest exemplar in the present case is

absurdly disproportionate with that as indicated in the other

deeds.

35. On a perusal of the three pre-notification deeds produced by the

claimant in the court below, we find that the respective market

values mentioned therein are Rs.5,03,472/- per cottah in Deed

No.01192, Rs.6,02,500/- per cottah in Deed No.05821 and

Rs.5,28,333/- per cottah in Deed No.01294. All the said deeds

were registered prior to executed prior to the notification dated

September 20, 2011.

36. Since the other two deeds produced by the claimant were

registered on September 23 and September 30, 2011, those are

kept outside the zone of consideration.

37. Going by the above, the highest exemplar stipulated the market

value per cottah at Rs.6,02,500/-, which is not absurdly higher

than the market value reflected in the other two pre-notification

deeds. Thus, we cannot find substance in the contention of the

State that the highest exemplar carried an absurdly high figure.

15

38. Both the State and the Referral Court proceeded on the wrong

premise of taking the average of sale deeds, since Clause (b) of

Section 26(1) does not come into play at all. The Referral Court

acted in a perverse manner in making an arithmetically wrong

calculation of the average of the sale deeds as well. More

importantly, it restricted the calculation of compensation to the

market value mentioned in the pleadings of the claimant without

considering the deeds, which goes against the grain of the settled

law in that regard. As mentioned earlier, in cases of compensation,

the Referral Court is not limited to the pleadings but has, for itself,

to assess compensation independently on the basis of Section 26

of the 2013 Act.

39. The next sub-question which falls for consideration under the

broad issue of the basis of valuation is whether Deed No.05821

can be taken into consideration, since the subject-land had a

structure standing on it, whereas the acquired properties had

none.

40. Exploring the arguments of the parties on the said issue, we find

that the State, in Page 3 of its written notes of arguments filed

before this Court, has taken a stand that the lands covered by the

three pre-notification deeds had structures of 100 Sq. Ft. R.T.

Sheds. Even as per the State, the value of the R.T. Sheds should

be deducted from the valuation of the land. The State has

contended that after such deduction, in respect of the first two

deeds, the actual value comes to Rs.1,48,706/- per cottah. The

said two deeds, even as per the State, contain the respective

values of Rs.1,76,944/- and Rs.1,98,662/- per cottah.

41. For arriving at the actual value of the said two deeds as per the

State’s version, that is, Rs.1,48,706/-, the valuation of the R.T.

Sheds were deducted. Thus, the valuation attributed to the R.T.

Sheds in respect of the two properties by the State can be arrived

at if we deduct the alleged actual value from the value shown in

the deeds. Upon such simple arithmetical calculation, we find that

16

in respect of the two plots, the structures have been evaluated by

the State respectively at Rs.49,956/- and Rs.28,238/-.

42. The claimant seeks to produce before this Court, by way of

additional evidence, documents which pertain to answers to his

RTI queries, as per which the valuation of the structures come

approximately to Rs.45,000/-. Even if we take the highest value

of the structure out of the three valuations, two given by the State

and one by the claimant, the highest value of the structure comes

to Rs.49,956/-, which is the version of the State itself.

43. Hence, even as per the logic of the State, the valuation of the land

covered by the highest exemplar can be arrived at by deducting

the value of the structure (as furnished by the State itself) from the

market value shown in the highest exemplar, that is,

Rs.6,02,500/-. Thus, the actual market value of the land, upon

deduction of the value of the structure standing thereon, would be

Rs. (6,02,5000 – 49,956) = 5,52,544/- per cottah.

44. Thus, as we accept the highest value of the structure as per the

State’s submission, the Order XLI Rule 27 application of neither of

the parties is required to be entertained. The documents sought to

be produced by the State as additional evidence, in any event,

would be evidence beyond its pleadings, since no written

statement/objection was filed by the State in the reference. Even

otherwise, no satisfactory explanation as to why such documents

could not be produced in the Referral Court by exercise of due

diligence has been furnished.

45. In view of the above discussions, we come to the conclusion that

the compensation for the land should be in terms of the market

value of the highest exemplar, minus the value of the structure

standing thereon, which comes to Rs.5,52,544/-.

46. Two other factors are so to be taken note of. First, the sale deeds,

including the highest exemplar produced by the claimant, pertain

to the Bhadrakali Mouza (that is, the same Mouza where the

acquired lands are situated) and, as per the definition given in

Section 2(13) of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, a “Mouza”

17

is the smallest unit of land. Hence, the land covered by the said

sale deed comes within the purview of Section 26(1)(a) of the 2013

which contemplates, as a parameter of assessment of

compensation, the market value for the registration of sale deeds

in the area where the land is situated.

(ii) Whether compensation should have been granted till the date

of the Governor’s approval of the award

47. To ascertain the validity of the claimant’s argument that it is not

the date of the actual award but that when the Governor gave

approval to the award which is to be considered to be the relevant

dats up to which compensation should be granted, we are to

compare certain provisions of the 1894 and 2013 Acts

respectively. In this context, it is important to keep in mind that in

terms of Section 114, read with Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act,

since no award was made under Section 11 of the 1894 Act but

the acquisition proceeding was initiated under Section 4 of the

1894 Act, the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the

determination of compensation shall apply in its entirety, despite

the basis for calculation of compensation being the market value

as on the date of the notification dated November 20, 2011 issued

under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

48. Section 12 of the 1894 Act provides that the award of the Collector

shall be final and binding when it is filed in the Collector’s Office.

The corresponding provision in the 2013 Act is Section 37, which

are rather similar to Section 12 of the 1894 Act.

49. However, these provisions are respectively circumscribed by

Section 11 of the 1894 Act and Section 23 of the 2013 Act, which

roughly correspond with each other. A marked difference,

however, between the two can be found in the context of the

present arguments of the claimant. Whereas the first proviso to

Section 11(1) of 1894 Act stipulates that no award shall be made

18

by the Collector under the said sub-section without the previous

approval of the appropriate Government or of such other Officer as

the appropriate Government may authorize in this behalf, there is

no similar corresponding provision in Section 23 of the 2013 Act.

50. The latter Section stipulates that the Collector shall proceed to

enquire into the objections and shall make an award under his

hand, without any further requirement of approval by the

Government (as expressed through the Governor).

51. Hence, whereas the mandate of the 1894 Act is that, for an award

to be made, the same is to be approved first by the appropriate

Government (which will is generally expressed through the

Governor in such cases), there is complete absence of such

restriction in the 2013 Act as per which the award becomes final

on the date of its passing.

52. Reverting back to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, which is

applicable in the instant case, all provisions of the 2013 Act

relating to the determination of compensation shall apply. Thus,

although the reference was construed to be under Section 18 of the

1894 Act by an order of this Court, since no Rules under the 2013

Act had yet been framed at that stage, the assessment of

compensation was to be in terms of the 2013 Act as per Section 24

(1) (a) of the 2013 Act; as such, all provisions of the 2013 Act

relating to the determination of compensation, including Section

23, read with Section 37, of the said Act are applicable in the

instant case.

53. Thus, it is abundantly clear that whereas the 1894 Act imposes a

fetter in the shape of prior approval by the Government for an

award to be made, the unbridled provisions of the 2013 Act, which

is applicable to the present case, do away with such restriction for

an award to be passed.

54. Hence, the argument of the claimant to the effect that the

compensation should have been granted till the date of the

Governor’s assent cannot be accepted, as no such assent was

19

required in the first place for making the present award of

compensation, which was passed in terms of the 2013 Act.

55. Thus, we decide this issue in the negative and come to the

conclusion that the date up to which compensation is to be

awarded is the actual date of passing of the award that is July

30, 2015.

(iii) Whether the claimant is entitled to get interest on excess

compensation in terms of Section 72 of the 2013 Act

56. Section 72 provides that if the sum, which in the opinion of the

Referral Authority the Collector ought to have awarded, is in

excess of the sum which the Collector awards, the said award of

the Referral Authority may direct that the Collector shall pay

interest on the excess amount at the rate of 9% per annum from

the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of

payment of such excess to the Authority.

57. The proviso to Section 72 of the 2013 Act stipulates that where

such excess or any part thereof is paid to the Authority after the

date or expiry of a period of one year from the date of possession,

interest at the rate of 15% per annum is payable from the date of

expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess

or part thereof which has not been paid to the Authority before the

date of such expiry.

58. It is relevant to note that both the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act

contemplate possession to be taken after notice. As such, there is

no material difference between the two Acts regarding applicability

of the principle underlying Section 72 of the 2013 Act insofar as

the relevant date being the date of possession. Although the

expression “may” has been used in Section 72, we do not find any

conceivable reason as to why the claimant in the present case

should be deprived of such interest, upon ascertainment of the

date on which possession was taken from the claimant. The date

of possession has not been mentioned clearly in the award. Thus,

20

it is for the Referral Court to ascertain such date from the evidence

and materials available on record and to grant such interest as

mentioned in Section 72 to the claimant.

59. Thus, this issue is decided in principle in the positive, in favour of

the claimant.

(iv) Whether the claimant is entitled to interest under Section 80

of the 2013 Act.

60. By the same logic as above, concerning the grant of interest under

Section 72, the Collector as well as the Referral Court was duty-

bound to direct payment of interest on the compensation at the

rate of 9% per annum from the time of taking possession until it

has been paid or deposited, in the event such compensation was

not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land.

The proviso to Section 80 stipulates that if such compensation or

any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one

year from the date on which possession was taken, interest at the

rate of 15% per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of

the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part

thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of

such expiry. These mandates are statutory and no pleading

claiming such interest is required to be made by the claimant,

either for payment of interest on the excess or the principal

compensation. As a necessary corollary of grant of compensation,

the referral Court ought to have looked into the said issues and

granted such interest, if payable to the claimant. Hence, the

entitlement of the claimant to get the interest stipulated in Section

80 of the 2013 Act is in principle decided in the positive, in favour

of the claimant.

61. We find from the above discussions that the learned Referral Court

did not advert to the above questions at all or applied erroneous

legal principles and followed invalid legal yardsticks in coming to

its conclusions while passing the impugned award.”

21

11. The previous appeals were allowed in part in terms of the above

observations. As discussed above, since the present appeals arise

from the self-same acquisition proceeding and the arguments

advanced in the previous appeals, bearing FAT No. 516 of 2019

and FAT No. 3 of 2019, have been adopted by the parties in the

present appeals as well, the present appeals are also disposed of in

terms of the judgment passed therein in the following manner:

12. FAT No. 266 of 2020 with FAT No. 272 of 2020, FAT No. 267 of

2020 with FAT No. 277 of 2020, FAT No. 550 of 2019 (FA No. 228

of 2022) with FAT No. 140 of 2020 (FA No. 41 of 2021), FAT No.

268 of 2020 with FA No. 72 of 2022, COT No. 178 of 2025 with

FAT No. 273 of 2020, FA No. 70 of 2022, COT No. 177 of 2025 with

FAT No. 274 of 2020 (FA No. 200 of 2025), FAT No. 275 of 2020

with FAT No. 145 of 2021 (FA No. 377 of 2025) are allowed in part,

thereby setting aside the judgment and respective awards dated

September 20, 2018, passed by the learned Additional District

Judge, First Court at Hooghly Sadar, District – Hooghly in the

connected Land Acquisition cases and remanding the matter to the

Referral Court for adjudication on the following points:

(i) The compensation of the acquired lands of the land losers in

each of the appeals/cross-objections is fixed at Rs.5,52,544/-

per Cottah;

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(ii) The solatium of one hundred per cent of the compensation

amount, as stipulated in Section 30 of the 2013 Act, shall be

calculated by the Referral Court on the basis of the above

compensation and awarded to the land losers in each of the

cases;

(iii) The Referral Court shall also award interest at the rate of 12%

per annum on the market value as mentioned above in terms

of sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the 2013 Act.

(iv) The Referral Court shall grant an opportunity to both sides to

adduce evidence, if they so choose, on the limited question of

the date of possession and as to whether the parameters of

Section 72 and Section 80 of the 2013 Act are satisfied in the

present case. In the event the parties or either of them choose

not to adduce evidence or the evidence is not satisfactory, it

will be open to the Referral Court to look into the relevant

materials and/or to call for the necessary records from the

appropriate authorities for ascertaining the relevant factual

parameters and, upon such exercise, if it is found that the

land losers are otherwise entitled to the additional interest

and/or interest as contemplated in Section 72 and/or Section

80 of the 2013 Act, the Referral Court shall award such

additional compensation and/or interest to the land losers

entitled to the same in terms of the said Sections.

13. There will be no order as to costs.

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14. The interim applications filed in connection with the above appeals

are also disposed of in the light of the above observations.

15. As per the submission of learned counsel appearing for the land

losers, the awarded amounts were deposited in connection with the

appeals by the appellant/State with the learned Registrar General

of this Court, out of which a part has been withdrawn by the land

losers. Since the compensation awarded by us would exceed the

awarded amounts in each of the appeals, we direct the balance of

the deposited amounts in each of the appeals, after deduction of

the amounts already withdrawn, if any, along with interest accrued

thereon, to be disbursed by the learned Registrar General in favour

of the land losers in each of the appeals/cross-objections, as and

when so approached by them, after deduction of statutory charges.

The entire amounts so withdrawn by the land losers shall be

adjusted with the amount s which would be awarded by the

Referral Court post-remand.

(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)

I agree.

(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)