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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 236 OF 2021

Gajanan S/o Janardhan Wankhede,

Aged about 37 years, Occ. Labour

R/o Ralegaon, Tah. Bhadrawati, Dist.

Chandrapur

Present R/o Bhoyadapada, Tah. Wasai, Dist.

Palghar.

… Appellant.

// VERSUS //

State of Maharashtra, through Police Station

Officer, Majari, Tah. Bhadrawati, Dist.

Chandrapur … Respondent

Shri M.V. Rai, Advocate for the appellant.

Shri K.R. Lule, APP for the respondent/State.

CORAM : ANIL L. PANSARE

NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.

Reserved on : 20.01.2026

Pronounced on : 28.01.2026

JUDGMENT : (PER : NIVEDITA P. MEHTA J.)

By the present appeal, the appellant calls in question the judgment and

order dated 18.09.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Warora,

in Sessions Case No. 18 of 2017, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the

offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”)

and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of

Rs.5,000/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months.

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2.Prosecution Case :

(i)The prosecution case, in brief, is that the informant Anil Khaire, lodged a

report alleging therein that the deceased Kaushalya Wankhede was his cousin sister.

She had two sons, namely Gajanan (the present appellant) and Prakash, both

married. It was alleged that the deceased was mentally weak and therefore rarely

visited by relatives. The appellant Gajanan was residing at Mumbai and had come

to the village about one month prior to the incident along with his daughter

Punam, aged about 12 years, to visit his mother.

(ii)It is the prosecution case that the appellant was persistently insisting that the

deceased should transfer the house property in his name and used to quarrel with

her on that issue. The other son Prakash had gone to Warora eight days prior to the

incident for attending his duty.

(iii)On 11.06.2017, at about 6.00 p.m., the informant left for his duty at Issar

Petrol Pump, Mazri Colony, and returned on 12.06.2017 at about 9.15 a.m. On his

return, his wife informed him that on the previous night between 8.00 p.m. and

9.00 p.m., a quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the appellant,

which she had overheard. She further stated that when she went to the house of

the deceased, she noticed that the door was broken and upon entering, she found

Kaushalya lying on a cot with injuries on her face and blood oozing from her nose.

Kaushalya had succumbed to the injuries.

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(iv)The informant further stated that one Jitu Khamankar, resident of Ralegaon,

informed him that at about 9.00 a.m., he had seen the appellant and his daughter

leaving the village and when questioned, the appellant stated that his mother had

gone out of the village and therefore he was returning to Mumbai. Suspecting the

conduct of the appellant and alleging that the information furnished by him was

false, the informant lodged the report.

(v)On the basis of the said report, Crime No.196 of 2017 was registered against

the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

3.During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer prepared the

spot panchanama, seized blood stained articles including a broken pot, a German

pot, and a stainless steel charvi. The inquest panchanama (Exh.17) was prepared

and the dead body was sent for post-mortem examination vide requisition

(Exh.52). The post-mortem report (Exh.38) was received.

4.The appellant was traced at the Bus Stand, Warora, and arrested on

12.06.2017. He was medically examined and the medical report (Exh.29) disclosed

swelling on his right hand. Blood samples and clothes of the appellant were seized

and sent for chemical analysis. The statement of the appellant’s daughter Punam

was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After

completion of investigation, the charge-sheet was filed.

5.The learned Sessions Court framed Charge (Exh.2) against the appellant

under Section 302 IPC. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. The statement of the appellant under

Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded.

6.Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court recorded, inter

alia, the following findings:

(i)The relationship between the deceased, the appellant, the informant, and

prosecution witnesses P.W.2 Prakash and P.W.4 Mangala was not disputed.

(ii)It was not disputed that on the relevant night, only the appellant, his

daughter Punam, and the deceased were present in the house.

(iii)The homicidal death of Kaushalya in her own house was not disputed.

(iv)The appellant was apprehended on the very next day at Warora Bus Stand

and medical examination revealed swelling on his right hand, for which no

explanation was offered.

(v)The defence theory that the deceased sustained injuries due to falling of tiles

during heavy rain was belied by the spot panchanama, which revealed that the

house had a tin roof and not a tiled roof.

(vi)Blood stained utensils and a tiles’ piece were recovered from the spot.

(vii)The evidence of P.W.4 Mangala, P.W.6 Durga, and P.W.8 Ramabai established

that a quarrel had taken place between the appellant and the deceased on the

preceding night.

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(viii)The motive of the crime was established, namely the appellant’s insistence

on transfer of property in his name.

(ix)The medical evidence ruled out accidental injuries and established that the

death was caused due to multiple grievous injuries inflicted by hard and blunt

objects.

(x)On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the learned trial Court held that the

prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and

accordingly convicted and sentenced him as stated above.

7.Heard the learned Counsel Mr. Rai for the appellant and learned Additional

Public Prosecutor Mr. K.R. Lule for the state.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant :

8.Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment is

unsustainable as the prosecution case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence and

the chain of circumstances is incomplete. There is no direct eye-witness to the

incident and the conviction is founded on suspicion rather than legal proof. It was

contended that the testimony of P.W.11 Punam, the minor daughter of the

appellant, is unreliable due to material contradictions and omissions vis-a-vis her

statement under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, coupled with

admitted influence and unnatural conduct. In the absence of electricity and

independent corroboration, her evidence cannot safely be relied upon. Learned

Counsel further submitted that the alleged motive of property dispute is weak and

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based on interested witnesses having strained relations with the appellant. Motive,

even if assumed, cannot by itself sustain a conviction. It was also argued that the

“last seen together” theory is not established, as P.W.7 Jitendra has deposed that the

deceased was alive at about 6.00 a.m., thereby creating doubt regarding the time of

death. The medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution version

regarding the weapon of offence, and the alleged injury on the appellant’s hand is

not linked to the incident by medical opinion. Lastly, it was submitted that serious

lapses in investigation further weaken the prosecution case. In view of the settled

principle that benefit of doubt must go to the accused, the appellant is entitled to

acquittal.

Submissions on behalf of the State :

9.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor supported the impugned judgment

and submitted that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt.

The homicidal nature of death is conclusively established by medical evidence. It

was contended that a clear motive is proved, as the appellant was persistently

quarrelling with the deceased over transfer of property. The testimony of P.W. 11

Punam is natural and trustworthy, and being a child witness, cannot be discarded

merely on account of age. Her presence at the scene and narration of events inspire

confidence. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submitted that the

conduct of the appellant in leaving the village immediately after the incident and

giving a false explanation regarding the whereabouts of the deceased is

incriminating. The injuries found on the appellant’s hand further corroborate the

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prosecution case. According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the

cumulative effect of the evidence establishes a complete chain of circumstances

pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the appellant, and therefore no

interference with the conviction is warranted.

Discussion and Appreciation of Prosecution Evidence :

10.The prosecution case substantially rests on circumstantial evidence. Though

P.W. 11, the minor daughter of the appellant, has been projected as an eye-witness,

her testimony also requires to be examined in the backdrop of the settled principles

governing appreciation of child witness evidence. Therefore, we find it incumbent

to re-appreciate the entire evidence and to ascertain whether the prosecution has

succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

11.PW 1 - Wasudeo Chaudhary, the spot panch, deposed that he was called by

the police to act as a panch witness. In his presence, the police drew the spot

panchanama (Exh.16) and seized blood-stained cotton, a piece of tile, and two

blood-stained utensils. He further stated that the inquest panchanama (Exh.17) on

the dead body was prepared in his presence. In cross-examination, he denied the

suggestion that no seizure was effected in his presence and admitted that there was

no electric supply in the village on the night of the incident, which assumes

significance while assessing the version of alleged eyewitnesses.

12.PW 2-Prakash Wankhede, the younger brother of the appellant and son of

the deceased, deposed that the appellant, who was residing at Mumbai, had come

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to the village about fifteen days prior to the incident and was staying in their

mother’s house. At his instance, PW 2 had left the house and was staying outside

for work. While at Chandrapur, he received information about his mother’s death

and rushed to Ralegaon. At Rural Hospital, Warora, he noticed injuries on her head

and hands and bleeding from her nose and learnt that the appellant had assaulted

her. He stated that the appellant was demanding share in the property and had

absconded from the village after the incident. In cross-examination, he admitted

strained relations with the appellant and that his mother’s mental health was not

proper, but denied the suggestions of accidental fall or false implication due to

property dispute. His testimony, therefore, is that of a interested witness and

cannot be treated as substantive evidence of guilt.

13.P.W. 3–Anil Khaire is the first informant. He is also not an eye-witness. His

evidence establishes discovery of the dead body, alleged prior quarrels between the

appellant and the deceased, conduct of the appellant in leaving the village after the

incident. However, material omissions are admitted by him in cross-examination,

particularly regarding quarrel having taken place in his presence, and details

regarding the condition of the door and covering of the dead body.

14.P.W. 4–Mangala Wankhede, sister of the appellant and daughter of the

deceased, is an interested and inimical witness. She deposed that the appellant was

demanding transfer of the house standing in the name of the deceased and, upon

refusal, used to quarrel with an assault the deceased. She further deposed that

during her visit to the deceased house on the eve of Akhadi festival, the appellant

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attempted to assault her with a stone and asked her not to stay with the deceased,

whereupon she left the village. In cross-examination, she admitted strained

relations with the appellant and that she and her brother desired that the property

should devolve upon PW 2. She further admitted that she had not personally

witnessed the appellant assaulting the deceased and that her mother’s mental

health was not proper. Her testimony regarding alleged assaults by the appellant

appears hearsay and motivated.

15.P.W. 5–Dr. Rizwana Gawai proved swelling on the right hand of the

appellant. However, no opinion is given regarding age or cause of the swelling.

Mere presence of an injury on the appellant, without proof of its nexus with the

crime, cannot be incriminating.

16.P.W. 6–Durga Khaire, neighbour, claims to have heard quarrel but admits that

there was no electricity and it was raining heavily. She did not see the alleged

incident. Her evidence is, therefore, circumstantial and inferential, and cannot

independently establish guilt.

17.P.W. 7–Jitendra Khamankar, last seen witness, deposed that at about 6.00

a.m. on the day of the incident, he went to call the appellant for work and found

him at home, while his mother was sleeping on a cot. At about 9.00 a.m., the

appellant met him along with his daughter and stated that they were leaving for

Mumbai. At about 12.00 noon, he learnt that the appellant had killed his mother. In

cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the appellant had not met him or

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that he had not stated about leaving for Mumbai. This evidence creates doubt

regarding the time of death, particularly in light of medical evidence suggesting

death after about four hours of last meal.

18.P.W. 8–Ramabai Ghaiwan, neighbour of the deceased’s deposition initially

supported the prosecution story, but in cross-examination, she stated that due to

rain and lightning she could not hear anything clearly. She admitted that she had

not personally intervened in the quarrel and that there was village gossip about the

incident, but denied the suggestion of false implication. Such evidence is weak

and unreliable.

19.P.W. 10–Dr. Rohan Jabbalwar conducted post-mortem on the body of the

deceased and found multiple external and internal injuries.

On external examination, he found following injuries :

(i) Contusion having size of 8 cm x 3 cm on her left forearm.

(ii)Contusion having size of 6 cm x 2 cm on left forearm.

(iii)Laceration having size of 5 cm x 4 cm x skin deep on left forearm.

(iv)Contusion having size of 8 cm x 6 cm on right side of face.

(v)The eyes were black.

(vi)There was fracture to nasal bridge.

(vii)Multiple abrasions on right side of neck.

(viii)Contusion having size of 8 cm x 4 cm on left parietal region of scalp.

On internal examination, he found following injuries :

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(i)Fracture on left parietal region of skull.

(ii)Haematoma was present in left parietal region.

(ii)5

th

, 6

th

and 7

th

of ribs were having fractures.

He opined that all injuries were ante-mortem, caused by hard and blunt object

except injury No.(vii) which could be caused by sharp object. In his opinion, the

cause of death was multiple grievous injuries. The tile allegedly found was not

referred for medical opinion. Thus, medical evidence does not conclusively

corroborate the prosecution theory of assault by pot alone.

20.P.W. 11–Punam Wankhede (Child Witness) is projected as the sole eye-

witness. She deposed that she was residing with the appellant and deceased and

that on the night of the incident, at about 9-00 p.m., a quarrel took place between

the appellant and deceased over demand of land, during which appellant assaulted

the deceased. She further stated that out of fear, she hid herself and thereafter

went to a neighbouring house and on returning in the morning, found her

grandmother not breathing. According to her, the appellant thereafter collected

their clothes and left with her towards Mumbai.

In cross-examination, she admitted that there was no electricity supply on

the night of the incident, thereby rendering her claim of clearly witnessing the

alleged assault doubtful. She further admitted that she did not inform any

neighbour about the alleged assault nor did she raise any alarm. She also admitted

that she could not name the neighbour in whose house she allegedly took shelter.

Significant omissions and contradictions appear between her police statement and

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her deposition regarding the sequence of events, rendering her testimony unsafe

for sole reliance without independent corroboration.

21.P.W. 13-Sayyad Ahmed Sayyad Usman, Investigating Officer, visited the spot,

prepared spot panchanama (Exh.16), seized blood stained articles, prepared

inquest panchanama (Exh.17), seized clothes and blood samples of appellant and

deceased (Exhs. 18 & 21), and forwarded the seized articles for chemical analysis.

After completion of investigation, he filed the charge-sheet.

In cross-examination, he admitted that till reaching the spot, the identity of

the appellant and cause of death were not known, and that no witness statement

was recorded prior to preparation of spot panchanama. He further admitted

several material improvements in witness statements, non-referral of tile for

medical opinion, absence of initial clarity regarding weapon of offence. These

material lapses and contradictions further appear to weaken the prosecution story.

Points for Determination :

22.On the basis of the rival submissions and the evidence on record, the

following points arise for determination:

Sr.No. Points Findings

(i)Whether the prosecution has proved that the

death of Kaushalya Wankhede was

homicidal?

In the Affirmative.

(ii)Whether the prosecution has proved beyond

reasonable doubt that the appellant caused

the homicidal death of Kaushalya Wankhede?

In the Negative.

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(iii)Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence

relied upon by the prosecution is complete

and consistent only with the hypothesis of the

guilt of the appellant?

In the Negative.

(iv)Whether the conviction of the appellant

under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code

calls for interference in appeal?

In the Affirmative.

(v)What order ? As per final order.

REASONS

As to Point No.(i) :

23.There is no serious dispute regarding the homicidal nature of the death of

Kaushalyabai. The post-mortem report (Exh.38) coupled with the testimony of PW

10-Medical Officer clearly establishes that the deceased sustained multiple injuries

caused by hard and blunt objects. The nature, number and location of injuries rule

out the possibility of accidental or suicidal death. The medical evidence unerringly

points to a homicidal death. Accordingly, Point No. (i) is answered in the

affirmative.

As to Point Nos.(ii) & (iii) :

24.The prosecution case rests primarily on circumstantial evidence, with the

testimony of P.W.11 – Punam, the minor daughter of the appellant, projected as an

eye-witness. It is well settled that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, each

incriminating circumstance must be firmly established and the chain of

circumstances must be so complete as to point only towards the guilt of the

accused, ruling out every hypothesis consistent with innocence. The principles

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governing such cases have been authoritatively laid down in Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116. Keeping these principles in view,

the evidence adduced by the prosecution is required to be scrutinized with

circumspection.

25.The prosecution seeks to establish motive through the testimony of P.W.2

Prakash and P.W.4 Mangala, who are close relatives of the deceased. According to

their depositions, the appellant was persistently insisting that the deceased should

transfer the house property in his name, leading to frequent quarrels. However,

both witnesses have admitted in cross-examination that the relations between them

and the appellant were strained and that they were themselves interested in the

property. Their testimonies are, therefore, admittedly interested. It is trite law that

motive, even if proved, cannot by itself form the foundation of conviction unless

supported by reliable and cogent evidence. In the present case, the alleged motive

appears weak and insufficient.

26.P.W.3 Anil Khaire, the informant, is not an eye-witness. His evidence is

confined to the discovery of the dead body and the alleged conduct of the appellant

in leaving the village. Material omissions have been brought on record in his cross-

examination regarding the alleged quarrel and the condition of the house. His

testimony, at the highest, gives rise to suspicion. It is well settled that suspicion,

however strong, cannot take the place of proof.

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27.The prosecution relies upon the testimonies of P.W. 6-Durga and P.W. 8-

Ramabai to establish that a quarrel had taken place between the appellant and the

deceased on the preceding night. Both witnesses admitted that there was no

electricity supply and that it was raining heavily. They did not witness any assault

and only claimed to overheard a quarrel. Their evidence is, therefore, purely

inferential. Such evidence is weak and insufficient to establish any incriminating

circumstances.

28.P.W.7 – Jitendra claimed that at about 6.00 a.m. on the day of the incident,

he had seen the deceased sleeping on a cot and the appellant present in the house.

This evidence assumes significance as it creates doubt regarding the prosecution

theory of time of death, particularly when examined in light of the medical

evidence. The proximity of time necessary for invocation of the “last seen together”

theory is conspicuously absent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. State

of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 and Nizam v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 1 SCC

550 has cautioned that the said theory must be applied with great care and only

when the time gap between the accused being last seen with the deceased and the

death is so small as to exclude every other possibility. That requirement is not

satisfied in the present case.

The relevant para Nos. 12 and 15 of Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan

(supra) read as under:

“12.The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself

necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who

committed the crime. There must be something more establishing

connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-

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explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion,

by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant.

15.The theory of last seen-the appellant having gone with the

deceased in the manner noticed hereinbefore, is the singular piece of

circumstantial evidence available against him. The conviction of the

appellant cannot be maintained merely on suspicion, however strong

it may be, or on his conduct. These facts assume further importance

on account of absence of proof of motive, particularly when it is

proved that there was cordial relationship between the accused and

the deceased for a long time. The fact situation bears great similarity

to that in Madho Singh v. State of Rajasthan.”

29.Though the medical evidence establishes homicidal death, it does not

conclusively support the prosecution version regarding the weapon of offence. The

Medical Officer has admitted that certain injuries could be caused by a fall on a

hard surface and that one of the injuries could not have been caused by the alleged

pot. The stone/tile allegedly recovered was not referred for medical opinion. In

absence of such corroboration, recovery of the alleged weapon loses much of its

evidentiary value (State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 507).

Furthermore, although the trial court records seizure of a blood-stained pot

from the spot and refers to a subsequent medical opinion that some of the injuries

were possible by the said pot, the prosecution has failed to place on record any

clear clarification regarding the exact nature, size, weight, and structural features

of the pot, nor is there any consistent description of the alleged weapon across the

seizure panchanama, medical query report, and ocular testimony. This absence of

precise identification and correlation between the seized article and the injuries

sustained creates a significant evidentiary gap, rendering the prosecution version

regarding the weapon of assault uncertain and unsafe for sustaining a conviction.

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30.The prosecution relies upon the swelling found on the hand of the appellant.

However, the Medical Officer has not opined regarding the age or cause of the

injury. In the absence of such opinion, the injury cannot be treated as an

incriminating circumstance connecting the appellant with the crime.

31.The testimony of P.W.11 - Punam, the minor daughter of the appellant, is

projected as the most crucial evidence. While there is no legal impediment in acting

upon the testimony of a child witness, the law mandates that such evidence must

inspire confidence and be free from suspicion of tutoring. In Dattu Ramrao

Sakhare and Others v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 5 SCC 341, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held that as a rule of prudence, corroboration is desirable. The

relevant para of the said judgment is reproduced as under :

“5.The entire prosecution case rested upon the evidence of

Sarubai (PW 2), a child witness aged about 10 years. It is, therefore,

necessary to find out as to whether her evidence is corroborated from

other evidence on record. A child witness if found competent to

depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis

of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence

of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the

Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the

questions and able to give rational answers thereto. The evidence of a

child witness and credibility thereof depend upon the circumstances

of each case. The only precaution which the court should bear in

mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the

witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like

any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being

tutored. There is no rule or practice that in every case the evidence of

such a witness be corroborated before a conviction can be allowed to

stand, but however as a rule of prudence the court always finds it

desirable to have the corroboration to such evidence from other

dependable evidence on record. ------”

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32.In the present case, the testimony of P.W.11 suffers from material

inconsistencies and improbabilities vis-a-vis her statement under Section 164 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. Her conduct in allegedly leaving the house and

sleeping at a neighbour’s place without alarming or informing anyone appears

unnatural. Further, the admitted absence of electricity raises serious doubt

regarding the credibility of her claim of having witnessed the incident. It was

further brought on record that she was emotionally hostile towards the appellant,

particularly in view of subsequent death of her mother, thereby suggesting

possibility of tutoring and exaggeration. In the absence of independent

corroboration, it would be unsafe to base a conviction solely on her testimony.

33.The evidence of PW 13, Investigating Officer, discloses serious lapses,

including material improvements in witness statements, failure to seek medical

opinion regarding the alleged weapon, and lack of clarity regarding the sequence of

events. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, such lapses assume considerable

significance and enure to the benefit of the accused.

34.On a cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence, it is evident that the

chain of circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is incomplete and does not

form an unbroken chain consistent only with the guilt of the appellant and do not

rule out other plausible hypotheses. We, therefore, are of the considered opinion

that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the

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appellant alone was responsible for causing the death of Kaushalyabai. Accordingly,

Point Nos. (ii) and (iii) are answered in the negative.

As to Point No. (iv) :

35.It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that where two views are

reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. The

benefit of doubt is not a matter of charity but a legal right flowing from the

presumption of innocence, as reiterated in Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh

(1973) 2 SCC 808. Para 25 of the said judgment reads as under :

“25.Another golden thread which runs through the web of the

administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are

possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the

guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is

favourable to the accused should be adopted. This principle has a

special relevance in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to

be established by circumstantial evidence. Rule has accordingly been

laid down that unless the evidence adduced in the case is consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and is inconsistent

with that of his innocence, the Court should refrain from recording a

finding of guilt of the accused. It is also an accepted rule that in case

the Court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the

accused, the accused must have the benefit of that doubt. Of course,

the doubt regarding the guilt of the accused should be reasonable; it

is not the doubt of a mind which is either so vacillating that it is

incapable of reaching a firm conclusion or so timid that is hesitant

and afraid to take things to their natural consequences. The rule

regarding the benefit of doubt also does not warrant acquittal of the

accused by report to surmises, conjectures or fanciful considerations.

As mentioned by us recently in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagir

Singh, a criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to

give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with

the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty

of the offence with which he is charged. Grime is an event in real life

and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In

arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with

the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the

yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of

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witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon

its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should

be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject

evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful

or in the nature of conjectures.”

36.In the present case, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is not

sustainable in law and warrants interference. Accordingly, Point No. (iv) is

answered in the affirmative.

As to Point No.(v) :

37.In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

Hence, we pass the following order.

ORDER

(i) The Criminal Appeal is allowed.

(ii) The judgment and order dated 18.09.2019 passed by the learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Warora, in Sessions Case No. 18 of 2017 is hereby quashed

and set aside.

(iii) The appellant is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code.

(iv)The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

(v) Fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant.

[NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.] [ANIL L. PANSARE, J.]

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