As per case facts, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was convicted and sentenced to death for his alleged involvement in a devastating bomb blast on a Rajasthan Roadways bus in ...
2026 INSC 734 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . 1827-1829 OF 2019
DR. ABDUL HAMEED ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF RAJASTHAN ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s). 621 of 2020)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s). 571 of 2020
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . 1830 OF 2019
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s). 681 of 2020)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s). 143 of 2020)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S) . OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No(s). 3531 of 2021)
2
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
For clarity of exposition and to facilitate structured
consideration of the issues arising in the present
matter, this judgment has been organised under the
following heads: -
Table of Contents
I. THE PROLOGUE ................................................ 4
II. PROSECUTION’S STORY .................................. 9
A. Facts leading to the registration of FIR: .... 10
B. Investigation conducted by the State Police:
12
B.1. Expansion of Investigation and Alleged
Conspiracy ...................................................... 15
B.2. Investigation Concerning the Alleged
Operational Network ........................................ 18
B.3. Investigation Relating to Dr. Abdul Hameed
and Other Accused .......................................... 21
C. Details of the Chargesheet: ........................ 27
III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT .. 30
A. All the accused persons except Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim ................................................... 30
B. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim ................... 39
IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT ... 43
3
V. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
PERSONS ............................................................. 52
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed ................ 52
B. Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No. 2 -
Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4 -Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6 -
Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10 -Raees
Baeg .................................................................. 77
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim ................... 81
VI. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF
RAJASTHAN ......................................................... 88
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed ................ 88
B. Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No. 2 -
Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4 -Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6 -
Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10 -Raees
Baeg ................................................................ 105
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim ................. 109
VII. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
ARISING FOR DETERMINATION .......................... 115
A. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed ................................... 116
Whether the trial culminating in the conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was conducted in
a manner consistent with the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial and the requirements of
due process of law? ....................................... 118
4
B. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the Ancillary Issues
Arising Therefrom ........................................... 142
C. Challenge to the Acquittal of Accused No. 1 -
Javed Khan, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No.
4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali
Bhatt, Accused No. 6 -Mirza Nisar Hussain and
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg .............................. 159
D. Conclusion .................................................. 175
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
I. THE PROLOGUE
3. The history of civilization is, in many aspects, a
history of conflict, of order emerging from disorder
and of laws fashioned to restrain the chaos that often
lurks beneath human ambition. Throughout history
wherever human life has thrived, discord and
dissension have followed. Wherever human societies
have flourished, there have inevitably arisen forces
seeking to disturb the delicate balance upon which
collective existence depends. The advancement of
civilization has therefore been accompanied by a
parallel evolution of legal institutions designed to
5
regulate human conduct, resolve disputes, and
safeguard the social order from those who threaten
its stability. At the heart of every organized legal
system lies the recognition that while liberty is
indispensable to human progress, it must coexist
with responsibility, discipline, and respect for the
rights and security of others.
3.1. Throughout history, societies have been
confronted by individuals and groups who, driven by
motives ranging from personal gain to ideological
fanaticism, have sought to undermine public peace
and security. The law has evolved not merely as an
instrument of punishment but as a civilizational
response to such threats. Its purpose extends beyond
the imposition of sanctions, it seeks to preserve
public confidence in the administration of justice,
maintain societal equilibrium, and ensure that the
response to crime remains governed by reason rather
than emotion. In a constitutional democracy
governed by the rule of law, the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system is measured not by the
severity of its punishments but by the fairness of the
processes through which guilt is determined.
6
3.2. The true measure of justice does not lie in the
swiftness of retribution, but in the discipline of
restraint. It is a canonical maxim of criminal
jurisprudence that it is better for a hundred guilty
persons to escape than for one innocent person to be
condemned and punished. This principle is neither a
concession to crime nor a sign of institutional
weakness, rather, it reflects the profound value that
the law places upon individual liberty and human
dignity. The criminal process is therefore structured
around safeguards intended to minimize the
possibility of wrongful conviction. Even where
suspicion appears strong, public sentiment runs
high, or the allegations are of the gravest character,
the law insists that guilt must be established through
legally admissible, reliable, and convincing evidence.
3.3. It is for this reason that the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial occupies a position of
paramount importance in our legal system. The right
to effective legal representation, the presumption of
innocence, the burden upon the prosecution to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the
requirement that evidence be scrutinized with
objectivity and caution are not mere procedural
7
formalities. They are substantive guarantees that
distinguish the rule of law from the rule of public
opinion. Justice must not only be done but must
manifestly be seen to be done. The legitimacy of a
judicial verdict rests not merely upon the outcome
reached, but equally upon the fairness,
transparency, and integrity of the process by which
that outcome is achieved.
3.4. These principles assume even greater
significance when Courts are confronted with
offences that shock the collective conscience of
society. Acts of violence directed against innocent
civilians, particularly those involving the use of
explosives in public spaces, strike at the very
foundations of social order an d generate
understandable feelings of fear, grief, and outrage.
Yet, it is precisely in such cases that Courts must
remain steadfast in their adherence to constitutional
values. The gravity of the allegation cannot be
permitted to dilute the standard of proof, nor can the
enormity of the crime justify a departure from the
settled principles governing criminal adjudication.
The greater the public outcry, the greater becomes
the responsibility of the Court to ensure that the
8
determination of guilt is based solely upon law and
evidence.
3.5. The factual matrix of the present case,
challenges the above principles to the hilt. The
allegations pertain to a devastating bomb blast that
occurred inside a Rajasthan Roadways bus near
Samleti village while it was travelling from Agra
towards Bikaner. The explosion claimed the lives of
fourteen innocent persons and left numerous others
seriously injured, causing immeasurable human
suffering and widespread public anguish. The
incident was not merely a crime against individual
victims but an assault upon public peace and
security itself, thereby warranting the most careful
and rigorous judicial scrutiny.
3.6. The appeals before us arise from a complex and
protracted prosecution spanning nearly three
decades in which the Courts below returned differing
conclusions regarding the culpability of the accused
persons. While two accused persons came to be
convicted and were awarded the sentence of death
and imprisonment for life respectively, as many as
seven other accused persons were ultimately
9
acquitted for want of sufficient evidence connecting
them with the crime. It is pertinent to note that
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has remained
incarcerated for almost twenty-nine years, whereas,
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim stands released on
parole after having served more than twenty-three
years of imprisonment. In these circumstances, the
task before this Court is not merely to examine the
gravity of the occurrence, which is undeniable, but to
determine, upon a meticulous appraisal of the
voluminous record, whether the findings of guilt
recorded against the convicted accused withstand
the rigorous standards of proof mandated by criminal
law and whether the acquittals recorded in favour of
the remaining accused call for any interference.
II. PROSECUTION’S STORY
4. The prosecution case emerging from the record,
as also set out by the Courts below in the impugned
judgments, is as under: -
10
A. Facts leading to the registration of FIR:
4.1. On 22
nd May, 1996, at about 4:00 PM, the
complainant, i.e., Ashok Kumar (PW -46)
1 the
conductor on duty in the public transport bus,
bearing registration number RJ-07-P-1038, en-route
from Agra to Bikaner gave a parcha statement
2 to
Sub-Inspector Bhawar Singh, Station House Officer,
Police Station Mahwa alleging, inter alia, that the bus
which was being driven by Ramji Lal left Agra at
11:00 AM with about 49 -50 passengers. Two
passengers had boarded the bus from Agra and
purchased tickets up to Jaipur. However, they got
down at Mahwa and returned the tickets to the
conductor (PW-46) asking him to use the said tickets
by issuing them to help some other needy
passengers. The conductor (PW-46) further stated
that both the aforesaid passengers appeared to be
approximately 27-28 years of age and were
conversing in Hindi.
4.2. As the bus continued its journey from Mahwa,
the conductor (PW-46) in order to issue tickets to the
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “conductor (PW-46)”.
2
Exhibit P-23.
11
three police constables including a lady constable
went towards the rear end of the bus to the seats
which these persons had occupied. After the bus had
travelled about 3-4 kilometers from Mahwa towards
Dausa, and had reached near village Samleti, a
powerful explosion went off inside the bus. The
impact of the explosion was devastating. The roof,
windows and gate of the bus were blown apart;
passengers were hurled from their seats and luggage
was scattered over a considerable distance. The
conductor (PW-46) himself sustained injuries and
reported impairment of hearing owing to the intensity
of the blast. Several passengers died on the spot,
while many others suffered grievous injuries.
4.3. It was further alleged in the complaint that the
explosion had been caused by a powerful bomb or
other explosive substance and appeared to be the
outcome of a pre-planned conspiracy intended to
cause large-scale loss of life and destruction of
property. On the basis of the said complaint, FIR
bearing Crime No. 148 of 1996 came to be registered
on 22
nd May, 1996 at Police Station Mahwa, District
Dausa against unknown persons for the offences
punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 120 -B of
12
Indian Penal Code, 1860
3; Sections 4 and 5 of
Explosive Substances Act, 1908
4; and Section 3 of
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984.
5
4.4. Pursuant to the registration of the aforesaid
FIR, the high-ranking police officials of District
Dausa; CID (Crime Branch); and a team of experts
from the Forensic Science Laboratory rushed to the
place of occurrence and commenced the proceedings.
The investigation of the case was entrusted to Liyakat
Ali Khan, Additional Police Commissioner, Dausa
(PW-75)
6.
B. Investigation conducted by the State Police:
5. The crime scene was immediately secured. A
specialised forensic team carried out a
comprehensive examination of the site, collected
physical evidence and undertook scientific analysis
to find out the precise cause of the explosion.
Preliminary expert assessments suggested the use of
a high-grade explosive, most likely RDX, though
certain opinions also pointed towards the possible
3
Hereinafter, referred to as the “IPC”.
4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Explosive Substances Act”.
5
Hereinafter, referred to as the “PDPP Act”.
6
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Investigation Officer (PW-75)”.
13
use of dynamite. The said opinion was founded upon
the pattern of destruction observed on the seats and
the bus floor directly beneath them.
5.1. During the investigation, it emerged that the
explosion had claimed the lives of fourteen
passengers and left thirty-seven others injured, with
some of them suffering serious injuries.
Panchayatnamas were prepared and thereafter, the
dead bodies were sent for post-mortem examination.
The injured passengers were initially shifted to
nearby hospitals at Todabheem, Dausa and Mahwa
and were thereafter referred to Jaipur for specialised
treatment. The site plan was prepared, the damaged
bus was seized, and all relevant material evidence
was collected. The loss caused to public property was
assessed at Rs.5,49,614.22/- (Rupees Five Lakh
Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Fourteen and
Twenty-Two Paise Only) on the basis of the report
received from the General Manager (Accidents &
Training), RSRTC
7, Jaipur. Post-mortem reports of
the deceased persons and injury reports of the
injured persons were obtained.
7
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation.
14
5.2. The conductor (PW -46) produced the two
returned tickets bearing seat Nos. 22 and 23, on their
back-side, that were issued by him to the two
suspected individuals who were travelling from Agra
to Jaipur. According to him the said suspected
passengers had gotten down in Mahwa, one stop
before the bomb blast occurred instead of their final
destination for which they had bought the tickets i.e.,
Jaipur. The investigating agency treated these tickets
as an important lead, particularly because the two
passengers had abandoned their onward journey
shortly before the explosion raising grave doubts
about their role in the incident.
5.3. Acting upon the lead provided by the conductor
(PW-46), and duly corroborated by the statements of
several surviving passengers, the investigating
agency identified the aforesaid passengers as persons
of interest. Witness accounts, including those of
passengers seated in close proximity to the suspects,
revealed that the two individuals had initially
occupied seats 22 and 23, with one of them
subsequently shifting to seat 41. It is the case of the
prosecution that in view of these consistent accounts
and detailed descriptions, rough sketches of the
15
suspects were prepared and circulated widely
through newspapers and law-enforcement agencies
across multiple States, particularly Punjab, Delhi,
and Jammu & Kashmir. The seriousness of the
incident, coupled with indications of the involvement
of organized extremist groups, also prompted the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Rajasthan,
to undertake a parallel and intensive investigation.
B.1. Expansion of Investigation and Alleged
Conspiracy
5.4. The investigation acquired a wider dimension
when Farooq Ahmed Engineer (Vice Chairman,
Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front
8) took the
responsibility for carrying out the explosion at Dausa
by making calls to news agencies like NDTV, Zee
News and BBC, Delhi. This development assumed
significance during investigation as he had also
allegedly claimed responsibility for the Lajpat Nagar
bomb blast in Delhi. The ensuing inquiry was
expanded to examine the involvement of extremist
organisations and the possibility of a broader
conspiracy. During interrogation in connection with
8
For short, “JKIF”.
16
the Lajpat Nagar bomb blast case, Farooq Ahmed
Engineer disclosed that both the Samleti and Delhi
blasts had been conceived under the leadership of
Bilal Ahmed Baeg, Chairman of JKIF, with the
objective of creating an atmosphere of terror ,
instability, and fear, and thereby disrupting the
electoral process in Kashmir.
5.5. On 24
th May, 1996, the file was transferred to
the Crime Branch for further investigation. Pursuant
thereto, a team was formed under the supervision of
Police Commissioner-I, CID (CB), Jaipur and further
investigation was assigned to the Additional Police
Commissioner. Thereafter, several specialised teams
were constituted to investigate different angles of the
conspiracy, including identification of suspects,
tracing their movements, collection of intelligence
inputs, and coordinating with law -enforcement
agencies in Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh,
Gujarat and Nepal.
5.6. On 25
th May, 1996 the Investigation Team
headed by the Additional Police Commissioner
prepared the seating plan of the bus with the help of
the surviving injured passengers. Meanwhile, on 26
th
17
May, 1996 the Superintendent of Police (Operation),
Srinagar informed the Rajasthan state police that
they had arrested Farukh Ahmad Khan (Accused No.
3-Farukh Ahmed Khan @ Swaroop Baba @ Anwar )
and Smt. Farida.
5.7. The State Forensic Science Laboratory
Rajasthan, Nehru Nagar, Jaipur
9 submitted its
report
10 on 28
th May, 1996. It was opined therein that
a very powerful explosive substance was used in the
bomb blast and the device containing the bomb was
planted under seat Nos. 17 and 18 which were in the
row ahead of seat Nos. 22 and 23. The reason for the
said opinion was the extent of damage that was
caused to these seats and the bus floor beneath
them. The FSL experts also opined that there was a
possibility that the explosive device was timer-
operated and had detonated while the bus was in
motion. In another FSL report dated 9
th September,
1996
11, it was opined that the amount of explosive
substance (RDX) that was used in the present bus
explosion was approximately 2.5 Kilograms.
9
Hereinafter, being referred to as “FSL”.
10
Exhibit P-175.
11
Exhibit P-182.
18
B.2. Investigation Concerning the Alleged
Operational Network
5.8. According to the police, the breakthrough came
with the arrest of Farooq Ahmed Engineer in
connection with the Lajpat Nagar bomb blast case.
Upon interrogation, it was revealed that the bomb
blasts at Delhi and Dausa were planned and carried
out under the leadership of Bilal Ahmed Baeg
(Chairman, JKIF) with the objective of spreading
violence in the country in response to the delay in
conducting the elections in Kashmir, which were
scheduled to take place in May, 1996. The accused
persons who played an impo rtant role in the
aforesaid conspiracy inter alia included, Accused No.
1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior
12 and Accused No. 2-
Abdul Goni @ Asadulla @ Nasaruddin @ Nikka @
Umer @ Majeed Khan @ Raja
13, who were arrested
from Ahmedabad on 15
th June, 1996 and 17
th June,
1996 respectively. Later, the police also apprehended
Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan @ Swaroop Baba
@ Anwar
14; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja
15;
12
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 1-Javed Khan”.
13
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni”.
14
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan”.
15
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja”.
19
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood
Keeley
16; and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @
Naja
17, from Delhi on 25
th June, 1996; 4
th July,
1996, 19
th July, 1996 and 27
th July, 1996
respectively.
5.9. Based on the extensive interrogation of the
aforesaid accused persons, it came to light that Bilal
Ahmed Baeg, former chief of JKIF and Khurshid Baeg
@ Naeem had gathered a few terrorists hailing from
Punjab and carried out bomb blasts in certain areas
of Delhi and nearby places. In this regard, Accused
No. 7-Kulwinderjit Singh @ Happy
18, was also
arrested on 3
rd August, 1996 on the ground that he
was operating the Khalistan Liberation Tiger Force, a
proscribed organization. The prosecution further
alleged that the conspiracy had been conceived
outside India and executed through operatives
functioning in different States. During investigation,
material was collected regarding the movements of
several accused persons/suspects between Pakistan,
Nepal, Delhi, Ahmedabad and other locations.
16
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt”.
17
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain”.
18
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 7-Kulwinderjit Singh”.
20
Reliance was placed upon travel records, statements
of co-accused, telephone records, diaries allegedly
recovered during investigation, and intelligence
inputs gathered by various agencies.
5.10. On 16
th March, 1997, Accused No. 8-Riaz
Ahmad Sheikh @ Maulvi
19 came to be arrested on the
suspicion that he had manufactured the bomb which
was used to cause the explosion in the present case.
Upon his interrogation and based on the information
from other sources, it was found that Shahji Group
of Harkat-ul-Ansar and Bilal Ahmed Baeg (Chairman,
JKIF) had conspired to carry out explosions in
different cities of the country. According to the
prosecution, members of these banned organisations
constituted a network that facilitated the
procurement of explosives, movement of operatives,
communication between conspirators and execution
of the planned acts of violence. The prosecution
further alleged that the Samleti bus explosion formed
one component of a broader campaign intended to
spread fear and disrupt public order in the country.
19
Hereinafter, being referred to as “Accused No. 8-Riaz Ahmad Sheikh”.
21
B.3. Investigation Relating to Dr. Abdul Hameed
and Other Accused
5.11. The prosecution’s case further rests on a
letter purportedly received by the CID (Crime Branch)
on 4
th June, 1997, in which the involvement of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, Accused No. 10-
Raees Baeg and Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim in
the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case
20 which took
place on 26
th January, 1996 was indicated. However,
notably, the said letter was never brought on record
of the case. The prosecution further claims that the
aforesaid accused persons were related to Harkat-ul-
Ansar. Based on the interrogation notes of an
accused named Abdul Mateen @ Iqbal involved in the
Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg were
arrested in the said case from Firozabad and Agra
respectively. It was found that the facial features of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed matched the
description of one of the suspects who was sitting on
seat No. 23 of the bus involved in the Samleti Bus
bomb blast case. The prosecution heavily relied upon
20
FIR No. 39 of 1996.
22
the Test Identification Proceedings conducted
subsequently and the similarity between the facial
sketches prepared during investigation and the
appearance of Dr. Abdul Hameed, who was arrested
in the instant bomb blast case on 26
th June, 1997.
The prosecution further claimed that Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed suffered a disclosure statement in
which he admitted that he along with Abdullah had
purchased one biscuit packet from Shirdiwale Sai
Baba Tea-stall at Bharatpur Bus stand while they
were travelling to Jaipur. The said accused further
admitted that he had also purchased a Bal Hans book
from Ashok Book Stall situated at the same bus
stand.
5.12. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was arrested
in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case on 28
th July,
1997 and his statement under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
21 was recorded. In the said
statement, the name of Accused No. 11 -Chandra
Prakash Agarwal surfaced and his premises were
identified, pursuant to which a search was conducted
21
For short, “IEA”.
23
and an alleged recovery of explosive material, namely
dynamite, was effected.
5.13. Thereafter, the confessional statement of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim came to be recorded
under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973
22 on 9
th September, 1997 in the Jaipur Stadium
bomb blast case. According to the prosecution, the
said statement provided a detailed first-hand account
of the activities of one Salaar, who was alleged to be
closely associated with operatives linked to Harkat-
ul-Ansar and other extremist organizations. In his
statement, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim narrated
that Salaar had initially established contact with
residents of Village Fareh under the guise of religious
and charitable activities connected with a local
seminary. Over a period of time, Salaar allegedly
developed close links with the management of the
seminary and used the premises for meetings with
various individuals who were subsequently identified
during investigation as persons involved in the
conspiracy. The statement further disclosed that
several persons, including Accused No. 8 -Riaz
22
For short, “CrPC”.
24
Ahmad Sheikh, Abdullah, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, Zilani, Iqbal and Yusuf, were frequent
visitors to the seminary and participated in activities
which, according to the prosecution, were connected
with the larger conspiracy and the nefarious plan to
cause the bomb blasts at various locations in India.
5.14. The prosecution further relied upon the
confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim to trace the procurement and movement of
explosive substances. According to the said
statement, Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had
accompanied Salaar and his associates on several
occasions to Roopwas in Rajasthan, where meetings
were held with Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash
Agarwal. During these visits, cartons purportedly
containing ordinary commercial goods were allegedly
procured and transported to the seminary at Fareh.
The prosecution case is that Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim subsequently came to know that the
contents of these cartons comprised explosive
substances. The statement further described the
storage of such material at the seminary, its transfer
into iron drums, and its subsequent transportation
through different channels to other locations. The
25
prosecution also relied on this statement to explain
the roles allegedly played by various conspirators in
arranging finances, transportation, accommodation
and other logistical support for the movement of the
explosive material.
5.15. According to the prosecution, the
statement further furnished details regarding a series
of meetings allegedly held at a seminary situated at
Village Fareh where different participants discussed
the execution of proposed explosions at various
locations. The statement referred to the presence of
several persons, including Salaar, Abdul Samad,
Iqbal, Yusuf, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and
others, at such meetings. The prosecution further
alleged that the statement disclosed about the
movement of explosive material from Fareh village to
Firozabad and the use of certain premises there for
storing and assembling explosive devices.
Significantly, the prosecution relied upon Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim’s statement to contend that,
after the Samleti bus explosion, Salaar informed him
that the timer used in the device had been procured
through Accused No. 8-Riaz Ahmad Sheikh and that
the explosive device had been placed in the bus by
26
Abdullah Dabran and Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, both of whom allegedly disembarked at
Mahwa before the explosion occurred. According to
the prosecution, the disclosures made by Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim enabled the investigating
agency to identify additional suspects, trace various
locations connected with the conspiracy, effect
recoveries of explosive substances and reconstruct
the sequence of events leading to the occurrence in
question. On the basis of the material gathered
during investigation, including the aforesaid
disclosures and recoveries, Accused No. 11-Chandra
Prakash Agarwal came to be arrested on 15
th
September, 1997.
5.16. The prosecution claimed that the cumulative
effect of the aforesaid arrests and interrogation of
accused persons and the consequent disclosures and
recoveries, was the unearthing of the entire
conspiracy. It was found that the instant bomb blast
case was a joint conspiracy of two terrorist
organizations i.e., JKIF and Harkat-ul-Ansar which
was hatched in Pakistan by Bilal Ahmed Baeg
(Chairman, JKIF) and Shahji (associated with
Harkat-ul-Ansar). This plan was allegedly the
27
brainchild of Colonel Farooq of the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan and Tiger Memon (main
accused of the Bombay Bomb blast case), whose
primary objective was to spread violence and terror
in India before the May, 1996 elections which were to
be held in Kashmir.
C. Details of the Chargesheet:
6. On the basis of the aforesaid investigation,
including the statements recorded, the recoveries
effected, the material collected from various
locations, and the alleged links established between
the accused persons, the investigating agency
proceeded against the persons allegedly found to be
involved in the offences under investigation.
Accordingly, in relation to the present FIR dated 22
nd
May, 1996, which came to be registered in connection
with Samleti Bus bomb blast case, the police
submitted chargesheet against the accused persons
alleged to be involved in the commission of the
offences in question. As the investigation progressed
and additional material was gathered, supplementary
chargesheets were filed from time to ti me,
28
incorporating further evidence and the alleged
involvement of other accused persons.
6.1. The particulars of all the accused persons and
the offences for which they were charged are
furnished hereunder in tabular form: -
Chargesheet
Details
Accused Details Sections Charged
Chargesheet No.
133 of 1996
submitted on 12
th
September, 1996.
Accused No. 1 -
Javed Khan @
Javed Junior
Accused No. 2 -
Abdul Goni @
Asadulla @
Nasaruddin @
Nikka @ Umer @
Majeed Khan @
Raja
Accused No. 3 -
Farukh Ahmed
Khan @ Swaroop
Baba @ Anwar
Accused No. 4 -
Lateef Ahmad Baja
Sections 115, 117,
118, 176, 302, 307
& 120B of IPC;
Sections 4 & 5,
Explosive
Substances Act;
and Section 3 of
PDPP Act.
Supplementary-1:
Chargesheet No.
133A of 1996
submitted on 16
th
October, 1996.
Accused No. 5 -
Mohammad Ali
Bhatt @
Mehamood Keeley
Accused No. 6 -
Mirza Nisar
Hussain @ Naja
-do-
Chargesheet not
filed against
29
Accused No. 7 -
Kulwinderjit Singh
@ Happy.
However, on 6
th
November, 1996,
the trial Court
took cognizance
against the said
accused.
Supplementary-2:
Chargesheet No.
133B of 1996
submitted on 18
th
June, 1997.
Accused No. 8 -
Riaz Ahmad
Sheikh @ Maulvi
-do-
Supplementary-3:
Chargesheet No.
133C of 1996
submitted on 23
rd
September, 1997.
Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed
Accused No. 10-
Raees Baeg
Accused No. 11-
Chandra Prakash
Agarwal
-do-
Supplementary-4:
Chargesheet No.
133D of 1996
submitted on 12
th
September, 2014.
Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim
Sections 115, 117,
118, 193, 302, 307
& 120B of IPC;
Sections 4 & 5,
Explosive
Substances Act;
and Section 3 & 4
of PDPP Act.
30
III. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT
A. All the accused persons except Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim
7. Pursuant to the chargesheet being filed, the
Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dausa
vide order dated 23
rd April, 1997 committed the case
to the Court of Sessions Judge, Dausa. During the
pendency of trial, Accused No. 8-Riaz Ahmad Sheikh
died and therefore, the criminal proceedings initiated
against him were dropped on 24
th August, 1999.
Subsequently, Additional Sessions Judge, Bandikui
vide order dated 15
th February, 2003, discharged
Accused No. 7-Kulwinderjit Singh of the charges
levelled against him. Ultimately, trial of the case
23
against the remaining accused persons was
commenced before the Court of Additional Sessions
Judge, Bandikui Camp-Mahawa, District Dausa.
24
7.1. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur
25 vide order dated 9
th November,
2013, allowed the quashing petition
26 filed by
23
Sessions Case No. 35 of 2011.
24
Hereinafter, referred to as the “trial Court”.
25
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
26
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 2890 of 2013.
31
Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal and
quashed the proceedings of the case, in respect of the
said accused person. In compliance of the aforesaid
order, the trial Court vide order dated 9
th January,
2014, dropped the proceedings against Accused No.
11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal . The trial therefore
proceeded only against the remaining 8 accused
persons. It may be noted that, owing to the non-
production of certain accused from different prisons,
the proceedings against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg, and Accused
No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal were initially
conducted separately, during which the prosecution
examined as many as 81 witnesses between 28
th
March, 2003 to 7
th August, 2008. Subsequently,
upon charges being framed against the remaining
accused persons in the year 2012, they adopted the
testimonies of the said 81 witnesses already recorded
in the case, and the trial proceeded on that basis. The
prosecution examined 99 witnesses and exhibited
197 documents and 8 articles in order to bring home
the charges against the accused persons.
7.2. Thereafter, the statements of the accused
persons were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC,
32
wherein they denied all incriminating circumstances
put to them, asserted their innocence, and claimed
false implication. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
specifically stated that he had been falsely implicated
in the present case after his arrest in connection with
another criminal case and denied having furnished
any disclosure statement or having participated in
any identification or site verification proceedings
attributed to him by the prosecution. In support of
his defence, Accused No. 9 -Dr. Abdul Hamee d
examined himself under Section 315 of CrPC and
exhibited 15 documents, including statements of
prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 of
CrPC, records pertaining to the arrest and pardon
proceedings of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, and
the subsequent statements made by the latter in the
year 2011.
7.3. The trial Court vide judgment dated 29
th
September, 2014, concluded that based on the
evidence on record, the prosecution was successful
in proving the charges against Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed, Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused
No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja,
33
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6-
Mirza Nisar Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
7.4. The trial Court upon holistic appreciation of the
evidence available on record, including the accounts
of eye witnesses (surviving passengers of the bus
bomb blast) and scientific evidence, concluded that
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and his associate
Abdullah were the passengers who occupied seat
Nos. 22 and 23 on the ill-fated bus. They
clandestinely placed their luggage, in which they had
carried the explosive substance, under seat Nos. 17
and 18 which were in front of their seats. The
scientific evidence corroborated this aspect
elaborating that the maximum impact of the bomb
blast occurred at seat Nos. 17 and 18.
7.5. On the strength of this cumulative analysis of
evidence, the trial Court returned a finding of guilt
against the Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and
others for their involvement in the bomb blast that
occurred on 22
nd May, 1996 aboard the Rajasthan
Roadways bus near Samleti village. The conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was primarily
founded on the testimony of the conductor (PW-46),
34
who identified the said accused as one of the two
young men who alighted from the bus at Mahwa and,
notably, returned their unused tickets with a peculiar
and notable remark that they may be used to help a
poor person, which act left a lasting impression upon
the said witness. Additional corroboration came from
PW-29 (Murari Lal), who described the accused as
sitting on seat No. 41, continuously smoking,
wearing a cap and dark glasses, and behaving in an
anxious manner; and PW-30 (Rajesh Kumar Yadav),
who too identified the accused as one of the persons
who alighted from the bus at Mahwa. These
identifications, though challenged by the defence,
were found to be credible by the trial Court in light of
the distinctive features evincing from the accused’s
appearance and conduct.
7.6. The trial Court further placed considerable
reliance on the expert reports
27, which concluded
that a powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
containing approximately 2.5 Kilograms of RDX had
been planted beneath seat Nos. 17 and 18, and was
detonated while the bus was in motion. The
27
Exhibits P-176 and P-182.
35
prosecution’s case was further bolstered by travel
records, hotel registers, and border crossing logs,
which demonstrated the movement of several
accused in a coordinated manner across states and
international borders. The confessional statement of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, recorded under
Section 164 CrPC by the Magistrate, was also heavily
relied upon by the trial Court, wherein he narrated
the detailed role played by various co -accused,
including the procurement of explosives and the
planning of the attack.
7.7. However, the trial Court acquitted Accused No.
3-Farukh Ahmed Khan , on the ground that the
evidence against him did not meet the threshold of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court noted
that none of the witnesses had attributed any specific
role to Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan in either
the planning or execution of the blast, nor was there
any direct or reliable circumstantial evidence linking
him to the incident. In the absence of incriminating
material of the requisite legal standard, the benefit of
doubt was extended in his favour.
36
7.8. The particulars of all the accused, other than
Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan; the offences for
which they were convicted and the sentence s
awarded to them by the trial Court are tabulated
hereunder: -
Name of the
Accused Person
In relation to
crime under
Punishment
awarded
Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed
IPC: -
Section 302
Section 307
PDPP Act: -
Section 4
Explosive
Substances Act: -
Section 4
Death Sentence
Life Imprisonment
+ Fine = Rs.
1,00,000/- (in
default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment +
Fine = 50,000/- (in
default to undergo
2 years rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment +
Fine = Rs.
25,000/- (in
default to undergo
1-year rigorous
imprisonment).
37
Section 5 7 years rigorous
imprisonment +
Fine = Rs.
15,000/- (in
default to undergo
6 months rigorous
imprisonment).
Accused No. 1 -
Javed Khan @
Javed Junior
Accused No. 2 -
Abdul Goni @
Asadulla @
Nasaruddin @
Nikka @ Umer @
Majeed Khan @
Raja
Accused No. 4 -
Lateef Ahmad Baja
Accused No. 5 -
Mohammad Ali
Bhatt @
Mehamood Keeley
Accused No. 6 -
Mirza Nisar
Hussain @ Naja
Accused No.10-
Rayees Beg.
IPC: -
Section 302 r/w
Section 120-B
Section 307 r/w
Section 120-B
PDPP Act: -
Section 4 r/w
Section 120-B
Explosive
Substances Act: -
Section 4 r/w
Section 120-B
Life Imprisonment
+ Fine = Rs.
1,00,000 (in
default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
Life Imprisonment
+ Fine = Rs.
1,00,000 (in
default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 50,000
(in default to
undergo 2 years
rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 25,000
(in default to
undergo 1 -year
38
Section 5 r/w
Section 120-B
rigorous
imprisonment).
7 years rigorous
imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 15,000
(in default to
undergo 6 months
rigorous
imprisonment).
7.9. The trial Court forwarded D.B. Criminal Death
Reference No. 1 of 2014 under Section 366 of CrPC,
for confirmation of the death sentence awarded to
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to the High Court.
Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 29
th September, 2014, Accused No. 1-
Javed Khan
28, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni
29, Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
30 and Accused No. 10-Raees
Baeg
31 preferred separate criminal appeals; and
Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-
Mohammad Ali Bhatt and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar
Hussain preferred a joint criminal appeal
32 before the
High Court.
28
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1092 of 2014.
29
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1094 of 2014.
30
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1024 of 2014.
31
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1073 of 2014.
32
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 1093 of 2014.
39
7.10. Aggrieved by the acquittal of Accused No.
3-Farukh Ahmed Khan , the State of Rajasthan
preferred a criminal appeal
33 praying for reversal of
his acquittal and another criminal appeal
34 seeking
enhancement of sentence in respect of the accused
persons who were only awarded life imprisonment by
the trial Court.
B. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
8. The confessional statement of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim, in the present case was recorded on
21
st October, 2002 (Exhibit P-189). However, upon a
challenge by Accused No. 9 -Dr. Abdul Hameed
regarding the legality of its recording, the trial Court,
by order dated 30
th November, 2010, directed that the
statement be recorded afresh. Pursuant thereto, a
fresh statement was recorded on 4
th January, 2011.
As doubts regarding compliance with the order dated
30
th November, 2010 persisted, the statement of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was again recorded
in open Court on 19
th February, 2011 before the
learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dausa,
33
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 2018.
34
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 2016.
40
where he categorically disowned his earlier
statements, denied having acted as an approver in
any case, and asserted that no statement had ever
been recorded by him before a Magistrate in the
manner alleged by the prosecution.
8.1. Vide judgment dated 29
th September, 2014, the
trial Court while observing that Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim has not satisfied the conditions of
tendering pardon under Section 306 of CrPC, ordered
a separate trial of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim.
Based on the same, police filed Chargesheet No.
133D of 1996 on 12
th September, 2014 (supra) before
the trial Court. The cognizance of the same was taken
on 8
th June, 2016 and the case was registered as
Sessions Case No. 12 of 2016. On 10
th June, 2016,
the trial Court framed charges against Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim for offences punishable under
Sections 302 r/w 120B, 307 r/w 120B and 193 of
IPC; Sections 3 and 4 of PDPP Act and Sections 4 and
5 of Explosive Substances Act.
8.2. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim denied the
charges and claimed to be tried. In support of its
case, the prosecution examined 25 witnesses and
41
exhibited 63 documents. Thereafter, the statement of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was recorded under
Section 313 of CrPC, wherein he denied all
incriminating circumstances appearing against him,
asserted that he had been falsely implicated in the
case, and contended that the statements attributed
to him had been recorded without proper knowledge
and were incorrectly relied upon by the prosecution.
He maintained that he had never been involved in any
such criminal activity and claimed innocence. The
accused did not lead any evidence in defence.
8.3. The trial Court vide judgment dated 7
th March,
2017, concluded that based on the evidence, the
prosecution was successful in proving the charges
against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim beyond
reasonable doubt and convicted him of all the
offences for which he was charged except for the
offence punishable under Section 3 of PDPP Act. The
details of the conviction and sentences awarded to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim are provided
hereinbelow: -
Accused Name In relation to
crime under
Punishment
awarded
42
Accused No.
12-Pappu @
Salim
IPC: -
Section 302 r/w
120B
Section 307 r/w
120B
Section 120B
Section 193
PDPP Act: -
Section 4
Explosive
Substances Act: -
Section 4
Life Imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-
(in default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
Life Imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-
(in default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
Life Imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-
(in default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
7 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
= Rs. 15,000/- (in
default to undergo 6
months rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
= 50,000/ - (in
default to undergo 2
years rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
43
Section 5
= Rs. 25,000/- (in
default to undergo 1-
year rigorous
imprisonment).
7 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
= Rs. 15,000/- (in
default to undergo 6
months rigorous
imprisonment).
8.4. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 29
th September, 2014,
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim filed criminal
appeal
35 before HC.
IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH
COURT
9. The High Court vide order dated 30
th April,
2015, remanded the case of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed to the trial Court for passing a fresh order of
sentence within 3 months on the ground of non -
consideration of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances by the trial Court, observing that the
sentence of death had been imposed on the very same
day on which the conviction was recorded and that,
at the stage of hearing on sentence, no counsel
35
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2017.
44
representing Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was
present before the trial Court. In pursuance of the
said direction, the trial Court passed a fresh order of
sentence dated 17
th December, 2015, again awarding
death sentence to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
The details of the said order of sentences are provided
hereinbelow: -
Accused Name In relation to
crime under
Punishment
awarded
Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul
Hameed
IPC: -
Section 302
Section 307
Section 120B
PDPP Act: -
Section 4
Death Sentence
Life Imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-
(in default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
Life Imprisonment +
Fine = Rs. 1,00,000/-
(in default to undergo
3 years rigorous
imprisonment).
10 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
= 50,000/ - (in
default to undergo 2
years rigorous
imprisonment).
45
Explosive
Substances Act: -
Section 4
Section 5
10 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
= Rs. 25,000/- (in
default to undergo 1-
year rigorous
imprisonment).
7 years rigorous
imprisonment + Fine
= Rs. 15,000/- (in
default to undergo 6
months rigorous
imprisonment).
9.1. The trial Court again forwarded D.B. Criminal
Death Reference No. 1 of 2016 for confirmation of the
death sentence awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and
aforesaid order of sentence awarded by the trial Court
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed also preferred
criminal appeal
36 before the High Court.
9.2. The High Court vide common judgment and
order dated 22
nd July, 2019,
37 disposed of the death
36
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 113 of 2016.
37
Impugned Judgment in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1827 -1829 of 2019;
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 621 of 2020; Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.)
No. 571 of 2020; Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 681 of 2020; and
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 143 of 2020.
46
reference forwarded by the trial Court for
confirmation of death sentence awarded to Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed; criminal appeals preferred
by the accused persons against conviction and the
criminal appeals preferred by the State of Rajasthan
against the acquittal of Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed
Khan and for enhancement of sentence in respect of
the accused persons who were awarded Life
Imprisonment.
9.3. The Division Bench of the High Court, vide the
impugned common judgment rendered in D.B.
Criminal Death Reference No. 1 of 2016 and
connected matters, affirmed the conviction and death
sentence awarded to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed by the trial Court, while acquitting several
co-accused persons including Accused No. 10-Raees
Baeg, Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 4-
Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali
Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain, and
Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla @ Nikka. The
High Court, upon the scrutiny of the evidence on
record, found that the prosecution had succeeded in
establishing beyond reasonable doubt the
involvement of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, in
47
planting the bomb in the Rajasthan Roadways bus on
22
nd May, 1996, which resulted in the death of
fourteen persons and injuries to thirty-seven others.
9.4. According to the High Court, the conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was fit to be
confirmed primarily based upon the testimony of the
conductor (PW-46) and other injured eyewitnesses,
who had consistently identified him as one of the two
passengers who alighted from the bus at Mahwa
shortly before the blast, coupled with his unusual act
of returning the bus ticket, a crucial detail that was
found to be both striking and incriminating. The High
Court also relied on the forensic evidence
establishing that approximately 2.5 Kilograms of
RDX was used in the explosion. Additionally, the
High Court drew support from the confessional
statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim recorded
under Section 164 of CrPC, which, though retracted,
was found to be corroborated in material particulars
by the ocular and forensic evidence. Considering the
grave and calculated nature of the act, its terror
motivation, and the prior conviction of Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in the Jaipur Stadium bomb
blast case, the High Court held that the imposition of
48
the death penalty was justified and proportionate to
the enormity of the crime committed by him.
9.5. At the same time, the High Court acquitted the
co-accused persons on the ground that the evidence
against them was either derivative in nature or
insufficient to meet the standard of proof required in
a criminal trial. It held that the conviction of the other
accused persons by the trial Court was largely based
on the confessional statement of a co -accused
recorded in a different case (the Jaipur Stadium
bomb blast case), without adequate and independent
corroboration. In respect of these accused, including
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg and Accused No. 1-Javed
Khan, the High Court noted that no direct evidence
linked them to the present bomb blast, and that their
prior involvement or arraignment in other bomb blast
cases, in which they subsequently stood acquitted,
could not be treated as trustworthy substantive
evidence in the instant case. The High Court
particularly noted the absence of recovery,
identification, or corroborative evidence against these
accused persons, and held that their conviction
violated settled evidentiary standards and principles
of criminal jurisprudence.
49
9.6. As regards the State’s appeal against the
acquittal of Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan, the
High Court found no error in the trial Court’s view,
holding that there was no admissible or credible
evidence connecting him to the conspiracy or the
execution of the crime, and therefore, upheld his
acquittal as well.
9.7. The High Court accordingly, vide common
judgment and order dated 22
nd July, 2019: -
A. Answered the death reference forwarded by
the trial Court in the affirmative and
confirmed the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence awarding death penalty to
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed passed by
the trial Court. Resultantly, the Criminal
Appeal preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed was dismissed.
B. Allowed the criminal appeals preferred by
Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior;
Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla @
Nasaruddin @ Nikka @ Umer @ Majeed Khan
@ Raja; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammed Ali Bhatt @
50
Mehamood Keeley; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar
Hussain @ Naja; and Accused No.10-Raees
Baeg.
C. Dismissed the criminal appeals filed by the
State of Rajasthan against the acquittal of
Accused No. 3-Farukh Ahmed Khan and for
enhancement of sentence in respect of the
accused persons who were awarded Life
Imprisonment.
9.8. The High Court vide separate judgment and
order dated 22
nd July, 2019,
38 dismissed the criminal
appeal preferred by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
and affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the trial Court.
9.9. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had thereafter
filed writ petition
39 seeking quashing and setting
aside of order dated 27
th January, 2020, by which his
parole application was rejected based on the
recommendation made by the Permanent Parole
Committee and the consequential grant of permanent
parole. The High Court vide judgment and order
38
Impugned in Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019.
39
D.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 102 of 2020.
51
dated 29
th September, 2020
40 allowed the writ
petition filed by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. The
Division Bench directed the District Authority to
release Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim on permanent
parole, subject to his furnishing a personal bond of
the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- with two sureties of Rs.
50,000/- each to the satisfaction of the concerned
District Magistrate. It was further stipulated that in
case, during period of his permanent parole, if the
said accused commits any undesirable activity, he
can be called upon to serve out his remaining
sentence and at the same time he shall also maintain
peace and tranquility during the parole period and
will abide by any other condition imposed by the
authority concerned.
10. The aforesaid judgments passed by the High
Court are under challenge in this batch of appeals by
special leave preferred at the instance of Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
41; State of Rajasthan
42 against
40
Impugned in SLP(Crl.) No. 3531 of 2021.
41
Criminal Appeal No. 1827-1829 of 2019.
42
Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP(Crl) No. 621 of 2020; SLP(Crl) No.
571 of 2020; SLP(Crl) No. 681 of 2020; SLP(Crl) No. 143 of 2020; and
SLP(Crl) No. 3531 of 2021.
52
acquittal of various co-accused; and Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim.
43
V. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
ACCUSED PERSONS
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
11. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel appearing
for Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, vehemently
and fervently contended that the entire prosecution
case is founded upon conjectures, surmises and
legally inadmissible material and that the Courts
below gravely erred in recording and sustaining the
conviction of the said accused. It was urged that the
case rests substantially upon circumstantial
evidence and alleged confessional statements, and
that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish
a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances
leading only to the hypothesis of guilt of the said
accused. Learned counsel submitted that the well-
settled principles governing conviction on
circumstantial evidence, as enunciated by this Court
in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
43
Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019.
53
Maharashtra
44, have been wholly disregarded and
that none of the indispensable conditions
constituting the “panchsheel” of circumstantial
evidence has been satisfied. According to the learned
counsel, the circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution are neither fully established nor of such
a convincing nature as to exclude every hypothesis
consistent with the innocence of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed. On the contrary, the prosecution
case is riddled with material inconsistencies,
unexplained gaps, and conjectural inferences,
rendering the conviction wholly unsustainable.
11.1. Learned counsel further submitted that
the Courts below erred in placing reliance upon the
alleged disclosure statements attributed to Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed without properly
appreciating the scope and ambit of Section 27 of
IEA. It was submitted that, in light of the law laid
down in Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor
45, only
such portion of information which distinctly relates
to the fact discovered is admissible and that the
prosecution and the Courts below impermissibly
44
(1984) 4 SCC 116.
45
1946 SCC OnLine PC 47.
54
relied upon material beyond the limited scope of
Section 27 of IEA. It was urged that the alleged
discoveries do not satisfy the legal requirements
under the IEA and, therefore, cannot constitute
incriminating circumstances against the said
accused. The Courts below, however, erroneously
treated inadmissible portions of the disclosure
statements as substantive evidence against Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, thereby causing serious
prejudice to him and tainting the impugned
judgments with gross illegality.
11.2. Learned counsel next assailed the reliance
placed by the prosecution and the Courts below upon
the alleged confessional statements of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim. It was contended that the
conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has
been substantially influenced by a retracted
confession
46 of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
recorded in the present case as well as another
confessional statement recorded in an entirely
different case, i.e., the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast
case.
47 Learned counsel submitted that both these
46
Exhibit P-189.
47
Exhibit P-174.
55
statements were treated by the Courts below as
having significant evidentiary value against Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, despite the well-settled
legal restrictions governing the use of such material
in criminal trials. According to learned counsel, the
law is well-settled that the confession of a co-accused
is not substantive evidence and can, at best, be taken
into consideration only to lend assurance to other
independent evidence already found reliable. It was
emphasized that the confession of a co-accused
cannot form the foundation of conviction and may be
looked into only by way of corroboration after the
prosecution has, by independent and legally
admissible evidence, established the guilt of the
accused concerned. Learned counsel submitted that
the High Court committed a grave error in relying
upon the confessional statements of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim as substantive evidence against
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and in treating
such statements as having independent probative
value sufficient to sustain the conviction.
11.3. Learned counsel further urged that the
High Court as well as the trial Court failed to
appreciate the principles laid down by this Court in
56
Kashmira Singh v. State of M adhya Pradesh
48
and Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar.
49 It was
submitted that this Court has consistently held that
the confession of a co-accused is not evidence within
the meaning of Section 3 of IEA and cannot form the
sole basis or foundation of a conviction. Such
material may be considered only as a supplementary
circumstance after the prosecution has, through
independent and legally admissible evidence,
established the guilt of the accused concerned. In the
present case, however, the High Court sustained the
conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed by
placing heavy reliance upon the confessional
statements of Accused No. 12 -Pappu @ Salim,
thereby departing from the settled legal position
governing the evidentiary value of the confession
made by a co-accused. It was submitted that the use
of such inadmissible material as a primary basis for
conviction has caused grave prejudice to Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and renders the impugned
judgments unsustainable in law.
48
(1952) 1 SCC 275.
49
1964 SCC OnLine SC 28; (1964) 6 SCR 623.
57
11.4. Learned counsel also contended that the
Courts below erred in overlooking the serious
infirmities surrounding the statement of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim recorded as an approver. It was
submitted that the said witness was not jointly tried
with Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and therefore
could not legally be treated as an approver in the trial
of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. Learned counsel
emphasized that the very foundation for treating
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim as an approver stood
vitiated in the absence of a joint trial, thereby
rendering the alleged confession legally suspect and
incapable of being relied upon against Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed. Furthermore, the procedure
adopted in recording the confessional statements of
Accused No.12-Pappu @ Salim suffered from serious
irregularities, resulting in repeated challenges before
the trial Court and multiple directions for fresh
recording of his statement. It was argued that these
recurring procedural lapses were substantive in
nature and not only cast a serious doubt on the
voluntariness and authenticity of the statements
allegedly made by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim but
58
also undermine the overall credibility of the
prosecution’s reliance on such evidence.
11.5. Learned counsel further submitted that in
the trial pertaining to the present incident, Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim implicitly retracted from his
earlier versions and denied having made the
statements attributed to him. The retraction,
according to learned counsel, seriously undermines
the prosecution case insofar as it sought to implicate
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed through approver
testimony. As a sequel to the retraction, the approver
status of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was
rescinded and he was subsequently tried and
convicted in a separate trial arising out of the same
incident. According to learned counsel, the
evidentiary value of such vacillating and retracted
testimony is incapable of sustaining a conviction,
particularly in the absence of independent evidence
and reliable corroboration connecting Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed with the alleged offence.
11.6. Learned counsel further elaborated upon
the procedural irregularities vitiating the
prosecution’s reliance on the alleged confessional
statements made by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim.
59
In particular, it was submitted that the statement of
the approver recorded on 21
st October, 2002 (Exhibit
P-189) in the present case was not recorded in
accordance with law, resulting in a challenge to its
sanctity by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed through
an application dated 28
th September, 2007.
Significantly, the trial Court, by order dated 30
th
November, 2010, found merit in the objection and
directed that the statement be recorded afresh.
Pursuant thereto, a fresh statement was recorded on
4
th January, 2011.
50 However, doubts regarding
compliance with the order dated 30
th November, 2010
persisted, compelling Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed to seek recording of the statement in open
Court. Consequently, the statement of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim was again recorded on 19
th
February, 2011
51 before the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Dausa, wherein he categorically
disowned his earlier statements and asserted that he
had never acted as an approver in any case and that
no statement had been made by him before a
Magistrate in the manner alleged by the prosecution.
50
Exhibit D-13.
51
Exhibit D-14.
60
11.7. Learned counsel further submitted that
the subsequent proceedings only reinforced the
unreliability of the purported confessional
statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. In view
of these categorical retractions made by him, neither
the alleged confessional statement (Exhibit P-174),
recorded in connection with another case relating to
the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast, nor the
subsequently retracted statement (Exhibit P-189)
recorded in the present case, could legally be treated
as either substantive or corroborative evidence
against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, much less
constitute the foundation of his conviction. According
to learned counsel, once the maker of the statements
had expressly disowned them, the evidentiary value
of such material stood substantially diluted and
could not be relied upon in the absence of strong
independent corroboration.
11.8. Learned counsel next contended that the
prosecution failed to adduce any independent
evidence whatsoever to corroborate the alleged
confessional statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim. It was submitted that substantial portions of
the statements were hearsay in nature and remained
61
unverified during investigation. No incriminating
circumstance, discovery, or other independent
evidence was unearthed pursuant to the information
allegedly furnished by him. In such circumstances,
the statements remained wholly uncorroborated and
lacked the degree of assurance required in law for
placing reliance upon approver or accomplice
evidence.
11.9. Learned counsel further submitted that
the investigating agency failed to pursue several
material leads emerging from the alleged confessional
statements. In particular, despite references to one
Salar and to meetings purportedly held at a hotel
after the incident, neither was the said individual
traced nor were the owner or staff of the hotel
meaningfully examined. It was also urged that the
prosecution’s suggestion that Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim retracted his statements under the influence
or pressure of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed is
wholly untenable. In this regard, learned counsel
pointed out that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had
remained lodged in Central Jail, Jaipur only between
12
th August, 1997 and 26
th January, 2000 and was
housed separately at the time when the subsequent
62
statements were recorded and retractions were made.
These circumstances, according to learned counsel,
demonstrate that the prosecution ’s imputation
against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed for the
retraction is speculative and unsupported by credible
evidence. Consequently, the High Court gravely erred
in placing reliance upon such unverified and
unsupported material to sustain the conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed.
11.10. Assailing the prosecution case insofar as it
rests on the identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, learned counsel vehemently contended that
the entire process of identification is vitiated by
serious infirmities and is therefore wholly unreliable.
It was urged that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
had consistently and unequivocally maintained that
he had been exposed and shown to the witnesses
prior to the conduct of the Test Identification
Parade
52, thereby compromising the fairness and
sanctity of the identification process. Learned
counsel pointed out that this specific objection was
not only raised by the accused at the relevant time
52
For short, “TIP”.
63
but was also duly recorded by the Munsif Magistrate,
Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98) who conducted the TIP
proceedings, lending credence to the grievance raised
by the Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed’s regarding
prior exposure. It was further argued that the very
purpose of a TIP is to test the memory and
observational capacity of witnesses under conditions
free from external influence, and once there exists a
reasonable possibility that the accused had been
shown to the witnesses before the TIP, the exercise
loses much of its probative value. In such
circumstances, it was submitted that the evidentiary
value ordinarily attached to a TIP stands
substantially diluted, if not entirely eroded, and that
the prosecution could derive little, if any,
corroborative support therefrom, particularly when
the identification process itself was shrouded in grave
suspicion, thereby creating grave doubt on the
involvement of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, in
the alleged offence.
11.11. Learned counsel further submitted that
the evidence tendered by the prosecution witnesses
regarding the identification of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed is wholly unreliable and incapable of
64
sustaining his conviction. It was contended that
serious doubts arise regarding the sanctity of the
investigation, particularly in view of the list of
witnesses bearing their signatures that was filed
along with the application seeking preponement of
the TIP. Learned counsel further pointed out that
Jagan Ram (PW-28), a constable, deposed that he
had boarded the bus at Mahwa and could identify
certain passengers who had alighted there on the
date of the occurrence. Although the witness
purported to identify Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed before the trial Court, he admittedly did not
participate in the TIP conducted on 29
th June, 1997.
This omission substantially undermines the
prosecution case, as it would be highly improbable if
not impossible for a person to accurately retain the
facial image of a casual co-passenger in a public
transport bus for a prolonged period of more than 7
years. It was, therefore, argued that the purported
dock identification after an inordinate lapse of time,
coupled with the witness’s failure to participate in the
TIP, renders the identification evidence inherently
doubtful, unsafe, and unworthy of reliance for the
purpose of recording conviction.
65
11.12. Learned counsel further contended that
the prosecution case suffered from significant
investigative lapses. It was pointed out that an
important witness had earlier identified an entirely
different individual during TIP, who was
subsequently discharged from the case. This
circumstance, according to learned counsel,
demonstrates the inherent unreliability of the
identification process and raises serious doubts
regarding the sanctity of the prosecution case against
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed.
11.13. Learned counsel contended that the
testimony of the independent witnesses associated
with the identification and site verification
proceedings in respect of the events at Tea Stall and
Book Shop substantially demolishes the prosecution
case. It was submitted that Lala Ram (PW-74), the
panch witness to the identification proceedings
conducted at Bharatpur Bus Stand, categorically
deposed that his signatures were obtained on blank
papers, and that the police officials did not conduct
any inquiry whatsoever from Accused No. 9 -Dr.
Abdul Hameed in his presence. He further stated that
the accused was never brought before him during the
66
alleged identification proceedings and that he was
merely asked to append his signatures on documents
prepared by the investigating officer. Lala Ram (PW-
74) further stated that identification memos bearing
Exhibit P-121 and P-122 were prepared while the
officials were sitting in the office and not at the place
where the proceedings were purportedly conducted.
According to learned counsel, this admission strikes
at the authenticity of the entire identification exercise
and raises serious doubts regarding the manner in
which the proceedings were allegedly carried out.
This version was further corroborated by Kartar
Singh (PW-76), who also admitted that identification
memos bearing Exhibit P -121 and P-122 were
prepared in the office rather than at the place of
identification, thereby lending further support to the
defence contention that the proceedings were not
conducted faithfully and, in the manner, projected by
the prosecution.
11.14. Learned counsel further submitted that
Kartar Singh (PW-76), while deposing about the spot
verification proceedings, stated that a person with a
muffled face accompanied the police when the alleged
site verification was undertaken and that the relevant
67
exhibits were prepared in his presence. However, no
one had seen the face of the said person and the
witness (PW-76) was, therefore, unable to ascertain
or verify the identity of the individual accompanying
the police party. Significantly, despite having been
associated with the proceedings, Kartar Singh (PW-
76) neither identified Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed as the person who allegedly pointed out and
identified the shops, nor furnished any physical
description or other particulars capable of linking the
accused to the alleged verification exercise. Learned
counsel argued that the total absence of
identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed by
an independent witness renders the alleged recovery
and verification proceedings devoid of evidentiary
value. These circumstances, according to learned
counsel, cast a serious shadow of doubt over the
prosecution case and render the identification and
verification proceedings purportedly made pursuant
to the disclosure statement suffered by the said
accused wholly unreliable.
11.15. Learned counsel next questioned the
prosecution theory regarding the alleged recovery
and seizure of two bus tickets purportedly connecting
68
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed with the crime in
question. It was submitted that the prosecution failed
to establish any nexus between the recovered tickets
and the ticket books allegedly issued to the conductor
(PW-46) on the date of the incident. The serial
numbers of the two recovered tickets, namely ,
091440 and 079718, did not correspond with the
serial numbers 83025346 and 83025350 of the ticket
books allegedly issued to the conductor (PW-46) for
issuance of tickets to passengers on the relevant day.
Learned counsel further contended that the
prosecution advanced mutually destructive versions
concerning the source and recovery of the tickets.
While Om Prakash (PW-32), one of the panch witness
to the seizure memo, deposed that the tickets were
brought to the police station by one Manucha and
that the seizure memo was prepared there in his
presence, the prosecution simultaneously sought to
project a different case that the said tickets had been
re-issued by the conductor (PW-46) to Bal Krishan
(PW-6), an injured witness, and were subsequently
recovered from him while he was undergoing
treatment at SMS Hospital, Jaipur. These
irreconcilable contradictions, coupled with the
69
unexplained circumstance as to why two tickets
would have been issued to a person allegedly
travelling alone, render the alleged recoveries wholly
unreliable.
11.16. Learned counsel further submitted that
the prosecution failed to examine material witnesses
connected with the alleged recovery of the tickets.
One Manucha, who allegedly produced the tickets
before the police, was neither examined during
investigation under Section 161 of CrPC nor cited as
a prosecution witness. Significantly, his name
surfaced for the first time only during the deposition
of Om Prakash (PW-32) before the trial Court.
According to learned counsel, such material
omissions erode the credibility of the prosecution
case and cast serious doubt on the authenticity of the
alleged seizure. In view of the inconsistent versions
regarding the source of the tickets and the failure to
examine the very person who allegedly produced
them, it was urged that the prosecution has failed to
prove the recovery beyond reasonable doubt, thereby
entitling Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, to the
benefit of doubt.
70
11.17. Learned counsel further contended that
there exist discrepancies and infirmities casting
grave doubt upon the testimony of the prosecution’s
star witness, namely, the conductor (PW-46), who
was heavily relied upon by the prosecution for the
identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. It
was submitted that the prosecution sought to portray
the alleged return of two tickets by Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed as a unique and unusual feature
which enabled the conductor (PW-46) to distinctly
remember his face and subsequently identify him.
However, once the very recovery and provenance of
the alleged tickets become doubtful owing to the
contradictory versions advanced by the prosecution
and its failure to establish a credible chain of
custody, the foundational circumstance on which the
identification rests stand seriously undermined. In
such circumstances, learned counsel urged that the
alleged theory of return of two tickets ceases to have
any evidentiary value as a distinguishing feature
capable of aiding identification. Consequently, the
identification of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed by
the conductor (PW-46) becomes unsafe and
unworthy of reliance.
71
11.18. Learned counsel also questioned the
authenticity and evidentiary value of certain
documentary material relied upon by the
prosecution. Referring to Exhibit P-123, a purported
bill evidencing the purchase of Bal Hans book, it was
submitted that a bare perusal of the document itself
gives rise to serious doubts regarding its genuineness
and probative value. Learned counsel pointed out
that the document purportedly emanated from
Poonam Book Stall, which was situated at Bharatpur
Railway Station and not at the Bharatpur Bus Stand,
thereby rendering it inconsistent with the
prosecution narrative regarding the movements and
activities allegedly attributed to Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed. It was further contended that the
prosecution failed to satisfactorily explain this stark
discrepancy or establish how a document originating
from a location different from that projected by the
prosecution could lend support to its case.
11.19. It was further contended that the date
appearing on Exhibit P-123 appeared to have been
altered from 31
st May, 1997 to 31
st May, 1996,
ostensibly to bring it in conformity with the
prosecution case and thereby implicate Accused No.
72
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. According to learned counsel,
the apparent alteration of the date mentioned in the
document, coupled with the discrepancy regarding
the place of issuance, casts a serious shadow on its
authenticity and reliability. It was argued that no
satisfactory evidence was adduced by the prosecution
to dispel the suspicion of tampering or to establish
the document’s provenance through legally
admissible and credible evidence. Likewise, the
sanctity and genuineness of the letter allegedly
received by the Superintendent of Police purportedly
implicating Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in the
crime in question was never established through
legally admissible evidence. The letter though
referred to in the chargesheet was never brought on
record and proved as per law thereby warranting
adverse inference against the prosecution. In the
absence of proper proof regarding its authorship,
source, and receipt, the said letter could not have
been treated as corroborative material. It was
fervently urged that the Courts below erroneously
relied upon these doubtful documents as
corroborative circumstances against Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed, despite the serious infirmities
73
surrounding their authenticity, thereby causing
grave prejudice to his defence.
11.20. Learned counsel further submitted that
the investigation conducted in the present case was
marked by serious irregularities, omissions, and
inconsistencies, rendering it fundamentally tainted
and wholly unreliable. It was urged that the
investigating agency, instead of undertaking a fair,
objective, and scientifically driven inquiry, proceeded
on preconceived assumptions and sought to build a
case around selected individuals by collecting
material suited to a predetermined narrative.
According to learned counsel, several vital leads were
either left unexplored or abandoned without
justification; material witnesses were not examined;
crucial documents were neither proved nor brought
on record in accordance with law; and contradictory
versions regarding recove ries, identification
proceedings, and the arrest of the accused remained
unresolved. The investigation also suffered from
unexplained gaps in the chain of circumstances,
stark procedural lapses in the recording of
confessional and approver statements, and utter
failure to secure reliable corroborative evidence
74
despite the gravity of the allegations. Learned counsel
submitted that these deficiencies were not isolated
irregularities but reflected a pattern of investigative
impropriety/apathy that substantially undermined
the credibility of the prosecution case. In such
circumstances, it was contended that the Courts
below ought to have approached the prosecution
evidence with heightened caution, for a conviction,
particularly in a case involving allegations of
terrorism and carrying the possibility of the gravest
penal consequences, cannot rest upon an
investigation that is demonstrably casual, deficient,
and tainted by serious procedural infirmities.
11.21. Learned counsel lastly and most fervently
assailed the fundamental procedural flaw in the trial
of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and the manner
in which the trial was conducted, contending that the
said accused remained effectively unrepresented
throughout substantial stages of the proceedings. It
was submitted that despite facing charges of the
utmost gravity, carrying the possibility of capital
punishment, no effective legal assistance was ever
offered or provided to him by the trial Court. Learned
counsel urged that the right to legal representation
75
constitutes an integral facet of the guarantee of a fair,
just and reasonable procedure and forms an
indispensable component of the constitutional
protection of life and personal liberty. According to
learned counsel, the trial Court was under a
constitutional obligation to ensure that Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed be provided competent legal
assistance and not left undefended during the
proceedings. However, no such meaningful
assistance was ensured in the present case. The trial
Court never offered the services of a legal aid counsel
or an amicus curiae to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed who was under these circumstances, left to
fend for himself and was compelled to cross examine
the witnesses on his own and also to address
arguments at various crucial stages of trial.
11.22. Learned counsel further submitted that
the absence of effective legal representation caused
serious and irremediable prejudice to Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed in defending himself against the
charges levelled against him. It was contended that
the accused was clearly deprived of a fair opportunity
to effectively challenge the prosecution evidence,
cross-examine material witnesses, raise appropriate
76
legal objections, and present his defence in
accordance with law. The failure of the trial Court to
secure effective legal representation for Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, it was urged, strikes at the very
root of a fair criminal trial and renders the
proceedings fundamentally unfair and
constitutionally vitiated. In such circumstances,
learned counsel submitted that the conviction and
sentence recorded against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed stand vitiated for violation of the
constitutional guarantees of a fair trial and effective
access to justice.
11.23. On these grounds, learned counsel
submitted that the impugned judgments suffer from
serious errors in appreciation of law and evidence. It
was urged that the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed rests upon inadmissible and
uncorroborated confessional statements, unreliable
identification evidence, doubtful recoveries,
unexplained contradictions, serious investigative
deficiencies and a tainted and fundamentally flawed
investigation that failed to inspire confidence or meet
the standards of fairness expected in a criminal
prosecution of such gravity. The prosecution has
77
failed to establish the guilt of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed beyond reasonable doubt and has
fallen far short of the exacting standard required in a
case involving capital punishment. It was, therefore,
prayed that the impugned judgment and order be set
aside and Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed be
acquitted of all charges by extending to him the
benefit of doubt.
B. Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No. 2 -
Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused
No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10-
Raees Baeg
11.24. Learned counsel further submitted that
the High Court rightly acquitted Accused No. 1-Javed
Khan; Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-
Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali
Bhatt; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain; and
Accused No.10-Raees Baeg, as the prosecution had
failed to adduce any cogent evidence connecting them
with the crime in question. It was submitted that the
High Court, upon a careful appraisal of the material
on record, correctly concluded that the evidence
relied upon by the prosecution related either to other
78
bomb blast cases or, at best, disclosed association
amongst certain accused persons without
establishing their participation in the Samleti Bus
bomb blast case. Learned counsel emphasized that
mere suspicion, prior association, or involvement in
other criminal proceedings could not act as a
substitute for proof of participation in the present
offence.
11.25. Insofar as Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @
Javed Junior was concerned, learned counsel
submitted that his confessional statement recorded
under Section 164 of CrPC
53 primarily referred to the
transportation of explosive substances and the
movements of various individuals in connection with
distinct incidents at Kathmandu, Delhi, Patna,
Mumbai, and Ahmedabad. Significantly, the
confessional statement neither contained any
reference regarding the Samleti Bus bomb blast nor
did it disclose any role played by him in the
commission of the present offence. Learned counsel
pointed out that the High Court rightly noted that, if
at all, the statement pertained to the alleged
53
Exhibit P-153.
79
transportation of explosives to Delhi, which formed
the basis of proceedings in the Lajpat Nagar bomb
blast case. The statement did not furnish any
material connecting Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @
Javed Junior with the present crime.
11.26. Learned counsel further submitted that
the case of prosecution against Accused No. 2-Abdul
Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No.
5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar
Hussain stood on an even weaker footing. These
accused were sought to be implicated principally on
the basis of the confessional statement of Accused
No. 1-Javed Khan. However, even a plain reading of
the said statement revealed no allegation regarding
their involvement in the Samleti Bus bomb blast
case. At the highest, the statement referred to their
presence or movements alongside other persons at
different points of time. Learned counsel submitted
that such vague references, in the confession of a co-
accused without any evidence connecting them to the
planning, execution, or facilitation of the present
offence, were wholly insufficient to sustain
conviction.
80
11.27. Learned counsel further submitted that
the acquittal of Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg was
equally justified. Although his name figured in the
confessional statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim recorded in Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case,
there was no reference therein to any involvement of
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg in the Samleti Bus bomb
blast case. The prosecution failed to produce any
independent evidence linking him with the incident
in question. Learned counsel emphasized that the
mere fact that Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg had been
convicted in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case
could not constitute evidence of his involvement in
the present case. In the absence of any material
establishing participation of the said accused in the
incident under consideration, the High Court
correctly held that the prosecution had failed to prove
its case against him.
11.28. On these grounds, learned counsel
submitted that the High Court rightly acquitted
Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No. 2 -Abdul
Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja; Accused No.
5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6 -Mirza Nisar
Hussain; and Accused No.10 -Raees Baeg. It was
81
urged that the prosecution failed to produce cogent,
reliable, or independent evidence connecting the
aforesaid accused with the Samleti Bus bomb blast
case. The material relied upon by the prosecution
neither established their participation in the
planning or execution of the offence nor disclosed any
circumstance incriminating them in the present case.
In these circumstances, learned counsel submitted
that the High Court correctly extended the benefit of
doubt to the aforesaid accused persons and their
acquittal calls for no interference.
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
11.29. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim assailed the findings
recorded by the Courts below and submitted that the
conviction of the said accused is wholly
unsustainable as there is not even an iota of evidence
connecting him with the alleged offence. It was urged
that neither any explosive substance, incriminating
article, weapon, or any other material object was
recovered at the instance of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim during investigation nor was the accused
charged for possession of any incriminating article
82
connected to the case at hand. Learned counsel drew
attention to the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
including the officers associated with the
investigation, who admitted that no recovery
whatsoever had been effected from Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim. According to learned counsel, the
absence of any recovery linking Accused No. 12 -
Pappu @ Salim to the alleged conspiracy or
commission of the offence constitutes a fundamental
lacuna in the prosecution case and completely
undermines the theory of his involvement in the case
at hand.
11.30. Learned counsel further submitted that
the entire prosecution case against Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim rests solely upon circumstantial
evidence, there being no direct evidence whatsoever
implicating him in the alleged crime. It was urged
that the prosecution has failed to establish a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstances
leading exclusively to the guilt of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim. Several material links remain
unproved, while other circumstances relied upon by
the prosecution are based upon assumptions and
inferences rather than on legally admissible evidence.
83
In such circumstances, it was submitted that the
Courts below gravely erred in recording a finding of
guilt despite the prosecution having failed to
establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.
11.31. Learned counsel next contended that the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses suffers from
serious inconsistencies, contradictions and inherent
improbabilities which strike at the very root of the
prosecution case. It was submitted that material
witnesses gave divergent versions on crucial aspects
of the case and several prosecution witnesses failed
to support and rather contradicted the prosecution
narrative in material particulars. According to
learned counsel, the Courts below ignored these
glaring discrepancies and proceeded to convict
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim on the basis of
evidence which was neither consistent nor reliable. It
was urged that since the prosecution evidence itself
is riddled with material contradictions, Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
11.32. Learned counsel further submitted that
the prosecution failed to establish any motive
whatsoever for Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim to
participate in the alleged offence. It was urged that
84
no evidence was led to demonstrate any association
of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim with the principal
accused persons or any circumstance even
suggestive of his involvement in the alleged
conspiracy. On the contrary, evidence on record
indicated that Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was a
driver by profession, belonging to a modest
background and earning his livelihood by lawful
means. Learned counsel further pointed out that a
prosecution witness, namely, Pramod Kumar (PW-7),
who was acquainted with Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim for a considerable period, specifically stated in
his deposition that he was not involved in any anti-
national activity and was known to be a peace-loving
and patriotic individual. These circumstances,
according to learned counsel, completely belie the
prosecution’s attempt to portray Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim as a participant in the alleged offence.
11.33. Learned counsel also questioned the
reliance placed by the Courts below upon the alleged
confessional statement attributed to Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim under Section 164 of CrPC. It was
submitted that Accused No. 12 -Pappu @ Salim
himself, while deposing as a witness (PW-95) in
85
connected proceedings, i.e., Sessions Case No. 35 of
2011, categorically asserted that the statement had
not been made voluntarily and that it had been
recorded under pressure exerted by the investigating
authorities. According to learned counsel, once the
voluntary nature of the alleged statement stood
seriously disputed, the Courts below ought to have
scrutinized such material with great caution.
Instead, the statement was implicitly relied upon
ignoring the suspicious circumstances in which it
came to be recorded and Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim’s subsequent explanation regarding the same.
11.34. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the
cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances
unmistakably demonstrates that the prosecution has
failed to establish the guilt of Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim beyond reasonable doubt. It was urged that
there exists no recovery, no direct evidence, no
proved motive, no reliable chain of circumstances
and no credible material connecting Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim with the alleged crime. The findings
recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High
Court are based purely on conjectures and surmises
rather than legally admissible evidence. In these
86
circumstances, learned counsel submitted that
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is entitled to the
benefit of doubt and that the conviction and sentence
recorded against him deserve to be set aside.
11.35. Learned counsel further opposed the
challenge laid by the State of Rajasthan [Criminal
Appeal @ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3531
of 2021] to the judgment and order dated 29
th
September, 2020 granting permanent parole to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. It was submitted
that the said order does not suffer from any legal or
factual infirmity warranting interference by this
Court. Learned counsel pointed out that Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim was convicted on 7
th March, 2017
and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and
had remained in custody even prior to his conviction.
Consequently, he has undergone more than twenty-
three years of actual incarceration. It was urged that
the High Court, while granting permanent parole,
rightly took into consideration the prolonged period
of imprisonment undergone by Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim, his satisfactory conduct in prison,
and the object underlying the parole framework,
87
namely, the reformation and social reintegration of
prisoners.
11.36. Learned counsel further submitted that
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had earlier been
released on first and second paroles and had
faithfully complied with all conditions imposed by the
competent authorities. He never misused the liberty
granted to him and, upon completion of each parole
period, surrendered before the concerned authorities
within the stipulated time. It was contended that his
conduct and behaviour both during incarceration
and while on parole remained satisfactory
throughout. In view of his long incarceration,
unblemished conduct, successful availing of earlier
paroles without any breach of conditions, and
fulfilment of the requirements prescribed under the
Rajasthan Prisoners Release on Parole Rules, 1958,
the High Court was fully justified in directing his
release on permanent parole. Accordingly, it was
submitted that the challenge laid by the State of
Rajasthan to the order dated 29
th September, 2020 is
devoid of merit and deserves to be rejected.
88
VI. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
A. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
12. Per contra, Mr. Raja Thakare, learned Additional
Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of
Rajasthan submitted that the trial Court and the
High Court have concurrently recorded findings of
guilt against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed upon
a comprehensive appreciation of oral, documentary
and forensic evidence. It was contended that such
concurrent findings, having been arrived at upon a
proper evaluation of the evidence and in accordance
with settled principles of criminal jurisprudence,
carry substantial persuasive value and do not
warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. It was further urged that the
prosecution has succeeded in establishing beyond
reasonable doubt that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed was not merely associated with the events in
question but was one of the principal conspirators
who played a significant and active role in the
planning and execution of the conspiracy
culminating in the Samleti Bus bomb blast of 22
nd
May, 1996. The said incident constituted a dastardly
89
and heinous terrorist act, resulting in widespread
public harm, leading to the death of fourteen
innocent passengers, causing injuries to several
others, and occasioning the destruction of public
property, while spreading terror in the society at
large.
12.1. According to learned senior counsel, the
evidence on record establishes a complete and
unbroken chain of circumstances pointing towards
the guilt of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed ,
demonstrating not merely his presence at the scene
but also his active involvement in the formulation,
coordination, and execution of the conspiracy. It was
submitted that the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, read together with the documentary and
forensic evidence, clearly corroborate the prosecution
case and conclusively establish the complicity of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, leaving no room
for doubt as to his guilt.
12.2. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
identity and presence of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed in the ill-fated Rajasthan Roadways bus
immediately prior to the explosion stand firmly
established through the testimony of multiple
90
independent witnesses. In this regard, reliance was
heavily placed on the evidence of Ashok Kumar (PW-
46), the conductor of the bus, who consistently
identified Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed during
the TIP as well as in the dock during his deposition
before the trial Court. The conductor (PW-46)
specifically deposed that two young men, one of
whom was Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, got
down at Mahwa and returned their tickets requesting
that they be given to a poor person. Learned senior
counsel submitted that the peculiar and uncommon
nature of this action made a lasting impression on
the witness (PW-46), thereby enabling him to
distinctly remember the said accused and to identify
him with confidence and consistency at the stages of
investigation and trial. Such identification, it was
argued, constitutes unimpeachable evidence
connecting Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed with
the events immediately preceding the explosion.
12.3. It was further submitted that on the
crucial aspect of identification, the testimony of the
conductor (PW-46) receives substantial corroboration
from Guman Singh (PW-3), Jhabbu (PW-19),
Dashrath Singh (PW-23), Constable Jagan Ram (PW-
91
28), Murari Lal (PW-29), and Constable Rajesh
Kumar (PW-30). Each of these witnesses, while
deposing independently, furnished materially
consistent accounts regarding the physical
appearance and conduct of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, describing features such as his unshaven
beard, spectacles, cap, clothing, and generally
suspicious demeanour during the journey. Their
testimonies further converge on the crucial
circumstance that the said accused was one of the
passengers who disembarked from the bus shortly
before the explosion took place. Although the
statements of these witnesses were recorded after a
considerable lapse of time, the consistency
maintained by them on the material particulars of
identification and highlighted conduct of Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed assumes seminal evidentiary
value. The thread of consistency running through the
testimonies of these witnesses, despite being
recorded years after the incident, therefore lends
considerable assurance to the prosecution case and
reinforces the reliability of the conductor’s account
on the material aspects of the incident.
92
12.4. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
challenge to the TIP is wholly misconceived. The
evidence of Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98), the Munsiff
Magistrate who conducted the TIP, clearly establishes
that all material witnesses correctly identified
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed during the
identification proceedings. The identification memos
prepared consistently bear the signatures of the
witnesses and form part of the record , thereby
providing contemporaneous documentary
corroboration of the identification process and the
participation of the witnesses therein. Significantly,
the evidence of Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98) remained
unshaken during cross-examination, and no material
contradiction, inconsistency, or procedural
irregularity could be elicited so as to cast any doubt
on the manner in which the proceedings were
conducted. His testimony, read together with the
identification memos and the direct evidence of the
identifying witnesses, unequivocally demonstrates
that the TIP was conducted in a fair, transparent, and
legally compliant manner, and conclusively
establishes the fairness and reliability of the
identification proceedings.
93
12.5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
State vehemently refuted the contention advanced on
behalf of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed that he
had been shown to the witnesses prior to the conduct
of the TIP as being wholly misconceived and
unsupported by the record. On the contrary, it was
urged that the evidence on record affirmatively
demonstrates that all necessary precautions were
taken to ensure the fairness and sanctity of the
identification proceedings. The testimony of Nand Lal
Sharma (PW-98), the Munsiff Magistrate who
conducted the TIP, clearly establishes that Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was kept properly
segregated and that the TIP was conducted strictly in
accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Significantly, no credible material was brought on
record during cross-examination to substantiate the
allegation that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed had
been exposed to the witnesses before the conduct of
TIP. The defence theory that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed was previously shown to the identifying
witnesses remains a bald assertion, unsupported by
any credible evidence whatsoever, and stands
squarely contradicted by the contemporaneous
94
record and the unimpeached testimony of Nand Lal
Sharma (PW-98). In these circumstances, the
allegation deserves to be rejected outright as an
afterthought raised solely to undermine an otherwise
reliable identification process conducted with due
diligence.
12.6. Learned senior counsel further submitted
that the inability of certain witnesses to identify
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in Court after a
considerable lapse of time does not dilute the
evidentiary value of TIP. It was contended that the
law has consistently recognized the fallibility of
human memory and the natural fading of recollection
with the passage of time, particularly in cases where
witnesses are required to identify individuals whom
they had seen only briefly and several years or
decades earlier. What assumes significance is that
such witnesses had correctly identified Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed during the TIP conducted at a
much earlier stage, when the events were relatively
fresh in their memory and the possibility of mistaken
recollection was substantially lower. The subsequent
inability to identify the accused in Court, therefore,
cannot dilute or undermine the reliability of the
95
identification made during the TIP, which was
conducted within a reasonable period after the
incident. The evidence of Nand Lal Sharma (PW-98),
read with Exhibit Nos. P-1, P-8 and P-9, therefore
conclusively establishes the identity of Accused No.
9-Dr. Abdul Hameed for the purposes of the present
case.
12.7. Learned counsel next submitted that the
conduct of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
immediately before the explosion constitutes a highly
incriminating circumstance that cannot be viewed in
isolation but must be assessed in light of the
surrounding facts and attendant circumstances .
Despite purchasing tickets valid up to Jaipur, he
unexpectedly and without any apparent reason
disembarked at Mahwa shortly before the blast.
Several witnesses consistently deposed that his
demeanour during the journey was unusual and
conspicuously anxious. He appeared visibly nervous,
continuously smoked cigarettes, and displayed signs
of restlessness that attracted the attention of fellow
passengers. He firmly objected when another
passenger attempted to move a suitcase believed to
belong to him, yet ultimately left the bus without that
96
suitcase, a circumstance that is both unnatural and
difficult to reconcile with normal human conduct.
According to learned counsel, the cumulative effect of
these circumstances, namely, the sudden
disembarking from the bus, his nervous behaviour,
his unusual concern for the suitcase, and his
decision to leave it behind, forms a coherent chain of
incriminating facts that is wholly inconsistent with
innocent conduct and strongly indicates prior
knowledge of the impending explosion.
12.8. It was further submitted that the returned
bus tickets constituted a crucial link in the chain of
circumstances connecting Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed to the events immediately preceding the
occurrence. The prosecution proved this
circumstance through the testimony of Bal Krishan
(PW-6), who boarded the bus at Mahwa and was
handed over the very tickets earlier returned by the
two passengers who had alighted. The testimony of
Bal Krishan (PW-6) corroborates the version put forth
by the conductor (PW-46) regarding the return of the
tickets and establishes the suspicious movements of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed immediately before
the occurrence. This circumstance assumes great
97
significance because it independently corroborates
the identification evidence led by the prosecution.
12.9. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
prosecution has conclusively established the
procurement, recovery and planting of explosive
substances in the bus through unimpeachable
scientific and documentary evidence. Bhoop Singh
(PW-91) proved the recoveries of substantial
quantities of ammonium nitrate, detonators and fuse
wires at the instance of one of the co -accused
persons. Chetan Das Ravatani (PW-93), the FSL
expert, categorically confirmed that the recovered
materials were not innocuous substances but
essential components capable of being used in the
manufacture and detonation of explosive devices,
thereby lending strong scientific support to the
prosecution case. Prem Sagar Manocha (PW-96)
further deposed that approximately 2.5 kilograms of
RDX, a highly potent military-grade explosive, had
been used in the blast and that the explosive
substance had been strategically concealed beneath
a seat inside the bus with the intention of causing
maximum destruction and loss of life. The forensic
findings regarding the nature, quantity, and
98
placement of the explosive material are wholly
consistent with the eyewitness account and other
prosecution evidence and leave no room for doubt as
to the manner in which the offence was planned and
executed. The scientific evidence, therefore, fully
corroborates and materially strengthens the
prosecution case regarding the commission of the
offence and the means employed for carrying out the
same.
12.10. Learned senior counsel further submitted
that the evidence of Guman Singh (PW-3) regarding
the large suitcase with an army -coloured cover
assumes considerable significance when read
alongside the forensic evidence. Guman Singh (PW-3)
specifically deposed that a passenger matching the
description of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed not
only objected when an attempt was made to move the
suitcase but also subsequently disembarked from the
bus leaving the suitcase behind. This conduct
assumes particular significance in light of the
forensic evidence establishing that the explosive
device was concealed beneath a seat in the bus. The
testimony of Guman Singh ( PW-3), when read
conjointly with the forensic findings, lends tangible
99
support to the prosecution case that the suitcase
contained the explosive material and was
clandestinely used to transport and place the device
in the bus, thereby forming a crucial link in the chain
of incriminating circumstances against the accused.
12.11. Learned counsel also emphasized that the
prosecution evidence does not merely establish
isolated circumstances but consistently proves the
participation of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in
a wider terrorist conspiracy. The evidence on record
demonstrates his association with persons connected
to organised terrorist networks and his involvement
in activities extending beyond the present incident,
thereby indicating a continuing nexus with
individuals and groups engaged in terrorist
operations. It was further submitted that the material
brought on record, when viewed cumulatively,
reflects not only the knowledge of the said accused
about such unlawful activities but also his conscious
participation in a broader conspiracy aimed at
proliferating terrorist objectives. The fact that
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed has also been
convicted in the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case,
which judgment has attained finality, assumes
100
considerable significance and provides additional
corroboration regarding his role and association with
terrorist activities, strengthening the prosecution’s
case as to his sustained involvement in terrorist
networks and related unlawful acts.
12.12. It is further submitted that the
confessional statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim, which, according to the prosecution, stands
duly proved in accordance with law through the
testimony of the approver (PW-95) himself as well as
the evidence of the Magistrates, namely, Suresh
Chand Sharma (PW-97) and K.P. Saxsena (PW-99),
who recorded the confessions, assumes considerable
significance in establishing the existence of the larger
conspiracy underlying the terrorist activities in
question. A perusal of the said confession clearly
reveals the involvement of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed along with other accused persons in the
conspiracy and discloses their association with the
terrorist networks responsible for orchestrating and
facilitating the commission of various terrorist acts.
The confession not only identifies Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed as a participant in the conspiracy but
also demonstrates the interconnectivity of the
101
accused persons in furtherance of the common
unlawful design. The disclosures made therein
constitute a vital link in the chain of evidence proving
the larger conspiracy and lend substantial
corroboration to the prosecution case regarding the
coordinated role played by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed and the other accused in advancing the
objectives of the terrorist organisation. In view of the
fact that the confessional statements stand duly
proved and their voluntariness and authenticity have
been established through legally admissible evidence,
the contents thereof constitute a relevant and reliable
piece of evidence for establishing the role of the
accused persons in the larger conspiracy.
12.13. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the
prosecution has successfully established a complete,
coherent and unbroken chain of clinching
incriminating circumstances which unequivocally
points towards the guilt of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, and excludes every reasonable hypothesis
consistent with his innocence. It was contended that
the presence of the said accused in the bus at the
relevant time, his identification by several
independent witnesses, his suspicious conduct
102
immediately preceding the blast, his premature
disembarkation at Mahwa, the return of the bus
tickets, his continuous connection with the suitcase
containing the explosive device, the forensic evidence
confirming the use of RDX, and his links with the
larger conspiracy are all circumstances which stand
firmly proved and mutually reinforce one another.
According to learned counsel, when these
circumstances are considered cumulatively and in
their proper perspective, they form a complete chain
that leaves no gap in the prosecution case and leads
to the only irresistible conclusion of his guilt. It was,
therefore, submitted that both the trial Court and the
High Court rightly appreciated the evidence on record
and correctly recorded findings of guilt, and
consequently, the conviction and sentence imposed
upon Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, warrant no
interference by this Court.
12.14. Learned senior counsel further submitted
that, assuming the conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed is upheld, the present case squarely
falls within the category of the “rarest of rare” cases
warranting confirmation of the death sentence
imposed by the trial Court. It was urged that the
103
offence was not an act of individual vendetta or a
crime committed in the heat of passion, but a cold-
blooded and meticulously planned terrorist attack
directed against unsuspecting civilians travelling in a
public transport bus. The explosive device,
comprising highly destructive material including
RDX, was planted in a State Roadways bus pursuant
to a calculated design to cause maximum casualties
and spread terror amongst the public at large. The
consequences of the act were catastrophic, resulting
in the loss of fourteen innocent lives, grievous
injuries to numerous others, and widespread fear
and insecurity within society. Learned counsel
submitted that the enormity of the crime, the
vulnerability of the victims, the ghastly nature of the
attack, and the profound impact of the incident upon
public order and national security constitute
aggravating circumstances of the highest order.
12.15. It was further contended that offences of
this nature strike at the very foundations of civilised
society and represent an assault not merely upon
individual victims but upon the collective conscience
of the nation. Learned counsel submitted that the
principles governing the imposition of capital
104
punishment, as authoritatively enunciated by this
Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
54,
require the death penalty to be reserved for the
“rarest of rare” cases where the alternative option of
life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
According to learned counsel, the present case
satisfies that exacting standard. The magnitude of
the crime, the number of lives lost, the severe injuries
inflicted upon numerous victims, the use of
sophisticated explosive material, and the wider
impact of the incident on public order and societal
security constitute aggravating circumstances of the
highest degree. In these circumstances, learned
counsel urged that the balance between aggravating
and mitigating factors overwhelmingly tilts in favour
of the extreme penalty and that no punishment short
of death would adequately reflect the gravity of the
offence, satisfy the demands of justice, or serve the
legitimate societal interest in deterring acts of
terrorism. It was, therefore, prayed that the death
sentence awarded to Accused No. 9 -Dr. Abdul
Hameed be affirmed.
54
(1980) 2 SCC 684.
105
B. Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No. 2 -
Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused
No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10-
Raees Baeg
12.16. Learned senior counsel assailed the
acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused No.
2-Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6-
Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10-Raees Baeg
by the High Court, contending that the impugned
judgment is vitiated by a manifest misappreciation
and erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
It was submitted that the trial Court, upon a
comprehensive and meticulous evaluation of the oral,
documentary, and circumstantial evidence, had
rightly recorded findings of conviction against the
aforesaid accused for offences arising out of the
larger criminal conspiracy culminating in the Samleti
Bus bomb blast. According to the learned senior
counsel, the High Court fell into grave error in
discarding crucial incriminating material, including
evidence demonstrating the accused persons’
106
association with and active participation in the
conspiracy, despite the existence of a consistent,
cogent, and interlinked chain of circumstances which
unmistakably connected them with the terrorist
network responsible for the commission of the offence
and established their culpability beyond reasonable
doubt.
12.17. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
prosecution case demonstrates that the aforesaid
accused persons were not isolated actors but
members of a coordinated terrorist conspiracy linked
with organisations such as JKIF and Harkat -ul-
Ansar. The evidence on record reveals their
participation in activities extending beyond the
present incident and forming part of a broader design
to carry out terrorist attacks in different parts of the
country. Learned counsel for the State emphasized
that several of the accused persons have also been
convicted in other bomb blast cases, including the
Lajpat Nagar bomb blast and Jaipur Stadium bomb
blast cases, thereby providing significant insight and
corroboration regarding their association with
terrorist organisations and the conspiracy in
question. It was further contended that these
107
convictions are not merely indicative of prior criminal
involvement but constitute strong circumstantial
evidence demonstrating a continuing nexus between
the accused persons and organised terrorist
networks operating across different regions and even
abroad. According to the prosecution, the pattern of
conduct emerging from the evidence establishes that
the present offence formed part of a larger and well-
defined conspiracy aimed at destabilising public
order and creating widespread fear among the civilian
population.
12.18. It was further submitted that the
confessional statements of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim, though requiring corroboration, furnish a
comprehensive and detailed account of the broader
criminal conspiracy, including the planning,
coordination, and execution of the acts culminating
in the explosion, and specifically implicate the
acquitted accused in various stages of the
conspiracy. It was contended that material aspects
set out in the confessional narratives stand
independently corroborated by evidence relating to
the transportation of explosives, recovery of
incriminating articles, identification of conspirators,
108
and the chain of events leading to the explosion.
According to the learned counsel for the State, the
High Court adopted an unduly hyper-technical
approach in evaluating this evidence and failed to
appreciate the cumulative effect of the circumstances
established by the prosecution, which, taken
together, pointed towards the involvement of the
acquitted accused in the conspiracy.
12.19. Learned senior counsel lastly submitted
that the trial Court had rightly recorded findings of
guilt upon a comprehensive appreciation of the entire
evidentiary record, including the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, recoveries effected and
discoveries made during investigation, forensic and
scientific evidence, as well as the conduct of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of
the offence. It was submitted that the High Court,
while acquitting Accused No. 1-Javed Khan; Accused
No. 2-Abdul Goni; Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja;
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt; Accused No. 6-
Mirza Nisar Hussain; and Accused No.10 -Raees
Baeg, failed to accord due weight to the overall
probative worth of the incriminating circumstances
established on record and clearly erred in upsetting
109
well-reasoned findings of conviction rendered by the
trial Court. According to the learned senior counsel,
such acquittal has resulted in a serious and manifest
miscarriage of justice, particularly in the context of a
large-scale terrorist attack of exceptional gravity that
led to the loss of numerous innocent civilian lives and
breached public order and threatened national
security. It was, therefore, prayed that the impugned
judgment of the High Court, insofar as it acquits the
aforesaid accused, be set aside as legally
unsustainable and that the convictions and
sentences recorded by the trial Court be restored in
the interests of justice.
C. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
12.20. Learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the State submitted that the conviction of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is fully justified and
firmly supported by overwhelming oral,
documentary, and circumstantial evidence available
on record. It was contended that he had initially been
granted pardon on the specific condition that he
would make a full, complete, and truthful disclosure
of all facts within his knowledge concerning the larger
110
criminal conspiracy, including the Samleti Bus bomb
blast and related incidents. In compliance with the
terms of the pardon, he made detailed confessional
statements in both the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast
case and the Samleti Bus bomb blast case, wherein
he disclosed the genesis of the conspiracy, identified
the various conspirators, described their respective
roles, and explained the manner in which explosives
and other incriminating materials were procured,
transported, and utilised. However, pursuant to
obtaining the benefit of pardon, he subsequently
resiled from his earlier statements, failed to adhere to
the conditions subject to which the pardon had been
granted, and deliberately withheld the truth behind
the larger conspiracy. Consequently, the protection
afforded to him under the pardon stood forfeited,
leading to his lawful prosecution and eventual
conviction.
12.21. Learned counsel submitted that the
offence punishable under Section 193 of IPC stood
fully and independently established the moment
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim chose to retract from
and materially contradict the confessional
statements voluntarily made by him earlier. It was
111
contended that the confessions had been duly proved
in accordance with law, formally exhibited before the
Court, and were found to be consistent on material
particulars, thereby lending assurance to their
reliability and evidentiary worth. The statements,
according to the prosecution, not only disclosed and
established the existence of the larger criminal
conspiracy but also provided a detailed and coherent
account of the procurement, transportation, storage,
and eventual use of explosives in furtherance of the
conspiracy. In these circumstances, it was argued
that the trial Court as well as the High Court were
fully justified in placing reliance upon the said
confessional statements, treating them as
substantive and corroborative evidence, and
consequently recording the conviction of Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim on that basis.
12.22. It was further submitted that substantial
independent corroboration exists for the confessional
statements. The testimony of Bhoop Singh (PW-91)
not only corroborates the recovery of fuse wires,
detonators, and ammonium nitrate from one of the
conspirators, but also provides an important link
connecting the accused with the procurement and
112
possession of materials capable of being used in the
commission of the offence. The evidence of the FSL
expert further strengthens the prosecution case by
scientifically establishing that the recovered
materials were of the nature and composition
commonly used for the manufacture of explosive
substances, thereby confirming the incriminating
character of the recovery. Likewise, the evidence
relating to the transportation of explosives through
different transport companies stand s duly
corroborated by the testimony of Phool Bahadur (PW-
9), Ashok Rajkapoor (PW-10), and Ramesh Chand
Tyagi (PW-13), whose depositions collectively verify
the movement, booking, and delivery of
consignments connected to the conspiracy. The
recovery of an identity card from the possession of
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim bearing an address
in Anantnag, Kashmir, constitutes an additional
incriminating circumstance, corroborating the
prosecution case regarding his association with the
wider conspiracy, his connections with co -
conspirators operating from Kashmir, and the
movement and concealment of explosives as part of
the larger unlawful design.
113
12.23. Learned senior counsel submitted that the
evidence on record unequivocally demonstrates that
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was not merely
associated with, but was an active and knowing
participant in the criminal conspiracy that
culminated in a series of coordinated explosions at
multiple locations, including Rajasthan and Delhi. It
was contended that these acts were carried out
pursuant to a well-orchestrated plan and resulted in
extensive loss of human life, serious injuries to
numerous individuals, and widespread destruction of
public and private property, thereby posing a grave
threat to public order and national security. In view
of the cogent and reliable evidence establishing the
involvement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim in the
crime in question, learned senior counsel argued that
the findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed
by the High Court are fully justified and supported by
the material on record. Consequently, it was
submitted that the conviction of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim for the offence of criminal conspiracy,
along with the allied offences arising therefrom,
suffers from no legal or factual infirmity warranting
interference.
114
12.24. Insofar as the judgment and order dated
29
th September, 2020 granting permanent parole to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is concerned, learned
senior counsel submitted that the High Court
committed a serious error in extending such relief
while proceedings arising out of the conviction and
sentence were still pending consideration before this
Court, and without assigning due weight to the
exceptionally grave and sensitive nature of the
offences involved. It was contended that the High
Court failed to undertake a proper assessment of the
findings concurrently recorded by the Courts below
regarding Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim’s active
participation in a terrorist conspiracy and activities
prejudicial to national security, and further
overlooked the statutory limitations and eligibility
conditions prescribed under the Rajasthan Prisoners
Release on Parole Rules, 1958, which govern the
grant of parole in such cases. According to the
learned senior counsel for the State, the impugned
order suffers from a manifest error of law and an
improper exercise of judicial discretion, rendering the
grant of permanent parole legally untenable .
Consequently, it was urged that the judgment and
115
order dated 29
th September, 2020 granting
permanent parole to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
is liable to be set aside and the parole granted
thereunder deserves to be rescinded.
VII. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE
ISSUES ARISING FOR DETERMINATION
13. We have given our anxious and thoughtful
consideration to the submissions advanced at the
Bar and have undertaken a meticulous examination
of the impugned judgments together with the entirety
of the material placed on record. Upon a
comprehensive appraisal of the rival contentions and
the evidence available on record, we proceed to
analyse the issues arising for determination in the
present matter.
14. At the outset, it may be noted that the present
batch of appeals gives rise to distinct issues
concerning different sets of accused persons, each
resting on separate evidentiary tranches requiring
independent consideration. In order to ensure a
structured and coherent analysis of the voluminous
record and the rival submissions advanced before us,
we deem it appropriate to divide our discussion into
116
three broad parts. The first part concerns the
challenge to the conviction and sentence awarded to
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. The second part
relates to the conviction and sentence awarded to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, as well as the
ancillary issues arising therefrom. The third part
pertains to the challenge mounted by the State of
Rajasthan against the acquittal of Accused No. 1-
Javed Khan, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No.
4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali
Bhatt, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain and
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg. We shall accordingly
examine the evidence, the findings recorded by the
Courts below and the submissions advanced on
behalf of the respective parties under each of the
aforesaid heads in seriatim.
A. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
15. Before examining the appeal of Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed on merits, it is necessary to first
address a foundational issue that strikes at the very
root of the criminal proceedings, namely, whether the
said accused was afforded a fair, just and
117
constitutionally compliant trial. The challenge raised
on his behalf is not confined merely to the
appreciation of evidence or the correctness of the
findings recorded by the Courts below, but extends
to the legality of the very process through which his
conviction came to be recorded. It is the specific case
of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed that he remained
effectively unrepresented throughout the trial and
that no meaningful legal assistance was provided to
him despite the grave nature of the charges and the
possibility of capital punishment. Since this issue
concerns the validity of the trial procedure itself, it
necessarily warrants consideration at the threshold.
16. The determination of the aforesaid issue is of
pivotal significance. If the trial is found to have been
conducted in breach of the constitutional guarantee
of a fair trial, the very foundation of the conviction
would stand vitiated. In that event, it would neither
be necessary nor appropriate for this Court to
undertake an examination of the evidentiary issues
arising in the appeals preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed. Conversely, it is only upon being
satisfied that the trial was conducted in conformity
with the constitutional and statutory safeguards
118
governing criminal prosecutions, or after determining
the legal consequences flowing from any infraction
thereof, that it would become necessary to examine
the evidentiary issues relating to identification,
confessional statements, forensic evidence and the
other incriminating circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution. We, therefore, consider it appropriate to
first consider and determine whether the trial of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed satisfied the
constitutional requirement of a fair trial before
embarking upon an examination of the merits of the
conviction recorded against him.
Whether the trial culminating in the conviction of
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was conducted
in a manner consistent with the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial and the requirements of
due process of law?
17. The issue of paramount importance which falls
for our consideration is whether Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed was afforded a fair and
constitutionally compliant trial. The significance of
this issue cannot be overstated, for the right to a fair
trial lies at the heart of criminal jurisprudence and
forms an inseparable component of the guarantee of
119
life and personal liberty enshrined under Article 21
of the Constitution of India. The legitimacy of a
conviction depends not merely upon the
establishment of guilt but equally upon the fairness
of the process through which such guilt is
determined. The concern raised before us is not a
minor procedural objection; rather, it strikes at the
very foundation of the criminal justice process and
the validity of the conviction and sentence imposed
upon the accused. Where the allegation is that an
accused facing charges of the gravest nature
remained undefended throughout the trial, the Court
is under a duty to closely scrutinize the record and
satisfy itself that the constitutional guarantees
available to the accused were not bypassed or
reduced to a mere ritualistic or illusory compliance.
18. It is a settled principle that the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial encompasses the right of an
accused to be effectively represented by a counsel of
his/her choice and, where necessary, to receive
competent legal aid at the expense of the State. These
safeguards are not mere formalities but essential
protections intended to ensure that an accused is
afforded a meaningful opportunity to defend himself
120
against the charges levelled against him. If an
accused is left undefended in proceedings carrying
grave penal consequences, the fairness of the trial
itself may stand seriously compromised. In such
circumstances, the Court must satisfy itself that the
safeguards guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of
the Constitution of India and criminal law were
observed not only in form but also in substance. The
question before us, therefore, goes to the very
legitimacy of the procedure adopted by the trial Court
and must be examined threadbare before proceeding
to consider the appeal of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed on merits.
19. The denial of a fair and constitutionally
compliant procedure to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed, is clearly manifest from the proceedings
before the High Court. It needs to be noted that the
High Court, vide order dated 30
th April, 2015,
declined the initial D.B. Criminal Death Reference
No. 1 of 2014 on the ground that the sentence of
death had been imposed on the very same day on
which the conviction was recorded and that, at the
stage of hearing on sentence, no counsel representing
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was present before
121
the trial Court. The High Court further found that no
meaningful opportunity had been afforded to
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to place on record
mitigating circumstances relevant to the question of
sentence. Recognising that such omissions struck at
the heart of the sentencing process in a capital
sentence case, the High Court remanded the matter
to the trial Court for passing a fresh order on
sentence after ensuring compliance with the
requirements of a fair hearing.
20. Significantly, while remanding the matter, the
High Court specifically directed that Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed be provided legal representation
either through legal aid or by the appointment of an
amicus curiae. It was only pursuant to these
directions that the trial Court appointed an amicus
curiae to represent the said accused for the first time
pursuant to his arraignment in the present case.
Thereafter, upon conducting fresh proceedings on the
question of sentence, the trial Court passed a fresh
order dated 17
th December, 2015, once again
awarding the sentence of death to Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed, for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of IPC. The aforesaid circumstances
122
assume considerable significance, for they
demonstrate that even the High Court had found the
original sentencing proceedings to be vitiated by the
absence of legal representation and the denial of an
effective opportunity to present mitigating
circumstances, thereby lending substantial weight to
the grievance raised by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed that the constitutional guarantee of a fair
hearing and a fair trial was not adequately observed
by the trial Court during the entirety of trial.
21. Although the issue concerning the absence of
legal representation was noticed by the High Court
limited to the sentencing aspect, the broader
contention now urged is that Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed remained effectively unrepresented
throughout the trial and that no assistance by way of
legal aid was extended to him during the conduct of
the trial proceedings. This contention came to be
specifically raised before us during the course of
hearing of the instant appeals. Learned counsel, Ms.
Jaiswal fervently submitted that Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed had faced the trial without the
assistance of counsel and that the constitutional
mandate of providing legal aid had not been complied
123
with. Having regard to the gravamen of the plea and
its direct implication on the fairness and validity of
the trial, this Court deemed it appropriate to verify
the factual position from Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed himself and so also from the record.
22. Consequently, by order dated 20
th February,
2025, this Court directed that Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed, who was lodged in Central Jail,
Jaipur, be connected through video conferencing.
Pursuant thereto, Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
appeared before us through video conferencing on 6
th
March, 2025. This Court considered it appropriate to
interact with him in order to ascertain whether the
grievance now sought to be raised had any factual
basis and whether he had, at any stage, been
represented by a counsel of his choice or through
legal aid.
23. During the course of the interaction, Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed unequivocally stated that no
advocate had represented him during the trial
proceedings. He further informed the Court that he
had not engaged any private counsel and that no
legal aid counsel was ever provided to him by the trial
Court. His response was categorical and left little
124
scope for ambiguity. The statement made by the
accused assumes considerable significance,
particularly in the context of the constitutional
guarantee of a fair trial and the obligation of the
Court to ensure effective legal representation to an
accused facing criminal prosecution. The State
counsel did not dispute that any counsel was ever
appointed to represent Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed through the legal services authority, nor has
any material been brought to our notice indicating
that the trial Court undertook any exercise to ensure
that the said accused was represented by an amicus
curiae before proceeding with the trial.
24. Likewise, there is nothing on record to suggest
that the consequences of facing a criminal trial
without legal assistance were explained to Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed or that he had consciously
and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by
counsel. In the absence of any such material, the
assertion made by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
assumes greater importance and raises a serious
concern as to whether the minimum safeguards of a
fair criminal process were duly observed.
125
25. A careful examination of the record reveals that
the proceedings against Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed continued over an extended period and
involved the examination of a large number of
witnesses as well as the consideration of voluminous
documentary and forensic evidence. The prosecution
case was founded upon multiple complex
circumstances, including identification evidence,
alleged confessional statements, recoveries, and
scientific material. These were not matters of a simple
or straightforward nature. The complexity of the
issues involved, coupled with the grave consequences
flowing from the prosecution case, demanded
competent and effective legal assistance to ensure
that the accused was in a position to adequately
understand, challenge, and respond to the evidence
led against him. Yet, the record does not disclose that
any meaningful legal assistance was ever made
available to Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed to
enable him to effectively defend himself throughout
the course of the trial.
26. A closer scrutiny of the trial record
unequivocally fortifies this conclusion. The
proceeding sheets of the trial Court do not reflect that
126
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed was represented by
a legal counsel at any stage of the proceedings.
Equally, the depositions of the prosecution witnesses
demonstrate that the cross-examination of witnesses
was undertaken by the accused himself. The record
is bereft of any indication that Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed was either represented by a counsel
of his choice or was ever provided the benefit of free
legal aid, legal assistance, or the services of an
amicus curiae. In a prosecution for offences carrying
capital punishment and resting upon complex
questions of fact and law, involving extensive oral,
documentary, and scientific evidence, the absence of
representation by an efficient and experienced legal
practitioner assumes critical significance. The
material on record thus affirms and fortify the
defense argument that Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed was left to fend for himself and conduct the
trial on his own in a case of exceptional seriousness
and complexity, a circumstance that raises
substantial concerns regarding the fairness of the
trial and the effective protection of his fundamental
right to a fair and meaningful defence.
127
27. The right of an accused to be defended by a legal
practitioner is not an empty ritual or a mere
procedural embellishment, rather, it is a substantive
safeguard that lies at the heart of a fair criminal
justice system and serves as an essential guarantee
against the risk of prejudice, arbitrariness, and
miscarriage of justice. Equally, the constitutional
obligation of the Court does not stand discharged
merely because an accused is physically present
before it. The requirement is one of real and
meaningful representation, ensuring that the
accused is able to understand the proceedings,
exercise available legal rights, and adequately
present a defence. This obligation becomes
particularly onerous where the accused is facing
charges carrying severe punishments, including
capital punishment. In such cases, the Court is
expected to remain vigilant and proactive in
safeguarding the rights of the accused, ensuring that
the accused is not left to navigate the complexities of
a criminal trial completely unaided.
28. This Court has, time and again, underscored
the fundamental importance of providing effective
legal assistance to an accused person and has
128
consistently held that the denial thereof strikes at the
very heart of a fair trial. In several cases, such denial
has resulted in the proceedings being declared
vitiated, leading either to the acquittal of the
accused
55 or, where the interest of justice so required,
to a remand for a de-novo trial.
56 In the present case,
the statement made by Accused No. 9 -Dr. Abdul
Hameed, before this Court, read in conjunction with
the total absence of any material demonstrating
either the appointment of legal aid counsel or the
provision of meaningful legal assistance during the
trial, raises a grave and unsettling concern regarding
the fairness of the proceedings conducted against
him. The issue is not one of mere procedural
irregularity; it goes to the very legitimacy of the trial
and the resultant conviction and sentence recorded
by the Courts below, thereby casting a serious doubt
on their constitutional validity and necessitating a
close scrutiny by this Court of whether the trial
satisfied the minimum requirements of fairness
guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India.
55
Suk Das v. UT of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401.
56
Tyron Nazareth v. State of Goa, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 321.
129
29. The question as to the course to be adopted
where a conviction is found to be constitutionally
infirm on account of the denial of effective legal
representation is no longer res integra. This Court
has, on more than one occasion, considered the
consequences of such a fundamental infraction of the
guarantee of a fair trial and the nature of the relief
that ought to follow. In particular, in Mohd. Hussain
v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)
57, this Court
exhaustively examined the interplay between the
constitutional right to a fair trial, the power of the
appellate Court to order a de-novo trial under Section
386(b) of CrPC, and the competing considerations
that must govern the exercise of such power. While
recognizing that the denial of legal representation
strikes at the very root of a fair criminal process, this
Court also emphasised that the relief to be granted
must ultimately be fashioned in a manner that
subserves the ends of justice. The relevant
observations from the said judgment are reproduced
hereinbelow: -
“40. “Speedy trial” and “fair trial” to a person
accused of a crime are integral part of Article 21.
57
(2012) 9 SCC 408.
130
There is, however, qualitative difference between the
right to speedy trial and the accused's right of fair
trial. Unlike the accused’s right of fair trial,
deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per
se prejudice the accused in defending himself. The
right to speedy trial is in its very nature relative.
It depends upon diverse circumstances. Each
case of delay in conclusion of a criminal trial has
to be seen in the facts and circumstances of such
case. Mere lapse of several years since the
commencement of prosecution by itself may not
justify the discontinuance of prosecution or
dismissal of indictment. The factors concerning
the accused's right to speedy trial have to be
weighed vis-à-vis the impact of the crime on
society and the confidence of the people in
judicial system. Speedy trial secures rights to an
accused but it does not preclude the rights of
public justice. The nature and gravity of crime,
persons involved, social impact and societal
needs must be weighed along with the right of
the accused to speedy trial and if the balance
tilts in favour of the former the long delay in
conclusion of criminal trial should not operate
against the continuation of prosecution and if
the right of the accused in the facts and
circumstances of the case and e xigencies of
situation tilts the balance in his favour, the
prosecution may be brought to an end. These
principles must apply as well when the appeal
court is confronted with the question whether or
not retrial of an accused should be ordered.
41. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal
from a judgment of conviction has power to order
the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of
the Code. That is clear from the bare language of
Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it
should not be exercised in a routine manner. A
de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be
ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and
rare cases and only when in the opinion of the
131
appellate court such course becomes
indispensable to avert failure of justice. Surely
this power cannot be used to allow the
prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up
the lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is
continuation of the same trial and same
prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must
always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise
of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code,
will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case for which no straitjacket formula can be
formulated but the appeal court must closely keep
in view that while protecting the right of an accused
to fair trial and due process, the people who seek
protection of law do not lose hope in legal system
and the interests of the society are not altogether
overlooked.
42. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it
has been concurrently held by the two Judges
[Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),
(2012) 2 SCC 584 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 919] who
heard the criminal appeal that the appellant was
denied due process of law and the trial held
against him was contrary to the procedure
prescribed under the provisions of the Code since
he was denied right of representation by counsel
in the trial. The Judges differed on the course to
be followed after holding that the trial against
the appellant was flawed.
43. We have to consider now, whether the matter
requires to be remanded for a de novo trial in the
facts and the circumstances of the present case. The
incident is of 1997. It occurred in a public
transport bus when that bus was carrying
passengers and stopped at a bus -stand. The
moment the bus stopped an explosion took place
inside the bus that ultimately resulted in death
of four persons and injury to twenty-four
persons. The nature of the incident and the
circumstances in which it occurred speak
volume about the very grave nature of offence.
132
As a matter of fact, the appellant has been
charged for the offences under Sections 302/307
IPC and Section 3 and, in the alternative, Section
4(b) of the ES Act. It is true that the appellant
has been in jail since 9-3-1998 and it is more
than 14 years since he was arrested and he has
passed through mental agony of death sentence
and the retrial at this distance of time shall
prolong the culmination of the criminal case but
the question is whether these factors are
sufficient for the appellant's acquittal and
dismissal of indictment. We think not.
44. It cannot be ignored that the offences with
which the appellant has been charged are of very
serious nature and if the prosecution succeeds
and the appellant is convicted under Section 302
IPC on retrial, the sentence could be death or life
imprisonment. Section 302 IPC authorises the
court to punish the offender of murder with
death or life imprisonment. Gravity of the
offences and the criminality with which the
appellant is charged are important factors that
need to be kept in mind, though it is a fact that
in the first instance the accused has been denied
due process. While having due consideration to
the appellant's right, the nature of the offence
and its gravity, the impact of crime on the
society, more particularly the crime that has
shaken the public and resulted in death of four
persons in a public transport bus cannot be
ignored and overlooked. It is desirable that
punishment should follow offence as closely as
possible. In an extremely serious criminal case of
the exceptional nature like the present one, it
would occasion in failure of justice if the
prosecution is not taken to the logical
conclusion. Justice is supreme. The retrial of the
appellant, in our opinion, in the facts and
circumstances, is indispensable. It is imperative
that justice is secured after providing the
133
appellant with the legal practitioner if he does
not engage a lawyer of his choice.”
[Emphasis supplied]
30. The aforesaid decision unequivocally lays down
that the denial of legal representation does not
invariably result in the acquittal of the accused. The
appellate Court is required to balance the accused’s
constitutional entitlement to a fair trial with the
nature and gravity of the offence, its impact on
society and the larger interests of justice. It was
accordingly held that, although a de-novo trial is an
exceptional course to be adopted only where the
interests of justice so demand , it becomes
indispensable where the constitutional infirmity is so
fundamental that the conviction cannot be
sustained, while, at the same time, the interests of
justice require that the prosecution be carried to its
logical conclusion through a trial conducted strictly
in accordance with law.
31. More recently, in Naveen v. State of M.P.
58,
this Court reiterated the content and scope of the
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. It was
emphasised that the concept of a fair trial cannot be
58
(2023) 17 SCC 381.
134
confined to a rigid or technical formulation but must
be understood as requiring a real, meaningful and
impartial opportunity to defend. This Court further
observed that fairness in a criminal trial protects not
only the rights of the accused but also the interests
of the victim and society, and that a trial which is
reduced to a mere formality or a stage-managed
exercise cannot command the confidence of the
justice delivery system. The relevant observations
from the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-
“20. It was further observed that there can be no
analytical, all-comprehensive or exhaustive
definition of the concept of a fair trial, and it may
have to be determined in seemingly infinite variety
of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind
viz. whether something that was done or said either
before or at the trial deprived the quality of fairness
to a degree where a miscarriage of justice has
resulted. Each one has an inbuilt right to be dealt
with fairly in a criminal trial. Denial of a fair trial is
as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim
and the society. Fair trial obviously would mean a
trial before an impartial Judge, a fair prosecutor,
and the atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial
means a trial in which bias or prejudice for or
against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause
which is being tried is eliminated. It is inherent
in the concept of due process of law, that
condemnation should be rendered only after the
trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham
or a mere farce and pretence. Since fair hearing
requires an opportunity to preserve the process,
it may be vitiated and violated by an overhasty,
135
stage-managed, tailored and partisan trial. It is
thus settled that a hasty trial in which proper
and sufficient opportunity has not been provided
to the accused to defend himself/herself would
vitiate the trial as being meaningless and stage-
managed. It is in violation of the principle of
judicial calm.
21. The principle of “judicial calm” in the context of
a fair trial needs to be elaborated for its observance
in letter and spirit. In our view, in the hallowed
halls of justice, the essence of a fair and
impartial trial lies in the steadfast embrace of
judicial calm. It is incumbent upon a Judge to
exude an aura of tranquillity, offering a
sanctuary of reason and measured deliberation .
In the halls of justice, the gavel strikes not in
haste, but in a deliberate cadence ensuring every
voice, every piece of evidence, is accorded its
due weight. The expanse of judicial calm serves
not only as a pillar of constitutional integrity,
but as the very bedrock upon which trust in a
legal system is forged. It is a beacon that
illuminates the path towards a verdict untainted
by haste or prejudice, thus upholding the
sanctity of justice for all.”
[Emphasis supplied]
32. The principles enunciated in the aforesaid
decisions furnish the governing framework for
determining the appropriate relief in the present
case. It is in the backdrop of these settled principles
that we must examine which of the available courses
would best uphold the constitutional guarantee of a
fair trial while ensuring that the administration of
criminal justice is neither rendered ineffective nor
136
divorced from the demands of justice. In undertaking
this exercise, the Court is required to strike a careful
balance between the constitutional imperative of
protecting the rights of the accused and the equally
compelling societal interest in ensuring that
allegations of a crime of such exceptional gravity are
adjudicated in accordance with law. The remedy to be
fashioned must, therefore, not only redress the
constitutional infirmity that has vitiated the
proceedings but also ensure that the administration
of criminal justice is not brought into disrepute by
either permitting a constitutionally flawed conviction
to stand or terminating the prosecution where the
interests of justice warrant a fresh adjudication. It is
this delicate balance that must inform the choice of
the appropriate course in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case.
33. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of
the present case, we find that broadly, three
alternatives present themselves. The first would be to
set aside the conviction and sentence and acquit the
accused outright, having regard to the serious
prejudice occasioned by the denial of legal
representation and the fact that Accused No. 9-Dr.
137
Abdul Hameed has remained incarcerated for nearly
twenty-nine years with the sword of death penalty
hanging over his head for nearly twelve years. The
second would be to set aside the impugned judgment
and remit the matter to the trial Court for a de-novo
trial after ensuring effective legal representation,
thereby affording the accused a real and meaningful
opportunity to defend himself by testing the
prosecution evidence on the anvil of effective cross-
examination and presenting his defence in
accordance with law. The third would be to undertake
an independent reappreciation of the evidence
already on record to determine whether,
notwithstanding the absence of legal representation
and the lack of effective cross-examination of the
witnesses, the conviction can still be sustained on the
basis of the evidence on record, including the limited
cross-examination conducted by the accused
himself.
34. In our considered opinion, the third course has
to be excluded at the outset. If, upon such
reappreciation, this Court were to affirm the
conviction, the probable consequence would be the
confirmation of the sentence of death
138
notwithstanding the fact that the trial itself stood
vitiated by the denial of effective legal representation.
The constitutional infirmity which has been found to
exist does not relate merely to the appreciation of
evidence but goes to the very fairness of the process
by which the evidence came to be recorded. To
sustain the conviction on the basis of a record
created in the absence of effective legal assistance
would render illusory the constitutional guarantee of
a fair trial and amount to perpetuating, rather than
remedying, the fundamental defect which has crept
into the proceedings. Such a course would be
inconsistent with the constitutional obligation cast
upon the Courts to ensure that a conviction,
particularly one carrying the sentence of death, rests
upon a trial conducted in strict conformity with the
guarantees of due process and fairness.
35. Equally, we are not persuaded that the first
course of acquitting the accused solely on the ground
of denial of legal representation would be appropriate
in the stark facts of the present case, particularly
having regard to the gravity and heinousness of the
crime. The denial of a fair trial undoubtedly
constitutes a grave constitutional violation; however,
139
the consequence thereof cannot invariably be an
order of acquittal irrespective of the nature and
gravity of the offence alleged. The allegations in the
present case concern a meticulously planned bomb
explosion in a public transport bus resulting in the
death of fourteen innocent persons, injuries to thirty-
seven others, and the complete destruction of public
property. The offence alleged is not merely one
against individual victims but one which strikes at
public order and the sense of security of society at
large. In these circumstances, to terminate the
prosecution without permitting the charges to be
tested in a constitutionally compliant trial would
neither advance the cause of justice nor
appropriately balance the competing interests
involved.
36. The only course, therefore, which adequately
balances the fundamental rights of Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed with the legitimate societal
interest in ensuring that serious criminal allegations
are adjudicated in accordance with law, would be to
set aside the impugned judgment and remit the
matter to the trial Court for a de-novo trial. Such a
course alone remedies the constitutional defect,
140
restores procedural fairness, and at the same time
preserves the opportunity to the prosecution to
establish its case through a trial conducted in
conformity with the constitutional and statutory
safeguards governing criminal proceedings.
37. We are not oblivious to the practical difficulties
that such a course may entail. Nearly three decades
have elapsed since the occurrence in question, and
the possibility that some witnesses may have passed
away; suffered fading memories; or may no longer be
available to depose cannot be ruled out. These are,
however, consequences that inevitably accompany
the delay in the criminal process and cannot, by
themselves, justify the affirmation of a conviction
recorded in proceedings found to be constitutionally
non-compliant, more so when the fundamental
procedural defect was writ large on the face of the
record and was raised by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed before the High Court. Otherwise also, the
obligation to ensure that the accused is provided
appropriate legal aid is upon the Court and the
accused cannot be faulted for the Court’s failure to
discharge its constitutional obligation of ensuring a
fair trial. The constitutional guarantee of a fair trial
141
is absolutely non-negotiable and cannot be sacrificed
at the altar of practical convenience. The
administration of criminal justice is founded not
merely upon the objective of securing convictions but
equally upon the assurance that every conviction is
preceded by a procedure which is fair, just and
reasonable. Consequently, notwithstanding the
practical impediments that may confront the
prosecution or the defence, the constitutional
imperative of ensuring a fair trial must prevail.
38. We may also clarify and emphasize that the
present conclusion is confined exclusively to the case
of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed. The direction for
a de-novo trial is founded entirely upon the peculiar
facts obtaining in his case, particularly the denial of
effective legal representation throughout the trial
proceedings, and should not be construed as
reflecting upon the validity of the proceedings against
the remaining accused.
39. Having carefully examined the record in minute
detail, we are duly satisfied that the de-novo trial to
be conducted qua Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed
would have no bearing on the fate of the remaining
appeals, which, though arising from the same case
142
but are founded on distinct factual and evidentiary
foundations and can be adjudged separately. The
remaining accused, including those acquitted by the
High Court and Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, were
represented by counsel throughout the trial and no
comparable challenge affecting the fairness or
constitutional validity of their trial has been raised
before us. Their appeals, therefore, fall to be
considered independently on the basis of the
evidence and legal issues peculiar to each of them.
We, accordingly, proceed to examine the merits of
those appeals in the succeeding part of this
judgment.
B. Conviction and Sentence Awarded to Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the Ancillary Issues
Arising Therefrom
40. We shall now consider the challenge laid by
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim to the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 7
th March,
2017 passed by the trial Court which came to be
affirmed by the High Court vide judgment and order
dated 22
nd July, 2019. The record reveals that the
prosecution case against the said accused stands on
143
an entirely different footing from that of the other
accused persons including Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed. A careful scrutiny of the material placed on
record indicates that the nature, quality and extent
of evidence relied upon by the prosecution against
this accused are markedly distinct from those relied
upon against the other accused persons. Unlike the
case of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed, where the
prosecution sought to rely upon certain eyewitness
accounts, identification evidence and surrounding
circumstances, the case against Accused No. 12 -
Pappu @ Salim rests substantially, if not exclusively,
upon the confessional statements attributed to him
during the course of investigation. The evidentiary
foundation of the prosecution case against him is,
therefore, required to be examined independently and
with particular care, especially having regard to the
settled legal principles governing the admissibility,
voluntariness and probative value of confessional
statements. It is in this backdrop that the correctness
of the findings recorded by the Courts below insofar
as they pertain to Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
falls for consideration.
144
41. The first confessional statement attributed to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was recorded under
Section 164 of CrPC on 9
th September, 1997 in
connection with the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case.
Subsequently, more than five years later, another
confessional statement came to be recorded on 21
st
October, 2002 in the present case arising out of the
Samleti Bus bomb blast. The prosecution sought to
place considerable reliance upon these statements as
a crucial part of its evidentiary framework, to
establish not only the involvement of Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim, in the commission of the alleged
offences, but also the participation of several co-
accused persons in the alleged conspiracy. According
to the prosecution, these confessional statements
furnished important details regarding the planning,
execution, and inter se roles of the accused persons,
and were therefore relied upon to connect the various
accused persons with the larger conspiracy alleged in
the case.
42. However, the record discloses that the legality
and evidentiary value of these statements became the
subject matter of serious dispute. Upon an objection
raised by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed regarding
145
the manner in which the statement had been
recorded, the trial Court, by order dated 30
th
November, 2010, directed that the statement be
recorded afresh. The said direction itself reflected the
Court’s concern that the earlier recording may not
have satisfactorily met the procedural requirements
necessary to ensure the reliability and admissibility
of the statement. Pursuant thereto, a fresh statement
was recorded on 4
th January, 2011. Even thereafter,
doubts persisted regarding compliance with the
directions issued by the trial Court. Consequently,
the statement of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim was
again recorded before the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Dausa on 19
th February, 2011.
Significantly, on that occasion, Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim categorically disowned the earlier
confessional statements attributed to him. He
expressly repudiated the prosecution ’s version
regarding the circumstances in which those
statements were allegedly made and questioned their
authenticity. He denied having acted as an approver
in any case and asserted that no statement had ever
been voluntarily made by him before a Magistrate in
the manner alleged by the prosecution.
146
43. The trial Court, while deciding the main case on
29
th September, 2014, recorded a finding that
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim had failed to satisfy
the conditions governing tender of pardon under
Section 306 of CrPC. Consequently, a separate trial
was directed and a supplementary chargesheet came
to be filed against him. The trial Court thereafter
framed charges against him for the offences
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120-
B, Section 307 read with Section 120-B and Section
193 of IPC, Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act, and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.
Ultimately, vide judgment dated 7
th March, 2017, he
was convicted for various offences under the IPC, the
Explosive Substances Act and the Prevention of
Damage to Public Property Act and was sentenced,
inter alia, to imprisonment for life for the offences
punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 120 -B of
IPC, along with the other substantive sentences
awarded thereunder. The High Court vide judgment
dated 22
nd July, 2019 affirmed the said judgment of
conviction and order of sentence and dismissed the
appeal preferred by him.
147
44. Having carefully examined the entire material
on record, we are unable to persuade ourselves to
concur with the approach adopted by the Courts
below. In our considered opinion, the confessional
statements attributed to Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim are attended by serious legal as well as factual
infirmities/lacuna which substantially erode their
evidentiary value and render it unsafe to place
reliance upon them. The record discloses that the
said accused was subjected to repeated exercises for
recording his confessional statement s over a
protracted period, commencing with the first
statement recorded under Section 164 of CrPC in
connection with the Jaipur Stadium Bomb Blast
case, followed by the confessional statement recorded
in the present case on 21
st October, 2002, and
thereafter by successive attempts to re-record the
confession pursuant to judicial directions. Such an
unusual and protracted course of recording
confessional statements is wholly inconsistent with
the safeguards ordinarily governing the recording of
voluntary confessions and, by itself, raises serious
doubts regarding their voluntariness, authenticity
and evidentiary reliability.
148
45. More importantly, the voluntariness of the said
statements stands seriously disputed. The maker of
the confession, namely, Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim, when produced before the trial Court for
recording of evidence as PW-95, i.e., as an approver
in the main case , categorically disowned the
statements attributed to him. He expressly denied
having acted as an approver and asserted that no
statement had been voluntarily made by him in the
manner projected by the prosecution. The
significance of this circumstance can not be
understated. A confession derives its evidentiary
value primarily from its voluntary character. Once
the maker himself challenges the circumstances
under which the statement came to be recorded and
repudiates its contents, the Court is duty-bound to
approach such material with the utmost caution and
circumspection.
46. Despite these glaring infirmities, both the trial
Court and the High Court proceeded to place
substantial reliance and implicit faith upon the
alleged confessional statements for recording a
finding of guilt. In our view, considered in light of the
attending circumstances, such an approach was
149
legally and factually impermissible. A retracted
confession, particularly one whose voluntariness is
seriously questioned and whose authenticity is
rendered doubtful by repeated recording and
subsequent repudiation, cannot constitute the
foundation of a conviction unless it receives strong
and independent corroboration from reliable
evidence. The law is equally well-settled that such
corroboration must be of a substantive character and
must connect the accused with the commission of the
offence in material particulars.
47. The doubts surrounding the voluntariness and
reliability of the alleged confessional statements
become even more pronounced upon an examination
of the original confessional statement dated 9
th
September, 1997, recorded in connection with the
Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case. A careful perusal of
the original confessional statement dated 9
th
September, 1997, recorded in connection with the
Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, reveals certain
features which cast serious doubt on the manner in
which the mandatory safeguards prescribed under
Section 164 of CrPC were observed. In particular, we
find that the manner in which the statutory warning
150
contemplated under Section 164(2) of CrPC has been
recorded is not entirely free from doubt. A close
scrutiny of the original document reveals that the
endorsement containing the statutory warning
clearly appears to have been inserted subsequently
in the limited space available at the commencement
of the document and, prima facie, appears to be in
handwriting different from that employed in the main
body of the confession. The placement and
appearance of the endorsement are such that they
give rise to a legitimate doubt whether the statutory
warning was, in fact, administered in the manner and
at the stage contemplated by Section 164(2) of CrPC,
namely, before the recording of the confession
commenced. This circumstance assumes
considerable significance, for the statutory warning
constitutes an essential safeguard intended to ensure
that the confession is made voluntarily and with full
awareness of its legal consequences.
48. We hasten to add that we do not propose to
record any finding on this aspect, effecting the
legality and validity of the said confession recorded in
the Jaipur Stadium bomb blast case, since the said
issue does not directly fall for determination before
151
us. Nonetheless, the aforesaid circumstances cannot
be regarded as wholly insignificant. They do give rise
to a legitimate doubt as to whether the procedural
safeguards intended to secure the voluntariness and
authenticity of the confession were observed in their
true letter and spirit. It is trite that where a
confession is relied upon as a substantive
incriminating circumstance, the Court must be
satisfied that every statutory safeguard has been
scrupulously observed. Any circumstance casting
doubt upon such compliance necessarily diminishes
the degree of assurance that may otherwise be
derived from the statement and warrants a
correspondingly cautious approach while assessing
its evidentiary worth.
49. Tested on the aforesaid principles, the
prosecution case against Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim is found to be woefully wanting and lacking in
merit. Apart from the confessional statements, which
themselves suffer from serious infirmities highlighted
supra, the prosecution has failed to place any
independent and reliable material on record capable
of lending substantive corroboration thereto. As a
matter of fact, once the confessional statements are
152
eschewed from consideration, t here is no
independent evidence establishing the participation
of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim in the alleged
conspiracy, his involvement in the preparation or
execution of the offence, or his connection with the
explosive device allegedly used in the occurrence. No
witness has deposed to having seen him participate
in any conspiratorial meeting, procure or transport
any explosive substance, provide logistical support
for the commission of the offence, or otherwise
perform any overt act indicative of his involvement in
the alleged criminal design. Equally, there is no
documentary, scientific or forensic material on record
which could lend assurance to the prosecution ’s
theory regarding his role in the occurrence. The
investigating officials have not stated about the
collection of any incriminating evidence against
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim during investigation
except of course for the confessional statements.
50. In these circumstances, once the confessional
statements are excluded from consideration, or even
treated with the degree of caution required in law, the
entire edifice of the prosecution case erected upon
such foundation consequentially collapses. Needless
153
to state that conviction of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim cannot be sustained solely on the basis of his
own confessional statements whose voluntariness
and authenticity remain shrouded in serious doubt.
More importantly, the prosecution has failed to
adduce any independent evidence capable of lending
assurance to the truthfulness of the alleged
confessions or connecting Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim with the alleged conspiracy in a manner known
to law. We are therefore of the considered view that
the alleged confessional statements attributed to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim do not possess the
degree of reliability necessary for sustaining a
conviction in a criminal trial.
51. The weakness of the prosecution case is further
compounded by the complete absence of any
incriminating recovery or discovery attributable to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim. We may note that the
entire record and evidence led by the prosecution do
not refer to any recovery or discovery of an
incriminating fact having been effected at his
instance during the course of the investigation.
Neither any explosive substance, weapon,
incriminating document nor any other material
154
object was recovered from his possession or pursuant
to any disclosure statement attributed to him. The
prosecution has also been unable to point out any
physical, forensic or documentary evidence
connecting him with the procurement, storage,
transportation or deployment of the explosive
substance allegedly used in the commission of the
offence. Indeed, the evidence of the investigating
officers themselves indicates that no material
recovery linking the Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim
to the alleged conspiracy was ever effected.
52. It is also pertinent to note that one of the
persons whom the prosecution had sought to
implicate on the basis of the very same confessional
statements of Accused No. 12 -Pappu @ Salim,
namely, Accused No. 11-Chandra Prakash Agarwal,
from whom the explosive material was allegedly
procured and from whose premises explosive
substances were purportedly recovered, stood
discharged from the present proceedings much
earlier. The High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur, by order dated 9
th November, 2013,
allowed the petition preferred by the said accused
and quashed the proceedings insofar as they related
155
to him. In compliance with the said order, the trial
Court, by order dated 9
th January, 2014, dropped the
proceedings against Accused No. 11 -Chandra
Prakash Agarwal. Consequently, the prosecution
case, insofar as it concerned Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim, thereafter proceeded in the absence of one
of the principal persons whose alleged involvement
had also formed part of the narrative emerging from
the confessional statements relied upon by the
prosecution.
53. The aforesaid circumstances assume
considerable significance in the facts of the present
case. The allegation against Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim is that he was an active participant in a large-
scale terrorist conspiracy involving the movement
and use of explosive substances. In such a case, the
recovery of incriminating articles or the discovery of
material objects pursuant to information supplied by
the said accused would ordinarily furnish important
corroborative support to the prosecution version. The
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, including the
investigating officers themselves, does not establish
any recovery or discovery linking Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim to the alleged conspiracy. The
156
complete absence of any such circumstance, when
viewed alongside the doubtful and unreliable
confessional statements discussed hereinabove,
leaves the prosecution case devoid of any dependable
evidentiary foundation. This constitutes a serious
lacuna which substantially undermines the
allegation of his involvement in the offence.
54. The evidentiary material brought on record
against Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim, when viewed
in its entirety, remains fragmented, inconclusive and
incapable of establishing his guilt to the standard
required in a criminal trial. The prosecution case
rests substantially upon confessional statements
whose voluntariness, authenticity and reliability
stand seriously impaired and completely
compromised, while the independent evidence
necessary to lend assurance thereto is conspicuously
absent. No coherent chain of circumstances emerges
from the record connecting the said accused with the
commission of the offence in a manner known to law.
Such material falls far short of the degree of certainty
required, particularly in a case resting substantially
on circumstantial evidence, and cannot form the
basis of conviction. To sustain a conviction on such
157
tenuous and uncertain circumstances would be
contrary to the settled principles of criminal
jurisprudence, which require proof beyond
reasonable doubt and not mere suspicion, however
strong it may appear to be.
55. Thus, when the evidence on record is evaluated
in its entirety, what emerges is a case devoid of any
reliable recovery or discovery, bereft of direct
evidence, unsupported by a complete chain of
circumstances, and founded principally upon
confessional statements whose voluntariness and
reliability stand seriously impeached. The
prosecution has therefore failed to establish the guilt
of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim beyond reasonable
doubt. In our considered view, the findings recorded
by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are
unsustainable in facts as well as in law, being
founded substantially upon conjectures and
inferences rather than legally admissible and reliable
evidence. Consequently, the benefit of doubt must
necessarily enure to the accused and hence, the
conviction and sentence recorded against Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim cannot be sustained and
deserve to be set aside.
158
56. Resultantly, Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019
preferred by Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is
allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 7
th March, 2017 passed by
the trial Court as well as the judgment and order
dated 22
nd July, 2019 passed by the High Court
affirming the conviction and sentence awarded to
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim are hereby set aside.
The conviction of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and
the sentences awarded to him by the trial Court and
affirmed by the High Court are also set aside.
57. Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is acquitted of
all the charges levelled against him. The said accused
shall be released forthwith, if in custody, unless
required to be detained in connection with any other
case.
58. In view of our conclusion acquitting Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim of all the charges levelled
against him in the present case, the challenge laid by
the State of Rajasthan to the judgment and order
dated 29
th September, 2020 passed by the High Court
granting permanent parole to the said accused no
longer survives for consideration. Consequently,
Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition
159
(Criminal) No. 3531 of 2021 has been rendered
infructuous and is accordingly dismissed as such.
C. Challenge to the Acquittal of Accused No. 1 -
Javed Khan, Accused No. 2 -Abdul Goni,
Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No.
5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6 -Mirza
Nisar Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg
59. Having dealt with the appeals preferred by
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed and Accused No.
12-Pappu @ Salim, we shall now examine the
challenge laid by the State of Rajasthan to the
acquittal of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed
Junior, Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla,
Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-
Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood Keeley, Accused
No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja and Accused No.
10-Raees Baeg. The question that falls for our
consideration is whether the view taken by the High
Court in acquitting the aforesaid accused persons
can be said to be a reasonably possible view on the
basis of evidence brought on record.
60. The entire fulcrum of the prosecution case
against the aforesaid accused persons except
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg is the confessional
160
statement of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan recorded
under Section 164 of CrPC in connection with Jaipur
Stadium bomb blast case [Exhibit P-153]. A careful
reading of the said statement reveals that it primarily
narrates the movements of certain individuals
including Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused No. 4-
Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali
Bhatt and Accused No. 6 -Mirza Nisar Hussain
between Kathmandu, Delhi, Patna, Mumbai and
Ahmedabad and refers to the alleged transportation
of a bag said to contain explosive material. It further
contains references to certain persons allegedly
associated with Bilal Ahmed Baeg and other
operatives. The broad tenor of the statement
indicates, at best, an attempt to describe the
movements and interactions of various individuals
allegedly connected with numerous extremist
activities under scanner of investigating agencies and
being investigated at the relevant point of time.
However, beyond such generic narrative references,
it does not attribute any specific role, overt act or
participation to the aforesaid accused persons in
relation to the occurrence forming the subject matter
161
of the present proceedings, i.e., the Samleti Bus
bomb blast.
61. The statement is conspicuously silent regarding
the Samleti Bus bomb blast. Neither does it contain
any admission or disclosure therein concerning the
planning, execution or facilitation of the occurrence
in question nor does the statement disclose any role
attributable to Accused No. 1-Javed Khan in the
commission of the present offence. At its highest, the
statement refers to events allegedly connected with
the transportation of explosive substances and
activities which formed the subject matter of other
nefarious criminal activities. There is no reference
whatsoever to the placement of any explosive device
in the Rajasthan Roadways bus, to any meeting or
discussion concerning the Samleti incident, or to any
act suggestive of participation in the conspiracy
alleged in the present case. Even if the entirety of the
statement is accepted at face value, it merely
discloses certain alleged antecedent events and
movements of individuals at different locations,
without establishing any discernible link with the
bus explosion that occurred near Samleti village on
22
nd May, 1996. The statement, therefore, does not
162
furnish any substantive or tangible material
connecting either Accused No. 1-Javed Khan or the
co-accused persons referred to therein with the
present crime.
62. Insofar as Accused No. 2-Abdul Goni, Accused
No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad
Ali Bhatt and Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain are
concerned, their implication also rests almost
entirely upon certain references contained in the
confessional statement of Accused No. 1-Javed Khan.
As has been discussed above, a plain reading of the
said statement reveals that these accused persons
are referred to only in the context of their alleged
presence at certain places or their movements
alongside other individuals at different points of time.
Significantly, there is no allegation therein that any
of them participated in the conspiracy or planning of
the Samleti Bus bomb blast, procured or transported
the explosive device or substances used in the
occurrence, facilitated its placement in the bus, or
otherwise contributed to the execution of the crime.
At the highest, the statement indicates acquaintance
or association amongst certain individuals during the
general corresponding period. Such instances, even
163
if accepted in their entirety, are wholly insufficient to
establish criminal culpability for the present offence.
Mere association, companionship or travel with other
accused persons cannot, by itself, establish
participation in a criminal conspiracy and that too for
a specific offence. In the absence of any independent
evidence demonstrating a meeting of minds, an overt
act, or any circumstance connecting these accused
persons with the planning or execution of the Samleti
Bus bomb blast, the generic references contained in
the confessional statement of the co-accused would
be wholly inadequate to sustain a conviction.
63. We also find that nothing material emanates
from the alleged disclosure statements attributed to
Accused No. 1-Javed Khan and Accused No. 10-
Raees Baeg. Though the prosecution has contended
that certain places, including a Masjid and premises
allegedly used by one Salaar, were identified
pursuant to disclosures made by the aforesaid
accused persons, such circumstances do not
materially advance the prosecution case. The
identification of a place, by itself, does not constitute
incriminating evidence unless it leads to the
discovery of a relevant fact previously unknown to the
164
investigating agency and having a direct nexus with
the crime under investigation. In the present case,
the prosecution has failed to demonstrate that any
recovery of incriminating fact or material, explosive
substance, document, weapon, or other article
connected with the Samleti Bus bomb blast was
effected as a consequence of such disclosures.
64. At this stage, it would be apposite to notice the
settled principles governing the evidentiary value of
disclosure statements and the memoranda prepared
pursuant thereto. The contents of a panchnama or
memorandum do not constitute substantive
evidence. As held by this Court in Murli & Anr. v.
State of Rajasthan
59, it is the testimony of the
witness in the witness box, and not the recitals
contained in such documents, that constitutes
substantive evidence. The memorandum merely
records what the investigating officer claims to have
observed and cannot, by itself, prove either the
disclosure allegedly made by the accused or the
discovery said to have followed. The evidentiary value
of such memoranda, therefore, is necessarily
59
(2009) 9 SCC 417.
165
circumscribed and depends upon satisfactory oral
evidence proving the precise information allegedly
furnished by the accused and the discovery said to
have ensued therefrom.
65. The principles governing the admissibility of
information under Section 27 of IEA are equally well
settled. In Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor
60, it was
authoritatively held that only that portion of the
information furnished by an accused which distinctly
relates to the fact thereby discovered is admissible in
evidence. The discovery contemplated by Section 27
of IEA is not the mere pointing out of a place already
within the knowledge of the investigating agency or
the production of an object without any incriminating
nexus, but the discovery of a relevant fact previously
unknown, brought to light as a direct consequence of
the information supplied by the accused. Unless the
information furnished by the accused results in the
discovery of a relevant fact previously not known and
connected with the offence under investigation, the
statutory exception carved out under Section 27 of
IEA would not be attracted. Mere statements
60
Supra note 45.
166
expressing willingness to identify places or locations,
without resulting in the discovery of a relevant fact,
do not satisfy the statutory requirements.
66. Examined in the light of the aforesaid settled
principles, the disclosure statements attributed to
Accused No. 1-Javed Khan and Accused No. 10 -
Raees Baeg do not advance the prosecution case. The
prosecution has primarily relied upon the
memoranda and the consequential site verification
proceedings, but has failed to establish, through
cogent oral evidence, the precise information
allegedly furnished by the accused which led to the
discovery of any relevant fact. Nor has it been shown
that the alleged disclosures resulted in the recovery
of any incriminating article, document, explosive
substance or other fact having a direct nexus with
the Samleti Bus bomb blast. The alleged pointing out
of certain places, by itself, does not constitute a
discovery of an incriminating fact within the meaning
of Section 27 of IEA. The memoranda and the
consequential site verification proceedings do not
satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 27 of
IEA and are incapable of constituting an
167
incriminating circumstance against the said accused
persons.
67. Consequently, the alleged disclosures, the
memoranda prepared pursuant thereto, and the site
verification proceedings undertaken on their basis do
not constitute incriminating circumstances capable
of connecting Accused No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused
No. 10-Raees Baeg, or any of the co-accused with the
commission of the present offence. The evidentiary
value sought to be attached to such material is,
therefore, extremely limited and incapable of
advancing the prosecution case. Viewed in their
entirety, these circumstances neither furnish a
legally admissible link in the chain of prosecution
evidence nor provide any meaningful corroboration to
the allegations levelled against the accused persons.
The said material, therefore, is of no assistance in
dislodging the view taken by the High Court while
acquitting the aforesaid accused persons.
68. Turning now to the case of Accused No. 10 -
Raees Baeg, we find that the prosecution primarily
relies upon the confessional statements of Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim as the principal circumstance
sought to connect the said accused with the alleged
168
conspiracy and the commission of the offence.
However, we are of the considered opinion that the
said confessional statements suffer from serious
infirmities and do not inspire confidence. We are also
of the opinion that the circumstances surrounding
the recording of those statements render them unsafe
to be acted upon. We have already concluded so while
dealing with the appeal of Accused No. 12-Pappu @
Salim. Once the very foundation of that evidence
stands discredited, the superstructure sought to be
erected upon it must necessarily collapse. In such
circumstances, no reliance can be placed upon the
confessional statements for implicating another
accused. Unquestionably, evidence in the form of
confession of one accused which is itself found to be
unreliable and unworthy of acceptance cannot be
employed, either directly or indirectly, to establish
the complicity of a co-accused. The prosecution has
not pointed to any other independent or convincing
material capable of lending assurance to the
allegations against Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
Consequently, the confessional statement of Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim cannot furnish a legally
169
sustainable basis for recording any finding adverse to
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
69. Even otherwise, a careful examination of the
confessional statement attributed to Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim does not disclose any specific role
played by Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg in the Samleti
Bus bomb blast. It is also relevant to note that once
the status of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim as an
approver stood withdrawn as he resiled from the
confession recorded after the grant of pardon, his
statement could, at best, assume the character of a
confession of a co-accused. Such a confession is not
substantive evidence and can only be used to lend
assurance to a conclusion otherwise reached on the
basis of independent and legally admissible
substantive evidence.
61 In the present case, however,
the confessional statement is conspicuously silent as
regards participation, specific act, or involvement of
Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg in the execution of the
Samleti Bus bomb blast. In the absence of any other
proven circumstance connecting him with the
offence, the statement furnishes no material capable
61
Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 1 SCC 275 and
Suresh Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 7 SCC 337.
170
of lending assurance to the prosecution case against
the said accused.
70. The prosecution has not produced any
independent evidence connecting him with the
occurrence. His alleged involvement in other terrorist
activity related cases cannot constitute proof of
participation in the present offence. Criminal liability
must be established on the basis of evidence relating
to the offence under consideration and cannot be
founded upon suspicions arising from other
proceedings that are neither directly connected with
nor cognate to the offence in question. In the absence
of legally admissible direct evidence implicating him
in material particulars, coupled with the lack of
independent corroborative evidence, no incriminating
circumstance can be said to have been established
against Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg.
71. The principles governing interference with a
judgment of acquittal are too well settled to require
elaborate discussion. In Sheo Swarup v. King
Emperor
62, the Privy Council observed that while an
appellate Court possesses full power to review the
62
1934 SCC OnLine PC 42.
171
evidence, it must always bear in mind the
presumption of innocence available to the accused
and the reluctance ordinarily exercised in disturbing
an acquittal. The same principles have consistently
been reiterated by this Court in a long line of
decisions.
72. The law accords a position of considerable
sanctity to a finding of acquittal, and for good reason.
In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat
63,
this Court held that before interfering with an
acquittal, the appellate Court must first conclude
that the findings recorded by the Courts below are
palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or
demonstrably unsustainable. Unless such infirmities
are shown to exist, the acquittal ought not to be
disturbed. Mere possibility of a different view is
insufficient. This principle was s ubsequently
elaborated in Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka
64, wherein this Court explained that an
accused who has secured an acquittal enjoys a
double presumption in his favour. Firstly, the
ordinary presumption of innocence available under
63
(1996) 9 SCC 225.
64
(2007) 4 SCC 415.
172
criminal jurisprudence; and secondly, the reinforced
presumption arising from the acquittal itself. This
Court further held that where two reasonable views
are possible on the evidence, the view favourable to
the accused must prevail. Relevant extract from the
said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding
powers of the appellate court while dealing with
an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of
such power and an appellate court on the evidence
before it may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and
compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”,
“very strong circumstances”, “distorted
conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not
intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate
court in an a ppeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes
of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an
appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to
curtail the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to him
under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that eve ry person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
173
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the
trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”
[Emphasis supplied]
73. Tested on the aforesaid principles, we find no
justification to interfere with the acquittal of Accused
No. 1-Javed Khan, Accused No. 2 -Abdul Goni,
Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-
Mohammad Ali Bhatt, Accused No. 6 -Mirza Nisar
Hussain and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg as recorded
by the High Court. Far from dislodging the reinforced
presumption of innocence operating in favour of the
acquitted accused, the prosecution has failed to
produce any cogent, reliable and legally admissible
evidence connecting them with the charged offence,
i.e., the Samleti Bus bomb blast. The deficiencies in
the prosecution case are not merely peripheral in
nature but strike at the very foundation of the
charges sought to be established against the accused
persons. The chain of circumstances relied upon by
the prosecution remains incomplete and falls
174
woefully short of the standard required to record a
finding of guilt in a criminal trial.
74. The prosecution has failed to point out any
material circumstance or credible ground
demonstrating that the appreciation of evidence by
the High Court is manifestly erroneous, perverse, or
otherwise warranting interference with the order of
acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. On the
contrary, upon an independent examination of the
evidence on record, we find that the view taken by the
High Court is reasonable, plausible and rather, the
only permissible view based on the material available
on record. Accordingly, we find no justification to
disturb the acquittal of the aforesaid accused
persons.
75. Resultantly, the Criminal Appeals arising out of
Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 621 of 2020,
571 of 2020, 681 of 2020 and 143 of 2020 preferred
by the State of Rajasthan challenging the acquittal of
Accused No. 1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior, Accused
No. 2-Abdul Goni @ Asadulla, Accused No. 4-Lateef
Ahmad Baja, Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt @
Mehamood Keeley, Accused No. 6 -Mirza Nisar
175
Hussain @ Naja and Accused No. 10-Raees Baeg fail
and are accordingly dismissed.
D. Conclusion
76. Having given our thoughtful consideration to
the issues arising in the present batch of appeals and
having recorded our conclusions thereon, we deem it
appropriate to dispose of the present batch of appeals
by issuing the following directions and consequential
orders in the succeeding paragraphs.
77. Criminal Appeal Nos. 1827 -1829 of 2019
preferred by Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed are
partly allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction
dated 29
th September, 2014 and order of sentence
dated 17
th December, 2015 passed by the trial Court
as well as the common judgment dated 22
nd July,
2019 passed by the High Court to the extent that it
upheld the conviction and sentences awarded to
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed are hereby set
aside. The conviction of Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul
Hameed and the sentences awarded to him by the
trial Court and affirmed by the High Court are also
set aside. While setting aside the conviction and
176
sentence awarded to Accused No. 9 -Dr. Abdul
Hameed, we direct as under: -
A. The matter is remitted to the Court of Sessions for
conducting a de-novo trial against Accused No. 9-
Dr. Abdul Hameed.
B. Having regard to the fact that the occurrence
relates to the year 1996 and the matter has
remained pending for nearly three decades, we
request the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice of the
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan to
designate a Special Court at Jaipur for conducting
the de-novo trial. The Special Court shall be
presided over by an officer of the Rajasthan Higher
Judicial Service having not less than seven years’
experience of conducting Sessions trials. The trial
shall be conducted at Jaipur, and the Special
Court shall make every endeavour to conclude the
trial within a period of one year from the date of
assignment of the case.
C. The Special Court shall proceed with the case from
the stage of recording of prosecution evidence and
thereafter conduct the trial afresh in accordance
with law, uninfluenced by any observations
contained in the judgments of the trial Court, the
177
High Court or in the present judgment on the
merits of the prosecution case.
D. Before commencing the trial, the Special Court
shall ensure that Accused No. 9 -Dr. Abdul
Hameed is represented by a counsel of his choice.
In the event the said accused is unable to engage
a counsel, the Special Court shall secure
competent legal representation for him through
the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority by
appointing an advocate having not less than ten
years’ standing at the Bar as the lead defence
counsel, assisted by another advocate having not
less than seven years’ standing at the Bar, so as to
ensure effective and meaningful legal assistance
throughout the proceedings. The fees and other
incidental expenses of the said counsel shall be
borne by the Rajasthan State Legal Services
Authority as per Rules.
E. The Special Court shall ensure that copies of all
documents and other materials relied upon by the
prosecution are furnished to Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed in accordance with law without any
avoidable delay so as to facilitate the expeditious
commencement and conduct of the trial.
178
F. Since, we have set aside the impugned judgment
passed by the trial Court qua Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed on the ground that the said
accused was not provided effective legal
representation at the time of recording of evidence
during the trial, the Special Court shall take
immediate steps for summoning all the
prosecution witnesses and thereafter, provide
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed a full and
effective opportunity to cross-examine them. The
concerned police authorities shall extend full
assistance to the Special Court and make every
endeavour to secure the presence of the witnesses
on the dates fixed for recording their evidence so
as to ensure that the trial proceeds expeditiously
and is concluded within the time stipulated by this
Court. The defence counsel engaged to represent
Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed in the de-novo
trial shall be provided sufficient time to prepare
the case.
G. It shall be open to the prosecution to seek the
issuance of appropriate coercive process for
securing the attendance of witnesses, and the
179
Special Court shall pass appropriate orders in
accordance with law to ensure their presence.
H. The Special Court shall, upon commencement of
the trial, proceed with the recording of evidence on
a day-to-day basis, as far as practicable, and shall
not grant unnecessary adjournments except for
reasons to be recorded in writing.
I. Once the prosecution evidence is concluded, the
trial Court may, if it so desires, examine Accused
No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed under Section 313 of
CrPC. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed shall
thereafter be given reasonable opportunity to lead
defence evidence. Thereafter, the trial Court shall
proceed to hear the final arguments and pass a
fresh judgment in accordance with law.
J. Accused No. 9-Dr. Abdul Hameed shall remain in
judicial custody during the pendency of the de-
novo trial. However, it shall be open to him to apply
for bail before the Special Court. If any such
application is preferred, the same shall be
considered on its own merits, strictly in
accordance with law and uninfluenced by the
findings recorded in the judgments which have
180
been set aside by this Court or by any observations
contained in the present judgment.
K. The Registry of this Court shall forthwith transmit
a copy of this judgment to the Registrar General,
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, who shall
place the same before the Hon’ble the Acting Chief
Justice forthwith for appropriate administrative
orders in terms of Direction B above and shall
thereafter ensure due compliance with all the
directions contained in this judgment.
L. The Registry of this Court shall forthwith transmit
the original records of the case to the Registrar
General, High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan,
who shall, immediately upon the designation of the
Special Court in terms of Direction B, ensure that
the entire original record is transmitted to the said
Special Court to facilitate the expeditious
commencement of the de-novo trial.
M. The Registry of this Court shall also ensure the
translation of the present judgment into Hindi. A
copy of the English version of the judgment shall
forthwith be transmitted to Accused No. 9-Dr.
Abdul Hameed, who is lodged in Central Jail,
181
Jaipur. Upon completion of the Hindi translation,
a copy thereof shall also be forwarded to him.
78. Criminal Appeal No. 1830 of 2019 preferred by
Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim is allowed. The
impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 7
th March, 2017 passed by the trial
Court as well as the judgment and order dated 22
nd
July, 2019 passed by the High Court affirming the
conviction and sentence awarded to Accused No. 12-
Pappu @ Salim are hereby set aside. The conviction
of Accused No. 12-Pappu @ Salim and the sentences
awarded to him by the trial Court and affirmed by the
High Court are also set aside. Accused No. 12-Pappu
@ Salim is acquitted of all the charges levelled against
him. The said accused shall be released forthwith, if
in custody, unless required to be detained in
connection with any other case.
79. In view of our conclusion acquitting Accused
No. 12-Pappu @ Salim of all the charges levelled
against him in the present case, the challenge laid by
the State of Rajasthan to the judgment and order
dated 29
th September, 2020 passed by the High Court
granting permanent parole to the said accused no
182
longer survives for consideration. Consequently,
Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No. 3531 of 2021 has been rendered
infructuous and is accordingly dismissed as such.
80. Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave
Petition (Criminal) Nos. 621 of 2020, 571 of 2020,
681 of 2020 and 143 of 2020 preferred by the State
of Rajasthan challenging the acquittal of Accused No.
1-Javed Khan @ Javed Junior, Accused No. 2-Abdul
Goni @ Asadulla, Accused No. 4-Lateef Ahmad Baja,
Accused No. 5-Mohammad Ali Bhatt @ Mehamood
Keeley, Accused No. 6-Mirza Nisar Hussain @ Naja
and Accused No. 10 -Raees Baeg fail and are
accordingly dismissed.
81. It is clarified that all observations made in the
present judgment concerning Accused No. 9 -Dr.
Abdul Hameed are confined to the issue relating to
the fairness of the trial and the legality of the
proceedings culminating in his conviction. The
Special Court shall independently appreciate the
evidence that may be adduced before it and decide
the matter strictly on its own merits, without being
influenced by any observation contained in this
judgment.
183
82. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH )
….……………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL )
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 21, 2026.
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