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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

DSREF No. 3 of 2024

CNR No. ODHC01-057527-2024

&

JCRLA No. 141 of 2024

CNR No. ODHC01-062122-2024

(From the judgment and order dated 30.07.2024 passed by

learned 2

nd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar in C.T.

Case No.322 of 2022)

AFR DSREF No. 3 of 2024

State of Odisha ….. Appellant

-Versus-

Sanjeet Dash @ Banku ….. Condemned Prisoner/

Accused

Advocates appeared though hybrid mode

For Appellant : Mr. Partha Sarathi Nayak,

Addl. Government Advocate

For Condemned

Prisoner/Accused : Mr. Soura Chandra Mohapatra,

Sr. Advocate (Amicus Curiae)

with Mr. S. Mohapatra, Advocate

JCRLA No. 141 of 2024

Sanjeet Dash @ Banku …. Appellant

- Versus –

State of Odisha …. Respondent

DSREF/3/2024

ODHC010575272024

2026:OHC:56-DB

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Advocates appeared though hybrid mode

For Appellant : Mr. Soura Chandra Mohapatra,

Sr. Advocate (Amicus Curiae)

with Mr. S. Mohapatra, Advocate

For Respondent : Mr. Partha Sarathi Nayak,

Addl. Government Advocate

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANASH RANJAN PATHAK

THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

Date of Hearing :07.07.2026 :: Date of Judgment: 25.08.2026

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

The trial Court, after convicting the accused for the

offence of murder and sentencing him to death, has

submitted the case record for confirmation by this Court

under Section 366 of Cr.P.C., which is registered as DSREF

No.3 of 2024. The condemned prisoner has independently

preferred appeal against the order of conviction and sentence,

registered as JCRLA No. 141 of 2024.

2. The condemned prisoner was charged under Section

302/307/324/326 of IPC by learned Second Additional

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Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar in CT Case No. 322 of 2022 for

committing the murder of his wife, Saraswati @ Tikili, for

attempting to commit murder of his daughter, Shree @ Pari,

for causing hurt by means of dangerous weapon and for

causing grievous hurt to her. By judgment passed on

30.07.2024, the condemned prisoner was held guilty of all

the charges and was convicted accordingly. By order passed

on 01.08.2024, he was sentenced to death for the offence

under Section 302 IPC, imprisonment for life for the offence

under Section 307 IPC, imprisonment for life for the offence

under Section 326 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for three

years for the offence under Section 324 IPC. All the

aforementioned sentences were directed to run concurrently.

3. Since the death reference and appeal arise out of the

same judgment of conviction dated 30.07.2024 and order of

sentence dated 01.08.2024, both matters were heard

together. As the issues involved in both the cases are

common, they are being disposed of by this common

judgment.

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PROSECUTION CASE

4. The condemned prisoner had married the deceased

Saraswati Dash as per Vedic rites about six years prior to the

occurrence, i.e., 09.06.2022. He used to frequently quarrel

with his wife for money. On the date of occurrence, the

condemned prisoner killed his wife by assaulting her with a

knife and slit the throat of his six year old daughter and

thereafter absconded. Upon hearing of the above incident,

one Sashikanta Dash, brother of the deceased rushed to the

spot and found his sister lying dead inside her house. He

further came to know that his niece, Pari had been taken to

the hospital by the other family members of the condemned

prisoner in a critical condition. He then went to Bharatpur

Police Station and lodged a written report. Said report was

registered as Bharatpur P.S. Case No. 237 under Sections

302/307/324/326 of IPC. The IIC of the Police Station

directed the Sub-Inspector, B.K. Das to take up the

investigation.

Investigation commenced immediately thereafter with

the I.O. and other police officers visiting the spot. The

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scientific team also visited the spot. Inquest was held over the

dead body, photographs were taken, fingerprints were lifted,

weapon of offence was recovered and the dead body was sent

for postmortem examination. Later that evening, the

condemned prisoner while roaming in Vipul Gardens area

was apprehended and taken to custody. While in custody,

during interrogation he confessed his guilt by stating that he

had picked up the knife from the kitchen and stabbed his

wife on different parts of her body and had also assaulted his

daughter, Shree. The complicity of the condemned prisoner

was otherwise established during investigation from the

statement of witnesses examined by the I.O.. The report of

fingerprint experts as well as the forensic report also pointed

at him. Accordingly, charge-sheet was submitted against him

on 07.10.2022 under Sections 302/307/324/326 of IPC.

DEFENCE PLEA

5. Defence plea is of complete denial, though it was

admitted during examination of the condemned prisoner

under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he along with his wife and

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children were staying in the first floor of the house at the

relevant time.

EVIDENCE

6. To prove its case, prosecution examined 15 witnesses,

the particulars of whom shall be discussed later in this

judgment. Besides, prosecution proved 18 documents and 8

material objects. Defence did not adduce any evidence, either

oral or documentary.

TRIAL

7. The condemned prisoner was represented by a lawyer

of his choice for most part of the trial. However, towards the

end, said counsel submitted memo of no-instruction, for

which the trial Court appointed a State Defence Counsel

(SDC). The SDC conducted the case thereafter by recalling

several witnesses for further cross-examination. By our

elaborate order passed on 19.02.2026, we have recorded our

satisfaction that the trial was conducted in a fair and proper

manner and that no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the

condemned prisoner at any stage.

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TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS

8. The first point for consideration for the trial Court on

the basis of evidence adduced was the nature of death. By

relying upon the evidence of the Autopsy Surgeon, PW-12, the

postmortem report, inquest report, the weapon of offence and

the doctors’ opinion with regard to the possibility of injuries

being caused by it, the trial Court held that the death of the

deceased was homicidal in nature. The trial Court thereafter

listed the following circumstances as relied on by the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the condemned prisoner;

“I. The accused was together with the deceased and the

victim child in the occurrence room just before the

occurrence.

II. The mother of the accused saw him coming downstairs

immediately after the incident.

III. The extra judicial confession of the accused before his

mother and his sister-in-law.

IV. His abscondence from the spot immediately after the

occurrence.

V. Collection of physical clues including the weapon of

offence by the scientific officer from the spot showing the

involvement of the accused

VI. The matching of the chance fingerprint on the weapon of

offence with that of the 10-digit fingerprint of the accused.

VII. Presence of the blood group of the deceased in the

wearing apparel as well as the hand of the accused.

VIII. Motive”

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9. The first two circumstances were considered together

for determination and held that both were adequately proved.

Circumstance No.III was also fully proved. Insofar as

Circumstance No.IV is concerned, the trial Court held that

mere absconding of the condemned prisoner from the spot

immediately after the occurrence by itself cannot establish

his guilt but it can constitute a relevant piece of evidence

along with other circumstances. Circumstance Nos. V, VI &

VII were also held to be established. As regards Circumstance

No.VIII, the trial Court held that the same also pointed at the

guilt of the condemned prisoner as charged. The condemned

prisoner was thus held guilty of the charges and convicted for

the same.

10. Be it noted that we have not expressed any opinion as

regards the findings of the trial Court reflected in the

impugned judgment but shall do so only after we have

ourselves independently scrutinised and analysed the

evidence. Since it is a death reference, law is well settled that

High Court is required to appreciate the evidence and arrive

at its own conclusion independent of the Sessions Court.

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Reference may be had in this regard to the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the Case of Jumman v. State of Punjab

1.

The Supreme Court held as follows:

“It is clear from a perusal of these provisions that in

such circumstances the entire case is before the High

Court and in fact it is a continuation of the trial of the

accused on the same evidence and any additional

evidence and that is why the High Court is given power

to take fresh evidence if it so desires. In an appeal

under Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code an appellate

court has to find whether the decision arrived at by the

court of first instance is correct or not on facts and law;

but there is a difference when a reference is made

under Section 374CrPC and when disposing of an

appeal under Section 423CrPC and that is that the High

Court has to satisfy itself as to whether a case beyond

reasonable doubt has been made out against the

accused persons for the infliction of the penalty of

death. In fact the proceedings before the High Court are

a reappraisal and the reassessment of the entire facts

and law in order that the High Court should be satisfied

on the materials about the guilt or innocence of the

accused persons. Such being the case, it is the duty of

the High Court to consider the proceedings in all their

aspects and come to an independent conclusion on the

materials, apart from the view expressed by the

Sessions Judge. In so doing, the High Court will be

assisted by the opinion expressed by the Sessions

Judge, but under the provisions of the law

abovementioned it is for the High Court to come to an

independent conclusion of its own.”

[ Emphasis added]

This has also been reiterated in the case of Balak Ram vs

State of U.P.

2

.

1

(1956) 2 SCC 554

2

(1975) 3 SCC 219

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ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

11. We make it clear that we shall only note the evidence

on record leaving the analysis thereof in light of the

arguments raised by both sides to a later stage.

ORAL EVIDENCE

12. As already stated, prosecution examined 15

witnesses. P.W.-1, Tapan Dash is the cousin of the

condemned prisoner. He is a post-occurrence witness, who

stated that he was informed of the incident by his paternal

uncle over phone, hearing which he immediately rushed to

the house and found the deceased lying in a pool of blood

with her intestine having come out. He also noticed injuries

on her cheek, thigh and hand. At that time, the injured Pari

(minor daughter of the condemned prisoner and deceased)

had been shifted to SUM Hospital and police was informed.

He was present during inquest and proved the inquest report

and signature thereon. In cross-examination, he denied the

suggestion that he had not stated before the I.O. of being

informed by his paternal uncle over phone that Sanjit Dash

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had murdered his wife and tried to slit the throat of his

daughter Shree Dash @ Pari etc., which he denied.

PW-2 – Dinesh Biswal is a constable attached to

Bharatpur Police Station. He was a witness to the seizure of

three plastic vials containing hair, nail and blood-soaked

gauge of the condemned prisoner. He proved the seizure list

marked Ext.P-2.

PW-3- Manmath Kumar is another cousin of the

deceased, who stated that he got information about the death

of Saraswati Dash (deceased) at about 11.30 a.m. and that

the condemned prisoner had caused her death by stabbing.

He went to the spot. He stated that the right side first room of

the first floor was the bedroom of the condemned prisoner

into which he entered and found the deceased lying in a pool

of blood wearing only a panty with injury all over her body.

He further stated to have found stab injury on her belly,

multiple stab injuries on her back, left side thigh, right side

thigh, right side lower leg. He was also a witness to the

inquest report and proved his signature on the said report.

He further stated to have found Shree Dash @ Pari lying alive

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in another room on a bed with cut injuries on her neck. He

described the other two brothers of the condemned prisoner

and specifically stated that the condemned prisoner was

staying in the first floor of the same building. He further

stated that he did not work and that the deceased was

working at SUM Hospital as Senior Nurse. He had two

daughters with the younger one being born three days prior

to the incident. He also stated that condemned prisoner used

to beat the deceased for money.

PW-4- Kanaklata Dash is the mother of the

condemned prisoner. According to her, on 09.06.2022 at

about 11.30 a.m. as meal was ready, she told Sujata, her

younger daughter-in-law to call the condemned prisoner over

phone to take meal. When Sujata called, nobody answered.

Sujata also went to the house of the condemned prisoner and

knocked but no one answered. She gave details of her other

sons and identified the condemned prisoner as her son in

Court. She referred to the two daughters of the condemned

prisoner and stated that the younger one was three days’ old

at the time of incident. She stated that as the deceased had

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given birth to her younger daughter three days earlier, she

was not able to cook food for which her younger daughter-in-

law cooked and provided to them. She also stated that the

condemned prisoner does nothing and that the deceased was

working as Head Nurse in SUM Hospital. PW-4 further stated

that when she was going upstairs, she found the condemned

prisoner getting down. Seeing him on the staircase, she

informed that lunch was ready and that he should take the

food to his house. Hearing this, the condemned prisoner told

her that he has killed Saraswati @ Tikili (deceased) and also

slit the neck of his elder daughter Pari, who is alive and

requested her to call police. Accordingly, PW-4 requested her

younger daughter-in-law to inform her elder daughter-in-law,

Rashmi, who in turn informed her elder son. Her elder son

called police. Her nephew- Likuna and niece- Tina took Shree

to SUM Hospital. She was suggested in cross-examination

that the condemned prisoner was getting down and that she

requested Sujata to give a phone call to Rashmi, which she

denied. She admitted however, that they are quite solvent and

their family is one of the richest in the locality.

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PW-5- Sujata Dash is the wife of the younger brother

of the condemned prisoner. She stated that the deceased had

given birth to a girl child three days prior to the incident for

which she was providing them food from her house. She

corroborated the statement of PW-4 regarding making phone

call to the deceased, who did not respond. She reported the

same to her mother-in-law, who directed her to go upstairs

and call them. Accordingly, she went upstairs and knocked

on the door but no one responded. She again informed her

mother-in-law to go upstairs. While going upstairs, her

mother-in-law found the condemned prisoner coming down

on the staircase and informed that he had killed his wife and

slit the neck of her elder daughter-Pari and at that time PW-5

was standing near PW-4. The condemned prisoner thereafter

went to the spot and PW-4 went to the house of her uncle-in-

law and informed the matter. PW-5 also informed the matter

to her husband. Her uncle-in-law came to the spot and his

son took Pari to the Hospital, who had sustained cut injury

on her neck, end of the eye and on the palm. PW-5 further

stated that the deceased was working as staff nurse at SUM

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Hospital, while the condemned prisoner did nothing. There

was frequent quarrel between the condemned prisoner and

the deceased on financial issues and her mother-in-law (PW-

4) used to pacify the matter. In cross-examination, she

admitted that she had not seen the condemned prisoner

committing the murder nor of entering into the first floor of

the house where the murder had been committed after

knowing about it. She admitted to have been examined by

police regarding the occurrence and denied the suggestion

that there was no quarrel between the condemned prisoner

and the deceased, there was good relation between them and

he was earning a handsome amount to run his family. She

denied the defence suggestion that she had not stated before

police that she had made phone call to the deceased at 11

a.m., to which she did not respond and that the condemned

prisoner informed her mother-in-law that he had killed his

wife and slit the neck of his elder daughter-Pari and that at

that time she was standing near PW-4.

PW-6- Sashikanta Dash is the informant and brother

of the deceased. He stated that the marriage between

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Saraswati and the condemned prisoner was performed in

December, 2015. He stated about receiving a phone call from

Ranjit Dash at about 12 noon regarding the incident. Hearing

this, he went to the spot and found the deceased lying on the

floor in a pool of blood with injuries all over her body. He also

found cut injury on the throat and chin of Pari, who was

already shifted to SUM Hospital, Bhubaneswar. He also

stated that the second daughter of the deceased was born

about four days before the incident and that his sister was

working as nurse in SUM Hospital but the condemned

prisoner was unemployed. The condemned prisoner killed

Saraswati due to scarcity of money and birth of second

daughter. He stated to have lodged FIR and proved the same.

He also stated to have been present during the inquest and

proved his signature thereon. In cross-examination, he could

not say the mobile number of Ranjit Dash and stated that

Ranjit had informed his wife over phone. He stated that he

had entered into the house. He admitted not to have noticed

any blood stain on the four walls. He further stated in cross-

examination that the deceased had informed him several

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times that the condemned prisoner is demanding money by

consuming intoxicating substances but admitted that he

cannot say the dates. He admitted not to have gone through

the inquest report before putting his signature.

PW-7- Sarbeswar Das is a constable attached to the

Bharatpur Police Station. He was a witness to seizure of nail

clippings, scalp hair, blood-soaked gauge and black colour

torn panty of the deceased at Bharatpur P.S.

PW-8- Shree Dash @ Pari is the elder daughter of the

condemned prisoner of the deceased. She deposed after being

found capable of giving rational answers to questions put by

the trial Court. She stated that she is otherwise known as

Pari. Her mother was working as Nurse in SUM Hospital. She

categorically stated that her father killed her mother with

knife and also slit her throat. She sustained injury also on

the right-side end of her right eye and that Tina aunty and

Likuna uncle had taken her to the Hospital for treatment. In

cross-examination, she stated that her mother usually went

to the SUM Hospital at about 9 am and returned at about 5

pm. She stayed in the house along with her father and

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mother in the first floor. Her elder father and his family reside

in the second floor while in the ground floor, her uncle

Manjit, his wife and her grandmother reside. She denied the

defence suggestion that she was in the ground floor at the

time of the incident, and reiterated that she was in the middle

floor. She further admitted that she goes to School at 6 am

and returns at 11 am. She also admitted that her father loves

her.

PW-9, Sushree Sabinaya is the Scientific Officer

attached to the DFSL, Bhubaneswar. She stated that on

receiving telephonic requisition from the IIC of Bharatpur

Police Station, she along with her team proceeded to the spot.

She described the spot house and stated that she found the

dead body of the deceased in the north west bed room of the

house in a pool of blood. She described all other articles

found inside the house and the blood stains at different

places. She also stated about the blood-stained knife kept in

the wash basin and two blood-stained towels, blood-stained

mattresses and other articles. She described the dead body

which was lying in a supine condition with head towards

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north-east direction. The upper part of the body i.e. from

head to hip was on the floor beneath the single set of sofa

while the rest part was on the mattress. She also found

multiple numbers of stab wounds and cut wounds on

different parts of the body appearing to be inflicted by some

sharp-edged weapon. The deceased was wearing only one

black panty containing menstrual pad. The spot was digitally

photographed, blood samples were collected and the blood-

stained knife was collected etc.. She also stated that two

chance fingerprints were found on the blood-stained knife,

which were photographed. After obtaining signatures from

the I.O. and witnesses, she prepared the spot map, body

outline etc. In cross-examination, she further described the

presence of the blood in different areas of the house and

articles.

PW-10, Dr. Akash Ranjan Barik was the Medical

Officer at SUM Hospital at Bhubaneswar, who had examined

Shree Dash at 12.15 PM on the date of occurrence. He

proved the injury report, marked Ext. P-7 and stated that he

found the following injuries

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“i. Multiple linear laceration at chin of size 3 to 4 c.m. with

bleeding.

ii. An incised injury on throat of size 8 to 9 CM larynx was

exposed.”

He opined that injury No.ii was grievous in nature

and might have been caused by sharp cutting weapon. The

time of injury was within six hours from the examination. In

cross-examination, he admitted that he does not remember

who accompanied the injured to the hospital and that the

M.L.C. number put on the injury report does not bear the

date and time. He denied the defence suggestion that the

kind of injury on the throat is not possible, if someone falls

on a piece of glass and is being rubbed against it.

PW-11, Kodandadhar Samal is a Constable attached

to the Bharatpur P.S., who had taken the condemned

prisoner for medical examination on 10.06.2022. He is also a

witness to seizure of scalp hair, nail clipping and blood

sample of the condemned prisoner. He was also a witness to

seizure of wearing apparel of the condemned prisoner. In

cross-examination, he admitted to have forgotten the name of

the doctor to whom he had taken the condemned prisoner for

examination and denied the suggestion that he was not

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present when the doctor collected biological samples of the

condemned prisoner.

PW-12, Dr. Laxmikanta Behera is the autopsy

surgeon, who conducted autopsy over the dead body of the

deceased. He described his findings as follows:

“External examination

I. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep on right

thigh anterior aspect.

II. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep on right

thigh lateral aspect.

III. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right thigh just above the knee joint on anterior aspect.

IV. Stab wound of size 5 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right knee joint on medial aspect.

V. Cut wound of size 5 cm x 2 cm x joint deep over right

knee.

VI. Cut wound of size 4 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right knee lateral aspect.

VII. Cut wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right thigh medial aspect.

VIII. Cut wound of size 6 cm x 3 cm x bone deep on right

forearm flexor aspect.

IX. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right forearm lateral aspect.

X. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right elbow joint.

XI. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right shoulder.

XII. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right hand extensor aspect.

XIII. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right thigh on lateral aspect.

XIV. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right wrist extensor aspect.

XV. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right forearm just below tip of elbow joint.

XVI. Stab wound of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

right arm on lateral aspect.

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XVII. 4 Nos. of Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x

abdominal cavity over front of lower abdomen in an area

of 12 cm x 12 cm.

XVIII. 2 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x

abdominal cavity over front of upper abdomen in an area

of 8 cm x 8 cm.

XIX. 2 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x sternum

deep over front of chest in an area of 5 cm x 5 cm.

XX. 3 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle

deep over left forearm on extensor aspect in an area of 10

cm x 10 cm.

XXI. 4 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle

deep over left elbow joint on lateral aspect in an area of

10 cm X 10 cm.

XXII. 3 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x

abdominal cavity deep over left side lower abdominal wall

in an area of 12 cm x 12 cm.

XXIII. 3 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x

thoracic cavity deep over front of left side chest wall in an

area of 12 cm x 8 cm.

XXIV. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over left thigh interior aspect.

XXV. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep over

left thigh lateral aspect.

XXVI. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over right side lower back.

XXVII. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over lower back.

XXVIII. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over right gluteal area.

XXIX. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over left thigh on medial aspect.

XXX. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x thoracic cavity

deep over left breast.

XXXI. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over right thigh on posterior aspect.

XXXII. 3 Nos. of stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle

deep over right side lower back in an area of 8 cm x 9 cm.

XXXIII. Stab wounds of size 3 cm x 2 cm x muscle deep

over mid back”

According to him, all the injuries were antemortem in nature

and were caused by sharp cutting weapon like knife. The

injuries are homicidal in nature. Death of the deceased was

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due to haemorrhage and shock, as a result of the above-

mentioned injuries. He admitted to have received a query

from the I.O. regarding the weapon of the offence which he

verified. He described it as a metallic knife with black plastic

handle. The total length of the knife was 32 cm. The length of

the metallic part was 21 cm and the maximum breadth of the

metallic part was 4 cm. The metallic part had a pointed edge

and one cutting edge. He answered the query of the I.O.

stating that the injuries inflicted on the body of the deceased

can be possible by the said knife and such injuries were

sufficient to cause death in ordinary course. In cross-

examination, he admitted that he was the only doctor to

conduct the post-mortem and that when he received the dead

body, he did not find any injuries bleeding. He also admitted

that the query report does not bear the fact as to who

produced the requisition before him and at what time. He

found blood stain on the knife on its both sides. He collected

the blood of the deceased and handed over the same to the

police.

Page 24 of 85

PW.13- Rakesh Kumar Sethi stated that he knows the

condemned prisoner, the deceased and the injured. On the

date of occurrence at about 3 p.m., he heard that someone

had committed murder of his wife. He went to the spot, i.e.,

the house of the condemned prisoner, where police were

present along with some other people. He saw a lady lying

dead in a pool of blood. He heard that the daughter of the

deceased was also injured and had been shifted to the

hospital. He was a witness to seizure of certain articles such

as, a red napkin, a violet napkin, a white Turkish towel and

black, yellow and red cloth. His cross-examination was

dispensed with in terms of Section 309 of Cr.P.C. on the

refusal of the defence counsel to cross-examine.

PW-14, Bijay Kumar Das is the I.O.. He proved the

formal FIR and stated about all the steps taken by him

during investigation of the case. He stated that he had gone

to SUM Hospital and tried to examine the daughter of the

deceased but could not do so as her condition was critical

and the doctor did not allow him to communicate with the

child. He further stated about receiving information of the

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condemned prisoner roaming near Vipul Garden Road and of

apprehending him. The condemned prisoner was taken to the

Police Station, his fingerprint was taken by an expert and he

was arrested. He then stated about further steps taken by

him including seizure of different articles made by him and of

forwarding the condemned prisoner to the Court. He stated

about examination of several witnesses. He was cross-

examined extensively by defence and denied the defence

suggestion of dictating the contents of inquest report to the

witness. He also admitted to have sent the exhibits to SFSL

three months after the occurrence by explaining that he was

busy in investigation of many other cases. He admitted that

no Magistrate was present while the fingerprints of the

condemned prisoner were taken. He admitted that Tapan

Dash (PW-1) had not stated before him that his uncle had

informed him over phone and that the intestine of the

deceased had come out. He also admitted that PW-4 had not

stated before him of requesting Sujata to make a phone call

to Rashmi and that he had gone to the first floor after hearing

about the murder. He also admitted that Sujata Dash had not

Page 26 of 85

stated that she made a phone call to the deceased and that

she was standing near her mother-in-law and that the

condemned prisoner left the spot immediately thereafter.

PW-15, Jyoti Prakash Dash @ Likuna is the cousin of

the condemned prisoner. He stated that at about 11 to 11.30

a.m. on 09.06.2022, PW-4 came running to their house,

which is opposite to their house and informed his father that

the condemned prisoner had committed murder of his wife

and slit the throat of his daughter, Pari. Hearing this, they

immediately rushed to the spot. They went inside the room

and saw the dead body lying there. Pari was lying in the

nearby room being injured. He and Tina Didi immediately

took the victim, Pari to SUM Hospital as her condition was

serious. In cross-examination, he admitted that Police asked

him about the incident at the hospital on the same day and

again 2 to 3 days thereafter. He stated that Pari was in the

SUM Hospital for about 2 to 3 months.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

13. As already stated, prosecution proved 18

documents; of them, Exhibits P-2, P-4, P-6, P-8, P-11 are

Page 27 of 85

seizure lists depicting seizures of different articles made in

course of investigation. Ext. P-3 is the FIR, which we have

already discussed. Ext. P-1 is the inquest report, which was

proved by PW-1. It describes the dead body and the position

in which it was found. It also contains a brief description of

the injuries seen on the body and the opinion of the

witnesses as to the cause of death. PW-3 endorsed his

opinion to the effect that his younger sister- Saraswati Dash

(deceased) was killed by her husband by assaulting her with

a knife on different parts of her body. PW-1 also endorsed

similar opinion. Ext.P-5 is the spot visit report of the

Scientific Officer and her team, which contains description of

the spot house and the rooms including the room in which

the dead body was found. The report notes the physical

evidence such as blood, knife etc. It mentions about retrieval

of two numbers of visible blood-stained fingerprints detected

on the blade of knife. The report was accompanied by a rough

body outline showing the location of the injuries. It is also

accompanied by a rough spot map showing blood

stains/droplets and the position of the dead body as well as

Page 28 of 85

rough diagram of the knife. Ext.P-7 is the medical

examination report of the injured, Shree Dash issued by the

doctor on police requisition. Ext.P-9 is the post-mortem

report. It was proved by the autopsy surgeon, PW-12 and

contains the description of the injuries and his opinion

regarding cause of death. Ext.P-10 is the query submitted by

the I.O. to the doctor and the opinion of the doctor regarding

the seized knife. Ext.P-13 is the spot map prepared by the

I.O. Ext.P-15 is the report of the State Fingerprint Bureau

regarding the chance fingerprints detected on the seized

knife. Ext.P-18 is the chemical examination report submitted

by the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Rasulgarh.

MATERIAL OBJECTS

14. As already stated, the prosecution also proved 8

material objects including the seized knife (MO-1) and other

articles.

15. Having noted the evidence adduced by the

prosecution we shall now refer to the arguments advanced by

the parties.

APPEARANCE

Page 29 of 85

16. Heard Mr. Soura Chandra Mohapatra, learned

Senior Counsel as Amicus Curiae assisted by Mr. S.

Mohapatra, learned counsel for the condemned prisoner and

Mr. P.S. Nayak, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the

State.

17. Be it noted that we interacted with the condemned

prisoner through video conference and informed him of the

appointment of Mr. S.C. Mohapatra, Sr. Advocate to

represent him, to which he expressed his consent. We have

recorded such fact in our order dated 12.03.2026.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF CONDEMNED PRISONER

18. We shall only refer to the submissions raised with

regard to the order of conviction and not the sentence

imposed, which we shall do only if we uphold the order of

conviction.

19. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Mohapatra has

assailed the order of conviction and sentence raising the

following grounds:

Page 30 of 85

(i) The trial Court has not discussed whether the

homicidal death of the deceased amounted to murder or

not but proceeded on presumption.

Mr. Mohapatra refers to the post mortem report as

well as the evidence of autopsy surgeon (PW-12) to urge that

out of 49 injuries found on the body of the deceased, all

except 4 or 5 were on the limbs which, individually cannot be

treated as fatal in nature. Further, the length of the blade of

the knife was 21 cm and breadth was 4 cm but the injuries

found measure 2cm x 2 cm x muscle depth. This, according

to Mr. Mohapatra, implies that only a small portion, i.e., tip of

the knife was inserted. It can therefore, be safely concluded

that the condemned prisoner may have had an intention to

cause injuries but certainly not death. He further submits

that the occurrence most probably was preceded by a

quarrel/altercation between the deceased and the condemned

prisoner during which, he lost control over himself due to

extreme anger and assaulted the deceased without thinking

of the consequences. So, it would not be case of he wanting

Page 31 of 85

definitely to kill his wife but must be treated as an act

committed in blind rage to cause hurt.

(ii) Prosecution has failed to prove a motive for the

crime.

Mr. Mohapatra argues that only 2 witnesses,

namely, PWs-5 and 6 have referred to the purported quarrel

between husband and wife on financial issues, which the trial

Court accepted but it was never considered that if the

deceased was the only earning member of the family why

would the condemned prisoner want to kill her. As regards

the unhappiness of the condemned prisoner due to birth of

the second girl child, there is nothing on record to

substantiate such allegation. The version of PW-6 is only an

opinion without any supporting evidence. As against the

above, it was elicited from the mouth of the child witness

(PW-8) that her father loves her.

(iii) The trial Court did not properly test the

competence of the child witness to give rational answers

to the questions before accepting its evidence.

Page 32 of 85

Mr. Mohapatra argues that PW-8 was aged about 6

years at the time of occurrence and around 7 years while

testifying before the Court. Law acknowledges that a child

under 7 years of age is not mature enough. Mr. Mohapatra

refers to the provision of Section 82 IPC in this context. He

further submits that it must be clearly proved that the child

was capable of understanding the questions and of giving

rational answers to them. The trial Court put three ordinary

questions and recorded its satisfaction as regards the

competence of the witness. While the witness herself stated

that she was not examined by police, her statement was

found to have been recorded two months after the

occurrence.

(iv) The conviction regarding assault on the minor

daughter cannot be sustained as the condemned prisoner

was charged thrice for the same offence.

Mr. Mohapatra submits that once the condemned

prisoner is charged under Section 307 IPC, which is the

graver offence, he could not have been charged and convicted

for the very same act under Sections 324 and 326 IPC also.

Page 33 of 85

Even otherwise, there being no conclusive evidence to

substantiate the allegation that that injury was capable of

causing death, conviction under Section 307 is bad in law.

(v) As regards the 8 circumstances listed by the

trial Court appearing in the evidence against the

condemned prisoner, Mr. Mohapatra does not dispute the

findings in respect of circumstances at Serial Nos.(I)

and (II).

In so far as circumstance No.(III) is concerned,

Mr. Mohapatra would argue that the trial Court has

heavily relied upon the evidence of PW-4 as proving the

so-called extra- judicial confession made by the

condemned prisoner without ascertaining whether it was

voluntary or not.

In respect of circumstance No.(IV), Mr,

Mohapatra submits that the occurrence took place

between 11 to 11.30 a.m. and the condemned prisoner

was arrested on the same day at about 7.40 pm at a place

not very far from the spot. So, by no stretch of

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imagination he can be said to have absconded after

committing the crime.

As regards the circumstance Nos.(V), (VI) and

(VII), Mr. Mohapatra would argue that there is no

evidence as to who retrieved the fingerprint of the

condemned prisoner. Said person was never examined.

Fingerprint supposedly retrieved was never confronted to

the condemned prisoner. So far as the finding regarding

presence of blood of the deceased on the wearing apparel

of the condemned prisoner is concerned, the trial Court

ignored the fact that the blood group of both the

condemned prisoner and deceased was ‘A’.

As regards the circumstance No.(VII), i.e. motive,

Mr. Mohapatra’s argument has already been noted before.

(vi) The trial Court has taken judicial notice of the

envelope containing photographs and fingerprints

without any legal basis.

Mr. Mohapatra submits that though the provision

under Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act lists facts of

Page 35 of 85

which the Court can take judicial notice, none of the said

facts are to be found in relation to the case. Under such

circumstances, reliance placed on the photographs can only

have a non-legal and moral influence on the mind of the trial

Court.

ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

20. Mr. P.S. Nayak, learned Addl. Government

Advocate advances his arguments by submitting that this is a

case of brutal murder of a helpless lady committed by her

husband only three days after she had given birth to a child.

The brutality is further established by the fact that the

condemned prisoner stabbed his wife as many as 49 times

with a knife. He did not stop at that and went on to slit the

throat of his elder daughter, who was a child of six years

only. He was therefore, rightly convicted and sentenced to

death by the trial Court. Mr. Nayak further argues that the

prosecution proved the guilt of the condemned prisoner

beyond all reasonable doubts through a complete chain of

circumstances coupled with direct evidence. In support of his

contentions, Mr. Nayak cites the following grounds:

Page 36 of 85

(i) PW-8 being the minor daughter of the condemned

prisoner and an injured eye-witness clearly testified that her

father assaulted her mother with a knife and thereafter slit

her throat. She being an injured witness, her testimony

assumes great significance. It was otherwise not shaken in

cross-examination.

(ii) The condemned prisoner made an extra-judicial

confession before his mother, PW-4 that he had killed the

deceased and assaulted PW-8. The evidence in this regard is

entirely trustworthy and corroborated by other evidence

including medical evidence, recovery of weapon and conduct

of the condemned prisoner.

(iii) The medical evidence is clear, credible and

conclusive. The nature, number and manner of injuries

clearly reveal the intention of the assailant to cause death.

The case therefore, falls under clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300

IPC.

(iv) There is unassailable evidence that the condemned

prisoner after killing his wife, slit the throat of his 6 year old

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daughter with a knife which is fully corroborated by medical

evidence. The doctor opined that the injury was grievous and

capable of causing death. Thus, both intention and

knowledge in this regard are present, for which the

condemned prisoner was rightly convicted for attempting to

commit the murder of his daughter.

(v) There is no law that a particular number of

questions are to be put to a child witness to test her

competence to testify. In the instant case, the trial Court put

three general questions and was satisfied. Even otherwise,

the fact that the witness stood the rigors of cross-examination

without flinching only fortifies the satisfaction of the Court

regarding her competence. As regards the scientific evidence,

Mr. Nayak would argue that as per the settled position of law,

examination of the fingerprint expert is not mandatory,

particularly when the condemned prisoner does not seek the

same.

(vi) As regards the so-called defect in the charges, Mr.

Nayak argues that framing of different charges for the same

offence is permitted by different provisions of Cr.P.C.

Page 38 of 85

beginning from Section 218 to 223. The act may be one but

there could be multiple offences in law.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

21. As already noted, the condemned prisoner faced

trial for committing the murder of his wife and attempting to

commit murder of his young daughter. We shall deal with the

murder part first.

22. In a case of murder, three questions are essentially

required to be answered, (i) whether the death of the

deceased was homicidal in nature; (ii) who was the author of

the crime; (iii) whether the act amounts to murder within the

meaning of Section 300 IPC.

23. In the present case, the defence has not questioned

the prosecution case or the finding of the trial Court that the

death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. Nevertheless,

in order to satisfy ourselves we have thought it proper to

analyse the evidence independently. From the ocular

evidence, we find that the dead body of the deceased was

lying in a supine position in the first bedroom of the house in

a naked condition save for a panty containing multiple

Page 39 of 85

injuries all over. That apart, blood stains and droplets were

found in other rooms as well. We have already discussed the

medical evidence. The postmortem report marked Ext.P-9,

proved by autopsy surgeon PW-12, lists the injuries found on

the dead body of the deceased, which we have quoted earlier.

The injuries total 49 though listed from Sl. Nos. I to XXXIII.

PW-12 opined that the injuries were homicidal in nature and

were caused by sharp cutting weapon like knife. A blood-

stained knife being MO-1 was seized from the wash basin of

the kitchen. There is nothing in the evidence to even remotely

suggest that the injuries were self-inflicted. Taking all these

into account there can only be one conclusion that death was

caused because of the injuries inflicted by another person,

which makes it homicidal in nature.

24. As regards authorship of the crime, prosecution

claims that it was the condemned prisoner, who committed

the same. Prosecution has projected the child witness (PW-8)

as its star witness. She clearly testified before the Court that

her father killed her mother with a knife and also slit her

throat. It was argued by the defence counsel in the Court

Page 40 of 85

below that the evidence of the child witness should not be

considered as she had not stated anything against her father

before the I.O. The trial Court while finding that PW-8 had

not stated that her father had killed her mother before the

I.O. brushed aside such objection on the ground that the

statement of P.W.-8 before police was never confronted to her

in the Court for the purposes of contradiction. We have also

perused the statement of PW-8 recorded by the I.O. under

Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and find that the same is recorded in a

question-answer form. The I.O. inter alia, asked her generally

as to what had happened on the date of occurrence, in

response to which she only stated about the assault on her

by her father. She did not say anything about her mother’s

death or of her father’s hand in it. But it cannot be said with

certainty that she had no knowledge about the death of her

mother. Had a direct question been put by the I.O., maybe

she would have given a definite answer. So, only for her

omission to say about her mother’s death and its cause, it

cannot be said that she was lying before the Court. It was

suggested that she was tutored by others. We are unable to

Page 41 of 85

agree for the reason that tutoring of a child witness implies a

motive to state falsehood in the Court to entangle a person

not involved in the occurrence. But as we shall be discussing

later, there is ample evidence otherwise to show the presence

of the condemned prisoner in the same house at the relevant

time and most importantly of slitting the throat of his

daughter (PW-8) with a knife. So, regardless of the omission,

we do not find any justified reason to doubt the veracity of

the testimony of PW-8.

25. The next important piece of evidence is the extra-

judicial confession made by the condemned prisoner before

his mother (PW-4). According to PW-4, when she asked her

daughter-in-law (PW-5) to inform the condemned prisoner to

come for meal, the latter called over telephone but there was

no response. She (PW-5) then knocked on the door but there

was no response. As such, PW-4 went herself to the house of

the condemned prisoner. She met him while he was coming

down the stairs. Seeing his mother, the condemned prisoner

himself informed that he had killed his wife and cut the

throat of his daughter and requested his mother, PW-4 to call

Page 42 of 85

police. This part of the evidence has not been shaken in

cross-examination at all. Moreover, PW-5 fully corroborates

the version of PW-4 in this regard and even to the extent of

stating that she was present when the condemned prisoner

made the confession before her mother-in-law (PW-4). Two

things are proved from the above – the condemned prisoner

was present at home with his family (including the deceased)

at least around noon of the date of occurrence and secondly,

he left home thereafter and was not seen by anyone till his

arrest at about 7 p.m. on the same day. Law relating to

acceptance of extra judicial confession is fairly well settled to

the effect that it must be proved that such confession was

made voluntarily and in free state of mind. In the case of

Mohd. Azad @ Samin v. State of W.B.

3

, the Supreme Court

observed as follows:

“xx xx xx

19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and

made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the

court. The confession will have to be proved like any other

fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any

other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness

to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as

to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness

who gives the evidence. It is not open to any court to start

with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is a

3

(2008) 15 SCC 449: 2009 AIR SCW 752

Page 43 of 85

weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of

the circumstances, the time when the confession was

made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak to

such a confession. Such a confession can be relied upon

and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence

about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses

who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to

the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought

out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive

of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused, the

words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous

and unmistakably convey that the accused is the

perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the

witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the

evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the

touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can

be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it

passes the test of credibility.”

26. What is important to note here is, the person

before whom the confession was made is none other than the

mother of the condemned prisoner. It would therefore, be too

much to expect a mother to speak blatant falsehood against

her own son in the Court. Secondly, the confession was made

voluntarily by the condemned prisoner seeing his mother who

had only asked him to come for meal. It was argued before us

that the condemned prisoner requested his mother to inform

the police, which shows that his intention was to protect

himself. It is not possible for us to know what weighed upon

the mind of the condemned prisoner at that time. The fact

that he confessed of his crime is only relevant and we accept

Page 44 of 85

the same. It was also argued that the condemned prisoner

was arrested from a place nor very far from the spot and

therefore, it cannot be said that he had absconded. We do not

agree for the reason that if the condemned prisoner was

aware of the death of his wife and serious injury of his

daughter and had also confessed of committing the crime

before his mother, the fact that he was not seen thereafter

only goes to show his guilty mind. Under normal

circumstances and had the crime been committed by

someone else, the reaction would certainly have been

different. We therefore, accept the evidence relating to extra-

judicial confession and also hold that the condemned

prisoner had absconded from the spot. We therefore, accept

the prosecution case that the condemned prisoner had

confessed to his crime before PW-4. We also accept the

prosecution case that he absconded immediately thereafter.

27. Another important aspect that has surfaced from

the evidence is the recovery of the blood-stained knife from

the wash basin inside the house containing fingerprints of

the condemned prisoner. The scientific officer (PW-9) testified

Page 45 of 85

to have collected the blood-stained knife and that two chance

fingerprints were found thereon, which were photographed

after obtaining signatures from the I.O. and witnesses. In

cross-examination, she reiterated that she had taken the

photographs as well as the fingerprints from the spot. It was

argued that the fingerprint expert was never examined but

the so-called report, marked Ext-P-16 was accepted by the

trial Court erroneously. The fingerprint report was proved by

the I.O., PW-14. He stated that he collected the envelope

containing fingerprint report from SFSL, Rasulgarh and

produced the same before the SDJM, Bhubaneswar on

05.08.2023. The I.O. was cross-examined at length. It was

only elicited from his mouth by defence counsel that no

magistrate was present while the fingerprints were taken.

That apart it was not suggested that the report was in any

manner unacceptable. No prayer was made by the defence to

have the fingerprint expert examined. Under such

circumstances and particularly having regard to the fact that

the fingerprint report was prepared by an expert of a

government laboratory, we find no reason to discard it. In the

Page 46 of 85

case of Shri Fulkumar. Vs. Delhi Administration

4

, the

Supreme Court held that expert evidence relating to

fingerprint can be relied upon and examination of expert is

not mandatory when the accused does not seek such

examination. It is significant to note that during his

examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the condemned

prisoner admitted that his fingerprints were taken when

confronted with the evidence of I.O., PW-14 to such effect.

28. We have already commented on the conduct of the

condemned prisoner in absconding from the spot house after

the occurrence. What is more significant to note is the

complete absence of any explanation whatsoever offered by

him for such a horrific incident involving his own wife and

minor child in his own house. In his examination under

Section 313 Cr.P.C., the condemned prisoner preferred to

remain mum when he was asked to explain the evidence of

the witnesses deposing against him. Needless to mention, if

the accused of a crime does not offer a plausible explanation

of the facts which are specially within his knowledge, it

4

1975 (1) SCC 797

Page 47 of 85

becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances

against him. Reference in this regard may be had to the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Debojit

Pankika Charaideo Sonari v. State of Assam

5. The

Supreme Court held as follows:

“17. Admittedly, the mother of the accused left her

house for medical treatment leaving the child in the

house with the accused person. The child was

missing for a long time i.e. 22 days and as such it

was expected of the accused to offer some justifiable

explanation about missing child but the accused

utterly failed to provide any such explanation. It

would have been natural conduct of the accused to

report to the Police if the child was missing for a long

period or to inform some of the relatives but the

accused made no such attempt.”

29. The condemned prisoner had admitted that his

blood group is ‘A’ and also that of his deceased wife in his

examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is otherwise proved

that the wearing apparel of the condemned prisoner seized by

the I.O. contained blood stains of group ‘A’. The chemical

examination report marked, Ext. P-18 proved the same. It is

nobody’s case that the condemned prisoner had any injury on

any part of his body to justify the blood stains on his wearing

apparel. Therefore, the only explanation can be that the blood

5

2026 SCC OnLine SC 1336 : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 691

Page 48 of 85

so found was that of the deceased that may have spurted

from the site of injury onto the wearing apparel immediately

after inflicting the injuries.

30. As regards motive of the condemned prisoner in

committing the heinous offence, it is borne out from the

evidence of several witnesses that there was frequent quarrel

between husband and wife over financial matters. We may

refer to the evidence of PWs. 5 & 6 in this regard. It has also

been suggested by PWs. 5 and 6 that the condemned prisoner

was not happy with the birth of second girl child. According

to Mr. Mohapatra, the motive suggested is unacceptable for

the reason that if the deceased was the only earning member

why should the condemned prisoner want to kill her.

Secondly, the version of PW-6 regarding unhappiness of the

condemned prisoner regarding over birth of his younger girl

child is only an opinion and cannot be treated as statement of

fact. Mr. Mohapatra further refers to the admission of the

child witness (PW-8) who deposed that her father loved her

which also implies that he did not discriminate a girl child.

Mr. Nayak, on the other hand, would submit that on the face

Page 49 of 85

of clear direct evidence, motive is not relevant and even

without proof of motive an order of conviction would lie.

31. We have already found that the evidence on record

strongly suggests that it was the condemned prisoner alone

who committed the offence. This is established by direct

eyewitness account of PW-8 and other supporting evidence

which we have discussed in detail including evidence relating

to extra-judicial confession by the condemned prisoner. It is

well settled that motive is not very relevant in a case resting

on direct evidence but assumes importance in case of

circumstantial evidence. That apart, motive is a mental

condition known only to the offender and cannot always be

proved by the prosecution with certainty. Reference in this

regard may be had to the judgment of the Supreme Court in

the case of Amitava Banerjee v. State of W.B.

6. The

Supreme Court held as follows:

“41. Motive for the commission of an offence no doubt

assumes greater importance in cases resting on

circumstantial evidence than those in which direct

evidence regarding commission of the offence is available.

And yet failure to prove motive in cases resting on

circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself. All that the

absence of motive for the commission of the offence

6

(2011) 12 SCC 554

Page 50 of 85

results in is that the court shall have to be more careful

and circumspect in scrutinising the evidence to ensure

that suspicion does not take the place of proof while

finding the accused guilty.

42. Absence of motive in a case depending entirely on

circumstantial evidence is a factor that shall no doubt

weigh in favour of the accused, but what the courts need

to remember is that motive is a matter which is primarily

known to the accused and which the prosecution may at

times find difficult to explain or establish by substantive

evidence.

43. Human nature being what it is, it is often difficult to

fathom the real motivation behind the commission of a

crime. And yet experience about human nature, human

conduct and the frailties of human mind has shown that

inducements to crime have veered around to what Wills

has in his book Circumstantial Evidence said:

“The common inducements to crime are, the desire of

revenging some real or fancied wrong; of getting rid of a

rival or an obnoxious connection; of escaping from the

pressure of pecuniary or other obligation or burden; of

obtaining plunder or other coveted object; of preserving

reputation, either that of general character or the

conventional reputation of profession or sex; or of

gratifying some other selfish or malignant passion.”

44. The legal position as to the significance of motive and

effect of its absence in a given case is fairly well settled

by the decisions of this Court to which we need not refer

in detail to avoid burdening this judgment unnecessarily.

(See Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. [(1994) 2 SCC

220 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 358] , Surinder Pal Jain v. Delhi

Admn. [1993 Supp (3) SCC 681 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1096] ,

Tarseem Kumar v. Delhi Admn. [1994 Supp (3) SCC 367 :

1994 SCC (Cri) 1735] , Jagdish v. State of M.P. [(2009) 9

SCC 495 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 21] and Mulakh Raj v.

Satish Kumar [(1992) 3 SCC 43 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 482] .”

We have already seen that the condemned prisoner offered

no explanation whatsoever for the incident and preferred to

remain silent. What exactly weighed upon his mind that led

him to commit the act is only known to him. It is possible

Page 51 of 85

that there might have been quarrel or dissension between

husband and wife leading to heated arguments. But we would

not venture into such possibility or read much into it, given

the overwhelming evidence of the act itself that followed. It is

enough to hold him guilty. We agree with the contention of

learned State Counsel that on the face of direct evidence,

proof of motive is not sine qua non for holding the condemned

prisoner guilty.

32. Thus, from a conspectus of the analysis of all the

above circumstances surfacing from the evidence we are left

with no doubt that it was the condemned prisoner who was

the author of the crime.

33. Having held so, we shall now proceed to decide

whether the act of the condemned prisoner in doing away

with the life of the deceased falls within the definition of

‘murder’ within the meaning of Section 300 IPC.

34. Before delving into the rival contentions, we would

pause to take note of the fact that the trial Court has not

really analyzed this aspect and appears to have taken for

Page 52 of 85

granted that the act of the condemned prisoner amounts to

murder. According to us, this is not the correct approach as

the trial Court ought to have focused its attention to

ascertain as to if the act amounts to murder or culpable

homicide not amounting to murder. Proceeding to answer

this question we would first take note of the statutory

provision i.e., Section 300 of IPC, which is reproduced below.

“300. Murder.—

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable

homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is

caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—

(Secondly)— If it is done with the intention of causing such

bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause

the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—

(Thirdly)— If it is done with the intention of causing bodily

injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be

inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to

cause death, or—

(Fourthly)— If the person committing the act knows that it

is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,

cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause

death, and commits such act without any excuse for

incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as

aforesaid.

Exception 1. — When culpable homicide is not

murder. — Culpable homicide is not murder if the

offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by

grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the

person who gave the provocation or causes the death of

any other person by mistake or accident. The above

exception is subject to the following provisos: —

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(First)— That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily

provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing

harm to any person.

(Secondly)— That the provocation is not given by anything

done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the

lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

(Thirdly)— That the provocation is not given by anything

done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation.— Whether the provocation was grave and

sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to

murder is a question of fact.

Exception 2.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the

offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private

defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to

him by law and causes the death of the person against

whom he is exercising such right of defence without

premeditation, and without any intention of doing more

harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Exception 3.— Culpable homicide is not murder if the

offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant

acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the

powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing

an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and

necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public

servant and without ill-will towards the person whose

death is caused.

Exception 4.— Culpable homicide is not murder if it is

committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the

heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the

offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel

or unusual manner.

Explanation.— It is immaterial in such cases which party

offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Exception 5.— Culpable homicide is not murder when the

person whose death is caused, being above the age of

eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death

with his own consent.”

Page 54 of 85

35. According to Mr. Mohapatra, though as many as 49

stab wounds were found on the body of the deceased, yet

most of them were not on vital parts of the body. Moreover,

the wounds were not very deep as the weapon had not

penetrated to greater depth of the body. The doctor simply

opined that the cause of death was due to hemorrhage and

shock as a result of the injuries but he did not clarify as to if

any of the individual injuries was fatal. The doctor also did

not clarify whether death was due to the effect of hemorrhage

or shock, as both are not same thing. Mr. Mohapatra further

argues that having regard to the marital relationship between

the condemned prisoner and the deceased and the absence of

any motive, it can be reasonably inferred that some

dissension arose between them leading to provocation which

promoted the condemned prisoner to repeatedly assault his

wife most probably out of anger. It cannot be said that such

act was preceded by premeditation, planning or preparation.

According to Mr. Mohapata, this is a case that falls within the

exceptions of Section 300 IPC and is therefore, an act of

Page 55 of 85

culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable

under Section 304 Part I IPC.

36. Per contra, Mr. Nayak would argue that according

to the doctor (PW-12), the injuries resulted in extensive

damage to lungs, chest cavity and intestine. The nature,

number and manner of injuries clearly demonstrate the

intention to cause death. Referring to the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab

7

, Mr.

Nayak submits that all the four requirements, namely, (i)

presence of bodily injuries (ii) objective proof of injury (iii)

sufficiency of the injury to cause death in ordinary course of

nature; and (iv) infliction of injuries intentionally are fully

satisfied. Mr. Nayak further submits that this is not a case of

mere likelihood of death but an act so brutal that death was

the inevitable consequence.

37. Undisputedly, the deceased sustained as many as

49 stab wounds. While most of the injuries were not on vital

parts of the body quite a lot of them were. We have

reproduced earlier each of the injuries found on the dead

7

1958 SCC OnLine SC 37 : AIR 1958 SC 465

Page 56 of 85

body. According to the doctor, death of the deceased was due

to hemorrhage and shock as a result of all the injuries. We do

not agree with the argument of Mr. Mohapatra that the doctor

should have specified as to which injury was fatal in nature.

In a case of such nature where the body contained as many

as 49 stab injuries and the doctor certifies that hemorrhage

and shock was a result of all the injuries, there is no

necessity of segregating the injuries individually. Of course,

had the injuries being inflicted on non-vital parts, one could

have entertained such an argument but when the injuries are

found all over the body, the irresistible conclusion would be

that they were inflicted in a murderous spree without aiming

at any particular part of the body. For the same reason, the

depth of the each of the injuries is not a relevant

consideration. All the injuries cumulatively resulted in death.

It is otherwise borne out from the evidence on record that

blood stains were found not just at the spot where the dead

body was ultimately discovered but almost in all of the other

rooms. In all human probability, the deceased tried to save

herself by running to different parts of the house as the

Page 57 of 85

condemned prisoner followed her and continued to assault.

There can be no other explanation for the presence of blood

stains at other places.

38. As regards the argument that the act was actuated

because of her provocation resulting from a quarrel between

the husband and wife, we do not accept it for the reason

firstly because, there is no evidence of any quarrel having

actually taken place prior to the occurrence and secondly, the

condemned prisoner himself has not said so in his

examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.. No suggestion was

given in this regard to the prosecution witness also. Even

accepting the defence argument that the incident had arisen

out of a quarrel and the condemned prisoner was blinded by

rage the very fact that the number of injuries is so large being

49 in all, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that they

were inflicted with the intention of causing death of the

deceased. What distinguishes an act of culpable homicide

and murder was examined by the Supreme Court in the case

Page 58 of 85

of Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala

8. The following

observations of the Supreme Court are noteworthy.:

“8. The argument requires close examination. Two offences

involve the killing of a person. They are the offence of

culpable homicide and the more henious offence of murder.

What distinguishes these two offences is the presence of a

special mens rea which consists of four mental attitudes in

the presence of any of which the lesser offence becomes

greater. These four mental attitudes are stated in Section

300 IPC as distinguishing murder from culpable homicide.

Unless the offence can be said to involve at least one such

mental attitude it cannot be murder. We shall consider the

acts of the appellants in relation to each of the clauses of

Section 300.”

As held in Virsa Singh (supra), all the four conditions are,

according to us, fully satisfied in the case at hand. We have

already seen that none of the exceptions provided in Section

300 IPC are attracted to the case at hand. On the contrary,

we are convinced that the condemned prisoner acted in an

extremely cruel manner and took undue advantage of his

wife, who had given birth to a child three to four days ago,

only with the intention to kill her. We have therefore, no

hesitation in holding that the act of the condemned prisoner

is nothing but murder within the meaning of Section 300 IPC.

8

1966 SCC OnLine SC 50 : AIR 1966 SC 1874

Page 59 of 85

39. We are therefore, persuaded to uphold the order of

conviction passed by the trial Court.

40. We shall now deal with the other charges. As

already stated, the condemned prisoner was charged and

convicted under Sections 307/326/324 IPC. Mr. Mohapatra

has submitted that the act being the same, three different

charges could not have been framed nor the offender

convicted of all the three offences. Since the offence under

Section 307 IPC is the graver offence, it automatically covers

the offence under Section 324 and 326 IPC. Mr. Mohapatra

further submits that even otherwise, unless the injury comes

within the meaning of ‘grievous hurt’ as per Section 320 IPC,

the conviction under Sections 324 and 326 IPC are not

tenable. Having held the person guilty of the offence under

Section 307 IPC for the same act, the trial Court could not

have convicted him for the other two offences as it amounts

to double jeopardy. Per contra, Mr. Nayak would argue that

charge under different heads is permissible, if the acts are of

similar nature. He refers to the provisions under Sections 218

to 223 IPC in this regard.

Page 60 of 85

41. We may first refer to the three different offences

namely, Sections 307, 326 and 324 IPC, which are

reproduced below:

“307. Attempt to murder. — Whoever does any act

with such intention or knowledge, and under such

circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he

would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may

extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and

if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender

shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such

punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.

Attempts by life-convicts. — When any person

offending under this section is under sentence of

imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be

punished with death.

324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous

weapons or means. —Whoever, except in the case

provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by

means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or

cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of

offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or

any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any

corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive

substance or by means of any substance which it is

deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or

to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to three years,

or with fine, or with both.

326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by

dangerous weapons or means —Whoever, except in

the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes

grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting,

stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a

weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means

of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any

poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any

explosive substance, or by means of any substance

which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to

Page 61 of 85

swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any

animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or

with imprisonment of either description for a term which

may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

Here the act committed by the condemned prisoner against

his daughter PW-8 is that he slit her throat with a knife and

also caused some injury on her chin. The doctor examining

PW-8 described the injuries, which we have quoted earlier. He

specified injury No.ii as grievous in nature. Both the injuries

were inflicted as part the same act and cannot be segregated.

Further, law is well settled that to justify a conviction under

Section 307 IPC it is not essential that bodily injury capable

of causing death should have been inflicted. It is sufficient in

law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act

in execution thereof. Reference may be had to the judgment

in Sagayam v. State of Karnataka

9. As is borne out from the

evidence on record, the condemned prisoner after killing his

wife, slit the throat of his daughter. PW-8 stated as follows:

“I am otherwise known as Pari. The accused Sanjeet

Dash is my father. Saraswati Dash is my mother who is

now dead. My mother Saraswati died one year back. My

mother was working as Nurse in SUM Hospital. My

father killed my mother with knife. My father has also

silted my throat. (The witness showed the cut portion of

her neck). I had also sustained injury on the right-side

9

(2000) 4 SCC 454

Page 62 of 85

end of my right eye. My father had silted my throat with

a knife. Tina Anty and Likuna uncle had taken me to

hospital for treatment. IO has examined me in this case.”

It was therefore, a part of the same transaction that PW-8

came to be assaulted. The above, coupled with the site of

injury i.e., throat and the weapon used can only suggest that

having killed his wife, the condemned prisoner also intended

to kill his daughter but because of prompt treatment, the

child survived. It would therefore, be a clear case of attempt

to murder punishable under Section 307 IPC.

42. We however, find force in the argument of Mr.

Mohapatra that having found the condemned prisoner guilty

of the offence under Section 307 IPC, the trial Court should

not have further convicted him for the other two offences that

arose out of the same transaction. We say so because the

doctor (PW-10) specified injury No.ii only as being grievous.

He has said nothing about injury No.i. It cannot be presumed

that said injury was also grievous in nature. Be that as it

may, the offence under Section 307 IPC, in our view, would

take within its ambit the offence under Section 326 IPC as

well as Section 324 IPC. Section 71 of IPC would be relevant

Page 63 of 85

for refence at this stage and is reproduced below along with

its illustrations.:

“71. Limit of punishment of offence made up of several

offences.— Where anything which is an offence is made

up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the

offender shall not be punished with the punishment of

more than one of such his offences, unless it be so

expressly provided.

Where anything is an offence falling within two or more

separate definitions of any law in force for the time being

by which offences are defined or punished, or

where several acts, of which one or more than one would

by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute,

when combined, a different offence,

the offender shall not be punished with a more severe

punishment than the Court which tries him could award

for any one of such offences.

Illustrations

(a) A gives Z fifty strokes with a stick. Here A may have

committed the offence of voluntarily causing hurt to Z by

the whole beating, and also by each of the blows which

make up the whole beating. If A were liable to

punishment for every blow, he might be imprisoned for

fifty years, one for each blow. But he is liable only to one

punishment for the whole beating.

(b) But if, while A is beating Z, Y interferes, and A

intentionally strikes Y, here, as the blow given to Y is no

part of the act whereby A voluntarily causes hurt to Z, A

is liable to one punishment for voluntarily causing hurt to

Z, and to another for the blow given to Y.”

It is not the prosecution case that two injuries found on PW-8

constituted two separate offences but it is the consistent case

that they were part of the same transaction. We therefore,

agree with the order of the trial Court convicting the

Page 64 of 85

condemned prisoner under Section 307 IPC and therefore,

uphold it. But, we are unable to concur with the order of

conviction recorded under Sections 324 and 326 IPC. We may

mention that Section 307 IPC being the graver offence, takes

within its sweep the other two offences automatically.

43. From the foregoing analysis of evidence on record

in light of the contentions raised by the parties, we uphold

the conviction of the condemned prisoner under Section 302

IPC as well as Section 307 IPC. We however, set aside the

conviction under Section 324 and 326 IPC.

SENTENCE

44. Having upheld the order of conviction, we shall

now proceed to determine the correctness of the sentence

imposed by the trial Court. The condemned prisoner was

sentenced to death for the offence under Section 302 IPC. He

was sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offence under

Section 307 IPC.

45. We have interacted with the condemned prisoner

through video conferencing from jail. We had also called for

Page 65 of 85

reports from the jail authorities regarding his conduct, which

we have perused. We shall deal with the death penalty first.

46. It is trite that imposition of appropriate

punishment is sine qua non being the logical conclusion of a

criminal trial. It is well settled that the punishment to be

imposed on the condemned prisoner of a crime has to be

adequate and appropriate. In the case of Ravji v. State of

Rajasthan

10, the Supreme Court held as follows:

““xxxxxxx The Court will be failing in its duty if

appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime

which has been committed not only against the

individual victim but also against the society to which

the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be

awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it

should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity

and brutality with which the crime has been

perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting

public abhorrence and it should “respond to the

society's cry for justice against the criminal” xxxxxxx”

47. According to the trial Court, in the present case,

sentence of death is the appropriate punishment. We shall

first refer to the submissions made by the parties before us.

Mr. P.S. Nayak, learned State Counsel submits that the

present case involves:

(a) Murder of wife inside the matrimonial home.

10

1996) 2 SCC 175

Page 66 of 85

(b) 49 stab injuries inflicted with extreme brutality.

(c) Attempt to murder a helpless minor child by

slitting her throat and

(d) Breach of trust in relationship.

Mr. Nayak has referred to the leading decision of

the Supreme Court in the case of Bachan Singh v. State of

Punjab

11, wherein it was held that death penalty can only be

imposed in rarest of rare case. The crime test, criminal test

and rarest of rare test were further explained in the case of

Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra

12.

According to Mr. Nayak, the present case fully satisfies the

conditions laid in the aforequoted judgments and therefore,

capital punishment is appropriate having regard to the

exceptional depravity and brutality exhibited by the

condemned prisoner. Mr. Nayak also submits that the

aggravating circumstances overwhelmingly outweigh the

mitigating circumstances for which, no leniency whatsoever

ought to be shown to the condemned prisoner.

11

(1980) 2 SCC 684

12

(2013) 5 SCC 546

Page 67 of 85

48. Mr. S.C. Mohapatra, learned Amicus Curiae argues

that the trial Court has not strictly followed the mandate of

Section 235 of Cr.P.C. regarding the statutory imperative to

hear the convict before passing sentence. The judgment was

passed on 30.07.2024 and the accused was heard on the

question of sentence on the next day. No opportunity was

given to the convict to be heard nor he was allowed to adduce

evidence regarding mitigating circumstances. The contentions

put forth by the State Defence Counsel were not properly

discussed nor analyzed. The trial Court took a moral view to

award the death penalty. According to Mr. Mohapatra, the

condemned prisoner deserves a lenient consideration having

regard to the fact that he has no criminal antecedents prior to

the occurrence and his conduct in custody has been

exemplary, which denotes a possibility of reformation and

rehabilitation. Even though the crime may be depicted as

extreme brutal, the same by itself does not justify the death

penalty as prosecution could not show that he had criminal

tendencies. In support of his arguments, Mr. Mohapatra has

relied upon the following judgments of the Supreme Court:

Page 68 of 85

i. Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh

13

,

ii. Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of

Maharashtra

14

,

iii. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka

15

,

Additionally, Mr. Mohapatra has also relied upon

the judgment of this Court rendered in the case of State of

Odisha vs. Mohammed Mustak

16

.

Mr. Mohapatra sums up of his argument by

submitting that the Court must take into account the

possibility that a domestic quarrel had blown out of

proportion and the convict had acted in the manner he did in

a state of temporary insanity borne out of uncontrolled anger.

49. Having regard to the submissions, we shall first

refer to the relevant statutory provisions to see whether the

statutory mandate while sentencing the condemned prisoner

was properly followed or not. Section 235 Cr.P.C. reads as

follows:

“235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction. —(1)

After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the

Judge shall give a judgment in the case.

13

(2019) 12 SCC 438

14

(2002) 2 SCC 35

15

(2008) 13 SCC 767

16

(2024) 94 OCR 875

Page 69 of 85

(2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless

he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of

section 360, hear the accused on the questions of

sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to

law.”

Thus, hearing the convict on the question of

sentence is indeed a statutory imperative.

50. After going through the order sheet of the case

record as well as the impugned judgment and sentence, we

do not agree that the procedure laid down was not followed.

On the contrary, we are satisfied that the trial Court followed

the due procedure by hearing the condemned prisoner on the

question of sentence.

51. This takes us to the question whether the sentence

was proper or not. In this regard, we can do no better than to

refer to the oft-quoted judgments of the Supreme Court in

Bachan Singh (supra) and Machhi Singh v. State of

Punjab

17. The ‘rarest of rare test’ was first propounded in

Bachan Singh (supra). The following observations are

noteworthy.:

“164. Attuned to the legislative policy delineated in

Sections 354(3) and 235(2), propositions (iv)(a) and

17

(1983) 3 SCC 470

Page 70 of 85

(v)(b) in Jagmohan [(1973) 1 SCC 20 : 1973 SCC

(Cri) 169 : (1973) 2 SCR 541] shall have to be

recast and may be stated as below:

“(a) The normal rule is that the offence of murder

shall be punished with the sentence of life

imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule

and impose the sentence of death only if there are

special reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be

recorded in writing before imposing the death

sentence.

(b) While considering the question of sentence to be

imposed for the offence of murder under Section

302 of the Penal Code, the court must have regard

to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime

as well as the criminal. If the court finds, but not

otherwise, that the offence is of an exceptionally

depraved and heinous character and constitutes,

on account of its design and the manner of its

execution, a source of grave danger to the society at

large, the court may impose the death sentence.”

Law was further crystalized in Machhi Singh (supra),

wherein the Constitution Bench observed as follows:

“32. The reasons why the community as a whole

does not endorse the humanistic approach reflected

in “death sentence-in-no-case” doctrine are not far

to seek. In the first place, the very humanistic

edifice is constructed on the foundation of

“reverence for life” principle. When a member of the

community violates this very principle by killing

another member, the society may not feel itself

bound by the shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it

has to be realized that every member of the

community is able to live with safety without his or

her own life being endangered because of the

protective arm of the community and on account of

the rule of law enforced by it. The very existence of

the rule of law and the fear of being brought to

book operates as a deterrent for those who have no

scruples in killing others if it suits their ends. Every

member of the community owes a debt to the

Page 71 of 85

community for this protection. When ingratitude is

shown instead of gratitude by “killing” a member of

the community which protects the murderer himself

from being killed, or when the community feels that

for the sake of self-preservation the killer has to be

killed, the community may well withdraw the

protection by sanctioning the death penalty. But the

community will not do so in every case. It may do

so “in rarest of rare cases” when its collective

conscience is so shocked that it will expect the

holders of the judicial power centre to inflict death

penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as

regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death

penalty. The community may entertain such a

sentiment when the crime is viewed from the

platform of the motive for, or the manner of

commission of the crime, or the anti-social or

abhorrent nature of the crime, such as for instance:

I. Manner of commission of murder

33. When the murder is committed in an extremely

brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly

manner so as to arouse intense and extreme

indignation of the community. For instance,

(i) when the house of the victim is set aflame with

the end in view to roast him alive in the house.

(ii) when the victim is subjected to inhuman acts of

torture or cruelty in order to bring about his or her

death.

(iii) when the body of the victim is cut into pieces or

his body is dismembered in a fiendish manner.

II. Motive for commission of murder

34. When the murder is committed for a motive

which evinces total depravity and meanness. For

instance when (a) a hired assassin commits murder

for the sake of money or reward (b) a cold-blooded

murder is committed with a deliberate design in

order to inherit property or to gain control over

property of a ward or a person under the control of

the murderer or vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a

dominating position or in a position of trust, or (c) a

Page 72 of 85

murder is committed in the course for betrayal of

the motherland.

III. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the

crime

35. (a) When murder of a member of a Scheduled

Caste or minority community etc., is committed not

for personal reasons but in circumstances which

arouse social wrath. For instance when such a

crime is committed in order to terrorize such

persons and frighten them into fleeing from a place

or in order to deprive them of, or make them

surrender, lands or benefits conferred on them with

a view to reverse past injustices and in order to

restore the social balance.

36. When the crime is enormous in proportion. For

instance when multiple murders say of all or

almost all the members of a family or a large

number of persons of a particular caste,

community, or locality, are committed.

V. Personality of victim of murder

37. When the victim of murder is (a) an innocent

child who could not have or has not provided even

an excuse, much less a provocation, for murder (b)

a helpless woman or a person rendered helpless by

old age or infirmity (c) when the victim is a person

vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a position of

domination or trust (d) when the victim is a public

figure generally loved and respected by the

community for the services rendered by him and

the murder is committed for political or similar

reasons other than personal reasons.

38. In this background the guidelines indicated in

Bachan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC

(Cri) 580 : AIR 1980 SC 898 : 1980 Cri LJ 636] will

have to be culled out and applied to the facts of

each individual case where the question of

imposing of death sentence arises. The following

propositions emerge from Bachan Singh case

[(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR 1980

SC 898 : 1980 Cri LJ 636] :

Page 73 of 85

“(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be

inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme

culpability.

(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the

circumstances of the ‘offender’ also require to be

taken into consideration along with the

circumstances of the ‘crime’.

(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death

sentence is an exception. In other words death

sentence must be imposed only when life

imprisonment appears to be an altogether

inadequate punishment having regard to the

relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided,

and only provided, the option to impose sentence of

imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously

exercised having regard to the nature and

circumstances of the crime and all the relevant

circumstances.

(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so

the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded

full weightage and a just balance has to be struck

between the aggravating and the mitigating

circumstances before the option is exercised.

39. In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the

following questions may be asked and answered:

(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime

which renders sentence of imprisonment for life

inadequate and calls for a death sentence?

(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that

there is no alternative but to impose death sentence

even after according maximum weightage to the

mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of

the offender?

40. If upon taking an overall global view of all the

circumstances in the light of the aforesaid

proposition and taking into account the answers to

the questions posed hereinabove, the

circumstances of the case are such that death

sentence is warranted, the court would proceed to

do so.”

Page 74 of 85

52. Applying the tests laid down in the above

judgments, the following aspects need a careful

consideration.:

(i) Whether the case at hand is a case of extreme

culpability.

From the manner and nature of the crime, coupled

with the fact that the victim was a helpless and unarmed

lady, fresh from delivery of a child, the act has to be

designated as grave form of extreme culpability.

(ii) Whether the circumstances of the offender

entitle him to a lesser punishment.

In this regard we have scanned the evidence

carefully and find that there is absolutely no justification

much less any compelling reason for the condemned prisoner

to have acted in the manner he has. The only thing that

comes out from the evidence is that he was unemployed and

depended on his wife for his sustenance, which resulted in

frequent quarrels. Other than the above, there is nothing to

treat him with leniency.

Page 75 of 85

(iii) Whether the present case is one in which life

imprisonment would be an inadequate

punishment.

and,

(iv) Whether the mitigating circumstances, if any,

outweigh the aggravating circumstances.

From the facts of this case, we find the following aggravating

circumstances.

(a) The crime was committed inside the home with

the condemned prisoner taking undue

advantage of his wife, who was fresh from

delivery of child and therefore, can be

reasonably expected to be in a weak physical

condition already.

(b) The condemned prisoner appears to have

repeatedly stabbed the deceased 49 times

affecting both vital and non-vital parts of the

body and evidently in quick succession.

(c) The deceased attempted to save herself by

running from room to room but the condemned

Page 76 of 85

prisoner followed her and continued to assault

her as evidenced by the blood stains and blood

droplets appearing everywhere in the house.

(d) The condemned prisoner committed the crime in

a murderous spree without even bothering that

his daughter was witnessing his act.

(e) He did not hesitate to make an attempt on the

life of his 6 year-old daughter also by slitting her

throat. Had his daughter died, it would have

resulted in a case of double murder.

(f) The condemned prisoner appearing before us

though video-conference mode did not express

any remorse whatsoever for the act committed

by him.

(g) He claimed to be falsely entangled without

specifying by whom or for what reason.

Having noted the aggravating circumstances, we shall now

list the mitigating circumstances working in favour of the

condemned prisoner, which are as follows:

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(a) There is no evidence of any prior assault by the

condemned prisoner against his wife or daughter

but only quarrel, which is not unnatural in a

domestic relationship.

(b) Most of the knife blows were inflicted on non-

vital parts of the body such as, lower and upper

limbs.

(c) Prosecution failed to establish a definite motive

for the condemned prisoner to commit the crime.

(d) The possibility that the quarrel between

husband and wife arose leading to heated

arguments during which the condemned

prisoner was blinded by rage resulting in

temporary suspension of his rationality which

made him further blind to the consequences of

his act, cannot be ruled out entirely.

(e) The accused did not exhibit any enmity towards

his family earlier as evident from the assertion of

his daughter that her father loved her.

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(f) The condemned prisoner does not have any

criminal antecedents.

(g) His conduct while in custody has been good as

satisfied by the jail authorities.

(h) The condemned prisoner has been practicing

yoga, meditation and engaging himself in

productive activities like reading

newspaper/magazines and watching television,

which suggests the possibility of reformation.

53. Turning to the sentence imposed by the trial Court

for a moment we find that it has referred to the principles

governing aggravating and mitigating circumstances laid

down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramnaresh v.

State of Chhattisgarh

18, but has itself not listed or

determined such circumstances referring to the evidence and

materials on record. The trial Court has only enumerated

what the SDC and additional PP referred to as mitigating and

aggravating circumstances respectively. The requirement of

determining the balance between the two has not really been

made, instead, the trial Court has digressed at length into the

18

(2012) 4 SCC 257

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so-called emotional and psychological trauma suffered by the

victim of this case. It has also dwelt upon, in great detail, the

trauma suffered and to be suffered by the child victims. The

trial Court has evidently been actuated by the desire to

ensure a measure of justice for the child victim’s mother and

the children themselves for the wrong done to them. The trial

Court has also referred to the community’s sense of moral

order and the victim’s dignity.

54. While much of what has been narrated by the trial

Court cannot be disputed or denied from a moral or ethical

point of view, yet we are constrained to hold that an

emotional or moral approach has no place in law. Law moves

on hard facts alone. We are further constrained to opine that

apparently in its zeal to paint the case as rarest of rare, the

trial Court ignored the legal requirement of balancing

aggravating and mitigating circumstances and embarked

upon a moral journey laced with highly emotive

considerations. We are unable to concur with such approach,

which to us, is bereft of legal reasoning.

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55. Coming back to the circumstances noted by us, we

are one with the trial Court that the offence is extremely

barbaric, brutal and depicts a heightened sense of depravity.

But the same, in our considered view, would still not satisfy

the test of ‘rarest of rare’. According to us, the mitigating

circumstances noted above outweigh the aggravating ones.

56. Having held as above, the next question that falls

for consideration is what then would be the adequate

punishment. Ordinarily, a person convicted of murder, if not

sentenced to death is to be punished with imprisonment for

life. However, according to us, life imprisonment simplicitor

would also not be commensurate to the crime. We say so for

the reason that in actual practice, life imprisonment can be

restricted to only 14 years as the condemned prisoner would

thereafter be entitled to be considered for premature release

as per Section 433 of Cr.P.C. The occurrence took place in

the year 2022. Four years have passed by. So technically, the

condemned prisoner would be entitled to remission of his

sentence after serving 10 more years of imprisonment. So,

while death penalty has been held by us to be not

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appropriate, life imprisonment simplicitor would not also be

adequate. It is difficult to envisage the condemned prisoner

returning home after spending only 10 more years in prison

or thereabouts, to his daughters, one of whom he attempted

to kill and other had come to the world only three days

earlier. In such cases, the Supreme Court has laid down the

principle of expanded option of life imprisonment. To amplify,

in the case of Swamy Shraddananda (supra) the Supreme

Court held as follows:

“92. xxxxxxxxxxx. If the Court's option is limited

only to two punishments, one a sentence of

imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not

more than 14 years and the other death, the Court

may feel tempted and find itself nudged into

endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would

indeed be disastrous. A far more just, reasonable

and proper course would be to expand the options

and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully

belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14

years' imprisonment and death. It needs to be

emphasised that the Court would take recourse to

the expanded option primarily because in the facts

of the case, the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment

would amount to no punishment at all.”

57. Applying the principle to the present case we

take note of the age of the convict at the time of commission

of the offence i.e., 46 years. This makes him aged about 50

years at present. Taking into consideration all factors, we are

of the considered view that the sentence of imprisonment for

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life with cap of 35 years in custody for being entitled for

remission, shall adequately meet the ends of justice. In other

words, the condemned prisoner shall not be eligible to be

considered for remission as per law unless he has served a

minimum of thirty-five years in prison in total. The period of

imprisonment already undergone shall be set-off against the

above period.

58. The Death Reference is answered accordingly.

59. The JCRLA is allowed in part. The impugned

judgment of conviction in so far as it relates to the offence

under Section 302 IPC and the judgment and sentence in so

far as it relates to the offence under Section 307 IPC are

confirmed and the judgment and sentence in so far as it

relates to the offence under Sections 326 and 324 IPC are set

aside. Further, the sentence of death in respect of the offence

under Section 302 IPC is modified in terms of paragraph 57

of this judgment.

60. Before parting, we would like to consider the

question of compensation to the victims. It is stated at the

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Bar that the two minor daughters were granted compensation

of Rs.5 lakhs each by the District Legal Services Authority,

Khurda at Bhubaneswar under the Victim Compensation

Scheme, but the same was refused to be accepted by the

paternal grandmother of the victims with whom they are

presently residing. Looking at the tender age of the two

children, 10 and 4 years, we feel that their future, in the

absence of their parents, needs to be secured to the extent

possible. While we are conscious that no amount of monetary

recompense can possibly assuage their loss and the lingering

trauma for the rest of their lives, yet a reasonably adequate

sum as compensation would afford protection to them as also

help to build their lives as decently as is possible. Therefore,

notwithstanding the amount already awarded as

compensation by the DLSA, we direct the State to pay a sum

of Rs.10 lakhs each to the child victims. Said amounts shall

be kept in fixed deposit in any Nationalized Bank, preferably

State Bank of India at Bhubaneswar in the names of the

victims represented by the Secretary, DLSA, Khurdha till they

attain majority. The amounts awarded earlier by the DLSA

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shall also be kept in fixed deposit in the names of the victims

represented by the Secretary DLSA, Khurdha at

Bhubaneswar till they attain majority. The Bank shall render

full cooperation in opening of the fixed deposit amounts. We

further direct the DLSA, Khurdha to regularly monitor the

condition of the victims by sending Para-legal Volunteers

(PLVs), preferably lady PLVs to their residence so as to ensure

that they are not deprived of any fundamental requirement of

life by also interacting with the children themselves. The

PLVs so deputed shall submit report to the Chairman, DLSA

once in every six-months without fail till the child victims

attain the age of majority.

61. We also place on record our deep appreciation for

the able assistance rendered by Mr. Soura Chandra

Mohapatra, learned Senior Counsel, who was appointed as

Amicus Curiae to defend the condemned prisoner/appellant.

We were greatly benefited by his meticulous analysis and

incisive arguments. We assess his professional fee at

Rs.50,000/-, to be paid by the Odisha State Legal Services

Authority. We also place on record our appreciation for the

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assistance rendered by Mr. Partha Sarathi Nayak, learned

State Counsel for his fair and effective manner of conducting

the case on behalf of the State.

..........................................

(Sashikanta Mishra, J)

Manash Ranjan Pathak, J. I agree.

…........................................

(Manash Ranjan Pathak, J)

Orissa High Court, Cuttack

The 25

th August, 2026/A.K. Rana, P.A.