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State Bank Of India Vs. Union Of India & Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India 2026 INSC 153
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Case Background

As per case facts, telecom service providers (TSPs), including Aircel Group entities, invoked the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) after failing to pay license dues to the Department of Telecommunication ...

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Document Text Version

2026 INSC 153 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1810 OF 2021

STATE BANK OF INDIA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2227 OF 2021

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 4570 OF 2021

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2263 OF 2021

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 4571 OF 2021

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 6546 OF 2021

1

J U D G M E N T

Contents

I.Introduction........................................................................................................3

II.Prelude to the NCLAT’s judgment: Facts leading to the filing of these

appeals................................................................................................................4

III.Submissions of the Learned Counsels.........................................................13

A.Submission on behalf of TSPs and financial institutions..........................13

B.Submissions on behalf of DoT/Union of India...........................................16

IV.Nature of Spectrum and the Constitutional Framework Governing the

Natural Resources...........................................................................................20

A.Spectrum as a Finite Natural Resource....................................................20

B.Concept of ownership over natural resources and its Constitutional

Underpinnings.................................................................................................21

V.Statute, Policy and Contractual Framework Governing Spectrum

Allocation, Licensing and Use........................................................................23

A.Statutory Framework of Spectrum............................................................23

B....The Successive Telecom Policies including unbundling of licensing

spectrum allocation.........................................................................................26

C. Guidelines for Trading of Access Spectrum by Access Service Providers,

2015..........................................................................................................31

D. Spectrum Licenses and Contract:.............................................................37

E.Tripartite Agreement..................................................................................42

VI.The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016................................................44

A.First principles...........................................................................................44

B.Difficulty in Expecting NCLAT to rule on Spectrum...................................46

C.Implications of Treating Spectrum as an Asset by TSPs/Corporate Debtor

and the Financial Institutions....................................................................47

VII.Identification of True Legal Province of Spectrum: Reconciliatory

Interpretation of Two Statutory Regimes......................................................58

VIII. Conclusion.........................................................................................................67

2

I.Introduction

1.The question for our consideration is whether telecom service

providers (TSPs), called upon to pay the license dues by the Department

of Telecommunication (DoT) can invoke moratorium on the basis of

voluntary corporate insolvency resolution process under Insolvency and

Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) for restructuring of their assets. The asset

in question is the Spectrum allocated to the TSPs through auction. The

endeavour to treat spectrum as an asset in the hands of TSPs gives rise

to a fundamental question as to its ownership, possession, use, transfer,

or assignment. Its definition and legal province are the subject matter of

our inquiry.

1.1.This issue is not as complicated as it seems. We could demystify

the legal challenge by first understanding spectrum as a material

resource, precisely as what our Constitution refers to as the material

resource of the community. If that be so, it is easy to find the path by

simply following the State policy to ensure that spectrum and its benefits

sub-serve common good - not uncommon good. For this purpose, its

“ownership” and more importantly its “control” with all its attributes,

including benefits, have to be secured for the citizens.

1.2.Our judgment is therefore in three parts. In the first part, we define

the legal implications of spectrum and in the second part we identify its

true legal province. In the third part, we examine treatment of an “asset”

3

under IBC and in this context its application to telecommunication laws

that govern ownership of spectrum. Finally, we could reach our

conclusion, as naturally as water knows its slope, IBC cannot be the

guiding principle for restructuring the ownership and control of spectrum.

II.Prelude to the NCLAT’s judgment: Facts leading to the filing

of these appeals.

2. The Aircel Group entities - Aircel Limited, Aircel Cellular Limited

and Dishnet Wireless Limited (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the

corporate debtors”) - were granted telecom licences by the DoT under

Unified Access Service Licences (UASL) pursuant to Licence

Agreements dated 05.12.2006, each valid for a term of twenty years.

Domestic lenders, including the State Bank of India, extended rupee

term loan facilities aggregating to 13,729 crores under a Rupee Loan

Facility Agreement dated 29.03.2014, followed by execution of

Indentures of Mortgage dated 02.05.2014 in favour of the lenders. In

spectrum auctions conducted by DoT during the years 2010, 2014, 2015

and 2016, the corporate debtor acquired rights to use spectrum in the

900 MHz, 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz bands upon payment of 6,249.27

crores.

3.Corporate debtors failed to pay licence fee. When DoT attempted

to recover these amounts, they invoked IBC by filing an application

4

under Section 10 for voluntary corporate insolvency resolution process.

The application was admitted by the National Company Law Tribunal,

Mumbai Bench, vide order dated 12.03.2018 in respect of Aircel Limited,

appointing Vijaykumar V. Iyer as the Interim Resolution Professional. By

a subsequent order dated 19.03.2018, Aircel Cellular Limited and

Dishnet Wireless Limited were also admitted into CIRP.

4.Upon constitution of the Committees of Creditors (CoC) for Aircel

Cellular Limited and Dishnet Wireless Limited on 30.03.2018, claims

were invited from all stakeholders. The DoT was invited to participate in

the CoC meeting held on 06.06.2018, and thereafter filed its claim on

16.08.2018 in Form-F, asserting a claim of 9,894.13 crores as a

licensor, arising from Annual Licence Fee and Spectrum Usage Charges

payable under the Licence Agreements.

5.A resolution plan submitted by UV Asset Reconstruction Company

was approved by the CoC on 13.05.2019 and thereafter sanctioned by

the NCLT by order dated 09.06.2020. Aggrieved, DoT assailed the NCLT

order approving the resolution plan before the appellate tribunal, NCLAT.

6.During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, this Court

delivered its judgment in Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom

Service Providers of India

1

, affirming the definition of Adjusted Gross

Revenue (AGR) as stipulated in the licence agreements executed

1 (2020) 3 SCC 525. (Hereinafter ‘AUSPI (II))

5

between the DoT and the TSPs. Pursuant thereto, the Union of India

filed M.A. (D) No. 9887 of 2020 on certain aspects relating to payment of

the AGR dues. In the course of consideration of the said application, it

was brought to the notice of this Court that several TSPs, including the

Aircel Group entities, were undergoing insolvency proceedings under the

IBC and in view of the moratorium recovery of amount is impermissible.

In the said proceedings, this Court passed an order on 20.07.2020

2

observing as under:

“We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties

at length with respect to the prayer made by the

Central Government and the time frame for making the

payment as per the order passed by this Court. During course

of hearing, again an attempt was made to wriggle out of our

judgment and orders, which were passed by this Court under

the guise of reassessment and recalculation. That is not at all

permissible. In view of decision, there is no scope of raising

any further dispute with respect to any item or to raise fresh

dispute. No dispute can be raised with respect to dues and

they have to be paid. New round of litigation is prohibited. In

the second inning, we have heard the same after remand of

the issues to the TDSAT. Thereafter, there is no question of

entertaining any kind of dispute with respect to the payment

and dues worked out. No dispute shall be entertained. The

calculations which have been given and the amount to be

recovered at pages 180181 of M.A.D. No. 9887 of 2020

(application for modification) in C.A. No. 63286399 of 2015 are

taken to be as final amount and there can be no dispute raised

about it. No recalculation and selfassessment can be

undertaken.

….

However, when we consider the dues of Telecom Service

Providers under insolvency, we find that there are

several companies which have dues to the extent of Rs.

38,964.27 crores, which have gone under liquidation. Since

the dues are huge, we propose to examine the bonafides of the

initiation of the proceedings under the IBC. Let all the

2 In Re Mandar Deshpande, 2020 SCC OnLine 758.

6

documents of the companies viz. Aircel Group of

Companies, Reliance Communication/Reliance Telecom

Limited, Sistema Shyam Teleservices Ltd. and Videocon

Telecommunications Ltd. relating to liquidation and orders

passed in proceedings be placed on record within 10 days from

today.

We have closed the matter with respect to the prayer made for

making the payment in installments and the offer made by the

Government, the time frame thereto and how to secure the

amount. The order is reserved on that aspect.

However, we will hear the matter separately with respect to the

companies under liquidation and test the bonafides of

their action and how to ensure that the amount is recovered.

Let all the documents be placed on record within 10 days from

today and the matter be listed for hearing about

these companies on the above aspect on 10.08.2020.”

7.In continuation of the above proceedings, this Court

3

, by order

dated 01.09.2020, noted that the question whether spectrum could be

subjected to proceedings under the IBC raised issue of considerable

significance. Accordingly, specific questions of law were formulated and

referred for adjudication to NCLAT on 25.09.2022 with a direction to

consider the same after hearing all concerned parties and to return a

reasoned determination. The following were the questions framed and

referred by this Court:

“20. A question has been raised concerning ownership.

Whether TSPs can be said to be the owner based on the right

to use the spectrum under licence granted to them? Whether

a licence is a contractual arrangement? Whether ownership

belongs to the Government of India? Whether spectrum

being under contract can be subjected to proceedings under

Section 18 of the Code? The question also arises whether the

spectrum can be said to be in possession, which arises from

ownership. What is the distinction between possession

and occupation? Whether possession correlates with the

ownership right? A question also arises concerning the

3 Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India, (2020) 9 SCC 748.

7

difference between trading and insolvency proceedings.

Whether a licence can be transferred under the insolvency

proceedings, particularly when the trading is subjected to

clearance of dues by seller or buyer, as the case may be, as

provided in Guideline Nos.10 and 11; whereas in insolvency

proceedings dues are wiped off. Guideline No.12 is also

assumed to be of significance in case spectrum is subjected

to insolvency proceedings, which must be considered.

21. It is also required to be examined that when the

Government has declined the permission to trade and has not

issued NOC for trading on the ground of non-fulfilment of the

conditions as stipulated in the licence agreement, the spectrum

can be subjected to resolution proceedings which will have the

effect of wiping off the dues of the Government, which are

more than Rs 40,000 crores. Whereas the dues of the banks

are much less. Whether obtaining the DoT's permission and its

approval to the resolution plan would be a substitute for

Trading Guideline Nos. 10, 11, and 12?

22. A question also arises of bona fide nature of the

proceedings under the Code. In the backdrop facts of the

cases, question also arises whether spectrum licence is

subjected to proceedings under the Code, and it overrides the

provisions contained in the Telegraph Act, 1885, the Wireless

Telegraphy Act, 1933, and the Telecom Regulatory Authority of

India Act, 1997.

23. In view of the fact that the licence contained an agreement

between the licensor, licensee, and the lenders, whether on the

basis of that, spectrum can be treated as a security interest

and what is the mode of its enforcement. Whether the banks

can enforce it in the proceedings under the Code or by the

procedure as per the law of enforcement of security interest

under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets

and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 (the

SARFAESI Act) or under any other law.

24. A question of seminal significance also arises whether the

spectrum is a natural resource, the Government is holding the

same as cestui que trust. In view of the nature of the resource,

it can be subjected to insolvency/liquidation proceedings.

Earlier licence was obtained on the payment of fees in advance

that was not beneficial to the TSPs, as such a new revenue

sharing regime was devised in 1999, and the Central

Government has an exclusive right under Section 4 of the

8

Telegraph Act, 1885 in use of spectrum, it can part with on

certain statutory guidelines, its use is not permissible without

the payment of requisite fee.

25. Whether dues under the licence can be said to be

operational dues? It is also to be examined whether

deferred/default payment instalment(s) of spectrum acquisition

cost can be termed to be operational dues besides AGR dues.

Whether as per the revenue sharing regime and the provisions

of the Telegraph Act, 1885, the dues can be said to be

operational dues? Whether natural resource would be available

to use without payment of requisite dues, whether such dues

can be wiped off by resorting to the proceedings under the

Code and comparative dues of the Government, and secured

creditors and bona fides of proceedings are also the questions

to be considered.”

8.The questions referred can be restated as follows;

(i) Whether spectrum is a natural resource held by the Union of India in

public trust, and the legal consequences flowing therefrom.

(ii) Whether the conferment of a right to use spectrum under a licence

granted under Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1885 vests any ownership

or proprietary interest in TSPs, or whether such right constitutes a

limited, conditional and revocable privilege.

(iii) What is the true nature of the relationship between ownership,

possession and occupation in respect of spectrum, and whether

possession or control of spectrum usage correlates with ownership

rights.

9

(iv) Whether spectrum, or the right to use spectrum under a licence, can

be treated as an “asset” of the corporate debtor so as to fall within the

ambit of Section 18 of the IBC.

(v) Whether spectrum licences or spectrum usage rights can be

transferred or traded in insolvency proceedings when such transfer,

under the Spectrum Trading Guidelines, is expressly subject to prior

governmental approval and clearance of past dues.

(vi) Whether spectrum or spectrum usage rights can be treated as a

security interest in favour of lenders by virtue of licence conditions or

tripartite arrangements, and whether such security can be enforced

under the Code.

(vii) Whether approval of a resolution plan under the IBC can substitute

or override the requirements contained in the Spectrum Trading

Guidelines, including Guidelines 10, 11 and 12, particularly where the

Government has declined permission to trade on account of non-

fulfilment of licence conditions.

(viii) Whether invocation of CIRP, particularly voluntarily, raises issues of

bona fides of the corporate debtor in triggering proceedings under the

IBC.

9.By the order impugned before us NCLAT heard parties in detail

and returned the following conclusions on the questions referred;

“75. In conclusion we summarize our findings as under:

10

a)Spectrum is a natural resource and the Government is

holding the same as cestui que trust.

b)Spectrum, being intangible asset of the Licensee/ TSPs/

TelCos/ Corporate Debtor, can be subjected to

insolvency/liquidation proceedings.

c)Dues of Central Government/ DOT under the Licence fall

within the ambit of Operational Dues under I&B Code.

d)Deferred/ default payment installments of spectrum

acquisition cost also fall within the ambit of Operational

Dues under I&B Code.

e)As per Revenue Sharing Regime and the provisions of

Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, the nature of dues payable to

Licenser continues to be ‘Operational Dues’ which are

payable primarily in terms of the Licence Agreement.

f)Natural Resource would not be available to use without

payment of requisite dues.

g)Triggering of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings

under I&B Code by the Corporate Debtor with the object of

wiping off of such dues, not being for insolvency resolution,

but with malicious or fraudulent intention, would be

impermissible.

h)TSPs have the right to use spectrum under licence granted

to them. They cannot be said to be the owners in

possession of the spectrum but only in occupation of the

right to use spectrum. Ownership of spectrum belongs to

Nation (people) with Government only being its Trustee.

Possession correlates with the ownership right.

i)Under Section 18 of the I&B Code, the Interim Resolution

Professional is bound to monitor the assets of the Corporate

Debtor and manage its operations, take control and custody

of assets over which the Corporate Debtor has ownership

rights including intangible assets which includes right to use

spectrum.

11

j)Trading in intangible assets like use of spectrum derives

strength from the terms and conditions of the Licence

Agreement/ UASL, clause 6.3 whereof vests in Licensee a

right to transfer or assign the Licence Agreement with prior

written approval of the Licensor and subject to fulfillment of

conditions which include payment of past dues in full till the

date of transfer. On the other hand, Insolvency Proceedings

arise out of default in discharge of financial or operational

debt and are triggered for insolvency resolution of corporate

persons, etc. in a time bound manner for maximization of

value of assets of such persons.

k)While a licence can be transferred as an intangible asset of

the Licensee /Corporate Debtor under Insolvency

Proceedings in ordinary circumstances, however as the

trading is subjected to clearance of dues by Seller or Buyer,

as the case may be, the Transferor/Seller or

Transferee/Buyer being in default, would not qualify for

transfer of licence under the insolvency proceedings.

l)The spectrum cannot be utilized without payment of

requisite dues which cannot be wiped off by triggering CIRP

under I&B Code.

m)The defaulting Licensees/ TelCos cannot be permitted to

wriggle out of their liabilities by resorting to triggering of

CIRP by seeking initiation of CIRP under Section 10 of I&B

Code, not for purposes of resolution but fraudulently and

with malicious intent of withholding the huge arrears

payable to Government, obtaining moratorium to abort

Government’s move to suspend, revoke or terminate the

Licences and in the event of a Resolution Plan being

approved, subjecting the Central Government to be

contended with the peanuts offered to it as ‘Operational

Creditor’ within the ambit of distribution mechanism

contemplated under Section 53 of I&B Code.”

n)Having regard to Clause 3.4 and 3.5 of the Tripartite

Agreement according priority/ first charge to DOT, the

spectrum cannot be treated as a security interest by the

12

Lenders. In view of this finding, we need not consider the

mode of Enforcement of security interest.

10.Appeals and cross appeals have been filed assailing the said order

impugning the different conclusions arrived at by the NCLAT. The lead

appeal has been instituted by the State Bank of India, representing the

financial creditors of the corporate debtor, assailing certain conclusions

of the appellate tribunal on the questions referred. Similarly, the erstwhile

Resolution Professional of the corporate debtor laid identical challenge

to the findings. On the other hand, Union of India through the DoT,

challenged the impugned judgment on some fundamental grounds.

Appeals have also been filed by “outsiders”- the Resolution

Professionals of Reliance Telecom Limited (RTL) and Reliance

Communication Limited (RCOM), contending that the findings of the

NCLAT would have a direct bearing on, and adversely affect, the

adjudication of the pending applications seeking approval of the

resolution plans under the IBC.

III.Submissions of the Learned Counsels:

11.Submission on behalf of TSPs and financial institutions: Ld.

Sr. Counsel Rakesh Dwivedi, appearing on behalf of the State Bank of

India representing the CoC, submitted that the impugned judgment of

the NCLAT proceeds on fundamentally inconsistent premises and is

13

contrary to the scheme, object and overriding mandate of the IBC.

Further, Ld. Sr. Counsel Shyam Divan, appearing for the erstwhile

Resolution Professional, and Mr. Gopal Jain, Ld. Sr. Counsel appearing

for the Resolution Professional of RCOM and RTL, advanced substantial

submissions, all of which can be articulated as follows:

11.1The NCLAT adopted inconsistent conclusions. Having held that

spectrum usage rights constitute an intangible asset of the corporate

debtor and that DoT dues are operational in nature, it nevertheless

concluded that spectrum cannot be utilised unless past dues are cleared

and that such dues survive the CIRP. These findings rest on mutually

destructive premises and cannot co-exist within the scheme of the Code.

11.2 Having accepted that spectrum usage rights are assets and that

DoT is an operational creditor, the NCLAT erred in relying upon the

Tripartite Agreement and the Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015 to

accord preferential treatment to DoT. This results in elevation of one

operational creditor over others, contrary to the pari passu treatment

mandated by Sections 30 and 53 of the Code.

11.3Telecom licences, together with the right to use spectrum for a

defined term, constitute valuable intangible assets of the corporate

debtor. While spectrum remains a sovereign resource, the grant of a

licence upon payment of consideration creates a legally enforceable

right of commercial exploitation. The Tripartite Agreement and the

14

Spectrum Trading Guidelines themselves recognise the transferability

and encumbrance of such rights, subject to regulatory approval.

11.4Once treated as assets of the corporate debtor, the licence and

spectrum usage rights fall within the exclusive domain of the insolvency

framework. During CIRP, all assets vest in the custody of the resolution

professional for preservation and value maximisation. Their treatment

under a resolution plan lies within the commercial wisdom of the CoC

and is immune from judicial reappraisal except on limited statutory

grounds.

11.5By virtue of Section 238, the Code prevails over any inconsistent

contractual or statutory instrument. To the extent that the UASL, the

Tripartite Agreement or the Spectrum Trading Guidelines impose

conditions inconsistent with the resolution process or the binding effect

of an approved plan, they must yield to the Code. Judicial precedent

consistently affirms that an approved resolution plan overrides prior

contractual and statutory claims.

11.6Once DoT’s dues are admitted as operational debt, their treatment

stands crystallised and can be governed only by the approved resolution

plan. Conditioning post-resolution use or transfer of spectrum on

clearance of residual pre-CIRP dues amounts to an impermissible

reordering of priorities outside the statutory waterfall and violates

Sections 30(2)(b) and 31. DoT, having filed its claims and not challenged

15

their classification before the NCLT, is estopped from contending

otherwise

11.7Secured lenders hold valid and subsisting security interests under

the loan and mortgage documents executed by the corporate debtors.

The NCLAT failed to give effect to these instruments and, in substance,

subordinated secured creditor rights by according priority to DoT dehors

the IBC, contrary to the legislative scheme of insolvency resolution.

11.8The NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing payment of

“requisite dues” as a precondition for use or transfer of spectrum. The

IBC vests all commercial decisions, including creditor treatment and

value distribution, in the collective wisdom of the CoC. Judicial

interference on equitable or regulatory considerations amounts to an

impermissible substitution of such wisdom, contrary to the law laid down

in K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank

4

and Committee of Creditors

Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta

5

.

11.9A clear demarcation must be maintained between DoT’s role as

regulator and its position as creditor. While regulatory powers may be

exercised prospectively in accordance with law, pre-CIRP dues resolved

under an approved plan cannot be revived under the guise of regulation.

The moratorium under Section 14 protects critical operating assets,

4 2019 (12) SCC 150.

5 2020 (8) SCC 531.

16

including spectrum usage rights, and bars enforcement of past claims

during CIRP and plan implementation.

12.Submissions on behalf of DoT/Union of India: Ld. Attorney

General R. Venkataramani, assisted by Ld. ASG Vikramjit Banerjee

assailed the impugned judgment of the NCLAT insofar as it holds that

spectrum constitutes an intangible asset of the corporate debtor

amenable to insolvency proceedings, that DoT dues are operational

debts, and that spectrum usage rights or licences are transferable under

the Code, 2016.

12.1Spectrum is a scarce and finite natural resource owned by the

people of India, with legal title vesting exclusively in the Union of India,

which holds it in trust for the public. Licensees acquire no proprietary

interest in spectrum. The doctrine of public trust, as consistently affirmed

by this Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India

6

, as

well as Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No.1 of

2012

7

, governs its allocation and use.

12.2The grant of spectrum under a licence does not effect a transfer of

property or title. It confers only a limited, conditional and revocable

privilege to use spectrum, subject to statutory requirements, licence

conditions and overriding public interest. The NCLAT, therefore, erred in

6 (2012) 3 SCC 1.

7 (2012) 10 SCC 1.

17

treating spectrum usage rights as assets of the licensee/corporate

debtor capable of transferred in insolvency or liquidation.

12.3Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1885 vests exclusive privilege in

the Union to establish and operate telecommunication systems and to

grant licences on such terms and payments as it determines. The

licence, though contractual in form, emanates from sovereign statutory

power and does not create proprietary rights. Judicial precedents,

including AUSPI (II) (Supra), reiterate the State’s obligation to retain

control over spectrum and secure fair value for its use.

12.4The Notice Inviting Applications for spectrum auctions issued on

28.09.2012 and the Tripartite Agreement expressly clarify that licensees

acquire only a right to use spectrum and that transfer, renewal or

continuation remains subject to satisfaction of dues and compliance with

licence conditions. The rights of lenders are subordinate to sovereign

control and cannot override statutory mandates.

12.5Treating spectrum as an asset of the corporate debtor is

inconsistent with Explanation to Section 18 and Section 36(4)(a)(iv) of

the Code, which exclude assets not owned by the debtor and contractual

arrangements conferring only a right of use. The resolution professional

cannot assume control over spectrum, which is neither owned nor

transferable as property by the licensee.

18

12.6DoT dues do not fall within the definition of “operational debt”

under Section 5(21) of the Code. Licence fees and spectrum usage

charges arise from the grant of a sovereign privilege and represent

regulatory consideration, not payment for goods or services. The

relationship between the Union and the licensee is that of sovereign

licensor and licensee, not a commercial creditor-debtor relationship.

Treating such dues as operational debt would permit insolvency

proceedings to undermine statutory and regulatory control over natural

resources.

12.7Alternatively, if right to use spectrum is held to be constituting

asset of the TSPs, then DoT would fall within ambit of “financial creditor”

since the definition of “financial debt” under Section 5(8) hinges on the

concept of time value of money. The right to use spectrum was granted

on a deferred payment basis, forming the very foundation of the TSPs

entitlement to use such spectrum. The deferment of consideration, in

exchange for the right to use a resource of enduring value, therefore

partakes the character of a financial arrangement, and such liability is

appropriately classifiable as a financial debt.

12.8The summation of the submissions is hence that TSPs does not

“own” spectrum either in law or in fact, nor do they have absolute

possession. What they hold is a limited, a case specific, and conditional

right to use spectrum. The combined effect of the Telegraph Act, public

19

trust doctrine, judicial precedents, Tripartite Agreements and statutory

exclusions under Sections 18 and 36 of the IBC unequivocally

establishes that spectrum cannot form part of the assets of the corporate

debtor capable of transfer during CIRP or liquidation.

IV.Nature of Spectrum and the Constitutional Framework

Governing the Natural Resources:

A.Spectrum as a Finite Natural Resource:

13.In simple terms, spectrum may be understood as an invisible

rainbow of radio waves enabling wireless services such as phone calls,

television signals, Wi-Fi, and 5G internet. Physical science describes it

as the electromagnetic spectrum, encompassing the full range of

electromagnetic frequencies from radio waves to gamma rays. Spectrum

refers to a range of radio frequencies used for wireless communications,

such as mobile calls and internet services. The radio spectrum, which is

a finite portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, is particularly suited for

wireless communication. The electromagnetic spectrum is a finite, non-

renewable resource comprising frequencies ranging from extremely low

frequency (ELF) waves to gamma rays. The portion of spectrum usable

for wireless communications is inherently limited due to several factors

such as; (a) propagation characteristics, as different frequencies exhibit

varying propagation properties affecting their suitability for specific

applications, (b) interference, including co-channel and adjacent-channel

20

interference, which restricts the number of users that can share the

same frequency band, and (c) technological limitations, since existing

technology cannot efficiently utilise all frequencies, rendering certain

bands impractical for use.

13.1The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialised

agency of the United Nations responsible for global telecommunications

regulation, divides the world into three regions, each with specified

frequency allocations. The ITU has allocated various spectrum bands to

India for mobile telecommunications, satellite-based services, and other

applications such as broadcasting. The spectrum needs of our fast-

growing economy has been projected to be around 2000 MHz by 2030.

This is said to be far below the needs of defense, telecommunications

and other sectors. In CPIL (Supra), this Court explained spectrum as;

“77. Spectrum has been internationally accepted as a scarce,

finite and renewable natural resource which is susceptible to

degradation in case of inefficient utilization. It has a high

economic value in the light of the demand for it on account of

the tremendous growth in the telecom sector. Although it does

not belong to a particular State, right of use has been granted

to the States as per international norms.”

14.Beyond its technical description, spectrum has consistently been

recognized as a public resource and it is precious also for the reason

that it is finite and limited.

B.Concept of ownership over natural resources and its

Constitutional Underpinnings:

21

15.Dealing with spectrum as a limited natural resource, this Court in

CPIL Case (Supra) had the occasion to deal with ownership and control

of the natural resource in the following terms;

“74. …Natural resources belong to the people but the State

legally owns them on behalf of its people and from that point of

view natural resources are considered as national assets, more

so because the State benefits immensely from their value.

75. The State is empowered to distribute natural resources.

However, as they constitute public property/national asset while

distributing natural resources the State is bound to act in

consonance with the principles of equality and public trust and

ensure that no action is taken which may be detrimental to

public interest. Like any other State action, constitutionalism

must be reflected at every stage of the distribution of natural

resources….”

16.Applying the doctrine of public trust, recognized in M. C. Mehta v.

Kamal Nath

8

this Court held that spectrum as a natural resource of the

nation is administered by the Central Government as a Trustee. In a

nuanced approach, this position was reaffirmed by the Constitution

Bench in Natural Resources Allocation, In re (Supra) by holding that

while the State may adopt different modalities of allocation, it cannot part

with the natural resource when the policy of the State is not supported

by social or welfare purpose.

“149. …Alienation of natural resources is a policy decision,

and the means adopted for the same are thus, executive

prerogatives. However, when such a policy decision is not

backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and

scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits

of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means

other than those that are competitive and maximise revenue

8 (1997) 1 SCC 388.

22

may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the

Constitution. Hence, rather than prescribing or proscribing a

method, we believe, a judicial scrutiny of methods of disposal

of natural resources should depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case, in consonance with the principles

which we have culled out above. Failing which, the Court, in

exercise of power of judicial review, shall term the executive

action as arbitrary, unfair, unreasonable and capricious due to

its antimony with Article 14 of the Constitution.”

17.The constitutional framework reinforces this understanding by

mandating that the ownership and control of this material resource of the

community be so distributed as best to subserve the common good.

Constitution obligates the State to ensure that access to and use of such

resource is regulated in a transparent, non-discriminatory manner, so

that, its benefit enure to the benefit of the nation, rather than being

treated as objects of private ownership or unfettered commercial

exploitation. This position is clear from the following passage in CPIL

(Supra);

“75. … while distributing natural resources the State is bound

to act in consonance with the principles of equality and public

trust and ensure that no action is taken which may be

detrimental to public interest. Like any other State action,

constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of the

distribution of natural resources. In Article 39(b) of the

Constitution it has been provided that the ownership and

control of the material resources of the community should be

so distributed so as to best subserve the common good, but no

comprehensive legislation has been enacted to generally

define natural resources and a framework for their

protection….”

23

V.Statute, Policy and Contractual Framework Governing

Spectrum Allocation, Licensing and Use

A.Statutory Framework of Spectrum:

18.The Statutory regime governing spectrum is conceptualized in the

above referred constitutional principle and it is reflected in Section 4

9

of

the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Spectrum is vested and secured in the

custody of the Central Government not as a property but as the

exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and operating

telecommunication systems, and for granting licences. In Union of India

v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India

10

this Court,

has interpreted Section 4 in the following manner:

“37. A bare perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the

Telegraph Act shows that the Central Government has the

exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and working

telegraphs. This would mean that only the Central Government,

and no other person, has the right to carry on

telecommunication activities.

9 4. Exclusive privilege in respect of telegraphs, and power to grant licenses.— [(1)] Within

[India], the Central Government shall have the exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining and

working telegraphs:

Provided that the Central Government may grant a license, on such conditions and in

consideration of such payments as it thinks fit, to any person to establish, maintain or work a

telegraph within any part of [India]:

[Provided further that the Central Government may, by rules made under this Act and

published in the Official Gazette, permit, subject to such restrictions and conditions as it thinks fit, the

establishment, maintenance and working—

(a) of wireless telegraphs on ships within Indian territorial waters [and on aircraft within or

above [India], or Indian territoral waters], and

(b) of telegraphs other than wireless telegraphs within any part of [India].]

[Explanation.—The payments made for the grant of a licence under this subsection shall

include such sum attributable to the Universal Service Obligation as may be determined by the

Central Government after considering the recommendation made in this behalf by the Telecom

Regulatory Authority of India established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Telecom Regulatory

Authority of India Act, 1997 (24 of 1997)]…

10 (2011) 10 SCC 543. (Hereinafter, ‘AUSPI (I)’)

24

38. Interpreting the expression “exclusive privilege” of the State

Government under the State Excise Act to sell liquor, this Court

has held in State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal.

11

“13. … The fact that the Government was the seller

does not change the legal position once its exclusive

right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the

Government is the exclusive owner of those

privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14

becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any

fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the

properties or rights belonging to the Government—

nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the

Government tries to get the best available price for its

valuable rights.”

This position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Har

Shankar v. Excise & Taxation Commr.

12

and in subsequent

decisions of this Court.

39. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph

Act, however, enables the Central Government to part with this

exclusive privilege in favour of any other person by granting a

licence in his favour on such conditions and in consideration of

such payments as it thinks fit. As the Central Government owns

the exclusive privilege of carrying on telecommunication

activities and as the Central Government alone has the right to

part with this privilege in favour of any person by granting a

licence in his favour on such conditions and in consideration of

such terms as it thinks fit, a licence granted under the proviso

to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act is in the

nature of a contract between the Central Government and the

licensee.

40. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v.

Devans Modern Breweries Ltd.

13

relying on Har Shankar case

14

and Panna Lal v. State of Rajasthan

15

has held in para 121 at

p. 106 that issuance of liquor licence constitutes a contract

between the parties. Thus, once a licence is issued under the

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, the

licence becomes a contract between the licensor and the

licensee. Consequently, the terms and conditions of the licence

11 [(1972) 2 SCC 36] : (SCC p. 44, para 13)

12 [(1975) 1 SCC 737]

13 [(2004) 11 SCC 26]

14 [(1975) 1 SCC 737]

15 [(1975) 2 SCC 633]

25

including the definition of adjusted gross revenue in the licence

agreement are part of a contract between the licensor and the

licensee. We have to, however, consider whether the

enactment of the TRAI Act in 1997 has in any way affected the

exclusive privilege of the Central Government in respect of the

telecommunication activities and altered the contractual nature

of the licence granted to the licensee under the proviso to sub-

section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act.”

19.It is important to note that the exclusive privilege of the Central

Government under Section 4, enabling it to grant a license, subject to

such terms and conditions, specifically include payments towards of

Universal Service Obligations (USO). Section 9-D also empowers the

Central Government to establish and administer the Universal Service

Obligation Fund. Following this the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India

(TRAI) has formulated guidelines for utilization of funds for the specified

purposes. The purpose of referring to these provisions is to indicate that

the monies received towards parting with the privilege of exploiting

spectrum under Section 4 is intended to be ploughed back for

subserving the common good.

B.The Successive Telecom Policies including unbundling of

licensing spectrum allocation

20. Until the early 1990s, the establishment, operation and

maintenance of telecommunication services in India were the exclusive

preserve of the Union of India. A decisive shift occurred with the

announcement of the 24

th

July 1991 Economic Policy, pursuant to which

telecommunication sector progressively opened to private participation.

26

The liberalization process was institutionalized with the announcement of

the New Telecom Policy, 1994, under which licences were granted for

Cellular Mobile Telephone Services and Basic Telephone Services,

along with paging services across various cities and circles. These

licences were bundled with spectrum and awarded through a competitive

tendering process. However, the financial and operational challenges

faced by licensees under the fixed-fee regime prompted a re-evaluation

of policy.

20.1The New Telecom Policy, 1999 formulated following a

comprehensive review, marked a paradigm shift from a fixed licence fee

model to a revenue-sharing regime. Existing licensees were permitted to

migrate to the new framework, with licence fees linked to a percentage

of AGR, and licences standardized to a 20-year term.

21.In furtherance of the Telecom Policy, Parliament also enacted the

Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997. Relevant portion of the

preamble, as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons, indicating the

need to establish a telecom regulator is extracted below for ready

reference:

“An Act to provide for the establishment of the Telecom

Regulatory Authority of India and the Telecom Disputes

Settlement and Appellate Tribunal to regulate the

telecommunication services, adjudicate disputes, dispose of

appeals and to protect the interests of service providers and

consumers of the telecom sector, to promote and ensure

27

orderly growth of the telecom sector and for matters connected

therewith or incidental thereto.

Statement of Objects and Reasons.—In the context of the

National Telecom Policy, 1994, which amongst other things,

stresses on achieving the universal service, bringing the quality

of telecom services to world standards, provisions of wide

range of services to meet the customers demand at reasonable

price, and participation of the companies registered in India in

the area of basic as well as value added telecom services as

also making arrangements for protection and promotion of

consumer interest and ensuring fair competition, there is a felt

need to separate regulatory functions from service providing

functions which will be in keeping with the general trend in the

world. In the multi-operator situation arising out of opening of

basic as well as value added services in which private operator

will be competing with Government operators, there is a

pressing need for an independent telecom regulatory body for

regulation of telecom services for orderly and healthy growth of

telecommunication infrastructure apart from protection of

consumer interest.”

22.The interplay between the power coupled with obligations of the

Union with respect to licensing on the one hand and jurisdiction of TRAI

to regulate the telecom sector is succinctly explained in AUSPI (I)

(Supra) as follows:

“41.Section 2(e) of the TRAI Act quoted above defines

“licensee” to mean any person licensed under sub-section (1)

of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act for providing specified public

telecommunication services and Section 2(ea) defines

“licensor” to mean the Central Government or the telegraph

authority who grants a license under Section 4 of the Telegraph

Act. Sub- section 2(k) defines “telecommunication service” very

widely so as to include all kinds of telecommunication activities.

These provisions under the TRAI Act do not affect the

exclusive privilege of the Central Government to carry on

telecommunication activities nor do they alter the contractual

nature of the license granted under the proviso to sub-section

(1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act.

28

43.These provisions in the TRAI Act show that

notwithstanding sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph

Act vesting exclusive privilege in the Central Government in

respect of telecommunication activities and notwithstanding the

proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Telegraph Act

vesting in the Central Government the power to decide on the

conditions of license including the payment to be paid by the

licensee for the license, TRAI has been conferred with the

statutory power to make recommendations on the terms and

conditions of the licence to a service provider and the Central

Government was bound to seek the recommendations of TRAI

on such terms and conditions at different stages, but the

recommendations of TRAI are not binding on the Central

Government and the final decision on the terms and conditions

of a license to a service provider rested with the Central

Government. The legal consequence is that if there is a

difference between TRAI and the Central Government with

regard to a particular term or condition of a license, as in the

present case, the recommendations of TRAI will not prevail and

instead the decision of the Central Government will be final and

binding.

44. In contrast to this recommendatory nature of the

functions of TRAI under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section

11 of the TRAI Act, the functions of TRAI under clause (b) of

sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act are not

recommendatory. This will be clear from the very language of

clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act

which states that TRAI shall discharge the functions

enumerated under sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (ix) under clause (b)

of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act. Under clause

(c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act, TRAI

performs the function of levying fees and other charges in

respect of different services and under clause (d) of sub-

section (1) of Section 11, the Central Government can entrust

to TRAI other functions. These functions of TRAI under clauses

(c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act are

also not recommendatory in nature. That the functions of TRAI

under clause (a) are recommendatory while the functions of

TRAI under clauses (b), (c) and (d) are not recommendatory

will also be clear from provisos first to fifth which refer to the

recommendations of TRAI under clause (a) of sub-section (1)

of Section 11 of the TRAI Act and not to clauses (b), (c) and (d)

of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act.

29

45. The scheme of the TRAI Act therefore is that TRAI being

an expert body discharges recommendatory functions under

clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act and

discharges regulatory and other functions under clauses (b), (c)

and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act. TRAI

being an expert body, the recommendations of TRAI under

clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the TRAI Act have

to be given due weightage by the Central Government but the

recommendations of TRAI are not binding on the Central

Government. On the other hand, the regulatory and other

functions under clauses (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of

Section 11 of the TRAI Act have to be performed independent

of the Central Government and are binding on the licensee

subject to only appeal in accordance with the provisions of the

TRAI Act.”

23.Further, structural reforms were followed with the introduction of

the Unified Access Services Licensing regime in 2003, pursuant to which

basic and cellular services were unified within service areas. Licensees

were given the option to migrate to the unified regime while retaining

their existing spectrum allocations, subject to revised licensing terms.

This reflected a move towards technological neutrality and operational

flexibility within a regulated framework.

24.A more fundamental change was introduced under the National

Telecom Policy, 2012, which consciously “de-linked” spectrum from

licensing. The shift was not one of relinquishment of control but of

restructuring the method through which the State would discharge its

obligations of securing the best price for spectrum by enabling private

participation in the development of telecom industry. Even after spectrum

being unbundled with licence and private enterprise permitted to develop

30

spectrum for provisioning services, the fundamental principle of Central

Government being the licensor under Section 4 continues. In AUSPI (II)

(Supra), this Court held that the State has a duty to obtain fair value for

natural resources and to ensure compliance with licence conditions. It

was observed that;

“86. DoT has urged that the Central Government has exclusive

privilege under Section 4 of the Telegraph Act; thus, it is bound

to get the best price for natural resources. To part with the

exclusive privilege under the revenue-sharing regime is

extremely beneficial to the licensees. Thus, the State must get

the price for its valuable right as mandated under Article 14. In

our opinion, there is no doubt that the State is a trustee of the

natural resources and is obliged to hold it for the benefit of the

citizens but also to ensure equal distribution to subserve the

common good as observed under Article 39 of the Constitution

of India in Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special

Reference No. 1 of 2012 [Natural Resources Allocation, In re,

Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1] . The

Government being the sole repository of all the resources in

the country, also has the exclusive power to determine the

licence conditions at which it parts with the exclusive right to

the resources. The Government has to make an effort to get

the best price for its valuable rights and cannot throw them

away, and there would be no arbitrariness in the same as

observed in State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal.”

C. Guidelines for Trading of Access Spectrum by Access Service

Providers, 2015

25.Telecom Policy envisioned liberalization of spectrum to enable use

of spectrum in any band to provide any service in any technology as well

as to permit spectrum pooling. Following recommendations of TRAI,

Government also permitted spectrum trading to enable optimal utilization

of these material resources through appropriate regulatory framework.

31

This also facilitates ease of doing business in India by allowing free play

in the commercial decisions and leads to optimization of resources apart

from improving the spectral efficiency and quality of service. It is apt to

provide the perspective in which the Guidelines for Spectrum Trading

were issued. It is necessary refer to a portion of recommendation made

by TRAI;

“1.1 Historically, the use of radio spectrum has been highly

regulated. In most countries, the regulator has used command

and control mechanism to decide the allocation of spectrum.

However, over the past two decades, there has been a growing

consensus that because of a significant increase in the

demand for spectrum, the hitherto prevalent regulatory

paradigm would prove inadequate to deal with the situation in

hand. Spectrum license holders, needed flexibility to respond

quickly to changes in market demand and technology; the old

paradigm would only result in inefficient use of available

spectrum and creation of artificial scarcity. This is why

policymakers and regulators worldwide have devoted their

attention to new ways of spectrum regulation with an increasing

emphasis on evolving more flexible and market oriented

models to increase opportunities for efficient spectrum usage.

Spectrum managers are following diverse approaches for

sharing frequencies viz. spectrum sharing, spectrum leasing,

spectrum trading, as well as unlicensed spectrum combined

with the use of low power radios or advanced radio

technologies including ultra wideband and multi-model radios.

1.2 Spectrum trading contributes to a more economical and

efficient use of frequencies. This is because a trade will only

take place if the spectrum is worth more to the new user than it

was to the old user, reflecting the greater economic benefit the

new user expects to derive from its use. It allows the present

user to decide when and to whom the spectrum authorisation

will be transferred and what sum it will receive in return. The

market, not the regulator, determines the value. Spectrum

trading makes it possible for companies to expand more

quickly than would otherwise be the case. It also makes it

easier for a new market entrant to acquire spectrum in order to

enter the market.

32

1.7 The Authority also observed that consolidation could also

be facilitated by allowing market forces to operate i.e. by

permitting spectrum trading as it allows far more specific and

targeted reallocations of spectrum than can be reached

through M&A activity. A TSP holding spectrum that is paid for

but in excess of its current requirements would then be able to

directly trade these holdings with another TSP which requires

additional spectrum for its operations. This would help to

ensure optimal allocative efficiency of this limited natural

resource, making the sector as a whole better off in the

bargain. Clarity on the policy framework with regard to

spectrum trading would help to unlock the full potential value of

spectrum that was proposed to be auctioned.”

16

26.Accordingly, the Guidelines for Trading of Access Spectrum, issued

in 2015, enabled transfer of the right to use spectrum between a seller

and a buyer, while expressly prohibiting leasing. Such trading is confined

between licensees and is permissible only upon prior intimation of 45

days to the DoT. Guidelines No. 10, 11 and 12, relevant for our purpose

are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:

“10. Both the licensees shall also give an undertaking that they

are in compliance with all the terms and conditions of the

guidelines for spectrum trading and the license conditions and

will agree that in the event, it is established at any stage in

future that either of the licensee was not in conformance with

the terms and conditions of the guidelines for spectrum trading

or/and of the license at the time of giving intimation for trading

of right to use the spectrum, the Government will have the right

to take appropriate action which inter-alia may include

annulment of trading arrangement.

11. The seller shall clear all its dues prior to concluding any

agreement for spectrum trading. Thereafter, any dues

recoverable up to the effective date of trade shall be the liability

of the buyer. The Government shall, at its discretion, be entitled

to recover the amount, if any, found recoverable subsequent to

16 Recommendations on Working Guidelines for Spectrum Trading; (accessible at:

https://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-11/Recommendation_Spectrum_28012014.pdf)

33

the effective date of trade, which was not known to the parties

at the time of the effective date of trade, for the buyer or seller,

jointly or severally. The demands, if any, relating to licenses of

seller, stayed by the Court of Law, shall be subject to outcome

of decision of such litigation.

12.Where an issue, pertaining to the spectrum proposed to

be transferred is pending adjudication before any court of law,

the seller shall ensure that its rights and liabilities are

transferred to the buyer as per the procedure prescribed under

the law and any such transfer of spectrum will be permitted

only after the interest of the Licensor has been secured.”

27.A plain reading of the Spectrum Trading Guidelines demonstrates

that the Central Government, as Licensor, has retained comprehensive

supervisory and corrective control over spectrum trading. Guideline 10

expressly reserves to the Government the power to take appropriate

action, including annulment of a trading arrangement, where

undertakings furnished by the seller or buyer at the stage of prior

intimation are found to be false, misleading, incomplete, or not in

conformity with the Spectrum Trading Guidelines or the licence

conditions. This power is not confined to scrutiny at the threshold but

also extends to subsequent discovery of non-compliances. The

Guideline thus safeguards the Government’s role as licensor, controlling

access to spectrum at every time. Guideline 11 further reinforces this

control by mandating that all outstanding dues of the seller be cleared

prior to conclusion of any spectrum trading agreement, and by

transferring liability for dues arising up to the effective date of trade to

the buyer thereafter. Significantly, it vests discretion in the Government

34

to recover any subsequently discovered dues from either or both parties,

jointly or severally. These provisions collectively establish that spectrum

trading is not a private commercial arrangement, but a part of the

privilege vested in the Central Government under Section 4. Trading is

conditional subject to adherence to financial and regulatory obligations

owed to the State.

28.When these guidelines are read conjointly with the terms of the

Licence Agreement, it becomes manifest that absolute control over the

licence and spectrum vests with the Licensor, namely the DoT. The

licence, though granted for a fixed term, is subject to revocation,

suspension, or termination on enumerated grounds, including non-

payment of dues, public interest, or security considerations. The

Licensee has no independent right to assign or transfer the licence or

create third-party interests without prior written consent of the Licensor.

Any transfer or assignment is permissible only upon fulfillment of

prescribed conditions, foremost among them being complete clearance

of past dues by the transferor and an undertaking by the transferee to

discharge future liabilities. Clause 6 of the Licence Agreement, read with

Guidelines 10 and 11, places an embargo on any transfer or spectrum

trading where dues remain unpaid or consent is procured on the basis of

non-conforming undertakings. Even where transfer is sought pursuant to

a Tripartite Agreement with lenders, the Licensor’s approval remains

35

conditional upon strict compliance with contractual and regulatory

procedures. Consequently, where consent for spectrum trading or

licence transfer is obtained on the basis of incorrect or non-compliant

undertakings, the Government is statutorily empowered to annul the

arrangement. The obligation to clear dues prior to trading is absolute,

and default by either seller or buyer disqualifies them from effecting a

valid transfer, including under insolvency proceedings.

29.Guideline 12 does not dilute this position. Its plain language

indicates that where spectrum is subject to dispute in a pending

litigation, the seller must ensure that all rights and liabilities are

transferred to the buyer as per the prescribed procedure. The forum

before which an “issue pertaining to the spectrum proposed to be

transferred is pending adjudication”, cannot be the adjudicatory authority

or the NCLAT under IBC. The Spectrum Trading Guidelines cannot be

overridden or substituted by the insolvency resolution framework. Dues

payable to the Licensor, which must be cleared prior to spectrum trading,

cannot be relegated to treatment under a Resolution Plan. While a

licence and allocation of spectrum may, in abstract terms, constitute an

intangible asset, it is always subject to the telecommunication laws of the

nation, viz. the Telegraph Act, 1885, Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1993 and

the TRAI Act, 1997, followed by the rules, regulations, guidelines

including contractual obligations arising thereunder. A defaulting seller or

36

buyer, failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of the

Spectrum Trading Guidelines, cannot indirectly seek modification of

telecom dues by applying for corporate insolvency resolution process.

30.The Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015 are not mere executive

instructions but draw their legitimacy and enforceability from out of the

province of telecommunication laws and the regulatory framework within

which licenses are issued and operated. The conditions stipulated

therein, including those relating to eligibility, prior approvals, clearance of

dues and transfer restrictions, are mandatory and binding on all

licensees and transferees. The use, transfer or trading of spectrum is

permissible only in strict conformity with the Guidelines, and any

deviation would amount to a breach of licence conditions, the statute

and its policy. The operation of the laws concerning telecommunications

governing spectrum trading cannot be overridden or bypassed on the

basis of an interpretation adopted to the expression “asset” and its

treatment as also Section 238 of IBC. We have clarified and explained

this position in more detail in later part of our judgment.

D. Spectrum Licenses and Contract:

31.Having examined the telecommunication laws, the subordinate

legislation, including the rules, regulations and guidelines that govern

37

spectrum, we will now proceed to refer to the provisions of the contract,

that is, the license and also the tripartite agreement.

32.In Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Union of India

17

this Court had an occasion

to examine the provisions of the license agreement as a contract in the

context of the Government parting with the privilege of dealing with

spectrum under Section 4 of the Telegraph Act. It clarified that a license

granted under Section 4 is, in form, a contract between the licensor and

the licensee. However, the Court simultaneously emphasised that such a

contract is not an ordinary commercial agreement. It emanates from a

statutory grant of sovereign privilege and is indelibly shaped by

constitutional and public law obligations. The Court asked the right

question as to – what are the obligations of the licensor and answered it

in terms of private and public law perspective, or, arising under the

contract or the Constitution. It has been held that;

“37. The question which requires examination is — What are

the obligations of the licensor on receipt of such an

application? The obligations of the licensor flow from two

sources, (i) from the contract, (ii) from the Constitution of India

and the relevant provisions of the statute (Indian Telegraph Act,

1885). In the event of any conflict between the said two sets of

obligations, the further question would be which one of the

conflicting obligations prevail?

39. However, the licensor being the Union of India, its

discretion to stipulate terms and conditions is regulated by

certain constitutional mandates apart from stipulations of any

law applicable.

17 (2015) 12 SCC 1.

38

41. The licensor/Union of India does not have the freedom to

act whimsically. As pointed out by this Court in 2G Case

18

in the

above-extracted paragraph, the authority of the Union is

fettered by two constitutional limitations: firstly, that any

decision of the State to grant access to natural resources,

which belong to the people, must ensure that the people are

adequately compensated and, secondly, the process by which

such access is granted must be just, non-arbitrary and

transparent, vis-à-vis private parties seeking such access.

42. By a statutory declaration made under Section 4 of the

Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, it is declared that the Government

of India shall have the exclusive “privilege for establishing,

maintaining and working telegraphs” (which includes

telephones). The proviso to Section 4 of the said Act authorises

the Government of India to grant licence to establish, maintain

and work telegraphs (which includes telephones) “on such

conditions and in consideration of such payments” as it thinks

fit. Telephones include both wired and wireless telephones like

cellular mobile phones, the establishment and working of which

necessarily requires access to spectrum which again is

controlled by the Government of India as it is already declared

to be a natural resource by this Court. It can thus, be seen that

no person other than the Government of India has any right to

establish, maintain and work telephones. It is the exclusive

privilege of the Government of India, which could be permitted

to be exercised by others by a grant from the Government of

India.

43. In other words, such licences are in the nature of largesse

from the State. No doubt, the authority of the State to distribute

such largess is always subject to the condition that the State

must comply with the conditions of Article 14 of the Constitution

i.e. the distribution must be on the basis of some rational policy.

Even the language of the proviso to Section 4 of the Telegraph

Act, which stipulates that the grant of licence should be “on

such conditions and in consideration of such payments as it

thinks fit”, must necessarily be understood that the conditions

must be rational and the payments forming the consideration

for the grant of licence must be non-discriminatory. The

conditions contained in the licences in question stipulate that

the term of the licence could be extended on mutually agreed

terms, if the Government of India deems it expedient. The

obligations of the Government of India flowing from the

Constitution as well as a statute necessarily require the

18 Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1.

39

Government of India to grant licences as rightly pointed by the

Tribunal (TDSAT) only “in public interest and for public good”.

48. The conditions of licences/contracts in whatever language

provided for consideration for the extension of a licence are

necessarily required to be interpreted in consonance with the

obligation of the licensor/Union of India under the Constitution

and the laws. Otherwise, the contract would be rendered void

for being inconsistent with public policy, the principle expressly

incorporated under Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872.”

33.The distinction drawn in Bharti Airtel (Supra) is crucial; while the

licence has contractual attributes, the licensor’s powers and obligations

do not arise solely from contract. They flow concurrently from the

Constitution and the statute. In the event of conflict, obligations flowing

from constitutional and statutory mandate necessarily prevail over

contractual stipulations. Spectrum access, as explained in Bharti Airtel

(Supra), is in the nature of State largesse. While such largesse must be

distributed in conformity with Article 14, ensuring fairness, transparency

and adequate compensation to the public, it does not translate into

transfer of ownership or creation of proprietary rights in favour of the

licensee. The grant of a telecom licence, including the right to use

spectrum, does not effect a transfer of ownership or proprietary interest.

What is conferred is a limited, conditional and revocable privilege to use

spectrum for specified purposes and for a defined duration.

34.It is undisputed that TSPs, including the Aircel entities, participated

and emerged as successful bidders, thereby obtaining the right to use

spectrum upon payment of consideration. The relationship is governed

40

by UASL dated 05.12.2006 executed between the DoT and Aircel Ltd.

The licence was granted by the Government in exercise of its exclusive

privilege under Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, to provide

Unified Access Services in the specified service area. The grant was

non-exclusive, subject to payment of licence fees and strict compliance

with the terms and conditions stipulated therein. The licensee

unequivocally undertook to comply with all contractual obligations,

acknowledging that the grant conferred only a regulated right to use

spectrum and not any proprietary interest therein.

35.The terms of the Licence Agreement unequivocally restrict the

autonomy of the licensee in dealing with the licence or spectrum. Clause

6 prohibits assignment, transfer, sub-licensing, partnership, or creation of

any third-party interest without prior written consent of the licensor.

Clause 6.3 carves out a limited exception permitting transfer or

assignment only upon fulfilment of stringent conditions, including

compliance with eligibility criteria, adherence to the Tripartite Agreement

where applicable, and complete clearance of all past dues by the

transferor, coupled with an undertaking by the transferee to discharge

future liabilities. The licence further imposes operational and regulatory

obligations on the licensee, including timely rollout of services, furnishing

of information to the Licensor and TRAI, and prohibition on dealing with

entities whose licences stand suspended or terminated. Clause 10 vests

41

in the Licensor the power to suspend, revoke, or terminate the licence,

inter alia, for breach of conditions, non-payment of dues, public interest,

or security considerations, upon issuance of notice. These provisions

underscore that continuation of the licence is contingent upon ongoing

compliance with contractual and statutory obligations.

36.A cumulative reading of the Licence Agreement leaves no manner

of doubt that effective and pervasive control over the licence and

spectrum vests with the Licensor notwithstanding the fixed tenure of the

licence and payment of consideration. The licensee’s rights are

circumscribed by regulatory oversight, disclosure obligations, restrictions

on transfer, and the ever-present power of the Licensor to suspend or

terminate the licence for breach, liquidation, or winding up of the

licensee. The licence does not confer an unfettered or absolute right, but

merely a conditional and defeasible permission to use spectrum, which

remains subject to statutory control under the Telegraph Act and the

regulatory framework administered by TRAI. The ability of the Licensor

to withhold consent, impose conditions, and enforce compliance

demonstrates that the licensee’s interest is limited and subordinate to

statutory and regulatory imperatives of telecommunication laws. The

ownership, particularly as a trustee of the natural resource, by the

Licensor, coupled with the power to suspend or terminate the licence for

default in payment or performance, negates any claim of proprietary

42

ownership in the licensee. Where the licensee has defaulted in payment

of licence fees or failed to perform its obligations, the very substratum of

its right to use spectrum stands impaired.

E.Tripartite Agreement:

37.As we realised that the operation of our economic system to

distribute material resources of the community could well be subserved

through the participation of private enterprise, it became compelling to

involve the financial institutions also. In furtherance of the successive

telecom policies, to develop the telecommunication sector, DoT

collaborated with TSPs and financial institutions. This collaboration is

evidenced in the large number of Tripartite Agreements. One such

agreement governs the contractual relationship between DoT, the

corporate debtor and the State Bank of India, all three are appellants

and respondents before us. We will now proceed to examine the

implications of the Tripartite Agreement, details of which were shown to

us by Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi appearing for the State Bank of India.

38.The Tripartite Agreement executed between the DoT, the TSP and

the Bank is a contractual mechanism devised to enable TSPs to secure

financial assistance and also to protect the interests of the Bank

(Lender). Under this Agreement, the DoT agrees, in principle, to transfer

or assign the licence by endorsement in favour of a “Selectee” identified

43

by the Lender, subject to the DoT’s final and binding approval. That the

Lenders themselves are expressly barred from operating the licensed

services reinforces the principle that the licence remains a regulated

privilege rather than a freely alienable asset.

39.The Agreement enables the licence to be treated as security for

financial assistance advanced to the TSPs, permitting transfer or

assignment only in the event of default and strictly in accordance with its

terms. Upon occurrence of a default, duly notified by the Agent acting on

behalf of the Lenders, and failure of the TSP to cure such default within

the stipulated period, the Lenders are empowered to invite and negotiate

bids for takeover and transfer of the project along with all its assets,

including the licence, to a Selectee who must assume all liabilities and

obligations of the Licensee towards the Licensor. Even where the

Licensor elects to transfer the licence to a person other than the

Selectee, the Agreement mandates due consideration of both the

Licensor’s and the Lenders’ outstanding dues. In the event no Selectee

is found, the licence stands terminated, and the assets of the defaulting

Licensee are to be disposed of, with the Licensor enjoying first charge

over the proceeds, followed by adjustment of Lenders’ dues, and any

residual amount reverting to the Licensee. The Agreement thus

underscores that while the licence may be conditionally transferable to

44

safeguard lender interests, such transfer remains subject to the

Licensor’s paramount authority and regulatory control.

VI.The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

A.First principles

40. IBC sought to fundamentally restructure the manner in which

insolvency proceedings are undertaken in India, in response to the

evident inadequacies of the earlier statutory regime governing

insolvency and bankruptcy, which had proved ineffective in delivering

timely and meaningful outcomes. The Code, therefore, brought together

the disparate insolvency laws into a unified legislative framework. It is

anchored in a set of core principles, including expeditious resolution

aimed at preservation and maximisation of economic value, reduction of

information asymmetry between debtors and creditors, certainty in the

order of priority for discharge of liabilities, and decision-making

autonomy of stakeholders in commercial matters, subject to overarching

legislative design and judicial supervision of the process.

19

41.Capturing the core principles of the Code, 2016, this Court in

Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India

20

noted;

“27. … The Code is first and foremost, a Code for

reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate debtors.

Unless such reorganisation is effected in a time-bound manner,

the value of the assets of such persons will deplete. Therefore,

19 Government of India, Report: Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (Ministry of Finance, November

2015).

20 (2019) 4 SCC 17.

45

maximisation of value of the assets of such persons so that

they are efficiently run as going concerns is another very

important objective of the Code. This, in turn, will promote

entrepreneurship as the persons in management of the

corporate debtor are removed and replaced by entrepreneurs.

When, therefore, a resolution plan takes off and the corporate

debtor is brought back into the economic mainstream, it is able

to repay its debts, which, in turn, enhances the viability of credit

in the hands of banks and financial institutions. Above all,

ultimately, the interests of all stakeholders are looked after as

the corporate debtor itself becomes a beneficiary of the

resolution scheme – workers are paid, the creditors in the long

run will be repaid in full, and shareholders/investors are able to

maximise their investment. Timely resolution of a corporate

debtor who is in the red, by an effective legal framework, would

go a long way to support the development of credit markets.

Since more investment can be made with funds that have

come back into the economy, business then eases up, which

leads, overall, to higher economic growth and development of

the Indian economy. What is interesting to note is that the

Preamble does not, in any manner, refer to liquidation, which is

only availed of as a last resort if there is either no resolution

plan or the resolution plans submitted are not up to the mark….

28. It can thus be seen that the primary focus of the legislation

is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by

protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and

from a corporate death by liquidation. The Code is thus a

beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back on

its feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors. The

interests of the corporate debtor have, therefore, been

bifurcated and separated from that of its promoters/those who

are in management. Thus, the resolution process is not

adversarial to the corporate debtor but, in fact, protective of its

interests….”

42. Hence, the scope and ambit of IBC is to speed up the process

providing for insolvency

21

, and achieving maximisation of value of the

asset of the entity undergoing CIRP.

B.Difficulty in Expecting NCLAT to rule on Spectrum

21 Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407.

46

43.Before we proceed to analyse the applicability of the Code, 2016

to the matter concerning telecommunication, we may first indicate the

difficulty which the NCLAT faced in answering the questions referred to it

by this Court. We may recall that this Court was hearing appeals against

the judgment of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal

(TDSAT) with respect to the liability of TSP’s to pay licence fees

calculated on the basis of Annual Gross Revenues. Having finally

decided the controversy in calculating the licence fee in AUSPI (II), this

Court sought to ensure that TSP’s remit the outstanding DoT dues

expeditiously. It is in that context that the present controversy was raised

by some TSP’s by submitting that they had invoked proceedings under

IBC to corporate insolvency resolution and as such payments cannot be

recovered due to moratorium. Taking note of this unusual plea, this Court

formulated certain fundamental questions and asked NCLAT to give its

opinion on the fundamental question about applicability of IBC for

recovering telecom dues.

44.Expecting a statutory appellate authority under the IBC to answer

issues about applicability of IBC has its own problems. Though tribunals

constituted by statutes will exercise that much of jurisdiction as is

empowered by the statute, they have primary duty to examine and

determine a “jurisdictional fact.” However, the perspective in which the

statutory tribunals could examine the matter would be limited for more

47

than one reason. It has fallen upon us to examine the matter

independently by posing probing questions to the Ld. Attorney General

and the Senior Counsels assisting us. We have no hesitation to say that

they have risen to occasion and have rendered invaluable assistance.

C.Implications of Treating Spectrum as an Asset by

TSPs/Corporate Debtor and the Financial Institutions

45.Allocation of spectrum to TSPs, coupled with the policy to permit

trading of spectrum has given rise to the spectrum being treated as an

asset in the hands of TSPs. The expression “asset” pervades the

contractual terms and this is the sheet anchor of the TSPs/corporate

debtor and the Bank to contend that spectrum as an asset can be

restructured only through IBC and no other law. A nuanced argument is

advanced that there is no transfer of ownership at all and that its

ownership continues to vest in DoT. It is only in the context of

restructuring the asset, that the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP)

takes control of it and processes it as per the provisions of the IBC. This

is legitimate and inevitable for the reason that spectrum is an intangible

asset, thereby triggering the application of the special statute, the IBC,

which operates notwithstanding any other law to the contrary. Whether

the recognition of spectrum as an asset in the books of account of the

licensee/TSP, the corporate debtor, would also be the asset falling for

48

reconstruction under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is

therefore an issue for our consideration.

46. As per Section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 the financial

statements shall give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the

company and comply with the accounting standards as notified under

Section 133 of the Act by the Central Government on the

recommendation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

22

47.TSPs recognise spectrum licensing rights as an intangible asset in

their balance sheet in compliance with the Accounting Standards (AS).

AS 26 on Intangible Assets which inter alia applies to rights under

licensing agreements, defines an intangible asset as an identifiable non-

monetary asset, without physical substance, held for use in the

production or supply of goods or services, rental, or for administrative

purposes.

23

Para 6.1 of AS 26 is as follows:

“6.1 An intangible asset is an identifiable non-monetary asset,

without physical substance, held for use in the production or

supply of goods or services, for rental to others, or for

administrative purposes.”

48.The elements of the definition of intangible assets under AS 26 are

as follows:

24

a)Identifiability – Asset is separable if it can be distinguished from

goodwill and can be used to rent, sell, exchange or distribute future

22 Section 129(1) and Section 133, Companies Act, 2013.

23 Para 6.1 , ICAI.

24 Paras 8, 11-13, 14-17 and 18 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI.

49

economic benefits specific to it. However, separability is not a

necessary condition for identifiability as long as the entity can

identify the asset in some other way

b)Control: It indicates the power to obtain and restrict access to the

future economic benefits from the resource through enforceable

legal rights. However, legal enforceability of rights is not a

necessary condition for exercising control

c)Future Economic Benefits (FEB): It may include revenue from the

sale of products or services, cost savings, or other benefits resulting

from the use of the asset by the enterprise

49.Similar elements of identifiability, control over resources and flow

of future economic benefits are also provided in the definition of

intangible assets under Indian Accounting Standard,

25

Ind AS 38.

26

50.Spectrum licensing rights are identifiable as they are separable

and can be sold, transferred, licensed, or exchanged, either individually

or together with the underlying contract. They arise from legal rights by

way of government auctions or assignment. They confer power on TSPs

to obtain economic benefits by providing telecom services and raise

loans under tripartite agreements with the Bank and Dept. of Telecom.

TSP’s can also restrict access to such economic benefits based on the

exclusivity conferred on them through the terms of the license. Hence,

25 (Ind AS).

26 Paras 8, 10, 11-12, 13-16 and 17 , ICAI.

50

TSPs exercise control over the licensing rights. The expectation of future

economic benefits from the licensing rights is also probable as TSPs

develop infrastructure under the state policy and provide telecom

services to the public. Thus, the spectrum licensing rights satisfy all the

ingredients of an intangible asset.

51.To recognise an intangible asset in the financial statements, the

recognition criteria has to be met, i.e., probable flow of future economic

benefits attributable to the asset, and reliable measurement of the cost

of the asset. The recognition provided in AS 26 and Ind AS 38 is the

same.

27

The recognition criteria as per AS 26 is reproduced below:

“19. The recognition of an item as an intangible asset requires

an enterprise to demonstrate that the item meets the:

(a) definition of an intangible asset (see paragraphs 6-18); and

(b) recognition criteria set out in this Standard (see paragraphs

20-54).

20. An intangible asset should be recognised if, and only if:

(a) it is probable that the future economic benefits that are

attributable to the asset will flow to the enterprise; and

(b) the cost of the asset can be measured reliably.”

52.The probability of future economic benefits is to be assessed using

reasonable and supportable assumptions that represent the best

estimate of the set of economic conditions over its useful life.

28

Further,

an intangible asset should be measured initially at cost.

29

There are

different methods for the acquisition of intangible assets, including:

30

27 Paras 19-23 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI and Paras 18-24 Indian Accounting Standard 38,

ICAI.

28 Para 21 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI and Para 22 Indian Accounting Standard 38, ICAI.

29 Para 23 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI and Para 24 Indian Accounting Standard 38, ICAI.

30 Paras 24-26, 27-32, 33, and 34 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI and Paras 25-32, 33-43, 44

and 45-47 Indian Accounting Standard 38, ICAI.

51

a)Separate Acquisition; or

b)Acquisition by way of government grants.

53.In the case of a separate acquisition, the price that the entity pays

normally reflects expectations of future economic benefits satisfying the

probability prong of the recognition criteria. Further, the cost of such an

asset can be measured reliably comprising its purchase price, non-

refundable duties and taxes and any directly attributable expenditure for

making the asset ready for its intended use.

31

54.Spectrum licensing represents a grant of right to use spectrum by

the Government by way of transfer or administrative allocation. As

discussed above, the flow of future economic benefits is probable due to

its revenue-generating capacity from the provision of telecom services.

Further, licensing rights are auctioned for a price or are administratively

assigned for a licence fee. The cost of a spectrum licence can thus be

measured reliably under the separate acquisition method comprising the

acquisition cost (auction price or licence fee), non-refundable duties and

taxes and any expenditure incurred to make the asset ready for its

intended use. As the recognition criteria is satisfied, TSPs record

spectrum licensing as an intangible asset in their balance sheet.

55.It is to be noted that the understanding of assets in the context of

accounting standards is different from the traditional understanding of

31 Paras 24-26 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI and Paras 25-32 Indian Accounting Standard 38,

ICAI.

52

property, as in the case of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the

Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which indicate title or ownership in the property

or goods. In Accounting Standards, asset is defined as a resource

controlled by an enterprise from which future economic benefits are

expected to flow.

32

Para 6.2 of AS 26 on the definition of asset is

reproduced below:

“6.2 An asset is a resource: (a) controlled by an enterprise as a

result of past events; and (b) from which future economic

benefits are expected to flow to the enterprise.”

56.Thus, AS 26 and Ind AS 38 recognise intangible assets if the

aspect of control over economic benefits is satisfied and the cost can be

measured reliably. Ownership is not recognised as an essential condition

to recognise an asset in the balance sheet. This is also clarified by the

Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements

in accordance with Ind AS.

33

This Framework is not a standard and does

not override any specific standards. However, it sets out the concepts

that underlie the preparation and presentation of financial statements

and guides the formulation of Ind AS.

34

Para 57 of the Framework is

extracted below:

“57. Many assets, for example, receivables and property, are

associated with legal rights, including the right of ownership. In

determining the existence of an asset, the right of ownership is

not essential; thus, for example, property held on a lease is an

asset if the entity controls the benefits which are expected to

32 Para 6.2 Accounting Standard (AS) 26, ICAI and Para 8, Indian Accounting Standard 38, ICAI.

33 Para 57,

34 Paras 1-4 .

53

flow from the property. Although the capacity of an entity to

control benefits is usually the result of legal rights, an item may

nonetheless satisfy the definition of an asset even when there

is no legal control. For example, know-how obtained from a

development activity may meet the definition of an asset when,

by keeping that know-how secret, an entity controls the

benefits that are expected to flow from it.”

57. Similar criteria are also provided in the New Conceptual

Framework titled Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting under

Indian Accounting Standards (Ind AS), 2020 (‘Conceptual Framework’).

35

It defines an asset as a present economic resource controlled by the

entity as a result of past events that has the potential to produce

economic benefits.

36

Control is described as that which links an

economic resource to the entity.

37

An entity thus controls an economic

resource if it has the present ability to direct the use of the economic

resource and obtain the economic benefits that may flow from it.

38

The

example given in Para 4.19 of the Conceptual Framework on the aspect

of ownership is reproduced below:

“… For example, an entity may control a proportionate share in

a property without controlling the rights arising from ownership

of the entire property. In such cases, the entity’s asset is the

share in the property, which it controls, not the rights arising

from ownership of the entire property, which it does not

control.”

58. This indicates that recognition of spectrum licensing rights as an

intangible asset in the balance sheet is not determinative of

35 The Conceptual Framework is applicable w.e.f. 01.04.2020 for standard setting activity and w.e.f.

01.04.2021 for preparing financial statements.

36 Paras 4.3-4.5 and 4.9 Conceptual Framework, 2020, ICAI.

37 Para 4.19, Conceptual Framework, 2020, ICAI.

38 Para 4.20, Conceptual Framework, 2020, ICAI.

54

recognition/transfer of ownership of the spectrum to TSPs. It only

indicates control over the future economic benefits flowing from the grant

of the right to use the spectrum. Hence, even if the right to use spectrum

exhibits property-like features such as longer licensing terms, exclusivity,

transferability, tradability, etc., they merely represent different sticks in

the bundle of rights and falls short of conferring complete ownership of

the spectrum on TSPs.

39

59.IBC explicitly excludes from the scope of insolvency and liquidation

framework, assets over which corporate debtor does not have ownership

rights. The legislative intent can be traced back to the Bankruptcy

Legislative Reforms Committee Report, 2015, on which the IBC is

based. The Report in Para 5.5.5, in the context of assets in liquidation,

clarifies that not all assets that are present within the entity can be

considered for liquidation and it excludes assets held as a part of

operational transactions, where the entity has rights over the assets but

not the ownership.

60.The IRP under section 18(f) of IBC, shall take control and custody

of assets, including intangible assets over which the corporate debtor

39 An analogy can also be drawn to Section 301 of the Communications Act, 1934, as amended by

the Telecom Act, 1996 in the United States, which provides that a radio licence confers the right to use

the licence for limited periods but does not confer ownership. It further provides that such a license

does not confer any rights beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license, indicating the

restrictive nature of the right. Section 301 of the Telecommunication Act is reproduced:

“Sec. 301. [47 U.S.C. 301] license for radio communication or transmission of energy:

It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to maintain the control of the United States

over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but

not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by

Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the

terms, conditions, and periods of the license…..””

55

has ownership rights as recorded in the balance sheet.

40

Explanation to

Section 18 specifically provides that for the purpose of this section,

assets shall not include those assets owned by a third party but are in

possession of the corporate debtor held under trust or under other

contractual agreements.

41

Relevant portion of Section 18(f) is

reproduced below:

“18. Duties of interim resolution professional.—The interim

resolution professional shall perform the following duties,

namely

….

(f) take control and custody of any asset over which the

corporate debtor has ownership rights as recorded in the

balance sheet of the corporate debtor, or with information utility

or the depository of securities or any other registry that records

the ownership of assets including—

(i) assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership rights

which may be located in a foreign country;

(ii) assets that may or may not be in possession of the

corporate debtor;

(iii) tangible assets, whether movable or immovable; (iv)

intangible assets including intellectual property;

Explanation.—For the purposes of this [section], the term

“assets” shall not include the following, namely:—

(a) assets owned by a third party in possession of the

corporate debtor held under trust or under contractual

arrangements including bailment;

(b) assets of any Indian or foreign subsidiary of the corporate

debtor; and

(c) such other assets as may be notified by the Central

Government in consultation with any financial sector regulator.”

(emphasis supplied)

61.Similar provisions are also contained in Section 36(3) of the Code

in relation to the liquidation estate. Section 36(4) provides that the

40 Section 18(f), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

41 Explanation to Section 18, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

56

liquidation estate shall exclude assets owned by a third party in

possession of the corporate debtor, including under other contractual

arrangements which do not stipulate transfer of title but only the use of

the assets.

42

Section 36(3) and (4) are reproduced as;

“36. Liquidation Estate

(3) Subject to sub-section (4), the liquidation estate shall

comprise all liquidation estate assets which shall include the

following:—

(a) any assets over which the corporate debtor has ownership

rights, including all rights and interests therein as evidenced in

the balance sheet of the corporate debtor or an information

utility or records in the registry or any depository recording

securities of the corporate debtor or by any other means as

may be specified by the Board, including shares held in any

subsidiary of the corporate debtor;

(b) assets that may or may not be in possession of the

corporate debtor including but not limited to encumbered

assets;

(c) tangible assets, whether movable or immovable;

(d) intangible assets including but not limited to intellectual

property, securities (including shares held in a subsidiary of the

corporate debtor) and financial instruments, insurance policies,

contractual rights;

(e) assets subject to the determination of ownership by the

court or authority;

(f) any assets or their value recovered through proceedings for

avoidance of transactions in accordance with this Chapter;

(g) any asset of the corporate debtor in respect of which a

secured creditor has relinquished security interest;

(h) any other property belonging to or vested in the corporate

debtor at the insolvency commencement date; and

(i) all proceeds of liquidation as and when they are realised.

(4) The following shall not be included in the liquidation estate

assets and shall not be used for recovery in the liquidation:—

(a) assets owned by a third party which are in possession of the

corporate debtor, including—

(i) assets held in trust for any third party;

(ii) bailment contracts;

(iii) all sums due to any workman or employee from the

provident fund, the pension fund and the gratuity fund;

42 Section 36(4)(iv), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

57

(iv) other contractual arrangements which do not stipulate

transfer of title but only use of the assets;”

(emphasis supplied)

62.Hence, IBC includes only those tangible or intangible assets within

the insolvency framework over which the Corporate Debtor has

ownership rights, including all rights and interests therein as recorded in

the Balance Sheet.

63.In conclusion, the framework of IBC is clear in excluding assets

over which the corporate debtor has no ownership rights. Mere

recognition of spectrum licensing rights as an intangible asset by TSPs

in the Financial Statements is not conclusive of their ownership, as it

only represents control over future economic benefits. Even assuming

that licensing of spectrum rights is one among the bundle of rights, in the

absence of transfer of title over the spectrum, no ownership rights are

created in TSPs either in the spectrum or in its right to use as governed

by licensing conditions. Hence, under the IBC framework, spectrum

licensing rights is not a part of the pool of assets for insolvency or

liquidation.

VII.Identification of True Legal Province of Spectrum:

Reconciliatory Interpretation of Two Statutory Regimes

64. When confronted with a situation where two statutory enactments

appear to operate in conflict, this Court is enjoined to interpret the

concerned legislations in a manner that gives effect to both, to the extent

58

such reconciliation is reasonably possible. Only where such harmonious

construction is not feasible does the Court proceed to determine which

enactment must prevail. Conflicts of this nature may arise either between

a general statute and a special statute, or between two statutes each

possessing a special character. Over time, this Court has evolved settled

principles to guide the resolution of such inter se inconsistencies which

are as;

(I) Where two enactments are attracted to the same factual matrix, the

initial inquiry must be directed towards determining whether either

statute is general or special in relation to the subject-matter in issue.

This determination is not made in the abstract, but by examining the

dominant subject-matter of the statute, viewed through the prism of its

legislative intent. An enactment may, depending on the context, operate

as a general law for certain purposes and as a special law for others.

The optimal outcome is achieved where each statute is allowed to

function within its designated sphere, without trenching upon the field

occupied by the other.

43

Bearing this in mind, the provisions of both

43 LIC of India v. DJ Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315. Relevant paragraph is as follows:

“52. In determining whether a statute is a special or a general one, the focus must be

on the principal subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be

general and for certain other purposes it may be special and we cannot blur distinctions when dealing

with finer points of law. In law, we have a cosmos of relativity, not absolutes — so too in life….

57. What is special or general is wholly a creature of the subject and context and may

vary with situation, circumstances and angle of vision. Law is no abstraction but realises itself in the

living setting of actualities. Which is a special provision and which general, depends on the specific

problem, the topic for decision, not the broad rubric nor any rule of thumb. The peaceful coexistence

of both legislations is best achieved, if that be feasible, by allowing to each its allotted field for play.

Sense and sensibility, not mechanical rigidity gives the flexible solution……”

59

enactments must be scrutinised to assess whether they can be

construed in a manner that permits harmonious construction.

44

(II) Where it is evident that one enactment is intended to function as a

special law governing a defined subject, while the other is a general law

operating in a broader or overlapping domain, the established principle

embodied in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies. In

such circumstances, the general provision must give way to the special

provision.

45

(III) In an eventuality where the contestation is between two special

enactments, both having non-obstante clauses, the general rule is that

later enactment must prevail over the earlier one.

46

(IV) However, this is not an absolute rule. In the event of a conflict

between two special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would

have to be analyzed to ascertain which one should prevail over the

other. The primary effort of the interpreter must be to harmonise, not

44 Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 76. Relevant paragraph is as fllows:

“10. While determining the question whether a statute is a general or a special one,

focus must be on the principal subject-matter coupled with a particular perspective with reference to

the intendment of the Act….”

45 State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai Danabhai, (1979) 3 SCC 347; Commercial Tax Officer,

Rajasthan v. Binani Cements Ltd., (2014) 8 SCC 319; Vodafone Idea Cellular Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar

Agarwal, (2022) 6 SCC 496.

46 Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Shri Kasturi Lal, (1977) 1 SCC 750. Relevant portion of the judgment is as

follows:

“20…..When two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non-

obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and incisive

problems of interpretation arise. Since statutory interpretation has no conventional protocol, cases of

such conflict have to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under

consideration….

21. For resolving such inter se conflict, one other test may also be applied though the

persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which combine to give a fair meaning to the

language of the law. That test is that the later enactment must prevail over the earlier one…..”

60

excise.

47

Hence, where both the enactments have the non obstante

clause then in that case, the proper perspective would be that one has to

see the subject and the dominant purpose for which the special

enactment was made and in case the dominant purpose is covered by

that contingencies, then notwithstanding that the Act might have come at

a later point of time still the intention can be ascertained by looking to

the objects and reasons.

48

65. This Court’s decision in Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd.

v. State of Karnataka

49

is a case in point to put substance into the view

that the jurisdiction of authorities under the Code, 2016 must take a

backseat when the same is in conflict with public law. One of the issues

before the Court in Embassy Property (Supra) was with respect to

Adjudicating Authority’s power to question and decide upon State

Government’s decision, in exercise of its powers under the Mines and

Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,1957, rejecting extension of

mining lease. In unequivocal terms, this Court held that where the

47 S. Vanitha vs Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District & Ors. (2021) 15 SCC 730. Relevant

portion of the judgment is as follows:

“34…Principles of statutory interpretation dictate that in the event of two special acts

containing non obstante clauses, the later law shall typically prevail. In the present case, as we have

seen, the Senior Citizen’s Act 2007 contains a non obstante clause. However, in the event of a

conflict between special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would have to be analyzed to

ascertain which one should prevail over the other. The primary effort of the interpreter must be to

harmonise, not excise….”

48 Bank of India v. Ketan Parekh, (2008) 8 SCC 148. Relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:

“28. …But cases might arise where both the enactments have the non obstante

clause then in that case, the proper perspective would be that one has to see the subject and the

dominant purpose for which the special enactment was made and in case the dominant purpose is

covered by that contingencies, then notwithstanding that the Act might have come at a later point of

time still the intention can be ascertained by looking to the objects and reasons...”

49 (2020) 13 SCC 308.

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dispute relates to the exercise of statutory or sovereign power by the

State, particularly in matters involving public interest and natural

resources, such issues fall outside the domain of the insolvency

adjudicatory framework. In Embassy Property, this Court emphasised

that IBC cannot be invoked to usurp or neutralise powers vested in the

State under special statutes, nor can insolvency proceedings be used to

compel the State to act contrary to its statutory obligations. The

jurisdiction of the NCLT and NCLAT is confined to matters that arise

purely within the insolvency framework and does not extend to

adjudicating the legality of sovereign actions. The following observations

of this Court in Embassy Property (supra) lucidly explain why matters

involving exercise of sovereign and statutory powers lie outside the

insolvency adjudicatory framework and are reproduced hereinbelow:

“11. It is beyond any pale of doubt that the IBC, 2016 is a

complete code in itself. As observed by this Court

in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank

50

[it is an exhaustive

code on the subject-matter of insolvency in relation to

corporate entities and others. It is also true that the IBC, 2016

is a single Unified Umbrella Code, covering the entire gamut of

the law relating to insolvency resolution of corporate persons

and others in a time-bound manner. The Code provides a

three-tier mechanism, namely, (i) the NCLT, which is the

adjudicating authority, (ii) the NCLAT, which is the appellate

authority, and (iii) this Court as the final authority, for dealing

with all issues that may arise in relation to the reorganisation

and insolvency resolution of corporate persons. Insofar as

insolvency resolution of corporate debtors and personal

guarantors are concerned, any order passed by the NCLT is

appealable to NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC, 2016 and the

50 (2018) 1 SCC 407.

62

orders of the NCLAT are amenable to the appellate jurisdiction

of this Court under Section 62…..

29. Therefore as rightly contended by the learned Attorney

General, the decision of the Government of Karnataka to

refuse the benefit of deemed extension of lease, is in the public

law domain and hence the correctness of the said decision can

be called into question only in a superior court which is vested

with the power of judicial review over administrative action. The

NCLT, being a creature of a special statute to discharge certain

specific functions, cannot be elevated to the status of a

superior court having the power of judicial review over

administrative action…..

40. If NCLT has been conferred with jurisdiction to decide all

types of claims to property, of the corporate debtor, Section

18(1)(f)(vi) would not have made the task of the interim

resolution professional in taking control and custody of an

asset over which the corporate debtor has ownership

rights, subject to the determination of ownership by a court or

other authority. In fact an asset owned by a third party, but

which is in the possession of the corporate debtor under

contractual arrangements, is specifically kept out of the

definition of the term “assets” under the Explanation to Section

18. This assumes significance in view of the language used in

Sections 18 and 25 in contrast to the language employed in

Section 20. Section 18 speaks about the duties of the interim

resolution professional and Section 25 speaks about the duties

of resolution professional. These two provisions use the word

“assets”, while Section 20(1) uses the word “property” together

with the word “value”. Sections 18 and 25 do not use the

expression “property”. Another important aspect is that under

Section 25(2)(b) of the IBC, 2016, the resolution professional is

obliged to represent and act on behalf of the corporate debtor

with third parties and exercise rights for the benefit of the

corporate debtor in judicial, quasi-judicial and arbitration

proceedings. Sections 25(1) and 25(2)(b) reads as follows:

“25. Duties of resolution professional.—(1) It shall be

the duty of the resolution professional to preserve and

protect the assets of the corporate debtor, including the

continued business operations of the corporate debtor.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the resolution

professional shall undertake the following actions:

(a) ***

(b) represent and act on behalf of the corporate debtor

with third parties, exercise rights for the benefit of the

63

corporate debtor in judicial, quasi-judicial and arbitration

proceedings;”

(emphasis supplied)

This shows that wherever the corporate debtor has to exercise

rights in judicial, quasi-judicial proceedings, the resolution

professional cannot short-circuit the same and bring a claim

before NCLT taking advantage of Section 60(5).

41. Therefore in the light of the statutory scheme as culled

out from various provisions of the IBC, 2016 it is clear that

wherever the corporate debtor has to exercise a right that falls

outside the purview of the IBC, 2016 especially in the realm of

the public law, they cannot, through the resolution professional,

take a bypass and go before NCLT for the enforcement of such

a right.

45. A lot of stress was made on the effect of Section 14 of

the IBC, 2016 on the deemed extension of lease. But we do not

think that the moratorium provided for in Section 14 could have

any impact upon the right of the Government to refuse the

extension of lease. The purpose of moratorium is only to

preserve the status quo and not to create a new right.

Therefore nothing turns on Section 14 of the IBC, 2016. Even

Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, 2016, which prohibits, during the

period of moratorium, the recovery of any property by an owner

or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the

possession of the corporate debtor, will not go to the rescue of

the corporate debtor, since what is prohibited therein, is only

the right not to be dispossessed, but not the right to have

renewal of the lease of such property. In fact the right not to be

dispossessed, found in Section 14(1)(d), will have nothing to do

with the rights conferred by a mining lease especially on a

government land. What is granted under the deed of mining

lease in ML 2293 dated 4-1-2001, by the Government of

Karnataka, to the corporate debtor, was the right to mine,

excavate and recover iron ore and red oxide for a specified

period of time. The deed of lease contains a schedule divided

into several parts. Part I of the Schedule describes the location

and area of the lease. Part II indicates the liberties and

privileges of the lessee. The restrictions and conditions subject

to which the grant can be enjoyed are found in Part III of the

Schedule. The liberties, powers and privileges reserved to the

Government, despite the grant, are indicated in Part IV. This

Part IV entitles the Government to work on other minerals

(other than iron ore and red oxide) on the same land, even

64

during the subsistence of the lease. Therefore, what was

granted to the corporate debtor was not an exclusive

possession of the area in question, so as to enable the

resolution professional to invoke Section 14(1)(d). Section

14(1)(d) may have no application to situations of this nature.”

66.The scope and ambit of IBC is to speed up the process providing

for insolvency

51

, and achieving maximisation of value of the asset of the

entity undergoing CIRP. The focus is on the company. On the other

hand, Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act and TRAI Act forms a

complete and exhaustive code for all matters relating to telecom sector.

This includes declaration of the nature of the rights and liabilities arising

out of holding and using spectrum. Powers of the Union includes

restructuring the telecom sector through policy decisions by introducing

reforms, provisioning bailout packages for stabilizing the sector,

prescribing conditions for grant of license, enabling treatment of

spectrum as an asset in the books of account of TSP to raise loans,

enable spectrum trading and power to prescribe consequence of failure

to pay the dues and also the power to recover the dues. The regulatory

jurisdiction for telecommunication sector through TRAI extends to

making recommendations to Union in the field enumerated in (i) to (viii)

of Section 11(1)(a) of the TRAI Act and to discharge the functions as laid

down in (i) to (ix) of Section 11(1)(b). Taken together, the Union as the

owner and trustee of spectrum on the one hand and TRAI as the

regulator on the other, occupy the entire province of telecommunications.

51 Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 407.

65

67.The statutory regime under IBC cannot be permitted to make

inroads into telecom sector and re-write and restructure the rights and

liabilities arising out of administration, usage, and transfers of spectrum

which operate under exclusive legal regime concerning

telecommunications. The disharmony caused by applying IBC to the

telecom sector which operates under a different legal regime was never

intended by the Parliament.

68.Statutory interpretation adopted by the corporate debtors for

applying IBC to the material resource of the nation, the spectrum by

referring to it as an asset in its books of account, the License Agreement,

Tripartite Agreement, or the Spectrum Trading Guidelines is like the tail

wagging the dog. Statutory interpretation cannot be based on a myopic

approach of reading the definition clauses out of its context. Merely

because spectrum can be treated as an “asset” on the basis of certain

attributes, such as possession and usage, lease and assignment, claim

and liability or credit and debt, the entirety of the telecom sector cannot

be brought under the sweep of IBC. The two statutes have different

subjects to deal with, different purposes to subserve, different laws to

abide, protect different rights and create different liabilities. It is

necessary for the constitutional courts to recognise their respective

provinces and to ensure that they operate with harmony and without

conflict.

66

VIII. Conclusion:

69. For the reasons stated above;

(A) We hold that Spectrum allocated to TSPs and shown in their books

of account as an “asset” cannot be subjected to proceedings under

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

(B) Civil Appeal No. 1810 of 2021 filed by State Bank of India, Civil

Appeal No. 2227 of 2021 filed by (successful resolution applicant of

corporate debtor) UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., Civil Appeal No.

2263 of 2021 filed by the IRP of the corporate debtor/ M/s Aircel Group

entities, and Civil Appeal Nos. 4570 and 4571 of 2021 filed by the IRP of

RCOM and RTL respectively are dismissed.

(C) Civil Appeal No. 6546 of 2021 filed by Union of India, through

Department of Telecommunication is allowed in part.

(D) Parties shall bear their own costs.

………………………………....J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

………………………………....J.

[ATUL S. CHANDURKAR]

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 13, 2026

67

Description

Introduction: Unraveling the Conflict between IBC and Spectrum Rights

A recent landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India has brought clarity to a critical legal conundrum: the interplay between the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 and the unique nature of spectrum rights. This ruling, State Bank of India v. Union of India & Ors. (Civil Appeal No(S). 1810 of 2021), now available on CaseOn, definitively states that spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) cannot be subjected to insolvency proceedings under the IBC, even if reflected as an asset in their financial records.

At its heart, the case questioned whether TSPs, facing demands for license dues from the Department of Telecommunication (DoT), could invoke the IBC's moratorium for restructuring their assets, specifically the spectrum acquired through auctions. This inquiry necessitated a deep dive into the very definition and legal standing of spectrum—its ownership, possession, use, transfer, and assignment—and how these aspects interact with the insolvency framework.

The Core Issue: Spectrum Rights vs. IBC

The central legal challenge was multifaceted, stemming from the Aircel Group's failure to pay license fees and spectrum usage charges. When DoT sought recovery, the TSPs initiated voluntary Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the IBC, leading to a moratorium on debt recovery. This triggered fundamental questions that the Supreme Court had to address:

  • Is spectrum a natural resource held by the Union of India in public trust, and what are the legal implications?
  • Does the right to use spectrum, granted under Section 4 of the Telegraph Act, 1885, confer ownership or proprietary interest to TSPs, or is it a limited, conditional, and revocable privilege?
  • Can spectrum, or the right to use it, be classified as an “asset” of a corporate debtor under Section 18 of the IBC?
  • Are spectrum licenses or usage rights transferable in insolvency proceedings, especially when subject to governmental approval and clearance of past dues under Spectrum Trading Guidelines?
  • Can spectrum or usage rights be treated as a security interest for lenders, and if so, how can it be enforced under the IBC?
  • Does an approved resolution plan under the IBC override the requirements of the Spectrum Trading Guidelines, particularly regarding non-fulfillment of license conditions?

Unpacking the Legal Framework: The Rules Governing Spectrum

Spectrum: A Public Trust Resource

The Supreme Court reiterated that spectrum is a scarce, finite, and non-renewable natural resource. It belongs to the people of India, and the Union of India holds legal title to it as a 'Trustee.' The State's power to distribute natural resources is bound by constitutional principles of equality and public trust, ensuring that spectrum serves the common good, not just private commercial interests (referencing CPIL Case and Natural Resources Allocation, In re). This means its ownership and control, with all associated benefits, must ultimately be secured for the citizens.

The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885

Section 4 of this Act vests the exclusive privilege of establishing and operating telecommunication systems in the Central Government. While the Government can grant licenses on specific terms and conditions, these licenses, though contractual, originate from sovereign statutory power. They do not create proprietary rights for the licensees but rather confer a limited, conditional, and revocable privilege to use spectrum (as established in Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India).

Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015

These guidelines, introduced to optimize spectrum utilization, permit the transfer of 'right to use' spectrum between licensees. However, such trading is strictly conditional on prior intimation to DoT, compliance with all license conditions, and, crucially, the clearance of all outstanding dues by the seller before concluding any agreement. The Government maintains comprehensive supervisory and corrective control, including the power to annul trading arrangements if conditions are not met.

The Tripartite Agreement

To facilitate financial assistance for TSPs, agreements were often forged between DoT, TSPs, and financial institutions (Lenders). These agreements allowed the license to be treated as security. However, any transfer or assignment required DoT's final and binding approval. Critically, if a defaulting licensee's license was terminated and no 'Selectee' (new buyer) was found, the Licensor (DoT) retained the first charge over the proceeds from the disposal of assets, underscoring the subordination of lenders' rights to sovereign control.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

The IBC aims to resolve insolvency in a time-bound manner, maximizing asset value for corporate debtors. However, the Code explicitly excludes assets over which the corporate debtor does *not* have ownership rights from the insolvency and liquidation framework. The Explanation to Section 18 and Section 36(4)(a)(iv) clarify that assets owned by a third party, held in trust, or under contractual arrangements that do not stipulate transfer of title, are not part of the corporate debtor's assets for IBC purposes.

The Court's Analysis: Reconciling Conflicting Statutes

TSPs' “Asset” Claim vs. DoT's “Trustee” Role

TSPs argued that spectrum licensing rights, recognized as 'intangible assets' on their balance sheets per Accounting Standards (AS 26, Ind AS 38), should fall under the IBC. These standards define an asset based on 'control over economic benefits' and 'reliable measurement of cost,' without requiring legal ownership. However, the Court firmly rejected this, stating that mere accounting recognition of an intangible asset does not confer legal ownership or title. The 'right to use' spectrum, while valuable, remains a conditional privilege, not an absolute property right.

The Court emphasized that the DoT's dues, including license fees and spectrum usage charges, stem from its sovereign privilege and regulatory authority, not from a typical commercial creditor-debtor relationship. Treating these as mere 'operational debts' that could be wiped out by insolvency proceedings would undermine the State's statutory and regulatory control over a vital natural resource.

The Primacy of Telecom Laws

This case highlighted a conflict between two special statutes: the IBC (for insolvency) and the telecom laws (Telegraph Act, Wireless Telegraphy Act, TRAI Act). While the IBC contains a non-obstante clause (meaning it typically overrides other laws), the Court applied principles of harmonious construction. It determined that the telecom laws form a complete and exhaustive code governing the telecom sector, including spectrum allocation, usage, and transfer. This framework is driven by public interest and sovereign control over natural resources.

The Supreme Court relied on precedents like Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, stressing that the IBC cannot usurp or neutralize the State's sovereign powers under special statutes. The conditions for spectrum trading, particularly the mandatory clearance of dues, are not mere executive instructions but derive their enforceability from the overarching telecom regulatory framework. These cannot be overridden by an IBC resolution plan. The Court poetically described the TSPs' interpretation as 'the tail wagging the dog,' asserting that statutory interpretation cannot be myopic, especially when dealing with the nation's material resources. For legal professionals looking to understand the nuances of these rulings, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs provide an invaluable and concise way to grasp the specifics of such complex judgments quickly.

Conclusion of the Supreme Court

Based on these rigorous legal considerations, the Supreme Court delivered a definitive verdict:

(A) Spectrum allocated to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) and recorded as an “asset” in their books of account cannot be subjected to proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

(B) The appeals filed by State Bank of India, UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (successful resolution applicant), and the Interim Resolution Professionals of Aircel Group entities, RCOM, and RTL were dismissed.

(C) The Civil Appeal filed by the Union of India, through the Department of Telecommunication, was allowed in part.

(D) All parties are to bear their own costs.

Why This Judgment Matters: Insights for Legal Professionals and Students

This Supreme Court judgment is crucial for several reasons:

  • Clarifies Spectrum Status: It firmly establishes that spectrum is a public resource under the sovereign control of the Union of India, held in public trust, and any rights granted to TSPs are mere privileges to use, not outright ownership.
  • Limits IBC Scope: It delineates the boundaries of the IBC, preventing it from overriding sovereign and statutory powers concerning natural resources. This is a significant precedent for other sectors involving public resources.
  • Impact on Creditors: Financial creditors and resolution applicants must now understand that spectrum, despite being an intangible asset on balance sheets, cannot be treated as a typical asset for recovery or restructuring under the IBC if it involves sovereign rights and outstanding dues. The DoT's claims are prioritized due to its unique position as a licensor exercising sovereign power.
  • Statutory Interpretation: The judgment provides a masterclass in harmonious construction, demonstrating how courts reconcile conflicts between special statutes and identify the 'dominant purpose' of legislation.
  • Regulatory Authority: It reinforces the paramount authority of the DoT and the telecom regulatory framework, ensuring that compliance with license conditions and payment of dues remains non-negotiable for the continued use and transfer of spectrum.

For lawyers advising clients in the telecom sector, insolvency professionals, and students of constitutional and corporate law, this ruling offers invaluable insights into the complex interplay of property rights, sovereign powers, and statutory frameworks in India's dynamic economic landscape.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with qualified legal professionals for advice on specific legal issues.

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