2026:HHC:5592

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr.MMO No.754 of 2024

Date of Decision: 27.02.2026

_______________________________________________________

Dalip Singh Thakur …….Petitioner

Versus

State of H.P. & another … Respondents

_______________________________________________________

Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

Yes.

For the Petitioner: Mr. S.D. Gill, Advocate.

For the Respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar,

Additional Advocate Generals with Mr. Ravi

Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy

Advocates General.

_______________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):

Through, instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C,

prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR

No.306 of 2016, dated 12.12.2016, under Sections 467, 468, 471,

201, 120-B of IPC and Section 196 of Motor Vehicles Act, registered

at police Station, Sadar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh as well as

consequent proceedings, if any, pending adjudication in the Court of

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal

Pradesh in Cr. Case No.357 of 2017, qua the petitioner.

2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the

pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties, are that on

1

Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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12.12.2016, ASI Ram Lal, In-charge of CI-cum- Narcotic Cell,

received information from the intelligence source that a red-brown

tipper bearing registration No. HP-62-3727 appears to be stolen, as

its Chassis number had allegedly been tampered with and was fake.

After having received aforesaid information, police official, named

hereinabove, visited the spot and found the afore tipper bearing

registration No. HP-62-3727 parked on the roadside. The person

sitting inside the tipper identified himself as Rahul @ Neelmani son of

Sh. Pratap Singh, R/o village and post office Talyahar. Aforesaid

person produced tipper’s registration certificate i.e. R.C and as per

the same, actual owner of the vehicle was found to be Sh. Kulveer

Singh son of Sh. Tule Ram. Upon checking, the Chassis number

matched with the RC, but the engine number and chassis number

were allegedly found to be tampered with. On inquiry, Investigating

Officer found that owner had either tampered with the tipper and

prepared fake documents or had purchased a stolen tipper and

prepared fake documents and as such, registered the FIR, as detailed

hereinabove.

3. During investigation, it transpired that fake documents

were prepared for the registration of tipper by present petitioner, who

at the relevant time was functioning as a Notary Public. It is alleged

that petitioner assisted the main accused namely, Jagdish Thakur, in

converting the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-62-3727 tipper

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2009 model to a 2014 model. Though, petitioner herein was not

originally named in the FIR, but at the time of filing challan, he was

arrayed as an accused. In aforesaid background, petitioner has

approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of the

FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent

Court of law.

4. Pursuant to notice issued in the instant proceedings,

respondent-State has filed reply, wherein the facts, as noticed

hereinabove, have not been disputed, rather stand admitted. It has

been averred at the behest of the respondent that offence committed

by the petitioner is serious in nature and he cannot escape the

consequences of the offence allegedly committed by him by filing

present petition.

5. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioner, as has been

highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. S.D.Gill,

learned counsel representing the petitioner, is that the petitioner has

been falsely implicated in the present case. Mr. Gill, submitted that

petitioner, being a Notary Public, is entitled to the protection given

under Section 13 of the Notaries Act. He submitted that affidavit, if

any, allegedly prepared for registration of the vehicle, as detailed

hereinabove, was prepared by the petitioner, being a Notary Public,

and at the relevant time, executant was duly identified by the attesting

witness. While referring to Section 13 of the Notaries Act, learned

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counsel for the petitioner submitted that no criminal proceedings could

have been initiated against the petitioner in the absence of a specific

complaint in writing made by an officer authorized by the Central or

the State Government. In support of his aforesaid arguments, he

relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in Dalip Singh Thakur

vs. State of H.P., 2024 SCC Online HP 233.

6. Per contra, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional

Advocate General, while praying for dismissal of the petition at hand,

argued that petitioner has committed a serious crime and as such,

does not deserve any leniency. He submitted that petitioner never

entered the agreement/affidavit in the register, which itself suggests

that the petitioner had not acted in a bona fide manner. He submitted

that whether the petitioner had connived with the main accused or he

had no knowledge of false affidavit, admitted to be prepared at the

behest of main accused, is a question to be decided by the trial Court

in totality of evidence collected on record by the prosecution, but

certainly this is not a fit case where this Court exercising power under

Section 482 Cr.P.C.( Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita), for quashing the FIR as well as consequent proceedings.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have

gone through the record carefully.

8. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of

the aforesaid submissions and counter submissions made on behalf

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of learned counsel representing the parties, this Court deems it

necessary to discuss /elaborate the scope and competence of this

Court to quash the FIR as well as criminal proceedings, while

exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was

explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under:-

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now

more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the

court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in

State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein

this Court has summarised some of the principles under which

FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following

words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant

provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the

exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent

powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way

of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent

abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid

formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases

wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in

their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a

case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other

materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable

offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section

156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the

purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or

complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not

disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against

the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable

offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation

is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so

absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent

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person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground

for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the

provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the

proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or

the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of

the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide

and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of

relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made

in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken

at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then

the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no

investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by

the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC,

and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act

under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings

can be quashed.”

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand,

2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its

extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue

orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the

ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled

nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the

broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court

must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such

powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself,

allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of

process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of

justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of

several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines

that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal

proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the

Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The

grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following

situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala

fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)

no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in

nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus

allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and

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compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan

Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).”

10. It is apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that

power under Section 482 Cr.P.C can be exercised where there is an

express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the

concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the

institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a

specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

11. Now being guided by the aforesaid proposition of law

laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court would make an

endeavor to examine and consider the prayer made in the instant

petition vis-à-vis factual matrix of the case.

12. In nutshell, the case of the petitioner, as has been

projected before this Court, is that no criminal proceedings could have

been initiated against him in the absence of a written complaint, if any

made by an authorized officer of the Central or State Government, in

terms of Section 13 of Notaries Act.

13. Section 13 of the Notaries Act, reads as under:-

Cognizance of offence.—(1) No court shall take cognizance

of any offence committed by a notary in the exercise or

purported exercise of his functions under this Act save upon

complaint in writing made by an officer authorized by the

Central Government or a State Government by general or

special order in this behalf.

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(2) No Magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate or a

Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence punishable

under this Act.

14. Careful perusal of aforesaid provision of law clearly

reveals that the Court is barred from taking cognizance of any offence

committed by a Notary in the exercise of his function under the Act,

except upon a complaint made by an officer authorized by the Central

or the State Government. It is not in dispute that petitioner had

attested the affidavit in exercise of the functions conferred upon him

under the Notaries Act, therefore, the provision of Section 13 of the

Notaries Act will apply to the present case.

15. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case tilted Jagdish

Kumar Negi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another, Cr.MMO

No.1069 of 2024, decided on 14

th

July, 2025, has held that in the

absence of a written complaint made by an Officer authorized by the

Central Government or State Government, no criminal prosecution

can be launched against the Notary Public for acts performed by him

in discharge of his functions under the Notaries Act. The relevant

paras of the aforesaid judgment are as under:-

“14. It is apparent from the bare perusal of the Section that

the Court is barred from taking cognizance of any offence

committed by a Notary in the exercise of his function under

this Act except upon a complaint made by an officer

authorised by the Central or the State Government. It is

undisputed that the petitioner had attested the agreement in

the exercise of the functions conferred upon him under the

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Notaries Act; therefore, the provision of Section 13 of the

Notaries Act will apply to the present case. It was laid down

by Bombay High Court in Chandmal Motilal Bora v. State

of Maharashtra, 2003 SCC OnLineBom 762: (2004) 2 Mah

LJ 41: (2004) 106 (2) Bom LR 521: (2005) 1 Bom CR (Cri)

823, that when any allegation is made against the notary

touching the official purpose, the Criminal Court cannot take

the cognizance except upon the complaint made in writing. It

was observed:

“10. Therefore, if any allegation is made against a

Notary which touches the official performance as a

notary, the Criminal Court is forbidden from taking

cognisance unless the complaint in writing is made

by an officer authorised by the Central Government

or State Government by general or special order in

this behalf. Therefore, whenever an official act of a

Notary comes into the picture, it becomes the duty of

the criminal Court to see whether the allegations are

directly concerned with his official duty or the

performance which he has to do as indicated in

section 8 of the Notaries Act. The Court, which has

been requested to take cognisance of the complaint,

has to apply its judicial mind and see whether the act

which is the subject matter of the complaint is the

official act of a Notary or it is an act which is beyond

his official performance. Suppose if the notary is

alleged to have committed an offence by his act

directly in his personal capacity, then there is no

need for sanction, because, the said act is not

connected with his official performance, like an

allegation showing that the notary committed he

murder or Notary assaulted a person for the

purposes of causing simple hurt, grievous hurt etc. If

the allegations show that by an act which is not in

accordance with the provisions of the Notaries Act,

the notary has been alleged to have committed an

offence, there is no need to have a sanction to the

complaint in writing of an officer as contemplated by

provisions of section 13 of the Notaries Act. But if the

act alleged is touching his official performance, the

Court has to be on guard when it has been

requested to take cognisance of the allegations

against the Notary.

11. If such protection is not granted to the Notary, he

would be involved, implicated and roped in in a

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number of offences, because a number of

documents are being notarised before him in his

Notarial register. Some documents may be

purporting to be for the offence of cheating,

blackmailing or an offence of commercial

transactions. He would be involved in a number of

offences concerned with the disposal of property,

transfer of the property, sale of the property, and

exchange of property. He would also be coming into

the picture as an accused in a number of offences

connected with a number of commercial crimes. A

Notary is not supposed to know each and every

person before him for the purpose of notifying a

document in his Notarial register. He is not supposed

to know the truth behind the documents brought

before him for entries. He is generally introduced to

parties by persons who happen to be persons of his

acquaintance. Such a person may be an advocate, a

clerk of the advocates, or some persons who are

connected with him by his profession as a Notary or

by his profession generally as a lawyer. If such

protection is not granted to a notary, it would be very

difficult for him to work as a notary and members of

the public at large would be facing a number of

difficulties at every step. With this object, section 13

has been enacted by the Legislature with foresight.

xxxxxx

14. As a special feature of a legitimate precaution

which the notary should have, a lawyer should have,

while performing his duty as Notary or lawyer, by his

profession as such, by his work as such, by his

function as such, he is likely to be in near proximity

of a probable accused or an accused. In the

performance of his duty as such, he is likely to do

some act, as requested by such person, maybe as a

client or a person who has come to notarising a

document. The advocate or a notary will have to do

such an act as requested by that person. At that

stage, he may not be known as to what would be the

consequences of the document which he has

prepared or notarised. Would it be proper to permit

such an advocate or a notary to be roped in, in the

prosecution, which would be initiated against such a

person in the future proximity. The reasonable

answer would be “no”. If such protection is not

granted to such persons, it would be very difficult for

them to perform the acts contemplated by the

profession of a lawyer or the functions contemplated

to be done by a notary. A Criminal Court has to take

into consideration the cognisance of such special

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features if they are indicated by the prosecution or by

the complaint of which the criminal Court is

requested to take cognisance. The Criminal Court

has to consider this aspect if an application is made

to exonerate such an accused, who happens to be a

professional or performing an official duty. When

such a request is made, even at the initial stage and

if there is a case to act accordingly, the Criminal

Court should not be shy in entertaining such an

application and even allow it if such an application

deserves to be allowed. Exactly that has been

contemplated, in the judgment of the Supreme Court

in Madhavrao Scindia's case (supra).

15. A similar view was taken by the Gujarat High Court in

Ashokbhai Rameshchandra Ghantivala v. State of

Gujarat, 2009 SCC OnLine Guj 2203 , wherein it was

observed:

8. Heard the learned advocates for the parties. Having

regard to the submissions advanced by the learned

advocates for the parties, this court is of the view that

it is not necessary to enter into the merits of the

allegations made in the chargesheet or the F.I.R., as

the same could have a bearing on the outcome of the

proceedings emanating from the F.I.R. However,

examining the main contention raised by the learned

advocate for the petitioner namely, that in view of the

provisions of Section 13 of the Act, the court could not

have taken cognizance of the complaint except as

provided under the said provision, it would be

necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 13 of

the Act which reads as under:

“13. Cognizance of offence. - (1) No Court shall

take cognizance of any offence committed by a

notary in the exercise or purported exercise of his

functions under this Act save upon complaint in

writing made by an officer authorised by the

Central Government or a State Government by

general or special order in this behalf.

(2) No Magistrate other than a Presidency

Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class shall

try an offence punishable under this Act.”

A plain reading of Section 13 makes it clear that a

complaint against a notary in exercise or purported exercise

of his functions under the Act has to be made in writing by

an officer authorised by the Central Government or the

concerned State Government by general or special order in

this behalf. Unless a complaint is made in the manner

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prescribed, no Court is empowered to take cognisance of

the offence. This view finds support from the objects and

reasons behind the said provision, which reads thus:

“The Committee consider that protection should be

given to notaries in respect of cognisance of offences.

They think that protection should be given only to

notaries who commit an offence, acting or purporting

to act in the discharge of their functions under this Act.

This clause has been inserted with this object.”

From the objections and reasons, it is apparent that even

if an offence is committed by a notary while acting or

purporting to act in the discharge of his functions under

the Act, a complaint can be lodged only as provided under

Section 13 of the Act. Thus, any offence committed by a

notary acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his

functions under the Act would fall within the ambit of the

Section, and a Court can take cognisance of such offence

only if the complaint is made in the manner laid down in

the Section.

16. Kerala High Court also held similarly in P.C. Jeeva v.

State of Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker 8294, as under:

7. From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is

evident that a special procedure has been

contemplated by virtue of the said provision and it

provides that the cognizance of any offence committed

by a Notary in exercise or purported exercise of his

function under the Notaries Act can be instituted only

upon a complaint in writing made by an officer

authorized by the Central Government in this behalf.

The crucial aspect to be noticed in this regard is that

Section 13 of the Act is made applicable to any

offence committed by a Notary in the exercise or

purported exercise of his functions under this Act. It is

evident that irrespective of the question that the

offence which is a subject matter is committed under

the provisions of the Notaries Act or any other

enactment, procedure as contemplated under Section

13 has to be followed while taking cognisance of an

offence against a Notary Public. The aforesaid

question came up for consideration before this Court

in Jyolsana VP. v. State of Kerala [2020 (6) KHC 334].

In paragraph 11 of the said judgment, this Court made

the following observations:

“11. As discussed above, it is quite impossible for a

Notary to know the genuineness of the document

produced before him for attestation. The Notary is not

supposed to know each and every person before him

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for the purpose of notifying a document in his Notarial

Register. He is generally introduced to parties by

persons who happen to be persons of his

acquaintance. If such protection is not granted to a

Notary, it would be very difficult for him to work as a

notary and members of the public at large would be

facing a number of difficulties at every step. With this

object, S. 13 has been enacted by the Legislature as a

safeguard.”

8. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the

stipulation contained under Section 13 is a mandatory

provision as far as the offence alleged to have been

committed by a Notary Public in exercise or purported

exercise of his function is concerned. It is also clear

that no court can take cognisance of such offences

unless the procedure contemplated under Section 13

of the Notaries Act, 1952, is followed. In this case, it is

evident that the proceedings have been instituted and

cognisance thereon was taken on the basis of a police

report, which is not the procedure as contemplated

under Section 13 of the Act. In such circumstances, as

the procedure which is mandatorily required to be

followed under Section 13 of the Act is not complied

with, the prosecution now ongoing against the

petitioner is vitiated. In such circumstances, I find

some force in the contentions put forward by the

learned counsel for the petitioner.

17. Karnataka High Court also held similarly in Praveen

Kumar Adyapady and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and

Ors. (11.04.2022 - KARHC) MANU/KA/2178/2022 as

under:

6. Upon hearing and perusal of records, which reveal

that accused No. 1 got married to the victim girl and the

daughter of this complainant-respondent No. 2,

defactocomplainant, by producing the affidavit before

the Arya Samaj before accused Nos. 7 and 9 and

married the victim girl, stating that the victim girl was

major and had attained the age of majority by

manipulating the date of birth of the victim girl as

25.09.1999, even though her actual date of birth was

25.09.2000. Admittedly, these two petitioners were

advocates/notaries, and they have given a declaration

in an affidavit filed by the parties. After looking at the

documents produced by the parties, of course, while

discharging the duty they have signed and given

declarations in the document produced by the parties

but it cannot be said, that these petitioners had

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intentionally colluded with the other accused persons

and signed agreement of declaration for helping the

accused No. 1 by manipulating the age of the victim.

That apart, as per Section 13 of the Notaries Act, there

is a bar for taking cognisance by the Court for offences

committed by the advocate and notary. Under the said

Notaries Act, they have to obtain the permission of the

Central Government or State Government for filing the

charge sheet and taking cognisance. Admittedly, the

petitioners are said to be Notaries of the Central

Government. Such being the case, as per Section 13 of

the Notaries Act, the sanction is necessary or

permission is necessary before filing a High Court of

H.P charge sheet and taking cognizance against this

petitioner but no such permissions were obtained or

produced by the Investigation Officer along with the

charge sheet and also not mentioned anything about

obtaining of the sanction in the charge sheet. Such

being the case, conducting criminal proceedings

against these petitioners/accused Nos. 8 and 10

requires to be quashed.”

16. Admittedly, there is nothing to suggest that any complaint

was ever made by an authorized officer with regard to alleged

wrongful attestation of the affidavit in question by the petitioner, being

a Notary Public. It is also admitted case of the respondent-State that,

at first instance, petitioner was not named in the FIR, sought to be

quashed, rather during investigation, police found complicity of

petitioner in the case, but even at that stage, the matter was not

reported to the competent authority, enabling it to take appropriate

steps for prosecution of the Notary Public for his having allegedly

contravened the provisions contained in the Notaries Act. Since

Section 13 of the Notaries Act specifically provided that no

prosecution can be launched against the Notary Public without there

being a complaint made by an officer authorized by the State or

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Central Government, no case can be permitted to continue against

the petitioner. The continuation of the criminal proceedings in the

absence of complaint by the competent authority would be

impermissible in law.

17. In view of the reasons stated hereinabove, the case qua

the petitioner is bound to fail in all probabilities, therefore, no fruitful

purpose would be served by permitting the criminal prosecution of the

petitioner.

18. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well

as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra), FIR No. No.306

of 2016, dated 12.12.2016, under Sections 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B

of IPC and Section 196 of Motor Vehicles Act, registered at police

Station, Sadar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh as well as

consequent proceedings, if any, pending adjudication in the Court of

learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi, District Mandi, Himachal

Pradesh in Cr. Case No.357 of 2017, are quashed and set aside qua

the petitioner.

19. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms,

alongwith all pending applications.

20 .

(Sandeep Sharma),

Judge

February 27,2026

(shankar)